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This article-based dissertation examines the involuntary role of Internet connectivity
providers in copyright enforcement in the EU, and in particular injunctions ordering
user-end providers to block access to websites facilitating infringement. The main
method is doctrinal legal scholarship supplemented by a socio-legal study of legal
policy, seeking answers to the ‘why’ questions underlying the law.
Copyright enforcement measures using providers include website blocking, dis-
connecting the website or the user, subscriber information disclosure, and notice or
graduated response mechanisms. There are also dozens of other options for enforce-
ment, and the IPR holder may select the optimal one(s). In international settings,
this can be further optimised by the choice of jurisdiction, the applicable law, and
characterisation of the infringement. These provide opportunities for ‘gaming the
system’.
Enforcement proceedings are problematic because typically only the copyright
holder and possibly the provider are represented in court. Nobody is responsible for
arguing for the users or website operators. The court should take their interests into
account on its own motion. Unfortunately, many courts have not yet recognised this
responsibility. Even this dual role as both the defender of unrepresented parties and
judge is less than ideal and improvement is called for.
All the enforcement mechanisms must be compatible with EU fundamental rights,
as well as the national ones. A proportionality evaluation procedure is suggested,
consisting of identifying the context, the interests of different parties, and applicable
principles as well as formulating the evaluation criteria and applying them in a
proportionality test. In the test, the legitimacy of the objective, suitability for the
purpose, necessity and balancing need to be critically assessed. The underlying goal of
copyright enforcement has implications for how the scale tilts. Ineffective enforcement
mechanisms can be more easily accepted if the goal of symbolic, educational or
politically motivated enforcement is deemed legitimate. However, if the goal is to
decrease the impact of infringement, greater efficiency and economically quantifiable
results may be required. A proportionate mechanism does not necessarily exist in any
particular case.
Current enforcement legislation is a product of heavy lobbying by the copyright
industry. This has led to the legislators being inundated with copyright ideology and
proprietarian bias. In consequence, the legislation fails to take the more general
public policy interests and the rights of others into account adequately. The pressure
is on rationalising rather than expanding the role of connectivity providers. This
background context also calls for a critical approach to interpreting the law. Such
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As the importance of the Internet has grown, there has also been an increasing
tendency to oblige intermediaries to perform web filtering and aid in enforcing public
policies and the rights of other persons. This has concerned intellectual property rights
infringement, defamation, gambling, extremism, child abuse, and other objectionable
content. The targeted intermediaries have been, inter alia, social media networking
services, auction websites, search engines, and hosting and connectivity providers.1
Since intermediaries are typically faultless third parties with respect to the dispute
between right holders and infringers, passive or neutral intermediaries are generally
exempt from liability within varying constraints.2 To balance the lack of liability,
a court may issue an injunction stopping or preventing a specific infringement.3
1 See eg Patrick Van Eecke, ‘Online service providers and liability: A plea for a balanced approach’
(2011) 48 CMLR 1455, 1461, 1497–1501; Uta Kohl, ‘The rise and rise of online intermediaries in
the governance of the Internet and beyond – connectivity intermediaries’ (2012) 26 IRLCT 185,
192–93, 200. See also Arno Lodder and Nicole van der Meulen, ‘Evaluation of the Role of Access
Providers: Discussion of Dutch Pirate Bay Case Law and Introducing Principles on Directness,
Effectiveness, Costs, Relevance, and Time’ (2013) 4 JIPITEC 130, paras 3, 5, 10, 57; Etienne
Montero and Quentin van Enis, ‘Enabling freedom of expression in light of filtering measures
imposed on Internet intermediaries: Squaring the circle?’ (2011) 27 CLSR 21, 22; OECD, The Role
of Internet Intermediaries in Advancing Public Policy Objectives: Forging partnerships for advancing
policy objectives for the Internet economy, part II (DSTI/ICCP(2010)11/FINAL, 2011) 30–84;
UNESCO, Fostering Freedom Online: The Role of Internet Intermediaries (2015) 19–25; Intellectual
Property Office, ‘International Comparison of Approaches to Online Copyright Infringement:
Final Report’ (9 February 2015) 〈https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-
comparison-of-approaches-to-online-copyright-enforcement〉 15–16.
2 Martin Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website Blocking’ (2013)
4 JIPITEC 116, paras 1, 18, 24; Søren Sandfeld Jacobsen and Clement Salung Petersen, ‘Injunctions
against mere conduit of information protected by copyright: A Scandinavian perspective’ (2011)
42 IIC 151; Kohl (n 1) 191; Lucas Feiler, ‘Website Blocking Injunctions under EU and U.S. Copyright
Law – Slow Death of the Global Internet or Emergence of the Rule of National Copyright Law?’
[2012] TTLF Working Papers 13, 45–46. On different models of intermediary liability, see UNESCO
(n 1) 40–43; Urs Gasser and Wolfgang Schulz, Governance of Online Intermediaries: Observations
From a Series of National Case Studies (The Berkman Center for Internet & Society Research
Publication Series 2015-5, 2015) 4–6.
3 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal
Market [2000] OJ L178/1, Arts 12–15. See also Van Eecke (n 1) 1464.
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The motivation for retaining some degree of actionability has been that the service
provider may be best placed to bring such infringing activities to an end.4 Further,
intermediaries may be irresistible from the regulatory perspective, because the in-
fringers may be too numerous or anonymous, or be located in other jurisdictions
beyond the reach of the legislator.5 On the other hand, broad liability for activities
that intermediaries cannot and need not control or monitor would result, inter alia, in
stifling of innovation, preventive censorship, and increased operating costs.6
IPR holders thus desire to leverage third parties in mitigating the infringement of
their rights. On the other hand, third parties want to avoid or limit such obligations,
which would also often be carried out at their own expense. In addition, user interests
in freedom of information and data protection are affected, and the rights of operators
of allegedly infringing services or innocent by-standing operators who are harmed
as collateral damage are also impacted. Beyond each of these, one can also identify
divergent public policy interests. This dilemma of finding balanced solutions in the
face of these conflicting rights forms the crux of the examination in this study.
This is an academic dissertation consisting of peer-reviewed publications and this
overview. The overview provides an analytical introduction, discussion and conclu-
sions in a forward-looking manner from selected perspectives. The six articles are
briefly summarised in Chapter 4. The approach has varied from from traditional doctri-
nal legal scholarship to socio-legal studies. Constitutional evaluation of fundamental
rights aspects has also been important.
This study is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 the objective and scope are
formulated. The methods, sources, and material, and research process questions are
also addressed. Chapter 3 describes the theoretical and practical foundations of this
study, including intermediaries as copyright enforcers, the impact of EU law and the
ECHR, the interests at stake, IPR enforcement principles, and the proportionality
evaluation procedure as a whole as a summary. Chapter 4 summarises the original
publications, in particular the key results, and analyses and develops further the
findings based on the foundations of the previous chapter. Chapter 5 concludes this
study.
4 See Recital 59 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society [2001] OJ L167/10.
5 This also allows enforcement of local policies on foreign sites. See Kohl (n 1) 186, 190–91, 193;
Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties’ (n 2) para 25; Feiler (n 2) 71–74; Jack
Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (OUP 2006)
65–85.
6 Van Eecke (n 1) 1465; Kohl (n 1) 191; Montero and van Enis (n 1) 28–29; Martin Senftleben,
‘Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models: Exploring the Matrix of Copyright Limitations,
Safe Harbours and Injunctions’ (2013) 4 JIPITEC 87, para 6; Marianne Levin, ‘A Balanced
Approach on Online Enforcement of Copyrights’ in Johan Axhamn (ed), Copyright in a Borderless
Online Environment (Norstedts Juridik 2012) 152.
Chapter 2
Approach
2.1 Objectives and scope
The objective of this study is to analyse the emerging role of Internet connectivity
providers as a means of copyright enforcement in the EU. The method is doctrinal
legal scholarship, primarily using a constitutional perspective. The study also discusses
legal policy and seeks to understand the patterns underlying the law.
Internet connectivity providers have been singled out for study.1 Providers are
especially attractive for research because they are faultless third-party intermediaries.
This provides an opportunity to consider the particularities of copyright enforcement
that are distinct from those applying to infringers.2 Further, connectivity providers
also differ from other types of providers, in particular hosting providers. Therefore, so-
called ‘mere conduit’ connectivity providers are more passive and have a wider liability
exemption in the EU than hosting providers.3 Until recently, most of the research and
case law has focused on hosting providers, and distinguishing connectivity providers
will bring forth new and more detailed perspectives.4
1 These are often also called ‘access providers’. ‘Access providers’ is however a misleading and
overly narrow term, because the issues also concern connectivity between access providers, not
just providing ‘the last mile’ access to Internet subscribers. The main difference between these
is the direct contractual relationship with the end-user. See Arno Lodder and Nicole van der
Meulen, ‘Evaluation of the Role of Access Providers: Discussion of Dutch Pirate Bay Case Law
and Introducing Principles on Directness, Effectiveness, Costs, Relevance, and Time’ (2013) 4
JIPITEC 130, paras 19–20, and whether Internet backbone operators are intermediaries, see Lucas
Feiler, ‘Website Blocking Injunctions under EU and U.S. Copyright Law – Slow Death of the Global
Internet or Emergence of the Rule of National Copyright Law?’ [2012] TTLF Working Papers 13,
20.
2 In consequence, this study differs significantly from the tradition of research focusing on the
preliminary injunctions between IPR holders and alleged infringers, for which see eg Marcus
Norrgård, Interimiska förbud i immaterialrätten (Kauppakaari 2002) and references in Section
3.1.4 and n 96 therein.
3 This is substantiated in Section 3.1.2.
4 The perspective is also very topical; see Eleonora Rosati, ‘2015: The year of blocking injunctions?’
(2015) 10 JIPLP 147.
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The focus is on involuntary involvement. The right holders have advocated a more
extensive role and mechanisms, but providers have usually been opposed to these
suggestions, wanting to stay out of being forced to monitor and police the activities
of their users. The mechanisms advocated would often also be implemented at the
provider’s expense.5 Providers may share the common objective with IPR holders
of proactively managing the data transmitted in their network. While some have
voluntarily shifted towards being active enforcers, this is not yet commonplace.6
Involuntary involvement typically occurs through a court order (eg, a website blocking
or a subscriber information disclosure order) or through a legislative act such as
an obligation to implement a warning letter mechanism. This study concentrates
particularly on court orders.7
The research focus is on copyright.8 Most of this study would apply as-is to IPR
enforcement in general (eg, patent or trademark infringement). However, there are
also significant differences, in particular concerning the legality of private use and the
parties with an interest in issues, justifying the narrower focus.
Particular attention is paid to a specific means of enforcement, the website blocking
injunction.9 This is motivated by explicit legislation in the Infosoc Directive10 and
Enforcement Directive11 and the case law within the EU in recent years. General
automated filtering systems intended to detect and block illegal material are not
5 This is discussed in Section 4.2.2 and Article II (at 237–39).
6 One example of a common goal is limiting the amount of peer-to-peer network traffic in order to
manage network congestion. See eg Jeremy de Beer and Christopher D Clemmer, ‘Global Trends
in Online Copyright Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?’ (2009) 49
Jurimetrics 375, 376, 389; Enrico Bonadio, ‘File Sharing, Copyright and Freedom of Expression’
(2011) 33 EIPR 619, 627–28. However, being active in managing communications has been argued
to endanger the provider’s liability exemptions; see Kalle Hynönen, ‘No More Mere Conduit?
Abandoning Net Neutrality and its Possible Consequences on Internet Service Providers’ Content
Liability’ (2013) 16 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 72.
7 The specific issues of administrative blocking procedures are not examined; see Section 3.1.4 and
n 72 therein.
8 For simplicity, ‘copyright’ also includes so-called related rights of producers, performers, etc. See
Chapter 1 on providers being targeted with other kinds of obligations.
9 ‘Website blocking’ is a simplified term implying blocking access to a specific technical resource
using an identifier such as an IP address or DNS name. Obviously, other sites rather than typical
websites could also be targeted and other technical means could also be used. Essentially, the
term includes any target that could reasonably be blocked by a connectivity provider; the term is
used as a synonym for ‘Internet resource’. It seems unnecessary to define it more precisely. On the
technical background, see eg Feiler (n 1) 6–11; Ofcom, ‘“Site Blocking” to reduce online copyright
infringement’ (27 May 2010) 〈http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.
pdf〉 17–45; Pekka Savola, Internet-operaattoreihin kohdistetut tekijänoikeudelliset estomääräykset
erityisesti vertaisverkkopalvelun osalta (Licentiate of Science (Technology) thesis, 2013) 67ff.
10 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001]
OJ L167/10, Art 8(3).
11 Corrigendum to Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L195/16, Arts 9(1)(a) and 11.
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covered.12 The focus is on the user end providers resulting in ‘decentralised’ and
national enforcement. Injunctions to disconnect an infringing user are covered only
very briefly. Other means such as subscriber information disclosure and graduated
response or warning letter mechanisms are not obligatory in EU legislation and are
in consequence domestic solutions.13 Nonetheless, those mechanisms are still briefly
covered to observe the more general trends in leveraging connectivity providers in
copyright enforcement.
The present concern is the phenomenon at the EU level, as well as the interaction
between EU and domestic legal systems. That is, instead of a detailed study of the
law of one or a few countries, the intention is to understand the implications of EU
law, its impact on national legal orders, and the applicability of national case law in
the EU context.14 In consequence and in particular in this overview, the specifics of
Finnish law are of less importance.
With this scope of study, the research question can be more precisely formulated
as follows: On what conditions and why may an Internet connectivity provider be
forced to participate in online copyright enforcement? This can be further divided into
sub-questions:
1. How may Internet connectivity providers be used for copyright enforcement and
how do these mechanisms fit into the general copyright enforcement landscape?
2. What are the requirements and considerations to be evaluated, in particular
with regard to fundamental rights, in order to issue a website blocking order?
3. What motivations can be observed in the expansion of copyright enforcement
through providers?
4. What trends can be discerned as general observations and conclusions?
The research question and the corresponding sub-questions encompass the whole
study. It is not possible to completely address them in this overview. In consequence,
the focus here is on providing an introduction, the methodological context, theoretical
and practical framework, summarising key findings, making observations on more
general trends and, finally, drawing conclusions.
12 Sometimes ‘filtering’ and ‘blocking’ are used interchangeably. In this context automated filtering
systems need to inspect the content of communications with some heuristics and make a decision
whether to prevent the communications or not. With blocking, the targets are usually specified
manually with the granularity of a whole site. See eg Opinion in C-70/10 Scarlet Extended
EU:C:2011:255, paras 44–52.
13 This is substantiated in Section 3.1.3 and n 46 therein.
14 While some Articles (in particular, II and III) have studied Finland in detail, others have used a
more detached and international approach. This is underlined in particular in Article VI, which
considers the case law from all EU states.
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The first, introductory sub-question was discussed from a more general perspective
first in Article I, and as an update, partially in Article II. The enforcement mechanisms
used were discussed throughout the articles, in particular Article III (on disclosure
requests) and Article VI (website blocking). The second sub-question was examined
in Articles IV, V, and in particular VI. The third sub-question was examined in Article
II. The fourth sub-question was discussed in particular in Articles II and VI and is
revisited at the end of this overview.
Sub-questions 1, 2, and in part 4 can be answered using traditional legal scholar-
ship, from within the law. On the other hand, sub-questions 3 and in part 4 must be
answered with sociological and political observations by analysing legal policy and
lawmaking. These two lines of questions support each other: the former develop
arguments for interpretation and help in understanding the law as it is; the latter
propose ways to understand the ‘why’ of the law and the phenomenon at the more
general level.15
2.2 Methodology
The quest for methodology begins from terminology. In the continental tradition,
normative ‘legal doctrine’ or doctrinal study of law refers to an internal inquiry using
the concepts of the legal system. On the other hand, in some parts of the English-
speaking world, ‘legal science’ as a concept is either bizarre – and ‘legal scholarship’
is used as a catch-all instead – or might refer to a mixed bag of other descriptive
non-legal disciplines that study the law from an independent theoretical framework.16
Van Hoecke illustrates the legal doctrine with various disciplines: a) hermeneutic
(textual interpretation like a literary researcher), b) argumentative (focusing more
on the arguments, rather than the interpretation as such), c) empirical (employing
existing information, for example, judicial practice as in legal realism), d) explanatory
(explaining the ‘why’ of rules and other legal concepts), e) axiomatic (formally using
logic and legal concepts), f) logical (implying a moderated version of purely axiomatic
discipline), and g) normative (taking normative positions and making choices even
15 On the importance of ‘why’ questions in legal research, see the discussion below on methodology
and Rob van Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, ‘Revitalizing Doctrinal Research in Europe: What
About Methodology?’ in Ulla Neergaard, Ruth Nielsen, and Lynn Roseberry (eds), European Legal
Method – Paradoxes and Revitalization (DJØF Publishing 2011) 70–71.
16 See eg Pauline C Westerman, ‘Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as a
Reflection of the Debate on Law’ in Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which
Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 2011) 94, 110. Yet there are more choices
than choosing between a doctrinal approach and an external approach, see Jan BM Vranken,
‘Methodology of Legal Doctrinal Research: A Comment on Westerman’ in Mark Van Hoecke (ed),
Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 2011)
118–20 with references.
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at the risk of subjectivity).17 In this study, the focus is more on argumentative than
hermeneutic and normative elements: balancing and the lack of one right answer
emphasises the imporance of argumentation. Further, a hermeneutical or logical study
is not possible due to the lack and terseness of authoritative and normative material.18
In the traditional Finnish (and to a degree continental) view, the goal of legal
doctrine or ‘doctrinal study of law’ must be to systematise and/or provide interpretative
suggestions on legal norms from the perspective of a judge. In other words, a doctrinal
study that does not provide a substantiated resolution would not be useful either for
courts or for other scholars.19 Some differences between researchers and judges in
legal sources, methods, and values are acceptable, however.20
Nowadays, the conception of legal scholarship is broader. There are more legal
methods and doctrinal study can also be conducted from different vantage points.21
There are also a number of justifiable models of interpretation; each individual,
whether a scholar or a judge, might balance these in a slightly different manner. For
example, Siltala demonstrates this with ten ‘frames of interpretation’.22 Indeed, van
Gestel and Micklitz have put it aptly:
European doctrinal legal research should be freed from the role model and research methods
of the judge as its sole point of reference and look for answers to the question of what
can be the added value of a legal scholarship that goes beyond being a service to legal
practice.23
They conclude that academic legal research should primarily be engaged with
questions such as trying to understand what is behind the law on a certain subject,
17 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What kind of Discipline?’ in Mark Van
Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline?
(Hart 2011) 4–10, 17. Van Hoecke mostly dismisses explanatory and axiomatic disciplines.
18 However, there are some differences in emphasis between the articles; for example, Article II had
a more empirical focus, and the latter part of this overview also includes explanatory elements.
19 See eg Aulis Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable: A Treatise on Legal Argumentation (D Reidel
Publishing 1987) 14–16; Aulis Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria (WSOY 1989) 57; Aulis Aarnio, Essays
on the Doctrinal Study of Law (Springer 2011) 19–22.
20 See Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria (n 19) 59–61; Jussi Syrjänen, Oikeudellisen ratkaisun perusteista
(Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2008) 181–82. For a critique and differences in the roles,
see Martijn Hesselink, ‘A European Legal Method? On European Private Law and Scientific
Method’ (2009) 15 ELJ 20, 21–23; Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (Ashgate
2003) 113–20 Raimo Siltala, Oikeudellinen tulkintateoria (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2004)
346–55, 534–40; Pekka Timonen, ‘Tutkijan ja tuomarin oikeuslähdeoppi: Oikeuslähdeopin eräiden
lähtökohtien tarkastelua’ (1989) 87 Lakimies 666, 670–71; Janne Kaisto, Lainoppi ja oikeusteoria:
Oikeusteorian perusteista aineellisen varallisuusoikeuden näkökulmasta (Edita 2005) 347–48.
21 See eg Vranken (n 16) 113 fnn 6–7; Raimo Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria (Suomalainen
Lakimiesyhdistys 2003) 103ff; Hesselink (n 20) 27ff. Aarnio seems to maintain relatively strict
rules on what would qualify as legal dogmatics, while accepting the possibility of other forms of
legal scholarship; see Aulis Aarnio, Reason and Authority: A Treatise on the Dynamic Paradigm of
Legal Dogmatics (Ashgate 1997) 75–78.
22 Raimo Siltala, Law, Truth, and Reason: A Treatise on Legal Argumentation (Springer 2011); Siltala,
Oikeudellinen tulkintateoria (n 20) 335–39, 344.
23 Van Gestel and Micklitz (n 15) 70 (emphasis in the original, citation omitted).
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why the lawmakers operate as they do, and why the law says what it says. In contrast,
legal practitioners focus on dealing with legal problems and do not have time to look
for answers to these ‘why’ questions.24
The primary argument is that legal scholarship needs to go beyond legal practice.
One way to accomplish this would be to examine the issues in more depth, and focus
on those arguments that have been absent in the legal practice. Another way, as also
reflected in the stance on ‘why’ questions, is to apply methods whose object of interest
is more extensive than merely the surface layer of legal provisions.25 I agree with and
employ both perspectives: the former with an approach of tight scrutiny and the latter
using socio-legal study as well.
On the former, I employ intense and even critical scrutiny in order to accomplish
more than a descriptive study.26 In particular, in examining case law and the literature
I seek to uncover insufficiently substantiated interpretations and illuminate under-
represented perspectives. Instead of merely neutral examination from established
institutional premises, the selected approach emphasises the necessity of scholarship
to remain critical, exceeding legal realism and serving only the needs of the legal
practise.27 One specific means is provided by so-called critical constitutionalism,
where fundamental rights analysis provides a heuristic methodology ‘capable of distin-
guishing and weighing constitutionally relevant rights, interest positions and values’
in the context of a particular case.28 This also provides an opportunity to identify and
as appropriate challenge the ‘structural proprietarian bias’ of interpretations related
to IPR and apply constitutionalism through fundamental rights to copyright law.29
24 See van Gestel and Micklitz (n 15) 70–71; Ulla Neergaard and Marlene Wind, ‘Studying the EU
in Legal and Political Sciences Scholarship’ in Ulla Neergaard and Ruth Nielsen (eds), European
Legal Method – in a Multi-Level EU Legal Order (DJØF Publishing 2012) 270, 277–79. Similarly in
Roger Cotterrell, Law’s Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (OUP 1995) 25–26:
‘Sociological analysis of law has as its sole unifying objective the attempt to remedy the assumed
inadequacy of lawyers’ doctrinal analyses of law.’ Beyond this, sociological analysis may have a
variety of aims. In Hesselink (n 20) 31–32, it is noted that multi-disciplinary research takes into
account different perspectives and will lead to more informed and balanced judgement.
25 One can draw on the law’s deeper levels in the interpretation of surface-level legal material. This
also enables non-subjectivist criticism of this material. According to Tuori, ‘[a] central part of
this critical work consists in disclosure of the often implicit social theoretical assumptions on which
these doctrines are based’ (emphasis added). See Kaarlo Tuori, Critical legal positivism (Ashgate
2002) 320. On the various objects of research and interests of knowledge in various forms of legal
scholarship, see Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria (n 21) 126–29, 137.
26 Similarly, Tuomas Mylly, Intellectual Property and European Economic Constitutional Law: The
Trouble with Private Information Power (IPR University Center 2009) 200, calls for the necessity
of extending constitutionalism in the form of critical discourses challenging the branch of law
specific developments. Likewise, van Gestel and Micklitz (n 15) 38–39, 71, require that doctrinal
legal scholarship should avoid being lured into ‘herd behaviour’ and start asking critical questions.
27 For example, Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria (n 21) 141–44 calls the former ‘an analytical-
descriptive approach’.
28 Juha Karhu, ‘Perusoikeudet ja oikeuslähdeoppi’ (2003) 101 Lakimies 789, 803; Mylly, Intellectual
Property and European Economic Constitutional Law (n 26) 151.
29 Ibid, 112–13, 201ff, 378, and more recently, Tuomas Mylly, ‘The constitutionalization of the
European legal order: Impact of human rights on intellectual property in the EU’ in Christophe
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Therefore, the critique, when applied, is inherent and internal to the law and by the
law. That is, the yardstick of justification is defined by the constitutional principles,
fundamental rights and other ‘core values’ of the legal system rather than by external
factors.30 These findings could be used to improve the robustness of reasoning while
still reaching the same conclusions or to reach other conclusions. All in all, I attempt to
provide the ideal (sollen) interpretation supported by the most authoritative sources.
One could also call the method a form of modern European IPR doctrinal scholar-
ship, where it is characteristic to examine broadly the legal provisions, principles of EU
law, fundamental rights, technological aspects as well as business models and market
requirements.31 Indeed, in interpretative or even materially unregulated situations
such as ones studied here, answers to legal questions cannot be discerned based on
textual interpretation. Sources such as travaux préparatoires are typically not very
helpful either, because they provide little or no additional context that would help in
discerning the legislator’s intent.32 Also more generally, Hesselink notes that European
legal culture is less formal, dogmatic and positivistic than national cultures in Europe
have been. This leads to the legal method admitting more substantial arguments.33
In this study, providing an explicit resolution in many situations would require
difficult balancing based on case-by-case dependent facts. This applies in particu-
lar to proportionality evaluation between numerous competing interests. With the
researcher’s prerogative, I have not usually posed the research question so as to
attempt to seek an explicit answer like a judge. Rather, I have sought principles and
considerations and contemplated a balance between them. Applying them in a specific
Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2015)
126ff.
30 That is, according to Koskenniemi, such interpretations could be those that best reflect the legal
system’s internal value coherence (see n 49). See also Tuori, Critical legal positivism (n 25) 304–07.
In some parts of this study, there is also a suggestion of unmasking rather than normative criticism,
ie, being satisfied with exposing and explicating issues rather than indicating a desirable direction
of change; see Kaarlo Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas: The Tension Between Reason and Will in Law
(Ashgate 2011) 27–28, 70.
31 This is also discussed in Section 2.4 (on the number and difficulty of identifying the legal sources
and on empirical uncertainty). For example, Marcus Norrgård, ‘The Role Conferred on the National
Judge by Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2005) 6
ERA Forum 503, 511–14 calls for balancing based on inter alia fundamental rights, context-
sensitivity, and the comparative method. See also eg Ansgar Ohly and Justine Pila (eds), The
Europeanization of Intellectual Property Law: Towards a European Legal Methodology (OUP 2013);
Taina Pihlajarinne, ‘Eurooppalaisen tuomioistuinkäytännön hyödyntäminen immateriaalioikeuden
tutkimuksessa’ (2012) 110 Lakimies 547, 551, 556.
32 On the impossibility of semantic interpretation, see n 46 onward.
33 Hesselink (n 20) 31. For example, case law and legal scholarship as sources of law do not
depend on formal recognition, but merely on whether they are convincing in substance. Similarly
Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What kind of Discipline?’ (n 17) 12, separates
authoritative and normative sources.
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case would be an adjudicative task. While I often make an explicit determination, on
some occasions I have left the issue open.34
Methods of comparative law have also been applied in this overview and in
particular in Articles IV and VI. Husa characterises the methods to different degrees.
The first degree consists of comparison in law drafting. The second means applying
an external metric such as economic effectiveness. The third implies comparison
within a field of law using an independent conceptual framework or a normative
object of interest. The inquiry in the fourth degree is internal to comparative law,
seeking explanations to differences and similarities; it is also possible that there is no
normative or particular national or supranational object of interest. Finally, the fifth
degree implies developing comparative law methods and theories.35 In this study, the
method is also used to identify similarities and differences within a certain field of
law.36 However, one needs to be sensitive to the differences in traditions of each legal
system.37 The main import of national court rulings has been a source of inspiration
for patterns and arguments.38 Therefore, national court rulings have not been given
much normative value: the rulings and particularly their conclusions are not used to
argue for a specific interpretation one way or another.39 Because the object of interest
is not trying to predict the outcome of future judgements, the value of arguments
and patterns in national judgements is of a more general kind.40 All in all, in Husa’s
34 In contrast, I go further than ‘de sententia ferenda’ research, in which one characteristically needs
to consider many conflicting principles, analogies, and practical reasons. In that context, choosing
among multiple acceptable interpretative options is a matter of purposefulness rather than legality.
See eg Olli Norros, Vahingonkorvaus arvopaperimarkkinoilla (WSOYpro 2009) 12. That in turn
provides more explicit proposals than ‘argument-developing dogmatic study’, where the lack of
sufficient legal support prevents any answer; see eg Mika Hemmo, Sopimus ja delikti: tutkimus
vahingonkorvausoikeuden vastuumuodoista (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus 1996) 10–11 and critically
Norros (n 34) 14–15.
35 Jaakko Husa, Oikeusvertailu (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus 2013) 172–73.
36 Esin Örücü, ‘Developing Comparative Law’ in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative
Law: A Handbook (Hart 2007) 46.
37 Pihlajarinne, ‘Eurooppalaisen tuomioistuinkäytännön hyödyntäminen immateriaalioikeuden
tutkimuksessa’ (n 31) 554. Because of harmonisation of substance provisions, the most sig-
nificant differences concern procedural law and legal traditions; see also eg Örücü (n 36) 51, 57;
Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, OUP
1998) 24–25.
38 Hesselink (n 20) 39. Similarly, according to Koen Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking Legal Orders in the
European Union and Comparative Law’ (2003) 52 ILQ 873, 879 and Zweigert and Kötz (n 37)
15, 20, the methodology is used for ‘enriching the supply of solutions’. Likewise, see Pihlajarinne,
‘Eurooppalaisen tuomioistuinkäytännön hyödyntäminen immateriaalioikeuden tutkimuksessa’
(n 31) 551, 555, 558 and on obtaining awareness of foreign solutions, see Örücü (n 36) 55.
39 Pihlajarinne, ‘Eurooppalaisen tuomioistuinkäytännön hyödyntäminen immateriaalioikeuden
tutkimuksessa’ (n 31) 555–56.
40 I do not commit to so-called legal realism as a frame of interpretation, and therefore judgements
from national courts are of less importance. The question of sources of law will be expanded in
Section 2.4. More generally on analytical legal realism, see eg Siltala, Law, Truth, and Reason
(n 22) 145–63; Aarnio, Reason and Authority (n 21) 62–74.
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typology, the comparison occurs at the third and fourth degree due to the object of
interest surpassing normative inquiry.
Doctrinal study has been used to a greater or lesser extent in all Articles except II,
in which the perspective has been socio-legal study as applied to law drafting, using
in particular critical legislative theory and Pierre Bourdieu’s power theories.41 Article
IV examines the case law in the United Kingdom almost exclusively. Article VI surveys
the case law from all EU/EEA states from a particular perspective. A normative focus
and providing explicit resolutions is strongest in Articles III and V, while Articles IV
and VI are more argumentative and more issues had to be left open for case-by-case
consideration.
2.3 On research neutrality
European legal research should start with a disclosure of ideological preconceptions
and, in consequence, the selection of methods. Van Gestel and Micklitz submit that
this is a major lesson to be learned from the instrumental use of the law: by those who
want to change the society through law, or those who want to preserve the status quo
using the law.42 Specifically, they observe that questioning the ‘apolitical’ character of
law started from the 1960s and 70s and that the law cannot be disconnected from
all sorts of implicit preconceptions that determine one’s perspective. This requires
self-reflection and self-control of one’s own premises. They submit that methodology
assists in getting a hold of these preconceptions, challenges one to make the implicit
assumptions explicit, and raises awareness and openness to alternative explanations.43
In science, this view is by no means new. For example Nagel states that ‘there is no
view from no-where’, meaning that no study can be completely neutral and detached
from the object of study.44 Therefore, the experiences and background of a scholar
will perforce affect the study. However, legal scholars, particularly in doctrinal study
of law, have typically simply taken being neutral and objective as given.45
41 Bourdieu’s theory was present in Article I, but not yet in a fully substantiated manner.
42 See van Gestel and Micklitz (n 15) 70. Similarly, in Hesselink (n 20) 35 ‘[a]rticulating one’s
version of a legal method may contribute to making the legal debate more transparent’; the
importance of this increases in international contexts as the communities are less homogeneous.
As a summary of the law as an instrumental tool in the service of a group or individual interest,
see Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas (n 30) 25–28.
43 See van Gestel and Micklitz (n 15) 36–37. For example, on legal scholarship conducted reflecting
the political bias of U.S. law professors, see Adam S Chilton and Eric A Posner, ‘An Empirical Study
of Political Bias in Legal Scholarship’ [2014] University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law
& Economics Research Paper No 696.
44 See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (OUP 1986) 67. Applying it to the legal scholar’s
position, see Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria (n 21) 610–11.
45 For recently raised questions about the standards of objectivity in legal scholarship, see Chilton
and Posner (n 43).
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I agree with this approach that questions the inherently apolitical nature of law
and legal scholarship. The law and legal interpretation are affected by values, except
in trivial cases of subsumption.46 This can be observed in particular in the weight
afforded to specific interests in a balancing situation.47 It is admitted that the valuation
of incommensurable rights and principles is difficult.48 Nonetheless, any suggestion
enjoying at least some degree of inter-subjective support among other researchers
could be argued to be the one that most appropriately implements the legal system’s
values and fundamental rights.49 Specifically, there are many scenarios where the
applicable legal sources such as the law provisions or travaux préparatoires do not
provide sufficient guidance for interpretation. In consequence, neither a scholar nor a
judge can be truly and completely objective and unmoved in trying to ascertain the
guidelines for weighing the balance in a difficult situation.50
46 Hesselink (n 20) 33: ‘Today nobody believes [...] that answering questions of law is a matter of
mere logical deduction without any value judgement.’ Also, Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitu-
tional Rights (Julian Rivers tr, OUP 2002) 369, states that ‘[i]n all moderately problematic cases,
value-judgments are needed which do not emerge necessarily from authoritative pre-existing
material’, and the rationality of legal discourse depends on being able to control these additional
value judgements rationally. On the impossibility of neutral literal interpretation, see eg Susanna
Lindroos-Hovinheimo, Despairing justice and the ethics of legal interpretation (Unigrafia 2011), and
on semantic interpretation, see Kaisto (n 20) 245ff. As a summary of positions on ideological
influences in adjudication, see eg Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: {fin de siècle}
(Harvard University Press 1997) 31–37, 157ff.
47 See Alexy (n 46) 365–66: ‘Which solution is regarded as correct after having balanced the
interests depends upon value-judgments, which are themselves not controllable by the balancing
procedure.’ Earlier, in Mark V Tushnet, ‘Following the Rules Laid Down: Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles’ (1983) 96 Harvard LR 781, 824, ‘The theory of neutral principles is initially
attractive because it affirms the openness of the courts to all reasonable arguments drawn from
decided cases. But if the courts are indeed open to such arguments, the theory allows judges to do
whatever they want.’
48 See eg Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (CUP 2013)
21 fn 37; Janneke Gerards, ‘Judicial Argumentation in Fundamental Rights Cases – the EU Courts’
Challenge’ in Ulla Neergaard and Ruth Nielsen (eds), European Legal Method – in a Multi-Level EU
Legal Order (DJØF Publishing 2012) 29 fn 10; Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights
and their Limitations (Doron Kalir tr, CUP 2012) 482; Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable
Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 CLJ 174, 201.
49 Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What kind of Discipline?’ (n 17) 10, 18. Indeed,
a Dworkinian argument would be that the ‘right’ solution could only be grasped by those who
understand the legal system’s internal value coherence correctly, but Koskenniemi rejects this
as utopian; see Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The structure of international legal
argument (Reissue with new epilogue, CUP 2005) 55–56. Commenting on this, Tuori, Ratio and
Voluntas (n 30) 169–70, also observes the uncontrollability of judges’ policy-based choices in
weighing and balancing.
50 See eg Koskenniemi (n 49) 25, 42, 50, 57, 597; Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas (n 30) 26–27; Nagel
(n 44) 67–68, 138ff; Chilton and Posner (n 43) 27–29; Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Objectivity in Law and
Jurisprudence’ in Jaakko Husa and Mark Van Hoecke (eds), Objectivity in Law and Legal Reasoning
(Hart 2013) 7. Kent Greenawalt, Law and Objectivity (OUP 1992) 205–06 summarises thus: ‘A
harder question is posed by the worry that far from being objective, balancing is actually highly
subjective. [...] The fundamental concerns are (1) that the way interests are to be balanced are
formulated is extremely arbitrary, and (2) that no basis exists to weigh the competing interests
objectively.’ Greenawalt submits that courts often are overtly and unconsciously manipulative in
the characterisation of interests, and that conscientious judges try to assess the weight reasonably
in accord with the basic premises of the legal system.
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While I question the putative and inherent neutrality of law and legal scholarship,
the degree to which this affects reasoning is a different issue. That is, the capacity to
use the law for instrumental purposes does not yet suggest whether and when it is used
in this manner. In science, sensitivity in avoiding unconscious and/or undisclosed bias
is needed. If methodology is properly disclosed, even politically motivated advocacy
research would also be acceptable. Indeed, a significant but typical pitfall would be
offering biased and value-laden interpretative recommendations without realising
it. As observed, discussing presuppositions is necessary in order to reflect on and to
control the researcher’s argumentation.
As for my value base as a researcher, I appreciate freedom of expression and
privacy; compromising them begins a slide toward an Orwellian society. Liberalism
also supports freedom to conduct a business. For example, imposing obligations
on third-party intermediaries to advance private interests of others seems doubtful
and requires appropriate justification, especially when conducted at the expense of
the third party. While the law is an instrument by which rights and responsibilities
can be assigned to private parties, this needs to be accomplished in a manner that
best benefits everyone. The innovative potential of new and sometimes disruptive
technology is also crucial for the evolution rather than stagnation of the society.
While intellectual property is necessary, its goal should be to offer incentives for
creation, evolution, and re-use. From that perspective, excessive rewards may be
detrimental. Over the last decades, IPR holders have been successful in advocating
and accomplishing their agenda in legislation; the result and its implication have
sometimes been called a structural proprietarian bias. I want to be cognisant of
such possibility and resist such bias as far as it seems justified. In consequence, I
would prefer to find an appropriate balance to online copyright enforcement that
takes into account all the aforementioned values instead of merely, for instance, IPR
holders’ desire for strong IPR protection. Further discussion and the basis for these
values is beyond the scope of this study; these are merely offered as indicators of the
researcher’s perspective.51
51 For example, Hesselink observes that since nobody will be able to consider all possible insights
and balance them in a rational and objective way, it is necessary to rely on our own set of values
and prejudices. He calls this an eclectic contemporary method, following Duncan Kennedy. See
Hesselink (n 20) 32; Kennedy (n 46) 15. Somewhat differently, Matti Ilmari Niemi, ‘Objective
Legal Reasoning Without Objects’ in Jaakko Husa and Mark Van Hoecke (eds), Objectivity in
Law and Legal Reasoning (Hart 2013) 79–80, argues that a legal scholar applying a principle of
justice would ‘unquestionably not’ apply his personal beliefs, but would appeal to the values of
society and its objective values. Whether the scholar’s argumentation is well-founded or credible
is another issue.
14 CHAPTER 2. APPROACH
2.4 Sources and material
The intended audience of this study is researchers in the EU in the fields of the Internet,
copyright, and to some degree, constitutional and EU law. To this end, I refer to sources
not written in English only selectively.52 However, being an academic submission in
Finland, certain references are unavoidable in particular in this chapter.53
While the focus is mainly on the EU perspective, partial examination of the national
context is necessary as a case in point. This concerns in particular the issues which
lack uniform EU-wide solutions. Using Finnish and focusing on Finland was natural
in an article-based dissertation in examining national legislative processes, subscriber
information disclosure and the powers of public authorities (Articles II and III).54 On
the other hand, the emphasis on the UK in Article IV was predicated by the existence
of commonly understood, substantiated and publicly available series of case law.55
The sources of law, ie, what arguments are more authoritative than others, could
be a topic of its own.56 Legal polycentricity, constitutionalisation, and Europeanisation
have shaken at least the traditional Nordic organisation of legal sources and their
authoritative value.57 This has several implications. While private law pluralism has
not yet had a major impact on IPR enforcement – given that it is essentially regulatory
rather than akin to ‘traditional’ private law – constitutional pluralism has multiplied
the number of applicable legal orders.58 Coherence and controllability of reasoning
52 The European focus also makes it natural to employ The Oxford University Standard for Citation
of Legal Authorities (OSCOLA) as the citation and formatting style.
53 Fortunately, there has been little discussion in Finnish (or Swedish) on the main subject matter.
54 Examining the intricacies of one relatively small jurisdiction would probably not have been possible
in an international journal. Finnish law has also been used in other Articles when it has offered a
helpful example. In hindsight, Article I could have been written in English as well.
55 The length limitations and the focus of the journal chosen also influenced the choices made.
56 On Nordic theory of the sources of law, see eg Henrik Zahle, ‘The Polycentricity of the Law or the
Importance of Legal Pluralism for Legal Dogmatics’ in Hanne Petersen and Henrik Zahle (eds),
Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law (Dartmouth 1995) 189–90.
57 See eg Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context’ in Mate Avbelj and Jan
Komárek (eds), Constitutional pluralism in the European Union and beyond (Hart 2012); NW
Barber, ‘Legal Pluralism and the European Union’ (2006) 12 ELJ 306; Tuuli Heinonen, ‘Val-
tiosääntöoikeus ja oikeuslähdeoppi’ in Tuuli Heinonen and Juha Lavapuro (eds), Oikeuskulttuurin
eurooppalaistuminen. Ihmisoikeuksien murroksesta kansainväliseen vuorovaikutukseen (Suoma-
lainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2012). See also Tuomas Ojanen, ‘The Europeanization of Finnish Law –
Observations on the Transformations of the Finnish Scene of Constitutionalism’ in Kimmo Nuotio,
Sakari Melander, and Merita Huomo-Kettunen (eds), Introduction to Finnish Law and Legal Culture
(Publications of the Faculty of Law University of Helsinki 2012) 99, 102–04; van Gestel and
Micklitz (n 15) 67; Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas (n 30) 242–45, 293; Jane Reichel, ‘European Legal
Method from a Swedish Perspective – Rights, Compensation and the Role of the Courts’ in Ulla
Neergaard, Ruth Nielsen, and Lynn Roseberry (eds), European Legal Method – Paradoxes and
Revitalization (DJØF Publishing 2011) 262–70; Hesselink (n 20) 39–42; Karhu (n 28) 800–06.
58 According to Christine Godt, ‘Intellectual Property and European Fundamental Rights’ in Hans-
W Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP 2014) 215, ‘in contrast
to the founding principles of private law, private autonomy and contractual freedom, IP is in
essence regulatory’. On legal pluralism, see eg Zahle (n 56) 195–98; Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘Legal
Integration as Disintegration of National Law’ in Hanne Petersen and Henrik Zahle (eds), Legal
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also becomes more difficult, because the applicable legal sources are more diverse
and cannot be predetermined as before.59 In consequence, sources of law doctrines
are nowadays less and less useful; for example, Hesselink argues that ‘these different
sources cannot (or can no longer) be distinguished’.60 Further, given the focus on EU
law, the importance and authority of CJEU case law requires a different approach
from traditional Nordic research centred on travaux préparatoires and secondarily
national case law.61
A study on interpreting a specific EU law provision naturally shifts the focus
from national to EU perspective.62 This is particularly apparent in Articles V and
VI. This is supported by comparing and examining how particular EU law provisions
are implemented and interpreted in Member States. As observed in methodology,
a significant number of sources, some of them also non-legal nature, need to be
consulted.63 Empirical uncertainty also complicates the judicial determination of the
best approach. Uncertainty concerns such matters as the impact of infringement and
the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms.64 This requires taking into account
Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law (Dartmouth 1995). On constitutional pluralism,
see previous note. For a summary of attempts at private law pluralism, see eg Ralf Michaels,
‘Why We Have No Theory of European Private Law Pluralism’ in Leone Niglia (ed), Pluralism and
European Private Law (Hart 2013) 158–59; Hans-W Micklitz, ‘Monistic Ideology versus Pluralistic
Reality: Towards a Normative Design for European Private Law’ in Leone Niglia (ed), Pluralism
and European Private Law (Hart 2013) 42–51; Jan M Smits, ‘Plurality of Sources in European
Private Law, or: How to Live with Legal Diversity?’ in Ulla Neergaard and Ruth Nielsen (eds),
European Legal Method – in a Multi-Level EU Legal Order (DJØF Publishing 2012) 74–75.
59 For example, Barber (n 57) 329, notes that ‘inconsistent rules of recognition are at the heart of
the pluralist model’, and Janneke Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation
Doctrine’ (2011) 17 ELJ 80, 81, ‘new ways have to be found to determine who is authorised
to provide the final interpretation of [norms of co-existing legal orders]’. On inconsistency and
dealing with it, see Barber (n 57) 309–14. Also, Jääskinen notes that the pluralism between EU
and national law implies that in ultimate conflicts a coherent legal system including both of them
cannot be construed. However, he further notes that the highest courts have not portrayed these
ultimate conflicts as such, and that judicial practice does not require the assumption that the legal
system is coherent. See Niilo Jääskinen, Eurooppalaistuvan oikeuden oikeusteoreettisia ongelmia
(Unigrafia 2008) 157. For a somewhat different account, see René Barents, ‘The Precedence of EU
Law from the Perspective of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2009) 5 EuConst 421, 431–37, 446. Cf. on
ultimate conflicts and restraint related to the EU, Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (OUP
1999) 108–12; Barber (n 57) 323–28; Tuuli Heinonen, ‘Konstitutionaalinen konflikti Suomessa’ in
Tuuli Heinonen and Juha Lavapuro (eds), Oikeuskulttuurin eurooppalaistuminen. Ihmisoikeuksien
murroksesta kansainväliseen vuorovaikutukseen (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2012); Aida Torres
Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication (OUP
2009) 62–69. The conflicts will be briefly revisited in the context of Case C-399/11 Melloni
EU:C:2013:107 in Section 3.2.3 and n 198 therein onward.
60 Hesselink (n 20) 31 (referring to case law and legal scholarship).
61 Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas (n 30) 243. For a comparable Swedish perspective, see Reichel (n 57)
252, 269–70. Indeed, within the scope of EU law, the CJEU can also be seen as a major developer
of the law, bypassing the national legislators; see Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas (n 30) 243.
62 Similarly, see Leonard FM Besselink, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’ (2012)
〈http://www.fide2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=94〉 47.
63 See n 33.
64 Courts will be faced with ‘epistemic balancing’ as described in Section 3.2.2.
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non-legal materials such as studies of effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms and
economic analyses of the impact of infringement.
Article I used both international and domestic sources. Articles II and III focused
on Finnish law, and obviously Finnish sources were prevalent. In particular, in Article
II a large amount of legislative preparatory law drafting materials and statements by
interest groups were studied and evaluated. Nonetheless, these were also contrasted
to international literature. Article IV examined mainly UK case law and the related
literature. Article V focused on harmonised EU law, in particular the Brussels I and
Rome II Regulations.65 Article VI went further and examined website blocking case
law from the CJEU and all EU/EEA states. All in all, a substantial amount of material
has been researched and towards the end the focus has become increasingly European.
2.5 Fields of study
This study draws upon research on multiple fields of law. The underlying theme is
IPR and copyright. The study is extensively tempered by constitutional evaluation
and fundamental rights, in particular in this overview and Articles III and VI. The
research and in particular Articles V and VI concentrate largely on EU law. All
research could also be considered to contribute to Internet or telecommunications law.
Article V delves into private international law and the procedural law of international
jurisdiction. Article III also examines the issues of data protection and procedural and
police law for coercive measures and information disclosure. Article II and to a lesser
degree Article I applies socio-legal study to online copyright enforcement lawmaking.
The study is also interdisciplinary. My earlier thesis provided a technical per-
spective, the implications of which have also impinged into this study.66 Articles I
and Article II in particular also make a brief excursus into the field of policy and
sociology.67
65 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1; Regulation
(EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
[2012] OJ L351/1; Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations [2007] OJ L199/40.
66 See Savola, Internet-operaattoreihin kohdistetut tekijänoikeudelliset estomääräykset erityisesti ver-
taisverkkopalvelun osalta (n 9). For example, this background was beneficial in Article III in
examining peer-to-peer networking, in Article V in examining various kinds of Internet connec-
tivity providers and ways of providing access, and in Article VI in articulating considerations on
technical burden and the effectiveness of blocking.
67 The empirical part of the articles is not very substantial. In consequence, labelling the former as
‘law in context’ (see eg William Twining, Law in Context: Enlarging A Discipline (OUP 1997) 54)
and the latter socio-legal study would seem more appropriate than as full-fledged sociology and
law research.
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In decision-making there is always some empirical and epistemological uncertainty.
Here, these issues are particularly troublesome in proportionality evaluation, eg,
with the seriousness of infringement and the effectiveness of mitigating measures.68
Uncertainty can in part be addressed by research from other disciplines (such as
technology) using scientific insights as input to ‘help craft legal rules within the proper
parameters of a legal inquiry’.69
It is customary to briefly assess the tradition of dissertations and where the study
fits in. In Finland, Sorvari wrote an extensive analysis of online copyright infringement,
even though the coverage of intermediary liability was limited and the issues have
obviously evolved since then.70 Still analysed the imbalance in copyright and digital
rights management as a way to control that balance.71 Likewise, Mylly examined the
imbalance and power related to IPR in general from the perspective of constitutional
and competition law.72 His critical perspectives have been an inspiration to this
study. Vilanka’s recent dissertation confirms the imbalance in copyright legislation in
general, but the focus is quite different.73 Norrgård wrote on preliminary injunctions
in intellectual property law. While the study was on procedural law and actions against
infringers rather than third parties, inter alia the legal principles and balancing models
submitted might be of more general applicability.74 Finally, Lindroos’s dissertation
on EU trademark law also included an article on the liability of Internet service
providers.75 Other dissertations on copyright and IPR in general have not considered
the issues at stake here, in particular intermediaries.
All in all, there have been no equivalent studies in Finland, although there have
been a couple of articles and short monographs on Internet intermediaries.76 There-
fore, it is difficult to identify any single research tradition which this study continues.
The critical approach and constitutional perspective is most similar to Mylly’s work.
However, the context is closer to one small piece of Sorvari’s study and emphasises
balancing of principles like Norrgård.
68 See Article VI (paras 72–77, 86–87).
69 Robin Feldman, The Role of Science in Law (OUP 2009) 169. That is, Feldman frowns on blind
deference to other disciplines.
70 Katariina Sorvari, Vastuu tekijänoikeuden loukkauksesta (WSOY 2005).
71 Viveca Still, DRM och upphovsrättens obalans (IPR University Center 2007).
72 Mylly, Intellectual Property and European Economic Constitutional Law (n 26).
73 Olli Vilanka, Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Internet: A Study Evaluating
Role of Prosumers, Authors and Corporations in the Information Society (Unigrafia 2014).
74 Norrgård, Interimiska förbud i immaterialrätten (n 2). While the detailed procedural and material
considerations could be useful, a different focus in this study precludes such an evaluation here.
75 Katja Weckström, A Contextual Approach to Limits in EU Trade Mark Law (IPR University Center
2011).
76 See Taina Pihlajarinne, Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus
2012) and an early contribution, Mikko Välimäki, ‘Liability of Online Intermediary for Copyright
Infringement’ (Master’s Thesis, University of Helsinki 1999).
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In a European perspective, a number of somewhat similar studies are in progress,
notably by Christina Angelopoulos,77 Martin Husovec,78 Kevin T. O’Sullivan,79 and
Ellen Wesselingh80. Articles from them have been useful. At least one finished but non-
public and more general dissertation exists, by Jaani Riordan.81 Some dissertations
exist in the partially related fields.82 In consequence, this study has focused on other
forms of research. In particular, I have engaged in discussion with the authors of
recently published articles.
77 ‘The European Harmonisation of Intermediary Civil Liability for Online Copyright Infringement: A
Tort-Inspired Approach’ at Institute for Information Law (IViR), The Netherlands.
78 ‘Injunctions Against Innocent Third Parties’, at International Max Planck Research School for
Competition and Innovation (IMRS-CI).
79 ‘Digital Rights for the Information Age: Developing a Rights Based Regulatory Framework for the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Online’, at University College Cork, Ireland.
80 The still tentative topic is on copyright enforcement on the Internet, concentrating on the interac-
tion between technology and law, at Leiden University, The Netherlands.
81 ‘The Liability of Internet Intermediaries’ (2013) at Magdalen College, University of Oxford. A book
with the same title is forthcoming from OUP in 2015. Likewise, a broad and somewhat descriptive
study exists from Hong Kong; see Jerry Jie Hua, Toward A More Balanced Approach: Rethinking
and Readjusting Copyright Systems in the Digital Network Era (Springer 2014).
82 For example, Farrand has written on power struggles over copyright (Benjamin Farrand, Networks
of Power in Digital Copyright Law and Policy: Political Salience, Expertise and the Legislative Process
(Routledge 2014)) and Benedikt Pirker on proportionality analysis (Benedikt Pirker, Proportionality




This chapter provides an introduction to the theoretical and practical foundations upon
which the study has been based, particularly the essentials necessary to understand
the articles and follow-up discussion. However, the discussion is quite advanced
and the theory has also been developed and expanded. Elementary knowledge of
copyright, EU and constitutional rights law and Internet technology is assumed. To
ensure readability of this overview without consulting the articles, some repetition
has also been necessary. The focus is on the major topics that are fundamental to the
whole study.1
Section 3.1 describes briefly the context of copyright enforcement through inter-
mediaries, the conditions of obligations in general, and summarises the means of
copyright enforcement using connectivity providers. Section 3.2 examines how EU
law and the ECHR affect the national law on copyright enforcement and the impact of
fundamental rights when interpreting enforcement provisions. Section 3.3 examines
the rights and interests of different parties at stake. Section 3.4 discusses the role
of IPR enforcement principles in interpretation. Finally, Section 3.5 summarises and
demonstrates how the foundations create a coherent picture by describing a more
generally applicable proportionality evaluation procedure. Chapter 4 then summarises
key findings of the articles and continues the discussion initiated here.
3.1 Online intermediaries as copyright enforcers
3.1.1 Online copyright enforcement in context
An extremely brief summary and contextualisation may be called for. There are
many ways to enforce copyright: the traditional approach has been to target the
infringer(s). The means have included damage claims and injunctions to stop or
1 On the other hand, for example, the socio-legal framework and private international law were
discussed in the corresponding articles and will not be repeated here.
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prevent infringement.2 Further, a broad concept of infringer allows IPR holders more
options for enforcement. For example in the USA, facilitators such as the creators
of peer-to-peer networking software have been found to infringe through secondary
liability standards. More extensive liability for various third parties has also been
argued.3 Even if the third-parties have been subject to some obligations in the offline
environment,4 online environment has brought further options for enforcement that
have previously been unavailable or difficult in particular when it comes to prevention
rather than ex-post mitigation.5
In particular, online intermediaries such as Internet platforms or connectivity
providers have been leveraged in one way or another.6 Direct means include using
the provider’s customer data to identify the subscriber whose connection has been
used for a particular infringing act and suing them or otherwise trying to change
their usage patterns ex-post. Indirect means include website blocking injunctions or
other measures that try prevent undesirable behaviour ex-ante. As a requirement for
avoiding liability, some types of intermediaries have been assigned ‘duties of care’ and
they have had to implement mechanisms such as a notice-and-takedown procedure or
content filtering. Because some approaches have not been successful or have turned
out to public relations (PR) disasters – such as mass litigation against users in the USA
– IPR holders have, as appropriate, adjusted their approach and chosen some other
means of enforcement.7
That said, we can move on to examine the specifics of provider responsibilities
in more detail. Section 3.1.2 discusses and contrasts these in general, while Section
3.1.3 examines only connectivity providers and Section 3.1.4 merely website blocking.
2 On injunctions, see n 96 and references.
3 See eg Mark A Lemley and R Anthony Reese, ‘Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement without
Restricting Innovation’ (2004) 56 Stanford LR 1345; Ronald J Mann and Seth R Belzley, ‘The
Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability’ (2005) 47 William & Mary LR 239.
4 For example, freezing assets (eg, ‘Mareva injunction’ in the UK), disclosing information (eg,
‘Norwich Pharmacal order’ in the UK), or involvement of freight carriers in customs procedures;
see Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013
concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and repealing Council Regulation
(EC) No 1383/2003 [2013] OJ L181/15.
5 The reasons for increased involvement of connectivity providers are discussed in Section 4.2.3.
On the evolution of enforcement measures, see eg Peter K Yu, ‘Digital copyright enforcement
measures and their human rights threats’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human
Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2015) 462–67.
6 See eg John Blevins, ‘Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expansion of Secondary
Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms’ (2013) 34 Cardozo LR 1821, 1827–29. Some intermedi-
aries were also referred to in Section 1.
7 These approaches are elaborated in Article I and summarised in Section 4.1.
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3.1.2 Liability exemptions and obligations
While Internet service providers are not liable for information transmitted or stored,
they may be subject to various obligations.8 As connectivity and hosting providers
provide a different kind of service, the conditions and scope of potential obligations
also differ.9
The liability exemption of connectivity providers is based on neutrality, passivity
and the technical nature of automatic communication. This implies a lack of knowl-
edge and control over the information transmitted. Deliberate collaboration in order
to undertake illegal acts is not exempted.10
The exemption of hosting providers is conditional on the lack of awareness or
knowledge of illegal activities or facts or circumstances from which illegality is ap-
parent. Upon obtaining awareness of illegal material, hosting providers also need to
act expeditiously to remove or disable access to it. The exemption does not apply if
the provider has authority or control over the user and the content.11 The awareness
of facts relating to illegality appears to have been the grounds for excluding the
operators of sites such as The Pirate Bay from the hosting defence; even if material on
the site might not infringe, its role in overall infringing activities has been apparent.12
8 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal
Market [2000] OJ L178/1, Arts 12–14; Martin Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties:
The Case of Website Blocking’ (2013) 4 JIPITEC 116, paras 4–6; Martin Husovec and Miquel
Peguera, ‘Much Ado About Little: Privately Litigated Internet Disconnection Injunctions’ (2015)
46 IIC 10, 13, 15–16; Christina Angelopoulos, ‘Are blocking injunctions against ISPs allowed in
Europe? Copyright enforcement in the post-Telekabel EU legal landscape’ (2014) 9 JIPLP 812,
813; Urs Gasser and Wolfgang Schulz, Governance of Online Intermediaries: Observations From a
Series of National Case Studies (The Berkman Center for Internet & Society Research Publication
Series 2015-5, 2015) 4–6.
9 On these differences, see Opinion in C-324/09 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2010:757, paras 138–46,
correctly questioning the application of the liability exemptions of connectivity providers to hosting
providers in Joined Cases C-236–238/08 Google France EU:C:2010:159, paras 113–14. Also see
Patrick Van Eecke, ‘Online service providers and liability: A plea for a balanced approach’ (2011)
48 CMLR 1455, 1481–83.
10 E-Commerce Directive (n 8) Recitals 42–44 and Art 12. The provisions and their impact will be
further clarified when the CJEU answers the nine questions posed in Case C-484/14 Mc Fadden;
see Martin Husovec, ‘Munich Court Asks CJEU about Injunctions Against Operators of Open WiFis’
(13 October 2014) 〈http://www.husovec.eu/2014/10/munich-court-asks-cjeu-about.html〉.
11 E-Commerce Directive (n 8) Recital 46 and Art 14.
12 For a summary, see references in Article IV (at 285) and Dimitris Kioupis, ‘Criminal Liability
on the Internet’ in Irini A Stamatoudi (ed), Copyright enforcement and the Internet (Kluwer Law
International 2010) 247–49. When torrent files are no longer served on the site and only ‘Magnet’
links being used, the website operators may no longer have knowledge of the copyrighted material,
see Ellen Marja Wesselingh, ‘Website Blocking: Evolution or Revolution? 10 Years of Copyright
Enforcement by Private Third Parties’ in Internet, Law and Politics. A Decade of Transformations.
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics, Barcelona, 3–4 July,
2014 (UOC-Huygens Editorial 2014) 62. This will have an impact on proportionality evaluation.
See also eg Rita Matulionyte and Mindaugas Lankauskas, ‘BitTorrent Loses Again: A Recent
Lithuanian BitTorrent Case and What It Means for the Construction of E-Commerce Directive’
(2013) 4 JIPITEC 179; Gaetano Dimita, ‘Six Characters in Search of Infringement: Potential
Liability for Creating, Downloading and Disseminating .Torrent Files’ (2012) 7 JIPLP 466.
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In L’Oréal v eBay, the awareness (rather than neutrality) became more important
and a standard of diligent economic operator (arguably rather a high threshold) was
established as to when illegality should become apparent.13 If the exemptions do not
apply, this does not yet imply the operator is liable; rather, national rules on primary
and secondary liability must be consulted.14
This interpretation on apparent illegality is inapplicable to connectivity providers,
because their liability exemption is not tied to knowledge or awareness.15 Their role is
more passive, neutral, and automatic, and the transmitted data is transitory. They also
have no obligation to act upon obtaining awareness of illegality,16 unless explicitly
required by national law as provided by Article 15(2) of the E-Commerce Directive.17
As examples of activities which do not apply to connectivity providers, hosting
providers may be subjected to ‘duties of care’ in order to detect and prevent certain
types of illegal activity.18 National legislation may also establish procedures targeting
hosting providers governing the removal or disabling access to information (ie, notice-
and-takedown mechanisms).19
13 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474, paras 120–23. Van Eecke (n 9) 1467 reads
this to mean that any diligent economic operator should have been able to note the illegality,
implying a threshold slightly lower than ‘manifestly illegal content’. For similar earlier trends,
see Thibault Verbiest and others, Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries: Final report
(Markt/2006/09/E) (2007) 36–47.
14 Van Eecke (n 9) 1463–64 fn 46; Husovec and Peguera (n 8) 17.
15 Cf. Francesco Rizzuto, ‘The liability of online intermediary service providers for infringements
of intellectual property rights’ (2012) 18 CTLR 4, 13–14, submits the opposite argument by
generalisation and analogous interpretation. For the reasons stated, this seems unconvincing.
Indeed, since the E-Commerce Directive, there have been few serious claims (and no rulings)
to establish a connectivity provider’s liability for information transmitted. Matthias Leistner,
‘Structural aspects of secondary (provider) liability in Europe’ (2014) 9 JIPLP 75, 77–78, also
seems to support ‘balanced and differentiated interpretation of Articles 12 to 15’.
16 Similarly in Newzbin2 [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), para 145.
17 Such duties exist in close to 10 EU states; for example, Belgium and Italy. See Verbiest and
others (n 13) 72–73. At least in Italy, failure to comply has also led to finding the connectivity
provider liable. See Alberto Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators and
Intermediaries: The Position in Italy’ in Christopher Heath and Anselm Kamperman Sanders (eds),
Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: IP Infringers or Innocent Bystanders? (Kluwer Law
International 2012) 92, 96–97.
18 E-Commerce Directive (n 8) Recital 48. These cannot amount to general monitoring, but rather
refer to notification systems or imprecise notifications; see Etienne Montero and Quentin van Enis,
‘Enabling freedom of expression in light of filtering measures imposed on Internet intermediaries:
Squaring the circle?’ (2011) 27 CLSR 21, 29; Martin Senftleben, ‘Breathing Space for Cloud-Based
Business Models: Exploring the Matrix of Copyright Limitations, Safe Harbours and Injunctions’
(2013) 4 JIPITEC 87, paras 49–50. Leistner (n 15) 79 and Senftleben (n 18) para 59, also observe
the follow-up problem: the duty to prevent future infringements might (but should not) effectively
constitute a general monitoring obligation. Generally see also Jan Bernd Nordemann, ‘Liability
for Copyright Infringements on the Internet: Host Providers (Content Providers) – The German
Approach’ (2011) 2 JIPITEC 37. Cf. Leistner (n 15) 88–89, seems to consider the violation of
reasonable duties of care to prevent infringements a significant European factor and standard for
the providers’ secondary liability. His discussion seems to have an implicit hosting provider focus.
19 E-Commerce Directive (n 8) Article 14(3). See Van Eecke (n 9) 1484–85.
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The prohibition on imposing general monitoring obligations applies to all types
of providers. Likewise, a general obligation to seek facts or circumstances indicating
illegal activity is forbidden. However, monitoring (in a fairly narrow sense) ‘in a
specific case’ by orders of national authorities are possible.20 Court or administrative
authority may also require termination of present or prevention of specific future
infringement:
[12(3)]. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority,
in accordance with Member States’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to
terminate or prevent an infringement.
[15(1)]. Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when
providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which
they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances
indicating illegal activity.21
In UPC Telekabel Wien, the Advocate General suggested that a specific kind of
generic blocking order would not amount to a general monitoring obligation but
would be prohibited on other grounds.22 Instead, the CJEU allowed such an order,
but imposed rather severe requirements regarding judicial review.23
In summary, the requirements for obligations are stricter and the exemption is
broader when comparing connectivity providers to hosting providers. The acceptable
measures and obligations differ, with the former usually being more restrictive than
the latter. This implies that exemptions afforded to hosting providers will probably
apply to connectivity providers as well, but obligations might not be applicable. In
any case, careful analysis of similarities and divergences is needed. Issuing orders
grounded on duties of care or knowledge assumed by a diligent economic operator
would not be appropriate either.
20 E-Commerce Directive (n 8) Recital 45 and Art 15(1). Art 18 also requires provision of court
measures ‘designed to terminate any alleged infringement and to prevent any further impairment
of the interests involved.’ See Montero and van Enis (n 18) 28–29. An example of ‘specific
monitoring’ is a temporary request targeted at a specific user and a site to tackle a specific illegal
activity, for example using wire-tapping. See ibid, 30 fn 68–69.
21 E-Commerce Directive (n 8) Recital 45 and Arts 12(3), 13(3) and 14(3). On the other hand, it
is not clear whether a potential future infringement would qualify for pre-emptive relief. See
Husovec and Peguera (n 8) 14–15.
22 Opinion in C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien EU:C:2013:781, para 78. The AG did note that if the
connectivity provider needed to search for duplicate DNS entries for the same site, this would
amount to forbidden monitoring. On the value of AG Opinions for interpretation, see eg Michal
Bobek, ‘A Fourth in the Court: Why Are There Advocates General in the Court of Justice?’ (2012)
14 CYELS 529.
23 The issue of what kind of order might constitute a general monitoring obligation was left open.
See Martin Husovec, ‘CJEU allowed website-blocking injunctions with some reservations’ (2014) 9
JIPLP 631, 634.
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3.1.3 Enforcement mechanisms
Overview
Internet connectivity providers can be used as means of enforcement in various ways,
including in particular:
1. blocking access at the user end,
2. disconnecting the website, and
3. providing subscriber information disclosure or automated mechanisms or dis-
connecting the user.
The apparent purpose is to decrease the degree of user infringement directly or
indirectly. In website blocking at the user end, the means are directed at the infringing
service with the indirect goal of affecting user behaviour. In website disconnection,
the direct target is the operator of the infringing service, and the source connectivity
provider is used as a means to achieve that end. In the third option, the user end
connectivity provider is leveraged in order to target users directly. The means may vary
and include at least 3a) disclosing personal data on infringing subscribers (information
disclosure) for civil or criminal litigation, 3b) automated notification mechanisms, 3c)
automated graduated response mechanisms, and 3d) disconnecting the user with an
injunction.24 A sketch is provided in Figure 3.1, demonstrating which mechanisms are















Figure 3.1: Different mechanisms as applied to different providers
As a special case of website blocking,26 Norway has adopted legislation that also
allows ‘impeding access’ to a website.27 This might be implemented by rate-limiting
24 These were summarised in Article I. Legislative efforts in Finland were discussed in Article II.
Article III described 3a). Articles IV, V and VI focused on 1). Articles V and VI included some
discussion of 2) as well.
25 For comparative purposes, the figure also includes a hosting provider and the related notice-and-
takedown procedure.
26 The term ‘website’ is intentionally somewhat opaque. See Section 2.1 and n 9 therein.
27 Norwegian Copyright Act, Section 56c. In English, see eg TorrentFreak, ‘Pirate Site Blocking
Legislation Approved by Norwegian Parliament’ (1 May 2013) 〈http://torrentfreak.com/pirate-site-
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access to the targeted website down to a crawl. This is indistinguishable from blocking
when applied to indexing or other low-volume websites.28 Applying it to video
streaming sites or peer-to-peer users sharing content might be feasible in theory.
However, the large number of targets and their rate of change makes applying the
measure impractical and impossible.29 In consequence, these mechanisms are unlikely
to get traction, and further examination is unnecessary.
Impact on EU fundamental freedoms, ie, the free movement of people, goods,
services, and capital, seems to be minimal or at best arguable. Specifically, two
scenarios could be argued. First, if the laws of Member States differed on which
websites are illegal and eligible for blocking with the result that a legitimate business
in another Member State would be blocked. However, there have been only a few cases
in which indexing sites have been considered legal.30 Typically, linking to metadata or
infringing content in peer-to-peer networks has been considered infringing as making
available as per Article 3 of the Infosoc Directive and/or contributing to infringement;
an infringement and liability of the website operator is deemed a prerequisite of
blocking the website.31 The second scenario of fundamental freedoms would occur
in intra-EU blocking, that is, if blocking in another Member State rather than in the
source Member State was considered detrimental to the internal market.32 All in
blocking-legislation-approved-by-norwegian-parliament-130501/〉. In Finland introducing such a
mechanism was also investigated in Anna Vuopala, Luvattomien verkkojakelun vähentämiskeinojen
arviointia. Selvitykset lainvalmistelun tueksi (OKM:n työryhmämuistioita ja selvityksiä 2013:13,
Ministry of Education and Culture 2013) 81–85 as described in Article II (at 228–31), but it was
rejected in the final bill because of the lack of support and uncertain usefulness; see Hallituksen
esitys eduskunnalle laiksi tekijänoikeuslain muuttamisesta (HE 181/2014), 30–31.
28 This is because only a little data needs to be communicated and therefore the limit would need
to be very low, comparable to complete blocking. Potential benefits can be realised only with
high-volume targets. For example an illegal distribution of a copyrighted Blu-Ray video might be
two gigabytes in size. This is in the order of 100,000 times more data than a simple web page.
29 Further, in Finland, all IPR holders also opposed the rate-limiting orders, preferring to use website
blocking instead. Essentially nobody advocated them. See Article II (at 229 and 231).
30 Until 2015 and the passing of a new law, there had been conflicting judgements from Spain;
see Giancarlo Frosio, ‘Spanish Court Criminalizes Linking to Copyright Infringing Materials and
Reverses Consolidated Case Law’ (3 February 2015) 〈http : / / cyberlaw. stanford . edu / blog /
2015/02/spanish-court-criminalizes-linking-copyright-infringing-materials-and-reverses〉 and
references; Irene Palomino, ‘The Spanish hunt for websites providing hyperlinks’ (19 January 2015)
〈http://the1709blog.blogspot.com/2015/01/the-spanish-hunt-for-websites-providing.html〉.
In The Netherlands, in Ziggo and XS4ALL 200.105.418-01, paras 4:7–4:8, the only infringing
content on The Pirate Bay and the grounds for requested blocking (which was then denied)
was considered to be the covers, artwork and such material. On this interpretation, sites which
do not include such material would be legal. In Greece, blocking was also rejected due to
disproportionality, linking not being infringing and other somewhat dubious grounds; see Yannos
Paramythiotis, ‘Website blocking in Greece: how does it work there?’ (28 January 2015) 〈http:
//ipkitten.blogspot.com/2015/01/website-blocking-in-greece-how-does-it.html〉.
31 See Article IV and further in Section 3.1.4.
32 Lucas Feiler, ‘Website Blocking Injunctions under EU and U.S. Copyright Law – Slow Death of the
Global Internet or Emergence of the Rule of National Copyright Law?’ [2012] TTLF Working Papers
13, 67–69, 71, sees the possibility of market fragmentation and creating barriers to legitimate
trade. Similarly, although in a different context, Maria Martin-Prat, ‘The Future of Copyright
in Europe’ (2014) 38 ColumJLA 29, 45, writes that mechanisms of mutual recognition must be
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all, while interpretations of IPR protection with regard to illegality and the website
operator’s liability differ, it appears that operating a website with user-generated links
or content that leads to infringing activities is at the very least suspect in all or almost
all Member States.
Certain general patterns are examined next and enforcement options 2) and 3)
are briefly discussed. Because this study concentrates on blocking access at the user
end, it is covered more extensively in Section 3.1.4.
Disconnecting the website
A hosting provider may be ordered to shut down a website. However, since sites may
be operated without a hosting provider, or targeting the hosting provider may be
difficult, a connectivity provider may also be ordered to block access to the site. The
website might even be a direct subscriber of the provider. When this happens close to
the source, and in particular when a contractual relationship exists, this is referred
to as disconnecting the website. The practical difference is that with disconnection
the website becomes unreachable to everyone; with website blocking, the website
is unreachable only to the users of those providers that have implemented access
blocking.
Because actions against infringing customers at the source are more likely to be
proportionate and the issues differ, this case is not legally very interesting beyond the
point of deeming the site infringing in the first place.33 Indeed, the most important
issue from the perspective of this study is whether and in what cases disconnecting
the website may be deemed a possible, preferable or even required alternative to
blocking at the user end. This is referred to as subsidiarity, meaning the availability
of alternative, ‘primary’ measures, and, if so, the requirement or lack thereof to use
them first before resorting to ‘secondary’ or ‘subsidiary’ measures.34 The key issue is
how this is taken into account in proportionality evaluation.
Disconnecting the website has both drawbacks and advantages compared to block-
ing at the user end.35 The main advantage is its potential efficacy. Disconnection can
established to ‘ensure that an act covered by an exception in one member state is also recognized
as permitted in another member state’.
33 See Article VI (para 43).
34 This is unrelated to the legislative (political) subsidiarity referred to in Consolidated version of the
Treaty on the European Union [2012] OJ C326/1, Art 5. Even at the risk of confusion, the term is
used because it seems to have been relatively well established. See eg Arno Lodder and Nicole
van der Meulen, ‘Evaluation of the Role of Access Providers: Discussion of Dutch Pirate Bay Case
Law and Introducing Principles on Directness, Effectiveness, Costs, Relevance, and Time’ (2013) 4
JIPITEC 130, paras 37, 71; European Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy, ‘Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Rights’ (2011) 〈http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/
injunctions_en.pdf〉 9. Alternatively, one could use a less succint formulation such as ‘hierarchical
position of remedy in our enforcement systems’; see Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent Third
Parties’ (n 8) para 44.
35 For discussion, see also Cartier [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), paras 199–204.
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be quite effective, and working around a properly formulated disconnection order
requires changing providers. In particular, users cannot circumvent blocking through
proxies or using other mechanisms.36 Another major advantage is aggregation and
procedural economy, since there is no need to seek enforcement actions separately
in all the user-end states and against dozens or hundreds of user-end connectivity
providers, but one or a few providers close to the source.37 Further, the issues of
choice of law and jurisdiction can be minimised if an order is given in the state where
the infringing site or its operator is located.38
The main drawback is that an insistent website operator might switch providers
and continue as it were from elsewhere. However, such an operator is probably
resourceful and will find ways to circumvent blocking at the user end. Cloud-based
virtualised services may make it easier to manage such switching.39 In case of The
Pirate Bay, disconnecting the website has resulted in a game of ‘cat and mouse’ with
disconnections at least in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands. There has also
been pressure on ISPs to reject it as a customer.40 While this strategy might not
suffice against the most persistent offenders, it might be adequate in most cases.41 A
further but rather minor drawback is that a national IPR holder organisation might
need to initiate proceedings abroad, in a foreign court. However, it is difficult to
36 See Article V (at 305) and Article VI (paras 73–77), and eg Joost Poort and others, ‘Baywatch:
Two approaches to measure the effects of blocking access to The Pirate Bay’ (2014) 38 Telecom-
munications Policy 383; Ellen Marja Wesselingh, Arona Cristina, and Nicole Tweeboom, To Block
or Not to Block? (2014) 〈http://ssrn.com/abstract=2273453〉. For detail on user and operator
circumventability, see eg Pekka Savola, Internet-operaattoreihin kohdistetut tekijänoikeudelliset
estomääräykset erityisesti vertaisverkkopalvelun osalta (Licentiate of Science (Technology) thesis,
2013) 99–106, 205; Taina Pihlajarinne, Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus (Lakimiesliiton
Kustannus 2012) 133–35.
37 This is particularly true if the cost of updating the list of blocked websites is high. However, if the
update process is streamlined and the costs of updating are borne by the providers, pursuing and
updating blocking against numerous intermediaries may indeed be the most beneficial option for
the IPR holder; see Cartier (n 35) paras 202–04.
38 See Article V (at 302–03).
39 TorrentFreak, ‘Pirate Bay Moves to The Cloud, Becomes Raid-Proof’ (17 October 2012) 〈http:
//torrentfreak.com/pirate-bay-moves-to-the-cloud-becomes-raid-proof-121017/〉. However, the
site went down in December 2014 after a police raid in Sweden; see TorrentFreak, ‘Swedish Police
Raid The Pirate Bay, Site Down’ (9 December 2014) 〈http://torrentfreak.com/swedish-police-raid-
the-pirate-bay-site-offline-141209/〉. This indicates that it may indeed be efficient to target the
sites at the source, even if the site came back online after 1,5 months and the availability has been
somewhat sporadic since then; see TorrentFreak, ‘The Pirate Bay is Back Online!’ (31 January
2015) 〈http://torrentfreak.com/pirate-bay-back-online-150131/〉; TorrentFreak, ‘The Pirate Bay
Caught Up In a Hosting Whac-A-Mole’ (17 February 2015) 〈http://torrentfreak.com/pirate-bay-
caught-up-in-a-hosting-whac-a-mole-150217/〉.
40 See Article VI (para 43). For Sweden, see para 52. For Germany, see para 63 and note 143 in
particular. See also Christopher M Swartout, ‘Toward a Regulatory Model of Internet Intermediary
Liability: File-Sharing and Copyright Enforcement’ (2011) 31 Northwestern Journal of Interna-
tional Law & Business 499, 517–18. On the other hand, access to The Pirate Bay has been blocked
in a number of other countries, see Article VI (paras 27ff).
41 Indeed, the main argument appears to be that sooner or later the services would be moved
to a jurisdiction which could only be targeted through website blocking; see Cartier (n 35)
paras 201–02.
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see this as a major obstacle, especially when practically only the major IPR holders
have the resources and interest to pursue blocking at all, and they are (or have active
collaboration with) international organisations.42
In UPC Telekabel Wien, the Advocate General opined that subsidiarity would affect
proportionality. If possible, the primary infringer or infringer’s provider should be
targeted. This would be the case in particular if an upstream provider is located in
the EU.43 While the CJEU did not take a stance on proportionality evaluation in the
minimalist answer issued, this still seems like a reasonable approach.44
Targeting the subscribers directly
Article 8 of the Enforcement Directive concerning the right of information has been
argued to oblige Member States to legislate a mechanism allowing subscriber infor-
mation disclosure requests in order for the IPR holder to contact those users it has
found conducting infringing activities on the Internet.45 However, Promusicae held
that while national legislation may provide such a mechanism if fundamental rights
are adequately balanced, there is no mandate to do so. The judgement seemed to
implicitly accept that Article 8 might cover requests aimed at innocent third-party
intermediaries, which LSG later confirmed. However, because the information re-
quested was personal data, according to Article 8(3)(e) of the Enforcement Directive
the provision is without prejudice to the data protection legislation. In consequence,
the CJEU afforded national legislators and courts leeway on how to strike the balance
between these rights, even by not providing the means at all.46 Indeed, the reasoning
42 See Article VI (para 84 and its notes 191–92 in particular). As noted, Directive 2001/29/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects
of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L167/10, Art 8(2) does not
require a Member State to provide for an injunction against infringers (which is admittedly slightly
different from this context) except when infringement occurs on its territory.
43 UPC Telekabel Wien (Opinion) (n 22) para 57. See Article VI (paras 42, 84) for further references.
44 In Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien EU:C:2014:192, paras 33–45, the CJEU only argued that
user end providers should not be categorically excluded from the scope of injunctions. On the
principle of effectiveness, see n 73. There has been variance in national case law on the role of
subsidiarity. See Article VI (para 42). For example, Feiler (n 32) 47 argues that being ‘best placed
to bring infringing activities to an end’ requires IPR holders to at least establish that an alternative
would be impractical or less effective.
45 See eg Pilar Cámara Águila, ‘Enforcement of IPRs’ in Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou (ed), Codification of
European copyright law: Challenges and perspectives (Kluwer Law International 2012). For commen-
tary, see also Ioannis Iglezakis, ‘The Legal Struggle in the EU against Online Piracy’ in Tatiana-Eleni
Synodinou (ed), Codification of European copyright law: challenges and perspectives (Kluwer Law
International 2012). The Commission has held that Article 8 also includes intermediaries such as
Internet service providers, but that applicability may be restricted by privacy requirements. See
Commission, ‘Analysis of the application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the Member
States’ (Commission staff working document) SEC(2010) 1589 final 11.
46 Case C-275/06 Promusicae EU:C:2008:54, paras 58–60, 70; Case C-557/07 LSG EU:C:2009:107,
para 41. The approach and Swedish way of conducting multifactor assessment was later ac-
cepted in Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audio EU:C:2012:219, paras 57–60. For commentaries, see eg
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in LSG included a healthy dose of scepticism: ‘the Court did not immediately rule out
the possibility that Member States may, pursuant to Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48,
place Internet access providers under a duty of disclosure’ (emphasis added).47
Subscriber information disclosure has been used successfully at least in Finland,
Sweden, Austria, The Netherlands, Germany, France, Ireland, and the UK.48 Attempts
have been unsuccessful because of data protection at least in Belgium, Spain, and
Italy.49 In some countries such as Ireland and the UK, disclosure has been made
subject to safeguards.50 Indeed, safeguards are a good idea given the typical lack of
user representation in the court.51 This is particularly true for so-called ‘copyright
trolling’, where inter alia insinuations of potential publicity of legal proceedings for
distribution of ‘sensitive’ material are used to coax subscribers to discreetly settle the
issue for, say, 500–2000 euro.52
Irini A Stamatoudi, ‘Data Protection, Secrecy of Communications and Copyright: Conflicts and
Convergences – The Example of Promusicae v. Telefonica’ in Irini A Stamatoudi (ed), Copyright
enforcement and the Internet (Kluwer Law International 2010); Marianna Rantou, ‘The growing
tension between copyright and personal data protection on an online environment: The position
of Internet Service Providers according to the European Court of Justice’ (2012) 3 EJLT, 8–9;
Alexander Tsoutsanis, ‘Privacy and piracy in cyberspace: justice for all’ (2013) 8 JIPLP 952,
953–54; Xavier Groussot, ‘Rock the KaZaA: Another Clash of Fundamental Rights’ (2008) 45
CMLR 1745. In particular, ibid, 1749–50, 1756–57, 1764, echoing AG Opinion, argued that
disclosing personal traffic data for civil proceedings should not have been possible.
47 LSG (n 46) para 41. In that case, the CJEU did not take a stance on proportionality or the balance
of fundamental rights except by requiring that they must be ensured.
48 Verbiest and others (n 13) 77–79; Stamatoudi (n 46) 225–28; Maureen Daly, ‘Is there an
entitlement to anonymity? A European and international analysis’ (2013) 35 EIPR 198, 201–07;
Tsoutsanis (n 46) 955; Van Eecke (n 9) 1491–92; Bonnier Audio (n 46); Alles kann besser werden
BGH I ZB 80/11.
49 Verbiest and others (n 13) 81–82; Cámara Águila (n 45) 188–89; Bellan (n 17) 97–100;
Commission, ‘Analysis of the application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the Member
States’ (Commission staff working document) SEC(2010) 1589 final, 12–13; Van Eecke (n 9)
1492; Fanny Coudert and Evi Werkers, ‘In the Aftermath of the Promusicae Case: How to Strike
the Balance?’ (2008) 18 IJLIT 50, 60–61.
50 In Ireland, the information could only be used for copyright infringement litigation and the public
disclosure of the information was limited (Eircom [2005] IEHC 233; Verbiest and others (n 13)
78–79). In the UK, the court has inter alia participated in drafting the letters to be sent to the
alleged infringers and a Consumer Focus representative has also argued before the court; see
Golden Eye [2012] EWCA Civ 1740, paras 11–13, 21–23, 27; Mark Hyland, ‘The seductive interface
between adult entertainment and Norwich Pharmacal relief’ (2013) 18 CommsL 56.
51 This is briefly discussed in nn 216–217 and further elaborated in Section 4.2.1.
52 In the UK House of Lords, this has been called ‘straightforward legal blackmail’, see Nate Anderson,
‘“Straightforward legal blackmail”: A tale of P2P lawyering’ (7 June 2010) 〈http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2010/06/straightforward-legal-blackmail-a-tale-of-p2p-lawyering/〉. Other
types of similar behaviour are also commonplace. This has occurred at least in the US, the UK,
Germany and recently in Finland as well. See previous notes and Golden Eye (n 50); Sandra Schmitz
and Thorsten Ries, ‘Three songs and you are disconnected from cyberspace? Not in Germany where
the industry may ‘turn piracy into profit’’ (2012) 3 EJLT, 5; TorrentFreak, ‘Lawyers Sent 109,000
Piracy Threats in Germany During 2013’ (4 March 2014) 〈http://torrentfreak.com/lawyers-sent-
109000-piracy-threats-in-germany-during-2013-140304/〉; Swartout (n 40) 500, 509–13; Ville
Oksanen, ‘Tekijänoikeustrollaus tuli Suomeen - mutta vain hetkeksi?’ (1 September 2014) 〈http:
//www.tivi.fi/blogit/uutiskommentti/tekijanoikeustrollaus%20tuli%20suomeen%20mutta%
20vain%20hetkeksi/a1007908〉. Traditionally, mass litigation has not generated revenue. For
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Automated notification and graduated response mechanisms are not required by
EU legislation or even optional in the same sense.53 The former display or send
warnings to customers seen to be participating in infringing activities as identified by
IPR holders. The latter include increasingly aggressive sanctions (eg, warnings, an
administrative fine, throttling the speed of the Internet connection, or disconnection
from the Internet). However, Article 2(1) of the Enforcement Directive requires that
a Member State may provide stronger enforcement only ‘in accordance with Article
3’, ie, the IPR enforcement principles to be examined in Section 3.4. Because the
mechanisms concern enforcement of harmonised copyright, such national measures
could also be classified as being of remedial nature. Further, these mechanisms
concern EU legislation on privacy and data protection.54 In consequence, the national
mechanisms are within the scope of EU law, resulting inter alia in the applicability of
the EUCFR.55 This has meant that the national courts may (and in certain cases, are
also obliged to) make a preliminary reference request to the CJEU on whether these
mechanisms have struck a fair balance between rights or include features which are
incompatible with EU law.56
With various notice mechanisms, the IPR holders monitor Internet usage (eg,
peer-to-peer networks for certain copyrighted works). When they detect potentially
infringing activity, they craft a complaint that is sent to the user-end provider, to
be forwarded to the subscriber.57 Experiences of non-escalating ‘notice and notice’
systems are limited. This measure has been used or proposed in a few countries, but
it has typically been felt that such a system would not be effective enough and/or
worth the cost or the violation of the rights of others.58 On the other hand, there are
example, over five years the Recording Industry Association of America spent 90 million dollars in
legal fees only to recoup 2.5 million. See Article I (at 54) and Swartout (n 40) 506–07. On the
other hand, these more egregious approaches seek to generate profit, possibly in addition to the
preventive effect.
53 Ibid, 500–01 deems that the ‘conventional system of private enforcement against primary infringers’
has been a failure for major IPR holders, and has observed a trend toward a ‘regulatory model of
internet intermediary liability’, ie, imposing obligations such as graduated response systems.
54 The applicability of EU fundamental rights to the derogations foreseen in the E-Privacy Directive
(2002/58/EC) when transposing the Enforcement Directive could be read between the lines in
Bonnier Audio (n 46) paras 55–56 and Orla Lynskey, ‘The Data Retention Directive is incompatible
with the rights to privacy and data protection and is invalid in its entirety: Digital Rights Ireland’
(2014) 51 CMLR 1789, 1811.
55 With regard to subscriber information disclosure requests in the UK, for example, the applicability
of Article of 3 Enforcement Directive has been accepted in Golden Eye (n 50) para 18 and the
EUCFR in RFU v Viagogo [2012] UKSC 55, paras 28–32. See Joel Smith and Christopher Sharp,
‘The right to obtain information of wrongdoing versus an individual’s data protection rights: The
UK Supreme Court considers Norwich Pharmacal relief’ (2013) 35 EIPR 170.
56 Similarly, see n 75 on the obligation to refer cases to the CJEU when there is doubt about the
discretion granted to the domestic legislator.
57 This is complicated by the subscriber usually not being liable for Internet use by others; this cannot
be elaborated here, however. See eg Article III (at 887 fn 7) and references.
58 See eg Lilian Edwards, ‘The Role and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of
Copyright and Related Rights’ (2011) 〈http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/
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some experiences from graduated response mechanisms. In the EU, a statutory system
exists in France and a court-approved or voluntary system in Ireland. Subscriber
disconnections have been rejected at least in Germany and the European Parliament
and shunned by the United Nations Human Rights Special Rapporteur.59 There have
been various claims on the efficacy of the graduated response mechanisms, but so
far rigorous research has been inconclusive at best. Giblin has concluded that ‘there
is no evidence demonstrating a causal connection between graduated response and
reduced infringement’. For example, while the monitored peer-to-peer traffic has
decreased, users have moved on to other means of infringement which are not being
monitored.60
User disconnection using an injunction has been relatively rare in case law. While
the national implementation of Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive has been used as
the legal basis for issuing such orders at least in Finland and Spain, it is not obvious
that such a possibility needs to be provided by domestic legislation.61 In particular,
the proportionality of such an order is in doubt, owing to the severe impact on the
subscriber’s fundamental rights, which include in particular the freedom of expression
through access to the Internet and the right to a fair trial. The consequences of the
en/doc/role_and_responsibility_of_the_internet_intermediaries_final.pdf〉 29–30; Marcus
Norrgård, ‘Varningsbrev på Internet – några kommentarer angående ett aktuellt lagförslag’ [2010]
JFT 638. The inadequacy of ‘notice and notice’ mechanisms without any escalation was also
discussed in Article II (at 211–12, 229) and then affirmed in Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi
tekijänoikeuslain muuttamisesta (HE 181/2014), 29. In consequence, no further exploration is
warranted.
59 A statutory basis exists in the UK, but adoption has not started as of this writing. For a summary,
see eg Yu, ‘Digital copyright enforcement measures and their human rights threats’ (n 5) 467–71;
Rebecca Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2014) 37 ColumJLA 147, 153–59, 166–75;
Alain Strowel, ‘The ‘Graduated Response’ in France: Is It the Good Reply to Online Copyright
Infringements?’ in Irini A Stamatoudi (ed), Copyright enforcement and the Internet (Kluwer Law
International 2010); Edwards (n 58) 30–49; Schmitz and Ries (n 52); Frank La Rue, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on key trends and challenges to the right of all individuals to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds through the Internet (United Nations Human Rights
Council (A/HRC/17/27), 2011) 21; Coudert and Werkers (n 49) 54–56.
60 Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (n 59) 183ff, esp. 207–08 and for a summary, Rebecca
Giblin, ‘When ISPs Become Copyright Police’ (2014) 18 IEEE Internet Computing 84, 84–85. See
also TorrentFreak, ‘U.S. ‘Strikes’ Scheme Fails to Impact Piracy Landscape’ (11 January 2015)
〈http://torrentfreak.com/u-s-strikes-scheme-fails-to-impact-piracy-landscape-150111/〉. For
a similar, more general pattern of unreliability of the research on piracy, see Ian Hargreaves,
Digital Opportunity: Review of Intellectual Property and Growth (2011) 69–76; Benjamin Farrand,
Networks of Power in Digital Copyright Law and Policy: Political Salience, Expertise and the Legislative
Process (Routledge 2014) 113–17.
61 See Husovec and Peguera (n 8) 21ff; Pekka Savola, ‘Internet-operaattori ja perusoikeudet’ in
Tapani Lohi (ed), Oikeustiede–Jurisprudentia XLVI:2013 (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2013)
154–56. Feiler (n 32) 47ff argues that Article 8(3) and the ‘best placed’ in Recital 59 implies that
the intent is not to cover actions in the same state, because the local jurisdiction offers preferable
alternatives to addressing the problem. See also Section 3.1.4. Given the differences from website
blocking, it seems most convenient to cover user disconnections here even though the same legal
basis may be applied to both actions.
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lack of representation in court are particularly harsh in this case. Disproportionality is
also manifest, because less drastic measures can usually be pursued instead.62
3.1.4 Website blocking injunction
This study focuses in particular on website blocking injunctions at the user end. Ideally,
extensive coverage would be useful. However, a concern for brevity and avoiding
repetition of the articles precludes this. Therefore, the subjects already addressed in
the articles are only listed as an introduction and are summarised later in Section 4.1.
First it is necessary to describe the legal basis of injunctions.63 The second ele-
ment is the grounds for an injunction, ie, what sites may be eligible for blocking.64
Discussion will be quite brief.
The third and quintessential part is proportionality evaluation.65 Effectiveness and
cost or burden in general are crucial. If blocking is ineffective, it cannot mitigate the
economic losses of IPR holders; such blocking would only have symbolic value.66 On
the other hand, if blocking is cheap, non-intrusive, and precise, it usually does not
have major immediate impact on providers and users. The more intrusive, expensive
or infocused blocking becomes, the stronger its justification and effectiveness needs to
be in order to be proportionate. Indeed, the underlying objective may in practice be
62 In Finland, subscriber information is disclosed at an earlier point in the proceedings. Therefore, it
is difficult to see how contacting the subscriber would not (in all likelihood) resolve the issue; suing
the user would also be possible. On the other hand, in Spain subscriber information disclosure
was not available in civil proceedings and a criminal investigation would have been needed. It
is not obvious why that would not have been more appropriate. Further, the court should have
rejected the disconnection request because it appears to be more disproportionate than the already
rejected information disclosure. However, the appeals court did not even consider proportionality,
and comparatively, in Finnish courts the evaluation of proportionality has also been marginal. For
lengthier discussion, see Husovec and Peguera (n 8); Savola, ‘Internet-operaattori ja perusoikeudet’
(n 61) 154–56. In contrast to the five ‘routine’ ex-parte disconnection decisions in Finland, in
Disconnection and temporary seizure District Court of Oulu decisions of 14 February and 27 March
2008 (H 08/1438) it was held that the court could not evaluate the impact of disconnection on
the subscriber’s fundamental rights ex-parte, while also taking into account the legislator’s intent
that ex-parte injunctions are a special case; the request was denied after receiving the written
statement. In general, most issues with subscriber disconnection as the final step in graduated
response systems are also applicable here; see n 59 with references.
63 This expands slightly on the coverage in Article VI (paras 6–7, 24–26).
64 This was already covered, although largely from the UK perspective, in Article IV. The conditions
and international implications were also scrutinised in Article V. Some discussion of this as a
proportionality evaluation criterion was also present in Article VI.
65 This was the sole subject, and was extensively covered in Article VI and is summarised in Section
4.1. This chapter has also significantly expanded the theoretical and practical framework of
proportionality evaluation; only the conclusions could be included in Article VI (paras 3–4).
66 On similar criticism, see eg Angelopoulos, ‘Are blocking injunctions against ISPs allowed in Europe?’
(n 8) 819–21: ‘It is possible that the court is simply insisting that a symbolic ‘do something’ gesture
must be made to establish that the intermediary is opposed to piracy, even if it cannot achieve real
results.’ Further, she characterises the open-ended order as ‘an obligation to do the least useless
thing the intermediary can think of that is also respectful of the rights of others’.
3.1. ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES AS COPYRIGHT ENFORCERS 33
decisive in how the balancing scale tilts. However, it is not possible to examine this
here except by expanding the analysis in Section 4.2.
The fourth element includes procedural requirements and national modalities. A
number of issues surfaced in the articles, among others, relating to the procedural
situation in court and different conceptions of preliminary injunctions.67 Further,
domestic legislation may include additional factors.68 Such substantive national
rules can be examined in the context of proportionality evaluation or under local
procedural rules depending on their characteristics. This could be a very lengthy topic,
and in-depth discussion is not possible.
Legal basis
Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive includes a mandating rule, obliging Member States
to provide an opportunity for copyright injunctions against intermediaries:69 ‘Member
States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or
related right.’
The lack of fault and liability leads Husovec and Peguera to call these ‘obligatory
co-operation remedies’.70 According to Recital 59, the conditions and modalities are
to be determined in national legislation. Essentially identical provisions also exist for
other intellectual property rights in fine of Article 9(1)(a) and 11 of the Enforcement
Directive (2004/48/EC).71 Indeed, the E-Commerce Directive allows national law
to provide specific injunctions against connectivity providers in Article 12(3), while
prohibiting general monitoring obligations in 15(1). In consequence, blocking is
67 See eg Article VI (para 66).
68 For example, in Finland, the Copyright Act includes a special provision 60c(4) on the inviolability
of third party communications: ‘An injunction to discontinue issued pursuant to this section shall
not prejudice the right of a third person to send and receive messages.’ In other jurisdictions, this
aspect has typically been considered even without an explicit legal rule during proportionality
analysis. Yet, in Sweden and Denmark, for example, these third party interests had not been
adequately taken into account. See Article VI (paras 51–52, 54, 102).
69 For discussion on the scope of injunctions, see Husovec and Peguera (n 8) 13–16.
70 Ibid, 20–21. In contrast, Jaana Pihkala, ‘EUT:n ratkaisujen vaikutuksia piratismin torjumisen
näkökulmasta’ [2014] Defensor Legis 970, 972 argues that the provider is not a third party, but
rather something more, an intermediary whose services are used to infringe copyright, which
justifies reasonable measures through injunction. Obviously completely unrelated parties could
not be issued an injunction in the first place. As will be discussed in Section 4.2.3, responsibilities
are issues of policy and do not necessarily follow from the status of intermediary.
71 The former governs interlocutory injunctions, the latter injunctions awarded after infringement has
been established in court. The Infosoc Directive does not explicitly require interlocutory injunctions
(see Leistner (n 15) 76), and in consequence a provision was added to the Enforcement Directive;
see Commission, ‘Analysis of the application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament
and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the Member
States’ (Commission staff working document) SEC(2010) 1589 final, 15.
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almost exclusively ordered by a court based on the details and modalities of national
legislation.72
The national rules must be designed in such a way that the objective pursued
by the directive may be achieved; that is, the principle of effectiveness is ensured.73
While it has not been decisively established that website blocking orders targeting a
user-end provider must be provided for by national implementation of Article 8(3),
the CJEU has held that such orders may be compatible with EU law.74
National law may specify the grounds for proportionality evaluation or leave
issuing the order completely to the court’s discretion. While this may give the national
court leads on what to evaluate, it is important to note that EU law provides the
minimum (and maximum) level of protection to various competing rights. This will
perforce affect the court’s discretion and evaluation.75
As an example of national law on blocking injunctions,76 the Finnish Copyright Act
(404/1961, as amended by 679/2006) Section 60c(1):77 ‘[...] the court [...] may order
72 Injunctions under the Enforcement Directive are ordered by a judicial authority, while ‘injunction’
seems to imply this in the Infosoc Directive as well. See Corrigendum to Directive 2004/48/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual
property rights [2004] OJ L195/16, Recital 23. E-Commerce Directive (n 8) Article 12(3) allows
‘requir[ing] the service provide to terminate or prevent an infringement’ by ‘administrative
authority’ as well. This raises the question of whether this also applies to website blocking, as
recently introduced in Italy and conducted by AGCOM. As an uncritical commentary, see Federico
Marini-Balestra and Riccardo Tremolada, ‘Enforcement of Online Copyright in Italy: The New
Regulation Adopted by the Italian Communications Authority’ [2014] IPQ 143, and in contrast,
Giancarlo Frosio, ‘AGCOM Regulation Challenged before the Italian Constitutional Court: An
Update’ (3 February 2015) 〈http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/02/agcom-regulation-
challenged-italian-constitutional-court-update〉. It is not possible to discuss this here.
73 L’Oréal v eBay (n 13) para 136; Husovec and Peguera (n 8) 16. In particular, this has been
used to argue that if user-end providers were completely excluded from the scope of potential
intermediaries, copyright protection would be ‘substantially diminished’. See LSG (n 46) para
45; UPC Telekabel Wien (n 44) paras 33–35. On effectiveness as a meta-rule in choosing between
arguable alternative norm interpretations, see also Stefan Mayr, ‘Putting a Leash on the Court of
Justice? Preconceptions in National Methodology v Effet Utile as a Meta-Rule’ (2013) 5 EJLS 8,
17–18.
74 ‘Not precluded’ in UPC Telekabel Wien (n 44) para 64; Husovec, ‘CJEU allowed website-blocking
injunctions with some reservations’ (n 23) 631. That is, the requirement might be fulfilled by
other kinds of injunction as well.
75 The maximum level of protection is reached at least when other competing rights would end up
being infringed by overprotection; see Husovec and Peguera (n 8) 16–20, 31. This is substantiated
in Section 3.3.2 and in particular nn 223 and 227. Further, for example, according to German
Constitutional Court (Transposition of EU law 1 BvL 3/08), a preliminary reference to the CJEU is
required if a national court needs to determine the exact scope of discretion of the Member State
implementing EU law. See Daniel Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter? The Court of Justice,
national courts and the new framework of fundamental rights protection in Europe’ (2013) 50
CMLR 1267, 1301 fn 128.
76 For more examples, see eg Verbiest and others (n 13) 53–56.
77 Further details are provided in this and a number of subsections of the law. In the proposed
bill, Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi tekijänoikeuslain muuttamisesta (HE 181/2014), final
injunctions, interlocutory injunctions with a known website operator and injunctions regarding
unknown websites are differentiated into distinct Sections. The consideration of unreasonability
also explicitly includes the users. Nonetheless, there are no major changes from this perspective.
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[... the] intermediary to discontinue [...] unless this can be regarded as unreasonable
in view of the rights of the person making the material available to the public, the
intermediary and the author.’ In the preparatory papers of the Constitutional Law
Committee of the Parliament, it was noted inter alia that the order can be given only if
doing so is not unreasonable for the parties. The constitutional proportionality (stricto
sensu) also requires that the order must not affect communication to the public more
than strictly necessary for protecting copyright.78 The Law Committee also stated that
third parties must not suffer from the dispute, and that the prohibition on endangering
legal communications is inviolable.79
On the other hand, many countries have transposed Article 8(3) in a very minimal
fashion, almost verbatim, and without substantial additional details or modalities.80
Finland is one of the few examples of rather detailed legislation. Indeed, domestic
legislation has not typically exercised the option of providing modalities and even
travaux préparatoires may be lacking. In consequence, national constitutional systems
usually provide little additional input to the evaluation.
Grounds for blocking
Which websites may be eligible for blocking? Strangely enough, there has been
little critical scrutiny of this issue. This is particularly troublesome in the context
of peer-to-peer networking related sites which only index and host user-uploaded
descriptions and links to third-party trackers. This is because such sites include no or
very little content that would as such infringe copyright.81
There have been a few cases of peer-to-peer indexing websites where no infringe-
ment has been found. On the other hand, the precise grounds for blocking have not
necessarily been elaborated by a national court. When website operator liability has
been held, it has typically been based either on secondary liability (assisting in the
main infringement by users, for example, in Sweden) or as joint criminal liability
(for example, in Finland). However, direct infringement of ‘making available’ right
has occasionally also been found.82 All in all, courts seem to have had difficulty in
78 Perustuslakivaliokunnan lausunto 15/2006, 2. The committee acts in a role similar to most
constitutional courts and its statements are relatively significant in the interpretation of the law.
79 Lakivaliokunnan lausunto 5/2005, 10.
80 This is the case at least in the UK, Ireland, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria, as observed
during the research in Article VI.
81 See Article IV (at 280, 285) and Article VI (paras 70–72). Also see Dimita (n 12). On the other
hand, Ziggo and XS4ALL (n 30) held that only the images of artworks, covers, etc. constituted
infringement and as such were insufficient grounds for blocking the site; see n 30.
82 See Article IV (at 285) and n 30. On the conditions of ‘actual knowledge’ and mens rea, see eg
Kioupis (n 12) 247–49. For accounts of these cases in English, see eg Jerker Edström and Henrik
Nilsson, ‘The Pirate Bay Verdict – Predictable, and Yet...’ (2009) 31 EIPR 483; Mikko Manner,
Topi Siniketo, and Ulrika Polland, ‘The Pirate Bay Ruling – When The Fun and Games End’ (2009)
20 EntLR 197; Pessi Honkasalo, ‘Criminal Proceedings against the Administrators of a BitTorrent
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identifying and articulating a sound legal basis on which to base the liability of the
operators whose actions are instinctively deemed illicit. For example, Angelopoulos
calls this ‘legal gymnastics that fail to convince’.83 While for a legal realist the liabil-
ity and eligibility of blocking seems to be given, more thorough scrutiny would be
appropriate from an ideal perspective.
The liability of website operators does not necessarily arise, given that blocking
may be sought prior to or instead of targeting the infringer. Therefore, there may not
be a court decision on the illegality of the website (as in the case of The Pirate
Bay).84 Further, given that the website operator is not typically represented in
the proceedings, the interests must be taken into consideration in some other way.
These pose difficulties for courts which are more accustomed to typical adversial
proceedings.85
Demarcating websites as eligible and ineligible for blocking, or more precisely
identifying the conditions of eligibility, is beyond the scope of this study in particular
when it comes to liability for indirect linking.86 However, it seems obvious to require
liability as a basis; otherwise, any website would be in scope. One additional special
case is worth mentioning, however. Given that there are hundreds or even thousands
of site-specific or generic proxy sites offering ways to circumvent website blocking
(such as using www.pirateproxy.net to access www.thepiratebay.se), one may wonder
what would be required to block these proxies, or even websites providing instructions
Tracker: Finreactor KKO 2010:47’ (2010) 32 EIPR 591; Matulionyte and Lankauskas (n 12). In
Finnish, see eg Savola, Internet-operaattoreihin kohdistetut tekijänoikeudelliset estomääräykset
erityisesti vertaisverkkopalvelun osalta (n 36) 154–76. As was observed in Article IV (at 284), the
conceptions of secondary liability vary greatly across jurisdictions; see Allen N Dixon, ‘Liability
of users and third parties for copyright infringements on the Internet: Overview of international
developments’ in Alain Strowel (ed), Peer-to-peer file sharing and secondary liability in copyright
law (Edward Elgar 2009).
83 See Article IV (at 286) and Christina Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising
Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright Infringement in Europe’ [2013] IPQ 253, 256.
Similarly, Tuomas Mylly, ‘Criminal enforcement and European Union law’ in Christophe Geiger
(ed), Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2012) 215, wonders how well
these constructs fit the nullum crimen, nulla poena principle: ‘These Nordic cases stretch the
doctrines of copyright and criminal law to enable the criminal condemnation of services intuitively
regarded as ‘illegal distribution’.’
84 Basing injunctions on earlier judgements may also be problematic, because the structure, activities,
and/or operators may have changed in the meanwhile. This has occurred, for example, with The
Pirate Bay. See eg Savola, Internet-operaattoreihin kohdistetut tekijänoikeudelliset estomääräykset
erityisesti vertaisverkkopalvelun osalta (n 36) 166–69, and on the changing role of administrators
and moderators, see TorrentFreak, ‘The Pirate Bay is Back Online!’ (n 39); TorrentFreak, ‘The
Pirate Bay Caught Up In a Hosting Whac-A-Mole’ (n 39).
85 For further discussion, see n 94 and references therein.
86 Given that the EU case law is far from settled, this would be a topic for a thesis of its own. For
preliminary considerations, see Article IV, Section 4 and n 8 therein, and Pekka Savola, ‘Teki-
jänoikeuden vaikutus Internet-linkittämiseen erityisesti EU-oikeuden valossa’ in Päivi Korpisaari
(ed), Viestintäoikeuden vuosikirja 2014 (Forum Iuris, forthcoming 2015).
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on how to circumvent blocking.87 In practice, the further ‘removed’ the site is from
the main infringement, the harder it will be to prove that the operator is participating
in infringing activities. In consequence, the chances of ineligibility increase. Freedom
of expression would also imply that some threshold must be met when it comes to
merely providing instructions or hosting generic sites. Yet in practice these issues may
not materialise, since it is quite probable that many such proxy sites share IP addresses
with other third-party hosts. It has been held that this would disqualify blocking –
except with more advanced methods – because of inappropriate collateral damage.88
The huge number of these sites may also make pursuing these not worthwhile.89
Finally, the characterisation of the illegality of the website also affects the measures
adopted. If visiting the site does not infringe as such, the primary objective must be to
affect only the infringing activity. In such a case, denying access to those users who are
unlikely to use the website for infringing purposes would lack legitimacy. Examples of
such use might include technical machine-to-machine communications, government
officers, researchers, and even possibly enterprise users. On the other hand, the
strict requirement of affecting only infringing users might be untenable, because
distinguishing users and their activities precisely would require a system as intrusive
and burdensome as the one rejected in Scarlet Extended. This might substantiate
imposing restrictions only for consumer broadband connections or in some other
limited manner. In summary, one should aim at identifying the infringing activities
and then the required steps to mitigate them while preserving other activities.90
87 See discussion in Article IV (at 287). In comparison, in a case of the Supreme Administrative Court
of Finland, instructions on how to circumvent the blocking of child abuse websites was used as
one very questionable ground for blocking such a site; see Pekka Savola and Riku Neuvonen, ‘KHO
2013:136 – Verkkotunnusluettelon julkistamisen katsottiin edesauttavan lapsipornon levittämistä’
(2014) 112 Lakimies 114, 117. Yet another difficulty raised in Article IV concerns multiple layers
of linking (see eg Alain Strowel and Vicky Hanley, ‘Secondary liability for copyright infringement
with regard to hyperlinks’ in Alain Strowel (ed), Peer-to-peer file sharing and secondary liability in
copyright law (Edward Elgar 2009) 98–104); this cannot be further elaborated here.
88 See Article VI (paras 86–88 and references); Wesselingh (n 12) 72.
89 As discussed in Article IV (at 287 fnn 110–11), typically proxy site operators have been targeted
directly rather than through blocking access to them; see TorrentFreak, ‘UK ISPs Quietly Block
More Torrent Site Proxies’ (23 June 2014) 〈http://torrentfreak.com/uk- isps- quietly- block-
torrent-site-proxies-140623/〉. The measures have sometimes lacked lasting effect, however;
see TorrentFreak, ‘Immunicity Resurrected by Anti-Censorship Supporters’ (11 August 2014)
〈http://torrentfreak.com/immunicity-resurrected-by-anti-censorship-supporters-140810/〉.
90 See Article VI (para 71).
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Procedural requirements and national modalities
Article 9 of the Enforcement Directive includes a number of requirements for national
legislators on provisional measures.91 These require (with some simplification) in the
corresponding sub-paragraphs that:92
(3) the applicant may be required to provide evidence that it is the IPR holder in
question, and the right is being infringed or such infringement is imminent;
(4) in appropriate cases, measures may be ordered ex-parte in particular when
any delay would cause irreparable damage to the IPR holder. In such a case,
the parties will be informed after execution at the latest and measures will be
reviewed after notification;
(5) measures are revoked or cease to have effect unless proceedings are initiated on
the merits of the case within a reasonable period of at most 31 days;
(6) measures may be subject to requiring an appropriate security or an equivalent
assurance for possible prejudice caused in the event of (7);
(7) when measures are revoked, lapse, or are deemed unfounded, the applicant
may be ordered to pay compensation for any injury caused.
These include some ambiguities that are due to trying to apply the same generic
provisions against infringers and intermediaries without fully considering which
are appropriate in what combinations. These ambiguities may also infest national
provisions but cannot be addressed here. One specific example is provided. The
term ‘defendant’ might refer to the intermediary and/or the infringer. In particular,
in Art 9(4) it would seem strange, given the amount of technical detail needed,
that the injunction could be issued without hearing the intermediary.93 If so, in Art
9(5) it would not be clear what qualifies as a decision on the merits. On the other
91 There are no requirements for final injunctions in Article 11. Some national legislations (such as
Finland) have adopted some of them to apply to both kinds of injunction.
92 See eg Cámara Águila (n 45) 188–89. Many of these have strong similarities to Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994, Article 50, yet the novelty is that these
are also available against third-party intermediaries; see Commission, ‘Analysis of the application
of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the
enforcement of intellectual property rights in the Member States’ (Commission staff working
document) SEC(2010) 1589 final, 13 fn 31.
93 In contrast, according to Finnish travaux préparatoires the intermediary must always be heard. On
the other hand, the argument in UPC Telekabel Wien (n 44) para 52 seemed to be that a generic
blocking order better satisfies the provider’s freedom to conduct a business, because the provider
has more flexibility in choosing the best means to achieve the required outcome; see also Husovec,
‘CJEU allowed website-blocking injunctions with some reservations’ (n 23) 632. This ignores the
provider’s interest in legal certainty that results in the provider usually preferring a specific order
provided that it has participated in drawing up the terms. Nonetheless, this implies that at least
specific ex-parte injunctions are likely incompatible with the provider’s fundamental rights.
3.1. ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES AS COPYRIGHT ENFORCERS 39
hand, in many countries, separate proceedings have not been initiated.94 In practice,
this source of variation manifests itself in at least three related aspects: 1) whether
a ‘decision on the merits’ is made and in which proceedings, 2) the conditions of
having to hear the infringer and, more generally 3) how the interests and fair trial
requirements of unrepresented parties are taken into account.95
It is not possible to cover national procedural modalities here in detail.96 During
the evaluation of national case law, recurring issues were effectiveness (or lack
thereof), the impact of subsidiarity, the effect on the third parties, implementation
costs, the specificity of the order, the procedure for updating the blocking list, and the
special conditions of interlocutory injunctions.97 Suffice it merely to list a number
of points from Finnish law98 in order to demonstrate the multitude of issues to be
resolved.99 The first four transpose Articles 9(4)–(7) of the Enforcement Directive
almost verbatim, with an interpretation that the main infringer rather than the
provider is ‘the defendant’. The others are issues observed from the case law or from
the provisions. If national rules do not include explicit provisions, solutions must be
found in more general procedural principles or law.100
1. Conditions of preliminary vs ordinary injunctions;
94 See Article IV (at 287) and Article V (at 290 and 307) including references.
95 The interests of different parties are briefly discussed in Section 3.3 nn 216–217. These issues will
also be revisited in Section 4.2.1.
96 Vast literature exists on proceedings against infringers, but its applicability to innocent third parties
is doubtful (see n 100). It is not possible to examine the differences and similarities between these
in this study. In general, see eg European Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy (n 34); John
Leubsdorf, ‘The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions’ (1978) 91 Harvard LR 525; Mark A Lemley
and Eugene Volokh, ‘Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases’ (1998)
48 Duke LJ 147; Marcus Norrgård, Interimiska förbud i immaterialrätten (Kauppakaari 2002);
Douglas Lichtman, ‘Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief’ (2003) 70 University of
Chicago LR 197; Aditya Swarup, ‘Rethinking American Cyanamid: Procedural and timely justice’
(2012) 31 Civil Justice Quarterly 475.
97 See Article VI (para 66 and in particular note 151).
98 A submitted bill would expand the provision to also cover blocking targets where the website oper-
ator is anonymous and cannot be discerned and to make a few other clarifications, also changing
section numbering; see Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi tekijänoikeuslain muuttamisesta (HE
181/2014). Most importantly, blocking orders against anonymous website operators would have a
limited duration of at most one year; on the other hand, the practical burden of implementation
costs was shifted from the applicant to the provider; see Sivistysvaliokunnan mietintö 26/2014, 6.
99 For more elaborate discussion, see eg Savola, Internet-operaattoreihin kohdistetut tekijänoikeudel-
liset estomääräykset erityisesti vertaisverkkopalvelun osalta (n 36); Marcus Norrgård, ‘Blocking
Web Sites – Experiences from Finland’ in Johan Axhamn (ed), Copyright in a Borderless Online
Environment (Norstedts Juridik 2012); Pihlajarinne, Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus
(n 36) 51–61, 140–48. In general, and from a procedural perspective on preliminary injunctions
against IPR infringers, see Norrgård, Interimiska förbud i immaterialrätten (n 96).
100 Søren Sandfeld Jacobsen and Clement Salung Petersen, ‘Injunctions against mere conduit of
information protected by copyright: A Scandinavian perspective’ (2011) 42 IIC 151, 151 submit
that a proper implementation of Art 8(3) requires rules ‘which take into due consideration the
special aspects related to enforcement of copyright on the internet through [internet connectivity
providers]’. Therefore, general procedural rules might be inadequate. In particular, on the failure
of the safeguards of preliminary injunctions, see ibid, 174.
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2. the requirement to sue the main infringer;
3. the requirement of a security (eg, a ‘cross-undertaking’) to cover potential costs;
4. legal costs in various scenarios depending on merits;
5. specificity and the procedure for making changes to the order;
6. duration of the injunction;
7. appeals procedure (especially regarding preliminary ex-parte injunctions);
8. using ‘pain of fine’ to ensure compliance; and
9. implementation costs.
A number of these are complicated by the intermediary’s lack of liability and even
the legality of implementing blocking without a court order. Therefore, having to
bear the legal costs, for example, may be a difficult issue, to be revisited in general in
Section 4.2.
3.2 The impact of EU law and ECHR
3.2.1 The impact and interaction in general
This section examines European constitutional law as the theoretical framework of
fundamental rights evaluation of copyright enforcement. The key outcome is to
ensure the basis of fundamental rights analysis and proportionality balancing that is
applied in this study. First this section examines how EU law and the ECHR affect the
interpretation of copyright enforcement in particular in a national setting. The crucial
issues are the precedence, the most useful and authoritative legal sources, and the
interaction between legal orders. Section 3.2.2 discusses the concept of proportionality,
in this context meaning the evaluation and balancing while interpreting the law in a
particular case. Section 3.2.3 moves on to examine the legal basis of proportionality
in EU law and focuses in particular on the implications of proportionality of national
measures within the scope of EU law, such as website blocking injunctions.
EU law and domestic interpretation
The Court of Justice of the European Union has adopted three different forms of
supremacy: 1) to answer definitively all questions of European law, 2) determine what
constitutes European law, and 3) exert primacy over all conflicting rules of national
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law.101 However, there are also signs of self-restriction and sensitivity in how far the
CJEU is willing to go with the pursuit of primacy.102 As one significant tool, the CJEU
applies various interpretative methods and the case-by-case selection among them is
also a strategic choice.103 Another strategic approach is that the CJEU chooses how
extensively it wants to answer a preliminary reference request from a domestic court.
Options include a detailed answer, a half-answer by issuing some instructions but
leaving the determination to the national court, and avoiding the question.104 The
CJEU typically answers as narrowly as possible, leaving the rest to be filled in in a later
ruling. Such silent judgements serve as a way to grant a varying degree of deference
to domestic courts and legislation.105
Courts in Member States have an obligation to interpret the national law so far
as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of EU legislation.106 This also
includes a second layer: the domestic implementation of directives must not conflict
with fundamental rights or other principles of EU law either.107 Therefore, in order to
101 See NW Barber, ‘Legal Pluralism and the European Union’ (2006) 12 ELJ 306, 323. See also
Daniel Sarmiento, ‘CILFIT and Foto-Frost: Constructing and Deconstructing Judicial Authority in
Europe’ in Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loic Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law – The
Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 2010). Allan Rosas
and Lorna Armati, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction (2nd edn, Hart 2012) 67–68, distinguish
‘primacy’ from ‘supremacy’, the latter referring to a strict hierarchical sense and invalidation by
the CJEU, but most scholars seem to use them interchangeably. Cf. René Barents, ‘The Precedence
of EU Law from the Perspective of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2009) 5 EuConst 421, 423, deems
‘primacy’ to imply a hierarchy and being the first in rank and uses ‘precedence’ instead.
102 See eg Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino, The Interaction between Europe’s Legal Systems:
Judicial Dialogue and the Creation of Suprenational Laws (Edward Elgar 2012) 239–41.
103 In the context of fundamental rights cases, Janneke Gerards, ‘Judicial Argumentation in Fun-
damental Rights Cases – the EU Courts’ Challenge’ in Ulla Neergaard and Ruth Nielsen (eds),
European Legal Method – in a Multi-Level EU Legal Order (DJØF Publishing 2012) 34–59, 69,
discusses meta-teleological, autonomous, and consensus interpretation, with deference as an
additional means of enhancing the legitimacy of supra-national adjudication. More extensively,
see eg Hanneke Senden, Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel Legal System: An
Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union
(Intersentia 2011).
104 Daniel Sarmiento, ‘The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves: Constitutional Pluralism, Preliminary
References and the Role of Silent Judgments in EU Law’ in Mate Avbelj and Jan Komárek (eds),
Constitutional pluralism in the European Union and beyond (Hart 2012) 286. Further choices
include proceeding without AG opinion when the Court considers that ‘the case raises no new
point of law’ or deciding the matter with a reasoned order if the answer should already be obvious;
see Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice [2012] OJ L265/1, Articles 59(2) and 99; Art 20(5)
of Protocol 3 TEU (n 34).
105 Sarmiento, ‘The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves’ (n 104) 291. On the CJEU not being explicit in
its selection of review and deference, see Janneke Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine’ (2011) 17 ELJ 80; Gerards, ‘Judicial Argumentation’ (n 103) 62–64;
Benedikt Pirker, Proportionality Analysis and Models of Judicial Review (Europa Law Publishing
2013) 246. See also Xavier Groussot, ‘Constitutional Dialogues, Pluralism and Conflicting Identities’
in Mate Avbelj and Jan Komárek (eds), Constitutional pluralism in the European Union and beyond
(Hart 2012) 338–39.
106 Case 14/83 Von Colson EU:C:1984:153, para 26; Case C-106/89 Marleasing EU:C:1990:395;
Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer EU:C:2004:584, paras 113, 117.
107 Promusicae (n 46) para 68; UPC Telekabel Wien (n 44) para 46; Rosas and Armati (n 101) 74.
Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, ‘European Fundamental Rights, Private Law, and Judicial Governance’ in
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discern the true nature and extent of enforcement obligations, it is essential to always
examine CJEU jurisprudence first and only then national legislation, preparatory
materials and case law.108 As an indication of aforementioned ‘silent answers’ and
as will be seen, the CJEU sometimes leaves significant scope to national courts to
interpret the relevant conflicting rights, possibly with qualifications (as in Promusicae).
In some other cases, such as Scarlet Extended, the CJEU has observed an imbalance
between conflicting rights, and has adjudicated itself that a fair balance has not been
struck.109 These balancing approaches are also indicative of how injunction remedies
may be fine-tuned by acknowledging competing interests.110
The approach in Promusicae is less intrusive towards national law and involves
national courts more in fundamental rights dialogue.111 The CJEU usually aims to
assume an interpretation upon which all (or most) could agree.112 Indeed, when
ruling on the compatibility of domestic law provisions with EU law, the CJEU adopts a
comparative approach by examining the requirements and priorities of national legal
orders and ‘gauging the temperature’ to ascertain the acceptability of its decision for
the whole EU.113 Therefore, a comparative methodology is also useful for enriching
Hans-W Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP 2014) 121–22, describes
this as the ‘double indirect horizontal effect of EU fundamental rights’. The first layer corresponds
to interpreting EU directives in the light of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European
Union [2000] OJ C364/1, and the second layer national implementation being consistent with EU
fundamental rights.
108 See Section 2.4 and n 61 therein. The CJEU may often bypass the national legislator; see Kaarlo
Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas: The Tension Between Reason and Will in Law (Ashgate 2011) 243.
109 Leonard FM Besselink, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’ (2012) 〈http://www.
fide2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=94〉 23. Similarly on the CJEU examining only the first layer in
Promusicae, and focusing on the second layer in Scarlet Extended, see Colombi Ciacchi (n 107)
123.
110 Christine Godt, ‘Intellectual Property and European Fundamental Rights’ in Hans-W Micklitz (ed),
Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP 2014) 233. Similarly, on the necessity of
dynamism, and in consequence balancing, because copyright law must strike a balance between
competing interests, especially when it comes to copyright enforcement, see Orit Fischman Afori,
‘Proportionality – A New Mega Standard in European Copyright Law’ (2014) 45 IIC 889, 892, 899,
906.
111 Aida Torres Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication
(OUP 2009) 112–17; Clemens Ladenburger, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’
(2012) 〈http://www.fide2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=88〉 16, 43, also giving further examples.
For criticism of rejecting AG opinions providing a solution in the first phase, see eg ibid, 43 fn
198; Peter Oliver, ‘The Protection of Privacy in the Economic Sphere Before the European Court of
Justice’ (2009) 46 CMLR 1443, 1482–83.
112 Torres Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication
(n 111) 113. Gerards, ‘Judicial Argumentation’ (n 103) 58, refers to this as a ‘negative’ manner of
autonomous interpretation: providing a narrow interpretation or no interpretation at all because
of a lack of European consensus.
113 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking Legal Orders in the European Union and Comparative Law’ (2003) 52
ILQ 873, 898. While the signs of this may not be clearly apparent in the decision (even, ‘too visible
signs’ may be erased), it is typical for AG Opinions to include this kind of analysis (ibid, 874–76).
3.2. THE IMPACT OF EU LAW AND ECHR 43
the supply of solutions by offering ‘the scholar of critical capacity the opportunity of
finding the better solution for this time and place’.114
Finally, international IPR agreements, the TRIPS agreement115 in particular, con-
cluded by both Member States and the EU are taken into due regard in interpretation.
However, these do not have direct effect and the legality of EU measures is not re-
viewed against them.116 Nonetheless, directives must be interpreted, so far as possible,
in a manner consistent with the international law that the directive is intended to
implement, in particular the Berne Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the
TRIPS agreement.117 In this context, the TRIPS agreement and other treaties have
only limited impact since there are no explicit provisions on remedies against Internet
intermediaries and the CJEU has held that the treaties do not require them as such.118
The relative importance of EUCFR in contrast to ECHR
There has been ample literature on the constitutionalisation of IPR.119 Godt submits
that the ‘EUCFR is likely to become a central tool for the framing of conflicts in the
114 Ibid, 879, citing Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr,
3rd edn, OUP 1998) 15. The comparative method is applied in Article VI in particular.
115 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 15 April 1994.
116 See eg Rosas and Armati (n 101) 60–61, 84.
117 Promusicae (n 46) para 60; Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL EU:C:2011:631, para 189.
118 For example, in Promusicae (n 46) para 60, it was held that ‘while [the international agreements]
require the effective protection of intellectual property rights and the institution of judicial
remedies for their enforcement, they do not contain provisions which require those directives to be
interpreted as compelling the Member States to lay down an obligation to communicate personal
data in the context of civil proceedings’. There have been provisions on proposed or adopted bi-
or multilateral trade agreements, but these mainly try to expand the measures elsewhere instead
of directly affecting the EU. Therefore, the trade agreements are not crucial in this study. See eg
Xavier Seuba, ‘Checks and Balances in the Intellectual Property Enforcement Field: Reconstructing
EU Trade Agreements’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Constructing European Intellectual Property:
Achievements and new perspectives (Edward Elgar 2013); Josef Drexl, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan,
and Souheir Nadde-Phlix (eds), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better
or Worse? (Springer 2014).
119 See eg Fischman Afori (n 110); Willem Grosheide, ‘General introduction’ in Willem Grosheide (ed),
Intellectual Property and Human Rights: A Paradox (Edward Elgar 2010) 19–31; Jonathan Griffiths,
‘Constitutionalising or harmonising? The Court of Justice, the right to property and European
copyright law’ (2013) 28 ELR 65; Alexander Peukert, ‘Intellectual Property as an End in Itself?’
(2011) 33 EIPR 67; Enrico Bonadio, ‘File Sharing, Copyright and Freedom of Expression’ (2011)
33 EIPR 619; Christophe Geiger, ‘Intellectual Property Shall be Protected!? Article 17(2) of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: A Mysterious Provision with an Unclear
Scope’ (2009) 31 EIPR 113; Christophe Geiger, ‘‘Constitutionalising’ intellectual property law?
The influence of fundamental rights on intellectual property in the European Union’ (2006) 37
IIC 371; Tuomas Mylly, ‘Intellectual property and fundamental rights: Do they interoperate?’ in
Niklas Bruun (ed), Intellectual Property Beyond Rights (WSOY 2005). For three conceptions of
constitutionalism, see Tuomas Mylly, Intellectual Property and European Economic Constitutional
Law: The Trouble with Private Information Power (IPR University Center 2009) 377–79 (describing
inward-looking self-referential development, constitutionalisation based on economic analysis, and
accommodation with fundamental rights) and as a more recent critical reading, see Tuomas Mylly,
‘The constitutionalization of the European legal order: Impact of human rights on intellectual
property in the EU’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual
Property (Edward Elgar 2015).
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modern information society’.120 Indeed, the most important source of law seems to be
gradually shifting from the national and ECHR systems to the EU when within the
scope of EU law.121
Is the ECHR still relevant to this study? While the freedom of expression has
been deemed to cover copyright-infringing communications as well, the ECtHR has
granted national courts a particularly wide margin of appreciation when balancing
two conflicting rights.122 This finding for these two specific rights is somewhat
surprising, given that the freedom of expression has typically been subject to more
scrutiny and the right to property is weaker than the other rights.123 The approach
to non-commercial copyright infringement also remains to be seen.124 Husovec has
also speculated whether open-ended injunctions satisfy the requirements for legal
certainty and quality of the law.125 The ECtHR is also appreciative in cases of blatant
overblocking with a website operator as a victim.126 Finally, the ECHR does not include
a specific provision on the connectivity provider’s freedom to conduct a business.127
120 Godt (n 110) 235. There are two discourses struggling over whether the balance of IP and other
rights should be interpreted narrowly as exceptions or (supporting this view) broadly as protecting
the subjective rights of others (ibid, 212–13). Further, four layers of constitutionalisation are
identified: 1) impact on substantive private law, 2) the emergence of new remedies, 3) new forms
of standing, and 4) new institutional design for solving conflicts as summarised in Hans-W Micklitz,
‘Introduction’ in Hans-W Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP 2014)
18–19.
121 See eg Ladenburger (n 111) 53.
122 For evaluations of the ECHR in this context, see eg Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyumenko,
‘Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity Through Freedom
of Expression’ (2014) 45 IIC 316; Dirk Voorhoof, ‘Freedom of expression and the right to informa-
tion: Implications for copyright’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights
and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2015); Sandfeld Jacobsen and Salung Petersen (n 100)
176–80; Joseph Jones, ‘Internet Pirates Walk the Plank with Article 10 kept at Bay: Neij and Sunde
Kolmisoppi v Sweden’ (2013) 35 EIPR 695; Kolmisoppi v Sweden (2013) 4 EHRLR 425 ; Ashby
Donald v France App no 36769/08 (ECtHR, 10 January 2013) para 41. On Finland, see eg Riku
Neuvonen, Sananvapauden sääntely Suomessa (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus 2012) 161–65; Robin
Elizabeth Herr, ‘The Right to Receive Information under Article 10 of the ECHR: An Investigation
from a Copyright Perspective’ [2011] JFT 193, 210–11.
123 See eg, on the former Pirker (n 105) 203–04, on the latter Steven Greer, ‘Constitutionalizing
Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2003) 23 OJLS 405, 428, 433;
Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 CLJ 174, 195, noting
‘lower-ranking rights such as property’.
124 On the two cases mentioned in n 122, like Geiger and Izyumenko (n 122) 339, Jones (n 122)
700, has speculated that ‘the commercial nature of copyright infringement was too weighty a
consideration for the court to disregard’.
125 Husovec, ‘CJEU allowed website-blocking injunctions with some reservations’ (n 23) 634; Husovec,
‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties’ (n 8) paras 40–41, also referring to Opinion in C-70/10
Scarlet Extended EU:C:2011:255, paras 99–114.
126 See Yildirim v Turkey App no 3110/10 (ECtHR, 18 December 2012). The targeted website operator
might also claim that its right to a fair trial has been violated; see eg Husovec, ‘Injunctions against
Innocent Third Parties’ (n 8) paras 34–36 and in general Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Enforcement of
intellectual property and the right to a fair trial’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on
Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2015). However, in a recent inadmissible
complaint, Akdeniz v Turkey App no 20877/10 (ECtHR, 11 March 2014), an Internet user was
deemed not to be a ‘victim’ of website blocking.
127 Instead, this would need to be argued through property protection for example.
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At least three different justification paradigms for the level of review can be ob-
served from the IPR case law of the ECtHR: 1) the rule of law (a high threshold,
preventing only arbitrary excesses of state power and clear violations of national law),
2) enforcement (interpreting the state as having a positive obligation to provide en-
forcement mechanisms and inadequacy as being open to challenge), and 3) balancing
(interpreting the ECHR as providing both a minimum and maximum level on domestic
IPR protection standards). Signs of all of these approaches are visible in IPR disputes
reviewed by the ECtHR, but Helfer submits that the rule of law paradigm offers the
strongest justification for the ECHR.128
In summary and as a result of the low intensity of review, the CJEU has been a
more active developer of rights and the constitutionalisation of IPR than the ECtHR,
and it will also be of most interest here.
3.2.2 Proportionality and the intensity of review
Introduction to the various forms of proportionality
There are are at least three different ways to apply proportionality: 1) proportionality
considerations in lawmaking, 2) constitutional proportionality review of enacted laws
or decisions, and 3) proportionality evaluation in decision-making, in particular when
interpreting legal rules. This study examines only the third aspect.
In the first sense, evaluation is needed in lawmaking to ensure the compatibility
with constitutional law.129 In the second sense, ex-post constitutional review (con-
stitutional balancing) in courts determines the constitutional validity of a primary
decision, for example, an administrative action, legislative act, or judgement. The
evaluation has obvious similarities with the first sense because the review implies how
the evaluation should have been done in the first place. In the third sense, so-called
interpretive balancing, the decision-maker needs to reconcile different principles
and rules when interpreting a statute during decision-making, and adjudication in
particular.130
128 Laurence R Helfer, ‘The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of
Human Rights’ (2008) 49 Harvard International LJ 1, 36–51. More generally, Greer (n 123) 405,
432, suggests in a somewhat similar fashion: a) the rights principle, b) the democracy principle,
and c) the priority of rights over public interests.
129 On Finland, see n 146. On the first two conceptions, see eg Grant Huscroft, Bradley W Miller,
and Gregoire Webber (eds), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning
(CUP 2014). In European context, the subsidiarity principle of Art 5 TEU (n 34) also has similar
qualities, being essentially a political principle in the pre-legislative arena. It is not applicable as a
self-enforcing restraint of the CJEU’s actions (Thomas Horsley, ‘Subsidiarity and the European
Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?’ (2012) 50 JCMS 267, 267, 276, 278).
However, the principle fails even in the former attempt; see Gareth Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: The
wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ (2006) 43 CMLR 63, Horsley (n 129) 274.
130 Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Doron Kalir tr, CUP
2012) 4, 72–75, 92–93; Pirker (n 105) 42.
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Most acedemic contributions on constitutional law discuss only the second and
possibly by implication the first. In consequence, the literature needs to be read
in its context. Most arguments apply as is also to the third aspect. However, at
least the discussion of the ‘zone of proportionality’, meaning the leeway afforded
to the primary decision-maker, needs to be critically evaluated, because the court
is solely responsible for making a proportionate decision, not just reviewing the
proportionality of a decision made by some other body.131 In the same vein, Rivers
identifies four forms of discretion: structural, policy-choice, cultural, and empirical.132
Yet only evidential discretion (to be elaborated later) seems immediately applicable
to interpretive balancing. In summary, it is argued that more scrutiny is needed in
interpretive balancing scenarios; the distinction and implications of these two forms
of balancing will be elaborated later in the context of intensity of review.
In both the second and third sense, proportionality evaluation is the means of
assessing the precedence of conflicting principles and values in a particular case.133
This is of utmost importance here since in almost all cases making an interpretation
requires balancing competing interests. Generally speaking, the more immediate the
interference is or could be, the more intensely the issue should be scrutinised.134
Proportionality evaluation is usually depicted as three or four steps. The initial
and sometimes omitted step is the legitimacy of the objective pursued.135 The first two
main stages are the suitability and necessity of means of achieving the objective, ie,
131 This implies that the court must be convinced it has made the right decision, not just an arbitrary
decision among many proportionate alternatives. It is not possible to go into the discussion of
whether ‘one right answer’ exists or not. Suffice it to say that while multiple right answers are
possible, at least ideally the courts usually want to investigate the issue and substantiate their
decision so as to be convinced they have made the right decision. If they are unsure, they look
further and dig deeper. See eg Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana Press 1986) 245–50, 255,
269; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1978) 287–90.
132 See Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and discretion in international and European law’ in Nicholas
Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (CUP
2007) 114ff. Structural discretion refers to the lack of one right answer in any problem involving
two or more competing rights. Policy-choice discretion refers to ‘the range of possible policy
options which are both necessary and balanced’. Cultural discretion refers to the difficulty in
assigning values to some comparable scale, and in particular respecting diversity in international
inter-cultural settings. Evidential discretion refers to the probabilities of outcomes happening and
the reliability of factual judgements.
133 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers tr, OUP 2002) 58; Mattias Kumm,
‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality
Requirement’ in George Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights And Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert
Alexy (Hart 2007) 136–37.
134 Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (n 123) 177.
135 See eg Pirker (n 105) 16; Wolf Sauter, ‘Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?’ (2013) 15
CYELS 439, 448; Barak (n 130) 245–302, referring to it as ‘proper purpose’; Alec Stone Sweet and
Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 CJTL 72, 75. Cf.
Jürgen Kühling, ‘Fundamental Rights’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of
European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart 2010) 503–07, depicts the legitimacy and the legal
basis separately from the actual proportionality analysis, observing different steps in German,
CJEU and ECtHR contexts.
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that the goal can be achieved and there are no better means. The third, the actual
balancing part is proportionality in the narrow sense (stricto sensu), ie, whether the
burden of the means is excessive in relation to the objective sought.136 Different courts
may evaluate or emphasise only some of them in certain contexts.137
Proportionality evaluation in more depth
These criteria are firmly entrenched in the first and second sense of proportionality
evaluation especially in the continental tradition. The role in the third sense is less
clear; for example, Barak suggests using only balancing stricto sensu, but I see no
need for such blanket restriction.138 In practice, essentially similar criteria have been
applied to interpretation of EU law, the ECHR, and in national supreme courts.139 On
the other hand, if the law includes specific criteria to evaluate, those are of primary
interest.140 Nonetheless, the criteria usually correspond to the four-step test, and in
any case considering the steps is useful even without any normative implications.
Some cautionary remarks on how the four steps have typically been applied
in traditional constitutional review may be appropriate. Legitimacy requires the
limitations to be for a ‘proper purpose’. Most purposes have typically been accepted,
and Barak, for example, has submitted that the limitation of one constitutional right
to advance another always provides sufficient justification (at this point).141 Likewise,
suitability only requires a rather low probability of at least partially fulfilling the
objective, and therefore rules out few means.142 In turn, necessity requires that there
are no other less impacting means capable of fulfilling the objective at least to the same
degree.143 In the end, in almost every case one would need to employ proportionality
136 See n 135. For examples of a three-step test, see Alexy (n 133) 397–402; Paul Craig and Gráinne
de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011) 526; Tor-Inge Harbo, ‘The
Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 ELJ 158, 165. For example, Kühling
(n 135) 505, prefers to examine legitimacy separately from proportionality in order to carve
out the objectives pursued better. While the approach is slightly different, this underlines the
requirement for careful review all the same.
137 See eg Pirker (n 105) 384–86; Kühling (n 135) 505–06.
138 Barak (n 130) 4.
139 On the applicability of Article 52 EUCFR, see Section 3.2.3; on the ECHR, see n 147; and on
national courts, see eg RFU v Viagogo (n 55) paras 44–45; Cartier (n 35) paras 184–87.
140 See n 75 and the following discussion.
141 Barak (n 130) 537–38. See also Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (n 123)
188 on the importance of precisely formulating the objective.
142 Ibid, 188–89. Barak (n 130) 303, 539, observes that ‘All that is required is that the contribution
of the means to the fulfilment of the legislative purpose is more than minimal, and that the
probability that the legislative purpose is actually achieved is not merely theoretical.’
143 Ibid, 317, 540–41. According to Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (n 123)
189, 198–200, ‘one has to identify a third option which is as effective in protecting [the interest]
but less intrusive on other rights’ (emphasis in the original). If the objective has been formulated as
seeking the maximal amount of realisation of an interest, the most effective means is automatically
‘necessary’ even if another means would be almost as efficient yet much less intrusive on other
rights. In other words, the test seeks seeks Pareto-optimal solutions; see Pirker (n 105) 26–27
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evaluation stricto sensu, in which the inadequacies of the previous steps can still
be considered.144 In summary, the traditional way to structure the constitutional
proportionality review of acts and decisions has been somewhat toothless against
formulating the objective as seeking a maximal effect (maximalist objective), even
while slightly less extensive effect might otherwise allow better solutions. The first
three steps are typically fulfilled right away. In consequence, their main import on
many occasions is to serve as a reminder of what needs to be carefully examined in
the final phase.145
National constitutional evaluation usually also employs a simplified four-step
test model. Jumping straight into balancing unless a gross error has been made
in suitability or necessity is typical. Again, the manner in which the objective is
formulated may also make it difficult to contest suitability and necessity.146 The
evaluation by the ECtHR and its margin of appreciation doctrine suffers from similar
pitfalls: the prevalence of proportionality evaluation stricto sensu leads to very case-
by-case based adjudication and lack of systematic focus.147 Indeed, both CJEU and
ECtHR case law can be criticised for its lack of normative criteria, weighting without a
scale, unforeseeability, and ultimately the lack of adequate justification (reasoning).148
fn 71; Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (CUP 2013)
18–19; Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (n 123) 198.
144 Cohen-Eliya and Porat (n 143) 18–19. According to Barak (n 130) 344, 351, the examination will
focus on the purpose of limitation and the limited right, rather than the means of achieving the
purpose; the previous three steps focus on the purpose and the means of achieving it.
145 Indeed, there have been suggestions (eg, ibid, 528–47) on how proportionality evaluation could
be improved by making it more robust against these deficiencies.
146 As noted above, the suitability test usually excludes only measures which are clearly and totally
irrelevant. Also, even a much less restrictive measure is deemed insufficient unless it fully
satisfies the legislative objective. See Pirker (n 105) 130; Barak (n 130) 315–16. In Finland,
the Constitutional Law Committee does not appear to apply the full proportionality test; see
Veli-Pekka Viljanen, Perusoikeuksien rajoitusedellytykset (WSLT 2001) 210–14; Juha Lavapuro, Uusi
perustuslakikontrolli (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2010) 250.
147 The ECtHR does require some evidence of rational decision-making, however. See Pirker (n 105)
225, 231–32; Patricia Popelier and Catherine Van De Heyning, ‘Procedural Rationality: Giving
Teeth to the Proportionality Analysis’ (2013) 9 EuConst 230, 241–44, 251–54.
148 See eg Alexander Peukert, ‘The Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the Discretion of
the Legislature’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual
Property (2015) 134–36, 139. Justification is obviously not enough: according to Alexy (n 133)
100–01, ‘a balancing of principles is rational when the preferential treatment to which it leads can
be rationally justified’. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a discourse
theory of law and democracy (William Rehg tr, Polity Press 1996) 259, seems to doubt balancing
because of the risk of ’irrational rulings’ because there are no rational standards for balancing, and
‘weighing takes place either arbitrarily or unreflectively’. Alexy (n 133) 401–02, 405, responds by
agreeing that rationality is not guaranteed in every case, but is made possible; and that publicly
available reasoned judgements are a reflective exercise. He further observes, ibid, 365–66, that
the solution depends on value judgements which are not controllable by the balancing procedure,
but balancing is an open procedure, which will lead to openness of the legal system. A similar
transparency argument is advocated by Stone Sweet and Mathews (n 135) 89 and Barak (n 130)
458.
3.2. THE IMPACT OF EU LAW AND ECHR 49
The intensity of proportionality evaluation
The crucial point of departure in evaluation is the extent and intrusiveness of propor-
tionality analysis and particular interests (eg, economic integration) being focused on
(if any). Pirker calls this pre-balancing.149 How judicial proportionality evaluation is
justified affects this level. Justifications include norm theory, moral argumentation,
practical reasoning, and procedural democracy. Each and all have their pitfalls. Pirker
submits that the last one, representing the values neglected in the democratic process,
forms the strongest basis.150 In consequence, the justification models implicitly or
explicitly affect the rigour of review, for example, as reluctance or deference.151 While
in interpretive balancing the validity of norms is not in doubt,152 interpreting rules
still requires evaluation of proportionality, reasonableness, or some other defined
requirements prior to making a decision.
Courts and in particular the CJEU have not shied away from far-going interpreta-
tions that some might consider to belong to the legislature. Proportionality evaluation
has also been leveraged in such judicial activism.153 As will be seen later, the CJEU
applies a different metric to EU and domestic measures, resulting in different levels
of discretion.154 However, certain sensitive issues have been afforded more leeway
based on procedural and democratic arguments and in order to avoid constitutional
conflicts.155 Indeed, signs of proportionality evaluation in the second sense are also
149 Pirker (n 105) 13, 70ff.
150 Ibid, 79, 83–84. See also Popelier and Van De Heyning (n 147) 245ff. This is particularly
noteworthy in the ‘constitutional balancing’ model or where courts act in two tiers (such as
national and EU courts), leading to some reluctance. For the reluctance of the CJEU, see Torres
Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication (n 111)
113, 171; Elise Muir, ‘The fundamental rights implications of EU legislation: some constitutional
challenges’ (2014) 51 CMLR 219, 243 and n 155.
151 On the ‘sufficient reasonableness threshold’ and the requirement to closely assess each individual
situation, see Pirker (n 105) 64 and on ‘zone of proportionality’ Barak (n 130) 417. For example,
Kühling (n 135) 506 submits that broad discretion and a margin of appreciation must be granted
to sovereign authorities, especially when it comes to evaluating suitability and necessity.
152 Pirker (n 105) 45ff, 64.
153 Suvi Sankari, European Court of Justice Legal Reasoning in Context (Europa Law Publishing 2013)
53, 138. For general discussion, see Takis Tridimas, ‘The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’
(1996) 21 ELR 199.
154 Groussot, ‘Constitutional Dialogues, Pluralism and Conflicting Identities’ (n 105). With national
measures, the intensity seems to depend on the underlying value for which the Member State
claims regulatory autonomy. For example, protectionism has a higher bar than public or national
security. Further, narrow interpretation and burden of proof requirements alongside strict use
of the ‘necessity’ test have raised the bar of domestic measures, especially in the context of the
internal market. See Pirker (n 105) 262, 271; Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine’ (n 105) 91–93.
155 Examples being the accession of EU to the ECHR and respecting the constitutional identities of
Member States, as in Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen EU:C:2004:614 and more recently Case C-
208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein EU:C:2010:806; Muir (n 150) 243; Kühling (n 135) 507–08; Pirker
(n 105) 252–55; Groussot, ‘Constitutional Dialogues, Pluralism and Conflicting Identities’ (n 105)
336–40; Besselink, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’ (n 109) 46; Martinico and
Pollicino (n 102) 240–41. Still on criticism of Case C-399/11 Melloni EU:C:2013:107, see n 198
onward.
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apparent on how national and supranational courts interact by providing (or not) the
national courts with discretion on the matter.156 More generally, objectives on which
there is no European consensus may indicate a lower degree of review.157 Indeed, the
European multilevel system is characterised by permitting the co-existence of many
different polities and private law values.158
Finally, the implications of uncertainty also affect balancing and the intensity of
scrutiny. This is characterised in Alexy’s second law of balancing on empirical and
normative epistemic discretion: ‘The more intensive the interference in a constitutional
right is, the greater must be the certainty of its underlying premises.’ This requires
evidence-based lawmaking and judgements, with the level of intensity depending on
the level of interference.159 Rivers expands on this in case of empirical doubt: 1) there
may be uncertainty on the seriousness of the infringements in question, 2) the relative
abstract weight of values, and 3) the relative concrete weight, ie, how multiple scales
correlate to each other.160 In consequence, Rivers reformulates Alexy’s balancing rule
as follows: ‘The greater the chance that one principle may be seriously infringed, the
greater must be the reliability of the legislature’s assessment that a competing interest
will be realised to a sufficiently great extent.’161 Further, Rivers provides illustrative
examples of questions that courts face when reviewing proportionality:
(1) How idealistic should courts be in seeking to maximise the balance of rights and the
public interest and thus constrain policy choice? (2) To what extent should international
courts permit cultural variation in abstract conceptions of rights? (3) In what circumstance
should courts demand that primary decision-takers put more procedural resources into
establishing matters of empirical fact? (4) When may the court ignore trivial gains to
156 Pirker (n 105) 240–42.
157 Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ (n 105) 94–95. The
same may apply to cases where no scientific consensus exists, see ibid, 96–97. See also n 112 on
abstaining from making an autonomous interpretation when lacking consensus.
158 Giovanni Comandé, ‘The Fifth European Union Freedom: Aggregating Citizenship ... around
Private Law’ in Hans-W Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP 2014)
68. The balance may be legitimately resolved differently in other legal systems, see Torres Pérez,
Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication (n 111) 80.
159 According to Alexy (n 133) 417–20, both the absolute requirement of certainty and basing
interferences on highly dubious prognoses must be rejected. He considers that the legislature’s
competence (or lack thereof) to assess empirical facts belongs to knowledge-based discretion
rather than structural discretion, ie, the evaluation of suitability and necessity (ibid, 399–400).
Pirker (n 105) 27, notes that the burden of proof is essential, given epistemic limitations: how
sure can one be that a measure has or will have particular effects? Article II (at 214, 222) observes
inequalities between parties in producing evidence that may also increase hierarchy. Likewise
in EU context, see Benjamin Farrand, ‘Lobbying and Lawmaking in the European Union: The
Development of Copyright Law and the Rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’
[2015] OJLS (Advance access), 6–8. It might be impossible to iron out these inequalities in
adjudication; see Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing’ in
George Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart 2007)
182.
160 Ibid, 170, 177–78. On epistemic balancing, see also n 132.
161 Ibid, 181–83. Rivers focused on both constitutional evaluation of legislative acts and decisions of
a primary decision-taker in the executive branch.
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rights in the context of necessity review? (5) How insistent should courts be that they
hear all the arguments for and against the policy in question?162
In conclusion, Rivers suggests that the proper role of the second law of balancing
should be to guide the courts in determining the intensity of review. First, more serious
limitations of rights require closer review and a smaller scope of structural discretion.
Second, more serious limitations require devoting more procedural resources to
establishing the factual basis. Third, more serious limitations require the courts
to identify and reject only slight gains to the enjoyment of rights.163 A scholar or
judge should also contemplate the aforementioned questions bearing in mind that the
degree of discretion should likely be narrower and the necessity of requiring sufficient
evidence higher when making a proportionate decision in the first place compared to
reviewing proportionality of decisions made by others.
3.2.3 Proportionality in EU law
Different types of measures
The justification, depth and criteria of evaluation differ significantly depending on
what is being evaluated. One can distinguish EU measures (including legal acts,
eg, directives), national measures within the scope of EU law, and purely national
measures. EU-related Member State measures include the implementation of directives
and acts which impact either the internal market, equality, or discrimination issues.164
This study examines only national measures within the scope of EU law; the others
are mentioned briefly for comparison and to set them apart from the main topic.
An EU measure is typically required to be ‘manifestly inappropriate’ with regard to
the objective sought to be rejected. Broad discretion is granted to the Union legislature,
particularly on policy issues and in practice the use of the least restrictive means is
not required.165 Procedural guarantees and protection of fundamental rights have
162 These questions cannot be answered the same way either and some questions admit a degree of
discretion, but the degree differs from case-to-case. See ibid, 186.
163 Ibid, 187; Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (n 123) 177.
164 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 590ff; Bas Van Bockel and Peter Wattel,
‘New Wine into Old Wineskins: The Scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU after
Åkerberg Fransson’ (2013) 38 ELR 866, 873–75, 877; Verica Trstenjak and Erwin Beysen, ‘The
growing overlap of fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights in the case-law of the CJEU’
(2013) 38 ELR 293, 303–06. Cf. previously applicability to the implementation of directives was
also deemed controversial; see Kühling (n 135) 498.
165 See eg Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ (n 105) 97–100;
Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 143–45; Sauter (n 135)
449–51; Pirker (n 105) 250–52; Georgios Anagnostaras, ‘Balancing conflicting fundamental rights:
The Sky Osterreich paradigm’ (2014) 39 ELR 111, 118–20. See eg Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich
EU:C:2013:28. Also see Jan H Jans, ‘Proportionality Revisited’ (2000) 27 Legal Issues of Economic
Integration 239, 248; Craig (n 164) 591–92.
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narrowed the discretion lately, however.166 All in all, the metrics used in these cases
are not applicable in this context except in the inverse: if an EU measure deemed
manifestly inappropriate, a similar national measure might be as well.
In contrast, domestic measures, especially ones deterring citizenship, economic
integration or fundamental rights have been more rigorously evaluated in the har-
monised areas.167 The CJEU evaluation of such measures has traditionally focused on
necessity and identifying the least restrictive means for attaining national objectives
without undue impact on the fundamental freedoms, that is, the free movement in the
internal market. As was observed, the kind of online copyright enforcement studied
here has at best arguable impact on fundamental freedoms. Therefore, the case law
on proportionality of fundamental freedoms, even when compared to fundamental
rights, is also not applicable.
There are a number of bases of the proportionality requirement. These include
a specific treaty provision such as Article 36 TFEU168 on defences justifying national
measures that impede cross-border trade, Article 5(4) TEU on the proportionality
and subsidiarity of EU measures, Article 52(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, and general principles of law.169 The first two are typically relevant only in
internal market derogations and EU measures, which were deemed out of scope. That
is, proportionality could be relevant in this context through the latter two.
In the Lisbon Treaty, fundamental rights gained an independent legal basis as
EUCFR and Article 6(1) and 6(3) TEU, with the EUCFR applying to all cases within
the scope of EU law.170 In consequence, the former use of legal principles of law has
been essentially replaced by EUCFR references and the importance of proportionality
as a principle of law has diminished.171 These two sources are highly congruent.172
166 Sauter (n 135) 451–52; Pirker (n 105) 254–55; Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine’ (n 105) 100–01. The EUCFR has also been a basis for striking down
EU legislative acts, see eg Ladenburger (n 111) 8; Koen Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 EuConst 375, 393 referring to Joined Cases C-92/09
and C-93/09 Volker, Schecke and Eifert EU:C:2010:662, and recently, Joined Cases C-293/12 and
C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland EU:C:2014:238, para 69. Indeed, Mylly, Intellectual Property and
European Economic Constitutional Law (n 119) 167–68, argues Arts 2–3 and 6 TEU (n 34) that
providing fundamental rights – and not the internal market – is the core aim of the Union.
167 Sauter (n 135) 453ff; Pirker (n 105) 256ff; Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (n 165)
195ff; Craig (n 164) 617ff; Sara Iglesias Sánchez, ‘The Court and the charter: The impact of the
entry into force of the Lisbon treaty on the ECJ’s approach to fundamental rights’ (2012) 49 CMLR
1565, 1592–96.
168 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47.
169 Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (n 165) 136–38; Craig (n 164) 591, 617; Pirker (n 105)
235.
170 See n 184. See also Iglesias Sánchez (n 167) 1579–80; Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’
(n 75) 1270, 1274, 1283–84; Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights’ (n 166) 378, 393.
171 See eg Iglesias Sánchez (n 167) 1599 fn 168; Ladenburger (n 111) 5 fn 17 including the references.
172 This is pragmatic and desirable in order to avoid the development of two separate systems of
protection of EU fundamental rights. See Trstenjak and Beysen (n 164) 307. The CJEU remains
free to identify further fundamental rights not listed in the EUCFR; see Ladenburger (n 111) 4.
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Therefore, it is sufficient to focus on the proportionality and limitations based on the
EUCFR.
The test for necessity and suitability, as well as a limitations clause is provided at
the end of Article 52(1) EUCFR (emphasis added):
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must
be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to
the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect
the rights and freedoms of others.
The first sentence requires a legal basis and honouring the very essence of rights
as absolute prerequisites.173 The steps of proportionality are similar to the ECHR
limitation clauses and the four-step test described in Section 3.2.2. Notably legitimacy
is implicitly based on the word ‘genuinely’, and suitability is embedded within ‘nec-
essary’ and genuinely meeting the objectives.174 These evaluation criteria should be
kept in mind in interpretative situations.175
Proportionality of national EU-scoped measures
Delving deeper, national measures may be divided into three to five categories.176 The
first concern statutes implementing EU law, that is, fulfilling the positive obligations
of EU legislation. These are often referred to as Wachauf -like scenarios or as Member
173 On the ‘very essence’ being infringed in ECtHR case law, usually resulting in not having to do a full
analysis of proportionality, see Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (n 123)
184–87.
174 Kühling (n 135) 504–05. For example, disproportionality was established in Case C-390/12 Pfleger
EU:C:2014:281, paras 54–56, because the restrictions did not genuinely meet the purposes of the
declared objective and were therefore unsuitable.
175 Recently, Kevin T O’Sullivan, ‘Enforcing copyright online: Internet provider obligations and the
European Charter of Human Rights’ (2014) 36 EIPR 577, 581–83, has argued that Article 52
has a very limited role to play in evaluating the appropriateness of ISP’s freedom to conduct a
business, essentially because of Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive (n 72) and Article 12(3) of
E-Commerce Directive (n 8) already incorporate such a balance. This is a counter-majoritarian
view and I do not find it justified, although in practice the conclusion may often be the same.
Such critical perspectives to contitutionalisation are discussed and rejected in Monica Claes,
‘The European Union, its Member States and their Citizens’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and Stephen
Weatherill (eds), The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law Relationships (Hart 2013) 39–40.
Similarly, Husovec and Peguera (n 8) 17–19, 31 hold that the injunctions that do not pass the
Article 52 limitations test ‘would go beyond the maximum ceiling allowed’. This aspect will be
discussed in more detail in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.
176 See Michael Dougan, ‘The Impact of the General Principles of Union Law upon Private Relation-
ships’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Involvement of EU Law in Private
Law Relationships (Hart 2013) 75; Xavier Groussot, Laurent Pech, and Gunnar Thor Petursson,
‘The Reach of EU Fundamental Rights on Member State Action after Lisbon’ in Sybe de Vries,
Ulf Bernitz, and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU after
Lisbon (Hart 2013) 113; Trstenjak and Beysen (n 164) 304–08. On a historically different division,
see Opinion in C-427/06 Bartsch EU:C:2008:297, para 69 and Muir (n 150) 228.
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States acting as agents of the EU.177 In the area of shared competence, national
measures are deemed to be in this category when the EU has exercised its competence
and the implementation time limit (if applicable) has expired. After the deadline,
all domestic provisions that fall within the scope of pertinent EU rights will come
under EU law.178 The second category, ERT -type cases, apply when Member States
use the grounds of public interest inter alia for derogating from EU law, especially
in the context of fundamental freedoms.179 Besselink considers autonomous effect
(meaning direct applicability and effect) in a field covered by EU law a third scenario,
but it is not necessary to distinguish it from the first category here.180 Further, Van
Bockel and Wattel have suggested an additional category of cases where the EU has
a financial interest as per Article 325 TFEU.181 The final ones are purely national
measures, which do not concern EU obligations and do not violate EU law.182
177 Case 5/88 Wachauf EU:C:1989:321; Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights’ (n 166) 378–82; Groussot, Pech, and Thor Petursson (n 176); Sarmiento, ‘Who’s
afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1270–71, 1275; Van Bockel and Wattel (n 164) 873–74; Sonya Walk-
ila, Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights: Contributing to the ‘Primacy, Unity and Effectiveness of
European Union Law’ (2015) 150–52.
178 See Case C-147/08 Römer EU:C:2011:286, paras 63–64. Likewise, yet considering this as a
scenario separate from ‘implementation’, see Laurent Pech, ‘Between judicial minimalism and
avoidance: The Court of Justice’s sidestepping of fundamental constitutional issues in Römer
and Domingues’ (2012) 49 CMLR 1841, 1850, 1864–65. This is also argued to apply before the
transposition deadline if it can be proven that a specific domestic measure implements the EU
provision (ibid, 1865 fn 84, referring to Case C-144/04 Mangold EU:C:2005:709, para 75). See
also Tony Marguery, ‘European Union fundamental rights and member states action in EU criminal
law’ (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal 282, 287–88. Once EU legislation enters into force, there are
‘softer’ requirements for not adopting measures which would compromise the result of the EU law
provisions (ibid).
179 Case C-260/89 ERT EU:C:1991:254; Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights’ (n 166) 383–85; Groussot, Pech, and Thor Petursson (n 176); Trstenjak and Beysen
(n 164); Walkila (n 177) 152–53. On approval and contrary views, see Ladenburger (n 111) 17 fn
89. More recently, such an impact was found in Pfleger (n 174) paras 35–36. While the context
may differ, in the end both Wachauf and ERT concern the issue of whether EU obligations are
adequately honoured in the legal system. Similarly in Juha Raitio, ‘Eurooppaoikeuden yleisten
oikeusperiaatteiden horisontaaliset vaikutukset ja perusoikeuskirjan 51(1) artiklan tulkinta’ [2014]
Defensor Legis 110.
180 Besselink, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’ (n 109) 44, referring to certain
personal data provisions as adjudicated by the CJEU.
181 Van Bockel and Wattel (n 164) 877–78. In particular, they deem Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson
EU:C:2013:105 an example of this, because the link with implementation measures was somewhat
tenuous. At least for now it seems to be sufficient to consider this as belonging to the first
category. Somewhat similarly, Walkila (n 177) 154–57, 162, 165 proposes a notion of ‘a sufficient
connection to EU law’ to serve as the determining factor, requiring a concrete and relevant presence
of an EU legal norm other than the EUCFR provision, as supported by Case C-206/13 Siragusa
EU:C:2014:126, paras 24–26; for criticism on vagueness, see Filippo Fontanelli, ‘Implementation
of EU Law through Domestic Measures after Fransson: the Court of Justice Buys Time and “Non-
preclusion” Troubles Loom Large’ (2014) 39 ELR 682. Allan Rosas, ‘When is the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights Applicable at National Level?’ (2012) 19 Jurisprudence 1269, 1284 also
submits a practical rule of identifying a norm of EU law in concreto.
182 Examples include income tax and immigration policies with respect to the third country nationals
when the freedom of movement has not been exercised; see Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (n 166) 386–87; Rosas (n 181) 1281; Van Bockel and Wattel
(n 164) 875–77; Raitio (n 179) 113–14.
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It is important to identify the scenarios in which EU fundamental rights apply,
possibly in addition to national constitutional rights. Until recently, the material
scope of the EUCFR and in particular the interpretation of ‘implementing Union
law’ in Article 51(1) was debatable.183 Now it has been decisively established in
Åkerberg Fransson that EU fundamental rights apply within the whole scope of EU law
(emphasis added):
Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore be complied with
where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot
exist which are covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental
rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails applicability of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.184
In consequence, the EUCFR applies to all of the above categories except for purely
national measures, even though the precise criteria for ‘the scope of EU law’ have
so far remained somewhat vague.185 Further, the applicability of the EUCFR or lack
thereof can be illustrated by examining triggering rules, ie, the actual norm of EU law
applied. The first are mandating rules that require Member States to use a specific
means to attain a goal. The level of discretion afforded to Member States may vary.186
The second are optioning rules in an area regulated by EU law, but where Member
States have a choice about whether to implement measures or not. If this discretion
is used, the national provisions fall within EU law.187 The third are remedial rules
that are required for effectively exercising EU rights before national courts.188 All in
all, any national measure that jeopardises the effectiveness of EU law in any manner
183 See eg Pech (n 178); Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1270ff; Muir (n 150)
228–29.
184 Åkerberg Fransson (n 181) para 21. See Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1278;
Van Bockel and Wattel (n 164) 871–72. However, what precisely ‘within the scope of EU law’
means may still be argued, of which see Fontanelli (n 181). Ladenburger (n 111) 15–17 previously
argued against accepting ‘any theoretically construable nexus’, requiring a sufficiently specific link
between the national act at issue and an actual norm of EU law applied (cf. n 181).
185 For example, Fontanelli (n 181) 694–95, 699 examines the case law that has followed Åkerberg
Fransson and concludes that several roughly synonymous criteria have been put forward as to
when EU law does not apply, but no conclusions can be drawn on when it applies. It seems
unneccessary to explore these here in detail.
186 Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1279–81. In contrast, Dougan (n 176) 75–81
examines separately the context where the trigger is a provision of a treaty or directive. An
example is website blocking injunctions as required by Infosoc Directive (n 42) Art 8(3).
187 Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1281–82. See Joined Cases C-411/10 and
C-493/10 NS EU:C:2011:865, para 68 and Case C-105/03 Pupino EU:C:2005:386, paras 55–56.
Cf. Ladenburger (n 111) 18 fn 98, accepts this for ‘options or derogations foreseen in the directive’
but not when adding national provisions not induced by the directive. NS (n 187) paras 64–69,
however, confirms that discretionary power (in the context of a Regulation) may still be an instance
of implementation of EU law.
188 Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1282–85. Walkila (n 177) 152 explicitly mentions
national measures that have connection to the enforcement of EU legislation. See eg Case C-
279/09 DEB EU:C:2010:811 and Case C-199/11 Otis EU:C:2012:684. Examples are the most
essential procedural rules relating to IPR enforcement.
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falls within the scope of EU law.189 On the other hand, exclusionary rules restrict
the applicability of EU law from certain areas.190 The same result is also incurred by
purely domestic measures, where the rights afforded by EU law cannot be identified
and where the CJEU has no jurisdiction.191
Fundamental rights unquestionably apply in the vertical relation between a private
party and a state authority. Given that according to Article 51(1) EUCFR, the provisions
are addressed to, inter alia, Member States, those unaccustomed to constitutional
law might claim that the EUCFR has no impact in cases which concern a conflict
betweeen private parties.192 This would be incorrect due to so-called horizontal effect
of fundamental rights. That is, courts must apply the EUCFR to the interpretation
of principles and existing norms as the organs of state (indirect horizontal effect).193
Therefore the only excluded form of ‘direct’ horizontal effect is imposing obligations or
finding violations directly based on the EUCFR.194 On the other hand, direct horizontal
effect based on general principles of law has been accepted in restricted cases (eg,
certain kinds of age and gender discrimination) and this might also apply to some
EUCFR provisions.195 These situations are not relevant in this study, however.
189 Van Bockel and Wattel (n 164) 878.
190 Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1285. Examples are the ‘shall not apply’ provisions
in EU legislation. According to Fontanelli (n 181) 692–93, these need to be distinguished from ‘not
precluded’ provisons, by which domestic measures may be adopted, but the EUCFR still applies.
191 Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1286–87; Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (n 166) 386–87. This may also concern cases of the rights or
lack thereof associated with EU citizenship, see Case C-256/11 Dereci EU:C:2011:734. See also
n 182. Here, examples are those features of copyright that are not legislated by the EU, such as
moral rights (Infosoc Directive (n 42) Recital 29).
192 Besselink, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’ (n 109) 17–19 distinguishes the
addressees of obligations, the manner of rights, and the legal remedy. Being a direct assignee is
typically rejected, but a varying degree of indirect effect is accepted. Further, on the importance of
horizontal situations and the difficulty in separating the private and public spheres in IPR, see
Mylly, ‘Intellectual property and fundamental rights: Do they interoperate?’ (n 119) 193–94. On
difficulties in general, see eg Hugh Collins, ‘On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse
and Private Law’ in Hans-W Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP
2014) 38ff.
193 Dorota Leczykiewicz, ‘Horizontal application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2013) 38 ELR
479, 490–92. In general, see Walkila (n 177). Kühling (n 135) 493–94 notes that a Member State’s
duty to protect rights may also be invoked against private parties without having the private
parties bound by fundamental rights.
194 See the table of four categories in Groussot, Pech, and Thor Petursson (n 176) 113; Trstenjak and
Beysen (n 164) 307–09. On the difference being more formalistic than substantive, see Walkila
(n 177) 227. More forcefully, Alexy (n 133) 363 observes that the ‘horizontal effect will in the final
analysis always be direct’; such direct horizontal effect can only be denied by denying any form
of horizontal effect whatsoever. In a similar fashion, Mattias Kumm, ‘Who is Afraid of the Total
Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law’
(2006) 7 German LJ 341, 357, 359, concludes that ‘[a] doctrine of indirect horizontal effect, then,
seems to have much the same consequences, substantively and institutionally, as the embrace of a
doctrine of direct horizontal effect.’
195 See eg Pech (n 178) 1866ff; Groussot, Pech, and Thor Petursson (n 176) 111–12; Muir (n 150)
230–32; Dougan (n 176) 81–86; Raitio (n 179) 112.
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Comparatively within the ECHR, states have ‘at least some degree of leeway in
choosing whether to frame basic conflicts in terms of opposing fundamental rights or
through alternative conceptualisations’.196 Bomhoff also argues that defamation by
and of a private individual, for example, cannot be translated into a conflict between
individual rights and collective interests.197 As will be discussed in Section 3.3, the
same would apply to IPR infringement.
The precedence of EU fundamental rights over national fundamental rights
When a provision of EU law leaves no discretion to the national bodies (‘complete
determination’), national fundamental rights are displaced. That is, EU law and its
fundamental rights determine the level of protection entirely.198 The second, more
typical scenario concerns the co-existence of national and EU fundamental rights
(‘partial determination’), where national law may provide higher protection if doing
so does not compromise the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law.199 Even so,
national fundamental rights may still be displaced if they compromise EU law.200 In
the third case, derogation, a higher level of protection through national fundamental
rights is likely possible as long as it is in balance with the fundamental freedom.201
196 Jacco Bomhoff, ‘’The Rights and Freedoms of Others’: The ECHR and Its Peculiar Category of
Conflicts Between Individual Fundamental Rights’ in Eva Brems (ed), Conflicts Between Funda-
mental Rights (SSRN Version, Intersentia 2008) 23. ibid, 7, ‘[The ECtHR] is generally quick to
opt for an alternative ground for limitation’, in this case ‘public morals’ instead of ‘the rights of
others’. Further, in ibid, 4, in a system where the conflicts are pervasive, the ECtHR has had ‘great
difficulty in finding consistent and convincing ways of dealing with cases of conflicting rights’.
197 Ibid, 10.
198 The exhaustive grounds of non-execution of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13
June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States
[2000] OJ L190/1 in Melloni (n 155) para 61 is an example of this. In general, see Sarmiento,
‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1289–93; Van Bockel and Wattel (n 164) 879; Muir (n 150)
234–35. If ‘constitutional identity’ of a Member Stake is at stake, which was not the case in
Melloni, more leeway might be granted; see n 155. As to tensions caused by such an approach, see
Leonard FM Besselink, ‘The parameters of constitutional conflict after Melloni’ (2014) 39 ELR 531;
Aida Torres Pérez, ‘Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue’ (2014) 10 EuConst 308;
Iris Canor, ‘My brother’s keeper? Horizontal Solange: “An ever closer distrust among the peoples of
Europe”’ (2013) 49 CMLR 383 and n 203.
199 Åkerberg Fransson (n 181) para 29. See Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1294–95;
Van Bockel and Wattel (n 164) 871, 879; Nik de Boer, ‘Addressing rights divergences under the
Charter: Melloni’ (2013) 49 CMLR 1083, 1096.
200 Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1295. In national constitutional discussion,
it is more typical to reject and/or heavily criticise this approach. See also nn 198 and 203.
On Finland, see eg Tuuli Heinonen, ‘Konstitutionaalinen konflikti Suomessa’ in Tuuli Heinonen
and Juha Lavapuro (eds), Oikeuskulttuurin eurooppalaistuminen. Ihmisoikeuksien murroksesta
kansainväliseen vuorovaikutukseen (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2012) and Savola, ‘Internet-
operaattori ja perusoikeudet’ (n 61) 137 fn 28 and references.
201 Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1297–98; de Boer (n 199) 1096. Sarmiento notes
that the margin involved in justifying derogations is very different because free movement rules
occupy a privileged position. However, the majority opinion appears to be that the conflict of a
fundamental right and a freedom should be evaluated on the same basis and without precedence;
see Trstenjak and Beysen (n 164); Sybe A de Vries, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights within
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In this study, only the partial determination applies. That is, the primacy of EU law
implies that measures that would be disproportionate according to EU law must also
be deemed disproportionate at the domestic level (eg, the finding of disproportionality
in Scarlet Extended cannot be overruled based on national fundamental rights).202
Conversely, measures which are explicitly deemed proportionate at the EU level must
be proportionate at the national level (eg, the generic blocking order in UPC Telekabel
Wien, if provided by national law, cannot be rejected outright based on national
fundamental rights).203
This overlap is depicted in Figure 3.2, where disproportionality is depicted with (A),
explicit proportionality with (B), and the margin as (C). That is, the proportionality is
evaluated in purely national situations merely according to the national fundamental
rights (D). Given the partial determination situation in copyright enforcement, in the
area where the national and EU rectangles overlap, nationally proportionate mecha-
nisms could be deemed disproportionate at the EU level (A1). Inversely nationally
disproportionate mechanisms could still be deemed proportionate at the EU level (B1),
ie, national fundamental rights could be ‘overruled’. On the other hand, if the primacy,
unity and effectiveness of EU law is not compromised, ‘better’ protection based on
national fundamental rights could in some cases influence the interpretation of the
implementation of EU law (C1).204
This demonstrates that in practice fundamental rights systems usually need to
be applied cumulatively, although possibly with some ‘layers’ prevailing over others.
That is, from the national perspective, an eye needs to be kept on the discretion
allowed by EU law.205 Further, the conflict of multiple fundamental rights exhibits a
Europe’s Internal Market after Lisbon – An Endeavour for More Harmony’ in Sybe de Vries, Ulf
Bernitz, and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU after Lisbon
(Hart 2013) 87; Walkila (n 177) 226.
202 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended EU:C:2011:771, para 53.
203 See Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1294–95; Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (n 166) 376. Such primacy also over national fundamental
rights has caused some tension between national constitutional and supreme courts and the CJEU
as to who is the final guardian against violation or misbalancing of fundamental rights. See eg
Solange II BVerfGE 73, 339; Armin Von Bogdandy and others, ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the
essence of fundamental rights against EU Member States’ (2013) 49 CMLR 489. On a different
approach, ‘horizontal solange’, see Canor (n 198).
204 For example, Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1294–95 argues that the EUCFR
would need to be applied if the level of its protection is superior to national fundamental rights,
yet also that the EUCFR could only exceptionally displace national fundamental rights. The former
demonstrates a problem when evaluating conflicting rights, because some rights might be deemed
‘superior’ in the EUCFR while others might not. On the latter, Besselink, ‘The parameters of
constitutional conflict after Melloni’ (n 198) 546-47 describes conditions for diversity but that
‘primacy, unity and effectiveness’ has ‘the potential to become a magic formula’. Torres Pérez,
‘Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue’ (n 198) 328 argues that it should be for the
CJEU, rather than domestic courts, to balance the issue on a case-by-case basis. Also according
to de Boer (n 199) 1096, 1103 it is a crucial issue how ‘primacy, unity, and effectiveness’ will be
interpreted in future cases. This cannot be explored in depth here.
205 Ladenburger (n 111) 24.








Figure 3.2: Overlap and primacy in proportionality of national measures
difficulty for evaluation, because ‘better protection’ of one right usually implies worse
protection of other rights. This difficulty, to be elaborated in Section 3.3, is illustrated
by Ladenburger:
Particularly in situations of colliding rights, it can become a daunting task for a national
[...] judge to assess which margin, if any, a norm of Union law may leave for apply-
ing rights other than those of the Charter, and then to identify the various applicable
fundamental rights and their meaning pursuant to the case of law of the Strasbourg,
Luxembourg and the national constitutional courts.206
3.3 The rights and interests of different parties
3.3.1 Fundamental rights at stake
The courts’ role is to interpret fundamental rights in specific circumstances rather than
in the abstract. This focuses the inquiry on ‘the question of what interests parties have
in applying a particular fundamental right’, ie, to more specific interests rather than
merely rights in general.207
The state implements an enforcement mechanism or imposes an order at the
request of and to further the private interest of an IPR holder. This essentially portrays
a horizontal clash of interest as a vertical one. For example, in website blocking the
basis for applying the EUCFR and proportionality analysis is the vertical provision
in Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive and the corresponding Enforcement Directive
provisions. This avoids portraying the balancing situation as a horizontal fundamental
rights conflict, which might more easily invite parties to contest the horizontal direct
206 Ibid, 25–26.
207 Besselink, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’ (n 109) 21. In consequence, both
terms are mentioned to underline the need for more depth rather than simply abstract rights.
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and/or indirect effect of the directives.208 The EUCFR is likewise applied to other
mechanisms, as they fall within the scope of EU law. Nonetheless, both public and
private interests affecting the evaluation of these provisions should be considered and
distinguished.
The private interests at stake are very significant. So far the CJEU has had a
tendency to resolve these issues as limitations of fundamental rights rather than as a
matter of secondary legislation.209 The protection of property and the right to effective
remedy of IPR holders (Articles 17 and 47 EUCFR), the freedom of expression of
users (or information, Article 11 EUCFR), privacy and the protection of personal data
(Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR), the freedom of intermediaries to conduct a business (Article
16 EUCFR), and the website operator’s rights (such as the right to a fair trial, Article
47 EUCFR) may be impacted.210 As will be observed, the users and website operators
are typically not consulted, and their interests must be otherwise considered.211
An associated public interest can usually also be detected behind each private
interest – and likewise public interests are affected by the most prominent private
interests. There may also be other public interests. For example, in UPC Telekabel Wien
freedom of expression in general and the democracy principle were explicitly accepted
as public values to be afforded protection.212 Other so-called collective goods or social
functions may also be identified; these may limit excessive tendencies of IPR through
fundamental rights balancing.213 States must also provide adequate protection against
208 Daniel Sarmiento, email correspondence to author (13 May 2014). Nonetheless, even if the
situation was considered horizontal, the EUCFR could be applied to the interpretation of existing
provisions; see Section 3.2.3.
209 Husovec, ‘CJEU allowed website-blocking injunctions with some reservations’ (n 23) 632, although
in Scarlet Extended (n 202) para 40 it was held that the secondary legislation prohibited such
general monitoring; fundamental rights evaluation did not change this finding; see Mylly, ‘The
constitutionalization of the European legal order’ (n 119) 114–16; Article VI (para 31 note 59).
The interpretation of substance provisions of secondary legislation is discussed in Section 3.1 and
principles in Section 3.4.
210 Scarlet Extended (n 202) paras 46–52; UPC Telekabel Wien (n 44) paras 47, 49–50, 55–56 and
UPC Telekabel Wien (Opinion) (n 22) paras 81–82. On copyright (now) being placed on a level
playing field alongside other fundamental rights and ‘construction of a broader conceptual arena
where conflicting rights can openly vie against each other on equal terms’, see Angelopoulos, ‘Are
blocking injunctions against ISPs allowed in Europe?’ (n 8) 814 and references. In contrast, Mylly,
‘The constitutionalization of the European legal order’ (n 119) 116, 130–31 calls for recognising
some rights as more important than others.
211 Sandfeld Jacobsen and Salung Petersen (n 100) 181.
212 UPC Telekabel Wien (n 44) para 56, more explicitly in UPC Telekabel Wien (Opinion) (n 22) paras
82, 108. In particular, the measures should only affect illegal material according to Yildirim v
Turkey (n 126).
213 See eg Mylly, ‘Intellectual property and fundamental rights: Do they interoperate?’ (n 119)
190–93; Christophe Geiger, ‘Fundamental rights, a safeguard for the coherence of intellectual
property law?’ (2004) 35 IIC 268, 270; Christophe Geiger, ‘The Social Function of Intellectual
Property Rights, Or how Ethics can Influence the Shape and Use of IP law’ in Graeme B Dinwoodie
(ed), Intellectual Property Law: Methods and Perspectives (SSRN Version, Edward Elgar 2013)
10–11, 19–20. Different conceptions of the social function also affect the conclusions derived
(ibid). In general, see Geiger, ‘’Constitutionalising’ intellectual property law?’ (n 119) 385–89,
397–406. The social function of property rights is also acknowledged in Case C-280/93 Germany
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the conduct of private parties that violate the rights of others to avoid being in breach
of EU law. This includes providing access to effective remedies for infringement.214
What precisely ‘effective’ requires is open to debate.215
The website operator’s rights have usually been given little weight. The right
to a fair trial in particular is impacted especially if the operator actually wanted to
appear in court. So far, the operators have typically remained anonymous, evaded
the summons (if any), and have not asserted their rights. Indeed, in practice the
rights are relevant in the case of assertion. However, procedural rules typically
require that courts must still consider operator interests to some degree, because they
are not otherwise represented. This may also incur delays and complexity in case
management.216
Typically only the IPR holder and the intermediary are parties to the proceedings.217
This provides for a further argument against treating this case as a horizontal conflict
of interest: private party autonomy cannot be asserted, given that not all the affected
parties are present or even summonsed.218 Further, even if parties to the proceedings
v Council EU:C:1994:367, para 78. See also Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or harmonising? The
Court of Justice, the right to property and European copyright law’ (n 119) 67.
214 The principle of effective remedies at least traditionally applies only to procedural and remedial
situations. Given that there are specific provisions of injunctions in substantive law, the applicability
of the principle is questionable; see Section 3.2.3 and Leczykiewicz (n 193) 486–87, also referring
to Case 222/86 Unectef v Heylens EU:C:1987:442, para 14; Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable
EU:C:1986:206, para 18. More generally, the principle of effectiveness has been argued to possibly
result in unexpected legal obligations, unexpected remedies, and unexpected lack remedies, the
extent of which depend on the methods of interpretation at the national level; see Peter Rott,
‘The Court of Justice’s Principle of Effectiveness and its Unforeseeable Impact on Private Law
Relationships’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Involvement of EU Law in
Private Law Relationships (Hart 2013) 186–88, 196. In general, see also Tridimas, The General
Principles of EU Law (n 165) 450–52.
215 Article 47 EUCFR could be argued to apply if a Member State fails to protect the substantial
rights at issue; however, this should only occur in exceptional cases; see Chantal Mak, ‘Rights and
Remedies: Article 47 EUCFR and Effective Judicial Protection in European Private Law Matters’ in
Hans-W Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (OUP 2014) 243, 253. For
example, being able to file a request to impose orders to an intermediary established in the state
for activities occurring outside EU territory might be sufficient, as supported by UPC Telekabel
Wien (Opinion) (n 22) para 57; see n 43. In contrast, it would be paradoxical if ‘effectiveness’
required that requests be granted.
216 From the procedural perspective, this was briefly discussed previously in n 94. See Husovec,
‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties’ (n 8) paras 33–38, and in UK case law the court’s
acknowledged duty to consider unrepresented parties; see Article VI (paras 48–49) and Dramatico
Entertainment (no 2) [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch), para 11. On websites funded by advertisement
income being within the scope of the E-Commerce Directive and being subject to the require-
ments of Article 5 on providing particular contact information, see Case C-291/13 Papasavvas
EU:C:2014:2209, paras 26–30.
217 See Article III (at 893–95) and as a case for restraint, Article IV (at 287); Sandfeld Jacobsen and
Salung Petersen (n 100) 171–75. Like ibid, 173–74, Daly (n 48) 201, observes that the ISP usually
has no incentive to fight such applications. This will be discussed further in Section 4.2.1.
218 Similarly in Godt (n 110) 215, ‘in contrast to the founding principles of private law, private
autonomy and contractual freedom, IP is in essence regulatory’. See also Micklitz, ‘Introduction’
(n 120) 17.
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were in agreement, they could not dispose of public interest or the rights of others.219
These varying interests are illustrated in Table 3.1. While the private/public division
is somewhat problematic, for example because the public interest is dictated by
particular private interests, the table illustrates different perspectives without any
normative implications.220
Table 3.1: Private and public interests for the stakeholders
Private interests Public interests




Connectivity provider Freedom to conduct a busi-




User Freedom of expression, pro-
tection of personal data
Democracy, freedom of ex-
pression in general, culture
Website operator Freedom of expression, fair




3.3.2 Finding a balance
In fundamental rights conflicts, higher protection offered to one party’s interest
usually implies lower protection to another person’s interest.221 Further, comparison
between the level of protection offered to multiple rights is usually difficult. It may
also be difficult to compare the balance between legal systems (such as national
and EU fundamental rights systems). That is, the level of protection of EU law, or
more precisely the emphasis on the right balance, might differ from the national
219 By constrast, basing blocking increasingly on private agreements seems to have been on the rise,
especially in the USA, the UK, and Ireland; see Annemarie Bridy, ‘Graduated Response and the
Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement’ (2010) 89 Oregon LR 81; Intellectual
Property Office, ‘International Comparison of Approaches to Online Copyright Infringement:
Final Report’ (9 February 2015) 〈https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-
comparison-of-approaches-to-online-copyright-enforcement〉 6.
220 The private/public division is already being reformulated through EUCFR (Mak (n 215) 232),
‘gradually fading away’ (Micklitz, ‘Introduction’ (n 120) 5, similarly in Walkila (n 177) 227),
or ‘often difficult to separate’ (Mylly, ‘Intellectual property and fundamental rights: Do they
interoperate?’ (n 119) 193); see also Claes (n 175) 43–44; Walkila (n 177) 255, 262.
221 That is, few if any cases can be addressed with a Pareto improvement, making at least some-
one better off without making anyone else worse off. Instead, a Kaldor-Hicks improvement is
needed, trading off one interest with smaller societal benefit to another with bigger benefit; see
Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties’ (n 8) para 27; Besselink, ‘The Protection
of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’ (n 109) 46; Ladenburger (n 111) 25. Fundamental rights
conflicts can be classified as 1) between one person’s different rights, 2) between the same right
of different persons, and 3) between different rights of different persons, with only the last
usually being of particular interest. See Martin Scheinin, ‘Perusoikeuskonfliktit’ in Tuuli Heinonen
and Juha Lavapuro (eds), Oikeuskulttuurin eurooppalaistuminen. Ihmisoikeuksien murroksesta
kansainväliseen vuorovaikutukseen (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2012) 127–32.
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fundamental rights system. For example, if the same case had been decided based
on national fundamental rights alone, a different prevailing right might have been
chosen. Nonetheless, the primacy of EU law usually prevails in such a case.222 In
consequence, the national court must remain within the minimum and maximum
constraints and the guidelines for proportionality provided by EU law.223 Ideally, one
could identify how various rights should be balanced from CJEU case law. The scarcity
of relevant rulings and the terseness of the reasoning makes this difficult, however.224
The CJEU has had a tendency to only provide partial answers in these IPR en-
forcement cases, affording national legislation and courts rather wide discretion. EU
case law also typically only provides hints as to how to balance the total rather than
just one right at a time. Therefore, the CJEU essentially only provides a number of
constraints, allowing the issues to be dealt with in national systems.225 Further, the
approach of the CJEU with open-ended orders in UPC Telekabel Wien appeared to pass
the ‘hot potato’ of evaluation and figuring out how the balance could be achieved to
the intermediaries.226
From the perspective of the CJEU, Figure 3.3 demonstrates the deference that
results in a discernible zone of proportionality between minimum protection (inner
circle) and maximum protection (outer circle) for the national law. That is, the
maximum protection implies the threshold when another right would be infringed
222 See the earlier discussion on overlapping fundamental rights systems starting from n 198 and
Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the charter?’ (n 75) 1296. Similarly on difficulty of ‘multi-level’
balancing, see Besselink, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’ (n 109) 24, 46,
though calling for ‘creating the necessary space’ and ‘taking into account locally differentiated
preferences’ as increasing the legitimacy of balancing values.
223 See Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties’ (n 8) paras 7–8; Peukert, ‘The Funda-
mental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the Discretion of the Legislature’ (n 148) 134; Husovec
and Peguera (n 8) 16–20, 31; UPC Telekabel Wien (n 44) paras 46–47. Even though according
to Article 2, the Enforcement Directive is a minimum directive for the benefit of IPR holders,
fundamental rights and Article 3 may in some cases restrict more extensive protection provided by
national law.
224 For criticism of the CJEU’s succinct reasoning in the context of IPR, see eg Mylly, ‘Intellectual
property and fundamental rights: Do they interoperate?’ (n 119) 210–13; Griffiths, ‘Constitution-
alising or harmonising? The Court of Justice, the right to property and European copyright law’
(n 119) 74, 76–78; Peukert, ‘The Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the Discretion
of the Legislature’ (n 148) 134; Angelopoulos, ‘Are blocking injunctions against ISPs allowed in
Europe?’ (n 8) 815, 818. AG Opinions are a bit better in this respect, but their authoritative value
is suspect, especially when the CJEU does not adopt the solution proposed and/or uses different
arguments. In general, see Bobek (n 22).
225 On the different styles of answering and the associated deference, see Section 3.2.1 and more
precisely n 107 onward.
226 Angelopoulos, ‘Are blocking injunctions against ISPs allowed in Europe?’ (n 8) 817–18. This ‘a
rather tall order’ was criticised as being difficult to achieve. Such shifting of responsibility is also
likely to result in the provider choosing the cheapest and the easiest path by accepting the requests
of IPR holders. Likewise and going further in criticism, see Mylly, ‘The constitutionalization of the
European legal order’ (n 119) 121–22. This role is also discussed in Section 5.2.











Figure 3.3: Minimum and maximum limits of rights in balancing
through underprotection.227 Because the exact balance of various interests differs
from case to case, the limits may have their maximums and minimums at different
spots. In consequence, instead of two uniform circles, the case law ‘stretches’ the
limits in various directions.
Another issue is how the fundamental rights of various parties are taken into
account in interpretation. Specifically, do they have independent argumentative
power or are they only the final guardians against the most egregious violations in
secondary legislation? The majoritarian view is that the rights in the EUCFR as well
as the limitations clause of Article 52 do provide input for interpreting the secondary
legislation.228 On the other hand, O’Sullivan has recently essentially argued that
secondary legislation already incorporates the rights at issue and the focus must be on
discerning the interpretation of IPR enforcement principles to be examined in Section
3.4.229 While I disagree with the general premise that the impact of fundamental
227 The margin was also illustrated in the overlap of norms; see Figure 3.2 in Section 3.2.3. For
general discussion of binding minimum and maximum limits of injunctive relief in this context,
see n 223 and references.
228 As noted, the CJEU has had a tendency to resolve these issues as interpretations of fundamental
rights rather than through secondary legislation. See Husovec, ‘CJEU allowed website-blocking
injunctions with some reservations’ (n 23) 632. Since then, Husovec and Peguera (n 8) 18
have submitted that even if there was no fundamental rights issue, the inadmissibility of very
ineffective blocking should also be possible. In this way, ‘socially wasteful enforcement practices
can be outright prevented’. Further, although it is mostly political, see Council of the European
Union, ‘EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline’ (12 May
2014) 〈http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/documents/eu_human_rights_guidelines_on_
freedom_of_expression_online_and_offline_en.pdf〉 2, 5, 18, claiming that blocking access to
websites for copyright protection could constitute a disproportionate restriction of freedom of
opinion and expression, referring to a three-part proportionality test with similarities to that
employed by the CJEU. See Husovec and Peguera (n 8) 30–35 for more discussion, and Mylly, ‘The
constitutionalization of the European legal order’ (n 119) 128–30 on criticism of constitutionalism
if it is only used as ‘window-dressing’.
229 O’Sullivan (n 175) 581–83.
3.3. THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF DIFFERENT PARTIES 65
rights would essentially be exhausted during the legislative phase, this may only be
an issue of nuance when it comes to the conclusion.230
3.3.3 The level of protection
Intellectual property rights are not absolute, and it is impossible to protect them
completely using enforcement.231 Therefore, trying to find the least restrictive means
to eliminate or even to provide maximal protection against IPR infringement seems
misguided. This was emphasised in Scarlet Extended and affirmed in UPC Telekabel
Wien very explicitly:232
There is, however, nothing whatsoever in the wording of [Article 17(2) EUCFR stating
that ‘Intellectual property shall be protected’] or in the Court’s case-law to suggest that
that [intellectual property] right is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely
protected.
A better question is to ask what degree of IPR enforcement is deemed appropriate
when balanced against other issues, in particular other fundamental rights.233 How-
ever, even formulating the goal as seeking the most effective protection possible within
the constraints imposed by other fundamental rights does not really take any stance
on the balance of rights and only avoids defining the actual goal.234 This reflects the
230 That is, it might not matter that much whether the conclusion is presented as ‘Article 3 of the
Enforcement Directive, to be interpreted in the light of the EUCFR, should be interpreted as
imposing certain limitations on the interpretation of the law’ rather than more directly as ‘the
EUCFR imposes certain limitations on the interpretation of the law’.
231 For example, Lemley and Reese (n 3) 1389–90, with references, describe how infringement
has always been a feature of the IPR landscape, how ‘content industries merely need sufficient
incentive to create new works’, and that ‘weeding out all infringement is not cost-effective’, ‘would
impose in dramatic social costs to gain dubious benefits’, and that ‘the real policy question is how
to bring infringement down to manageable level [...] in conjunction with attractive and reasonably
priced alternatives’.
232 Scarlet Extended (n 202) para 43; UPC Telekabel Wien (n 44) para 61. Also similarly in UPC Telekabel
Wien (Opinion) (n 22) paras 75–76, 79–81. For earlier discussion, see eg Mylly, ‘Intellectual
property and fundamental rights: Do they interoperate?’ (n 119) 200.
233 See n 231 and Lemley and Reese (n 3) 1374 fn 111: ‘Even if it was legally possible, it simply
was not economically rational to stop the end users’ and ‘the optimal level of infringement is
likely greater than zero’. See also Feiler (n 32) 74–75, for instance. One way to answer this is
to conclude that rights are in some cases practically unenforceable. Alternatively, whether the
extension to enforcement is justified must be evaluated. See Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent
Third Parties’ (n 8) para 26; Alexandra Sims, ‘The denial of copyright protection on public policy
grounds’ (2008) 30 EIPR 189. Compare this to n 128 on ECtHR models of justification in IPR
disputes: in that context, the rule of law paradigm (prohibiting only excessive national solutions)
seemed to be stronger than enforcement or balancing paradigm.
234 With such an ambiguous ‘maximalist’ formulation, any mechanism providing more than a marginal
increase in IPR protection would automatically pass the suitability test; see Barak (n 130) 305. On
problems with maximalist formulations, see eg Mylly, Intellectual Property and European Economic
Constitutional Law (n 119) 205.
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underlying (and unresolved) policy issue on the level and constraints on enforcement
an IPR holder is entitled to.235
Rather than trying to find the most effective means in general, one should survey
the means and their trade-offs, including effectiveness, cost, restrictions on others’
rights, and other impacts. The appropriate balance between some degree of enforce-
ment using a specific means and other rights can then be considered. For example, in
UPC Telekabel Wien imposing a generic website blocking order incurred judicial review
requirements to the national procedure in order to ensure proportionality evaluation.
This was noted more explicitly in the Advocate General’s Opinion that proportionality
cannot be evaluated if the necessary measures could not be reviewed.236 In contrast,
another prediction of the practical consequences has been that generic blocking orders
will become more commonplace, because requesting and imposing them seems easier
and more effective for the court and the IPR holders.237 However, if courts are aware
of the resulting requirements for the procedural law, they might continue to prefer
specific orders – or even stop issuing generic ones.238
3.4 IPR enforcement principles
3.4.1 General observations
Since there are many different conceptions of the meanings of legal principles, a
clarification may be in order.239 The most significant issue here is that principles may
be directly posited by enactment or created indirectly.240 In this context, the principles
235 This question ‘what amounts to a reasonable level of enforcement’ is difficult even in the de lege
ferenda sense. For example, Hargreaves (n 60) 81 refers to a form of the cost-benefit framework
developed by WIPO, but observes that the data to evaluate it is lacking.
236 UPC Telekabel Wien (Opinion) (n 22) paras 66, 81–86, 88. This was also submitted by the
Commission.
237 Mylly, ‘The constitutionalization of the European legal order’ (n 119) 122.
238 Similarly, see Husovec, ‘CJEU allowed website-blocking injunctions with some reservations’ (n 23)
633; Angelopoulos, ‘Are blocking injunctions against ISPs allowed in Europe?’ (n 8) 820–21.
239 For example, Ralf Poscher, ‘The Principles Theory: How Many Theories and What is their Merit?’
in Matthias Klatt (ed), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (OUP 2012)
describes numerous principle theories being about 1) the concept of law, 2) norms, 3) adjudi-
cation, 4) argumentation, or 5) fundamental rights doctrine. Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas (n 108)
189 distinguishes decision principles, interpretation principles, general legal principles, source
principles, and legislative background principles; Aulis Aarnio, Reason and Authority: A Treatise
on the Dynamic Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics (Ashgate 1997) 177–78 has a similar yet somewhat
different classification. For Finnish summaries, see eg Janne Kaisto, Lainoppi ja oikeusteoria:
Oikeusteorian perusteista aineellisen varallisuusoikeuden näkökulmasta (Edita 2005) 72–78; Sampo
Mielityinen, Vahingonkorvausoikeuden periaatteet (Edita 2006) 60ff.
240 For example, principles for Dworkin are a joint product of legal rules, decisions, and moral
principles. For Alexy, principles can be created either directly or indirectly. In ‘indirect’ conceptions,
legal principles may be treated as distinct from legal rules. For a summary, see Larry Alexander,
‘Legal Objectivity and the Illusion of Legal Principles’ in Matthias Klatt (ed), Institutionalized
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are directly posited and therefore constitute legal rules.241 For simplicity, they could
also be called ‘principle-like rules’.242
In this context, principles are best conceived as Alexy’s optimisation requirements,
meaning that they can be satisfied to varying degrees. The appropriate degree depends
on what is factually and legally possible. The legal possibilities are determined by the
opposing principles and other rules.243 As was discussed in Section 3.2.2, the epistemic
question and certainty of what is factually possible and its predicted impact are also
crucial here. Dworkin’s model is somewhat similar to Alexy’s, but he emphasises rights
triumphing over policy considerations.244 While balancing is not a panacea, it adds
structure to adjudication, increases the transparency and rationality of decisions and
seems to be better than the alternatives.245
Finally, it is important to identify the principles in both EU and national law that
would apply to the interpretation of the legal basis and rights and interests in question.
Further, national principles may need to be interpreted differently within the scope of
EU law from applying them to purely domestic measures: this will be the case with
copyright enforcement.246
3.4.2 Multi-faceted IPR enforcement principles
From EU perspective, the foremost source is applying the EUCFR and the general prin-
ciples of law.247 However, these are typically so generic that ‘intermediate’ principles
would be useful in making the application more concrete.248 In the context of IPR
Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (OUP 2012) 118–23; Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas (n 108)
189.
241 In consequence, some of the more philosophical and/or theoretical discussions regarding rules
versus principles do not apply. See eg Aarnio, Reason and Authority (n 239) 174–86.
242 See eg Pirker (n 105) 51–52; Aarnio, Reason and Authority (n 239) 179–80; Kaisto (n 239) 78.
243 Alexy (n 133) 47–48; Pirker (n 105) 48–51. Balancing can still be useful even though one can
certainly disagree with some parts of Alexy’s theory, such as the prima facie equal footing of all
the relevant interests and the possibility and reasonableness of assigning weights to interests with
mathematical precision; see, Matthias Jestaedt, ‘The Doctrine of Balancing – its Strengths and
Weaknesses’ in Matthias Klatt (ed), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy
(OUP 2012) 163–65. Also, in Pirker (n 105) 44: ‘One may wonder whether such a representation
of reality by means of seemingly objective mathematical formulae adds much to the understanding
of what an adjudicator actually has to do to reach a satisfactory resolution to a value conflict.’ For
other critiques, see eg ibid, 31–38, 44; Lavapuro (n 146) 94–103, 112–19, 250–52.
244 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 131) xi, 83–84, 90–93; Pirker (n 105) 19. This has similarities
to the argument by Habermas (n 148) 256ff.
245 For criticism and replies, see eg Barak (n 130) 481ff; Jestaedt (n 243).
246 See Section 3.3.2 and more precisely n 222.
247 The latter not being that relevant anymore, see n 171 onward. As observed in Husovec, ‘CJEU
allowed website-blocking injunctions with some reservations’ (n 23) 632, the CJEU has had a
tendency to resolve these issues as balancing the fundamental rights rather than as a matter of
interpreting secondary legislation. This may be due to the ambiguous nature of principles and
deference afforded to national courts.
248 In the de lege ferenda context, proposals have been made, for example, for a new more balanced
TRIPS agreement also incorporating explicit balancing principles. See eg Marianne Levin, ‘A
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enforcement, these can be found in the Infosoc and Enforcement Directives.249 On the
other hand, these principles do not exhaust the general application and argumentative
power of the EUCFR.250
UPC Telekabel Wien applied Recital 9 as a requirement to ensure ‘a high level
of protection’ to argue that website blocking orders may be imposed on user-end
providers. This embeds the idea of the principle of effectiveness, since categorically
excluding all such providers would substantially diminish the level of protection.251
This may be read as endorsing at least some degree of effectiveness, especially when
reasonable alternatives do not exist. While this may be convincing for subscriber
information disclosure requests, the argument does not fully apply to website blocking,
since blocking or disconnecting the website could technically be implemented by other
providers as well.252
When it comes to website blocking, the Infosoc Directive does not provide explicit
guidance on how to balance Article 8(3) injunctions. While Art 8(1) particularly
requires effective and dissuasive sanctions against infringers, these do not apply to
faultless intermediaries. Recitals are essentially the only, yet unhelpful source of
Balanced Approach on Online Enforcement of Copyrights’ in Johan Axhamn (ed), Copyright in a
Borderless Online Environment (Norstedts Juridik 2012) 159–60 with references.
249 The directives have a number of recitals that could be read to support either weaker or stronger
enforcement (see n 268). Here, the focus is on explicit statutory provisions rather than non-binding
and ambiguous recitals. In contrast, Ladenburger (n 111) 9 describes the Commission’s legislative
requirement, adopted later, that ‘fundamental rights recitals’ must be elaborated, including where
appropriate, even the solutions found to respect the rights. A section on how the obligations have
been met must also be included in the Explanatory Memorandum.
250 Cf. O’Sullivan (n 175) 581–83, who argues for interpreting the obligations for ISPs solely through
secondary legislation, rather than the rights and limitations of the EUCFR. According to him, the
EUCFR has a role to play ‘where a judge over-steps the mark by going outside the criteria of Article
3 of the Enforcement Directive’, reducing it to a safety-valve against erroneous judicial discretion.
As we saw, this approach must be rejected.
251 UPC Telekabel Wien (n 44) paras 33–35, with references to the earlier case law (for which, see
n 73). A ‘high level’ of protection is however dubious for arguing for an essentially ‘even higher’
level of protection, because the previously adopted standards are already ‘high’ or even arguably
too high. See eg Bernt Hugenholtz, ‘The dynamics of harmonization of copyright at the European
level’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Constructing European Intellectual Property: Achievements and new
perspectives (Edward Elgar 2013) 275–76; Geiger, ‘’Constitutionalising’ intellectual property law?’
(n 119) 376–81; Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or harmonising? The Court of Justice, the right to
property and European copyright law’ (n 119) 68; Farrand, Networks of Power in Digital Copyright
Law and Policy (n 60) 93–94. Further, Martin-Prat (n 32) 32 notes that there was (emphasis
added, meaning at the time of adoption) general acceptance of a high level of protection, but
that future copyright reviews ‘may be very different in that respect’. For critically of maximalist
tendencies and on Recital 9 as having become an ‘institutionalized dogma’ for the CJEU, see Mylly,
‘Intellectual property and fundamental rights: Do they interoperate?’ (n 119) 200, 206–07 and
Mylly, ‘The constitutionalization of the European legal order’ (n 119) 119. On different readings
of ‘high’ or ‘low’ protection, Marcus Norrgård, ‘The Role Conferred on the National Judge by
Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2005) 6 ERA Forum
503, 507–11 and n 268.
252 In LSG (n 46) para 45, this ‘the only possibility’ argument seemed to be decisive for subscriber
information disclosure requests, because the user-end connectivity provider was the only one with
the required information. On different options, see Section 3.1.3 and Figure 3.1 in particular.
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interpretation. Looking further, it seems reasonable to conclude that the principles of
the Enforcement Directive can also be applied to the identical copyright injunctions
given that the same provisions also exist in that directive.253
Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive applies to (all) measures, procedures and
remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of IPRs covered by the Directive.254
These shall be ‘fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or
costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays’, and also ‘effective,
proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the
creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their
abuse’.255
Since it is challenging to realise all of these at the same time, case-by-case bal-
ancing will needed.256 This should be understood to require considering the general
characteristics of different kinds of services (ie, conducting typology), rather than
focusing on non-generalisable individual patterns.257 In Table 3.2, these are classified
as ‘Pro-IPR’, ‘Neutral’ and ‘Contra-IPR’ principles. However, it must be noted that in
different interpretative contexts, for example, against any infringer or a third party,
the principles could have an entirely different meaning and, in consequence, this
classification serves only as a simplified illustration.258 For example, ‘not unnecessarily
costly or complicated’ could also be construed to mean that the procedure should
be easy and cheap for the IPR holder (rather than that the injunction must not be
too burdensome to the intermediary).259 Similarly, it could be argued that in some
cases it would be disproportionate for the right holder to be denied an injunction
253 An alternative interpretation would be that given that the Enforcement Directive does not prejudice
the Infosoc Directive, the injunctions issued could in some cases be different. While strictly
speaking such a reading is possible, the interpretation of identical provisions should not depend
on which directive is used as the legal basis.
254 The chapter is titled ‘Measures, procedures and remedies’, Section ‘General provisions’, and Article
‘General obligation’. For example, Sylvia Mercado Kierkegaard, ‘Taking a sledgehammer to crack
the nut: The EU Enforcement Directive’ (2005) 21 CLSR 488, 491 has characterised these as
‘safeguards against misuse of the new measures’ due to ‘[a] big problem created by the lack of
proportionality’, because the directive applies to every kind of infringement, even minimal, based
on the broad scope of Article 2. Likewise, Mylly, Intellectual Property and European Economic
Constitutional Law (n 119) 267 has criticised the directive as reflecting ‘one-sided proprietarian
logic’.
255 On a recent evaluation of these in a national setting, see Cartier (n 35) paras 158–91 and as
summarised in n 265. Cf. the case on trademark infringement, in which the AG did not see
that EU law would impose any specific requirements beyond the efficacy, dissuasiveness and
proportionality required by Article 3(2); see L’Oréal v eBay (Opinion) (n 9) para 180. In that
context, however, dissuasiveness could be interpreted as being directed against the infringer or as
the requirement of the hosting provider to honour the obligations and requirements of the liability
exemption; ie, the repercussions of failure to comply with acting upon awareness of illegality.
256 On case-by-case consideration, see Enforcement Directive (n 72) Recital 17.
257 See Pihlajarinne, Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus (n 36) 157. That is, evaluating each
case strictly on its own would lead to legal uncertainty and the case law would not be developed.
258 The interpretations have been taken mainly from Scarlet Extended (n 202).
259 Ibid para 48. For example, Pihkala (n 70) 978 argues that ‘not costly’ means that the implementa-
tion costs should be borne by the provider.
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(rather than that the injunction must strike a fair balance between protection of IPR
and other rights).260 On the other hand, the ‘effectiveness’ requirement could also
be read negatively to mean that non-effective mechanisms must be rejected.261 Yet
another reading is that at least seriously discouraging measures would be required,
even if implementing them incurred significant cost to the provider.262 A positive
and more widely held reading is that effective mechanisms should be provided, but
ineffective ones may be also acceptable (maius includit minus), provided that a fair
balance between rights is struck.263 Likewise, ‘no barrier to legitimate trade’ could also
be construed to imply reluctance against intra-EU market fragmentation by imposing
different requirements on website operators in a patchwork of jurisdictions.264 It will
remain to be seen how interpretations will develop in the case law.265
As was already observed, according to Article 2(1), a Member State may provide
stronger enforcement only ‘in accordance with Article 3’, ie, the balance must be
maintained.266 In practice, this may be somewhat toothless as a yardstick of evaluation
because of the discretion in interpretation of ambiguous principles including that of
‘fair balance’.267 In theory, it is a very significant provision. In any case, the most
260 Scarlet Extended (n 202) paras 49–53.
261 Such reasoning is assumed by Feiler (n 32) 61–62, and is supported in Husovec, ‘CJEU allowed
website-blocking injunctions with some reservations’ (n 23) 633, based on UPC Telekabel Wien
(n 44) para 63, arguing that ‘blocking injunctions must be probably so effective that they at least
partially prevent and ‘seriously discourage’ access to a targeted website’ (emphasis in Husovec).
262 This seems implicit in, for example, Gemma Minero, ‘Case Note on “UPC Telekabel Wien”’ (2014)
45 IIC 848, 850.
263 However, the one-sided argument in O’Sullivan (n 175) 581–82 that effectiveness should be
judged solely from the perspective of the IPR holder, and ineffectiveness would likewise raise no
proportionality issue for the ISP must be rejected.
264 See Feiler (n 32) 68–69 and on the (non-)applicability of restrictions on fundamental freedoms, n
32 and corresponding text. This could possibly be read between the lines in UPC Telekabel Wien
(Opinion) (n 22) para 57 (see n 43).
265 In Cartier (n 35) paras 158–91, the national court made essentially the following interpretations
on trademark infringement: necessary requires considering whether less onerous alternative
measures are available (para 162); effectiveness is an important factor for proportionality, but
it does not require the IPR holder to show that injunction would reduce the overall amount of
infringement as long as the measure is not wholly ineffective; substitutability is also a factor of
proportionality (164, 173, 176); dissuasive refers to the dissuasive effect on the third parties (178);
not unnecessarily complicated or costly does not bar even complex or costly measures completely
provided that they are are proportionate (181); avoidance of barriers to legitimate trade means that
the measures must be strictly targeted so that they do not affect lawful communications (182);
fair and equitable refers to a proportionate balance (183); proportionate requires proportionality
analysis according to the criteria estblished (189–90, of these see Section 4.1.6 and n 19 therein);
safeguards against abuse in this case implied that anyone affected could apply to vary or discharge
the order, users should be notified of blocking on a web page if possible, and that duration of
blocking should be limited (262–65).
266 See n 55 and corresponding text. See also Norrgård, ‘The Role Conferred on the National Judge’
(n 251) 506. Further, as discussed in Section 3.3.2, other fundamental rights also limit the extent
of maximum protection.
267 Angelopoulos, ‘Are blocking injunctions against ISPs allowed in Europe?’ (n 8) 815, 818. For
example, Kierkegaard (n 254) 491 submits that Article 3 is too abstract and will result in different
implementations in each EU country.
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important implication of Article 2(1) is that it will, alongside other grounds, oblige
the evaluation of non-mandatory national measures (such as graduated response or
subscriber information disclosure) against these principles and EU fundamental rights.
Table 3.2: Enforcement principles when applied to third parties
Pro-IPR Neutral Contra-IPR
effective fair proportionate
dissuasive equitable not complicated
no time-limits not abusable not costly
no delays no barriers to trade
Norrgård observed in 2005 that the national judge could reasonably adopt both
a weak or strong enforcement ideology based on the discretion granted by the En-
forcement Directive.268 Balanced interpretation was suggested based on the principles
of Article 3, fundamental rights, context-sensitivity, and the comparative method.269
These have since then materialised in CJEU case law. Similarly, Ohly later underlined
the need for proportionality to balance effectiveness and dissuasiveness, referring to
taking due account of the specific characteristics of the case as noted in Recital 17.270
To conclude, it is important to note that both the Infosoc and Enforcement Di-
rectives have primarily been geared toward infringers. For example, applying the
principles of effectiveness and dissuasiveness against a faultless intermediary is ques-
tionable.271 Indeed, in his Opinion in L’Oréal v eBay, Advocate General Jääskinen was
not convinced that the identical scope of injunctions available against the intermediary
and the infringer would be a reasonable interpretation of Article 11 of the Enforce-
ment Directive.272 Context-sensitivity of Recital 17 and arguments by Norrgård and
Ohly would also suggest caution with regard to third-party injunctions.273 Further,
268 Norrgård, ‘The Role Conferred on the National Judge’ (n 251) 507–11. Norrgård’s argument
was also referred to in L’Oréal v eBay (Opinion) (n 9) para 171, repeated in Birgit Clark and
Maximilian Schubert, ‘Odysseus between Scylla and Charybdis? The ECJ rules in L’Oréal v eBay’
(2011) 6 JIPLP 880, and now applied in the new context of the ‘Scylla and Charybdis of technical
limits and legal requirements’ in Angelopoulos, ‘Are blocking injunctions against ISPs allowed in
Europe?’ (n 8) 820.
269 Norrgård, ‘The Role Conferred on the National Judge’ (n 251) 511–14.
270 Ansgar Ohly, ‘Three principles of European IP enforcement law: effectiveness, proportionality,
dissuasiveness’ in Josef Drexl and others (eds), Technology and Competition, Contributions in
Honour of Hanns Ullrich (SSRN version, Larcier 2009) 7–8, 11, 15.
271 Cf. Toby Headdon, ‘Beyond liability: On the availability and scope of injunctions against online
intermediaries after L’Oreal v Ebay’ (2012) 34 EIPR 137, 139, seems to implicitly accept dissua-
siveness with respect to intermediaries. He interprets it in the context of disobeying the court
order and being in contempt of the court. On the other hand, in Cartier (n 35) paras 178–79 this
was deemed to refer to the general dissuasive effect against the potentially infringing third parties
such as the public. See also n 255.
272 L’Oréal v eBay (Opinion) (n 9) paras 176–77. In contrast, in Cartier (n 35) para 173 greater
effectiveness against intermediaries than infringers was not required; this was not substantiated.
273 Norrgård, ‘The Role Conferred on the National Judge’ (n 251) 514. Actually, Norrgård describes
only four types of infringers covered by the directive (and not third parties at all) as imposing
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the notions attached to injunctions are different and comparisons difficult between
infringers and intermediaries as well as between legal systems.274
3.5 Proportionality evaluation procedure
In order to demonstrate and summarise the foundations presented in this chapter, an
approach to evaluating proportionality is formulated. It also illustrates the necessity
and interaction of the prior examination. Further, the procedure could also be useful
in other kinds of research. National interpretation of a copyright enforcement statute
is used as a generic example.275 The steps are as follows:
1. identifying the context and depth of evaluation,
2. identifying the interests of various parties,
3. identifying the principles of EU, and if applicable, national law,
4. formulating the criteria to be used in evaluation, and
5. applying the criteria in a four-step proportionality test and producing a reasoned
opinion.
The initial step is to identify the context of measures, proportionality evaluation,
and fundamental rights systems. Identification is necessary because purely domestic,
EU-scoped, and EU measures are evaluated differently. Further, the applicable legal
basis and fundamental rights systems (domestic, EU, or both) must be discerned.
The relevance and importance (or lack thereof) of ECtHR case law to the matter in
hand should also be analysed. Identifying the category (implementation, derogation,
etc.) at issue will be helpful in navigating the ocean of case law and literature. It is
also essential to see whether a horizontal aspect of fundamental rights application
is present, and if so, what kind and whether this has any impact on the evaluation.
Finally, as a crucial pre-balancing step, the desired intensity of evaluation needs to be
considerations for the context. Not mentioning third parties such as intermediaries serves as a
reminder of the number of different applicable contexts.
274 For examples of differences in approach between tort law -centric and in rem actions, see Husovec,
‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties’ (n 8) paras 12–19.
275 Examples from related fields include evaluating the constitutional legality or interpreting 1) a
graduated response mechanism or administative blocking orders from the perspective of EU
fundamental rights and IPR enforcement principles; 2) domestic data retention legislation that
in some countries replaced the implementations of the invalidated Directive 2006/24/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated
or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ
L105/54; or 3) the fully harmonised ‘making available’ right of the Infosoc Directive when it
comes to the liability for creating hyperlinks.
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considered. In summary, one should be able to answer the somewhat opaque question
‘what kind of proportionality evaluation will be performed?’
In the provided example, the context is a domestic implementation of EU legislation
or a mechanism otherwise within the scope of EU law. In this case both national
and EU fundamental rights apply, but the primacy of EU law may lead to diverging
interpretations compared to purely domestic measures. The most relevant legal basis
for proportionality evaluation is Article 52 EUCFR. Proportionality in this context
differs from the tradition of evaluation of EU measures (eg, legality of directives) or
degorations from the internal market rules. In this context, the ECtHR has granted
rather wide margin of discretion, and its case law is not very useful at present. When
it comes to the horizontal effect, there are no restrictions to applying the fundamental
rights to interpreting provisions; direct obligations are not imposed solely based on
the EUCFR. Finally, the intensity of evaluation depends on the object of interest. If
the goal is to predict the outcome of judgements, lesser amount of review may be
adequate. On the other hand, more idealistic or constitutional research might call for
stricter scrutiny. In any case, one cannot sidestep the issue of proportionality without
any consideration.
In the second step, the stakeholders and their rights and interests must be identified.
This includes both private and public interests. The private/public consideration may
also trigger further evaluation of horizontal or vertical relations. After this step
one should be able to answer the question ‘what are the rights and interests being
balanced?’
An example of rights and interests was described in Section 3.3. The multitude and
conflicts result in limits for minimal and maximal protection of each right, because
strong protection of one right at some point implies that another right will be infringed
through underprotection. Identifying different aspects of rights and interests is
necessary in order to grasp the big picture; rather than framing the issue solely as
protection of IPR, the impact as a whole requires consideration.
In the third step, one must identify the applicable principles, whether statutory or
not. These would in turn affect the interpretation of the legal basis and rights and
interests concerned. Depending on the case, both EU and national principles may
apply. However, national principles may need to be interpreted differently within the
scope of EU law compared to applying them to purely domestic measures. Therefore,
identifying the context is a prerequisite for considering the applicable principles. After
this step, one should be able to answer the question ‘what intermediate principles
apply to the interpretation of this case?’
An example of principles was examined in Section 3.4, which in EU context were
found in Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive. These provide more input to the
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evaluation of the aforementioned rights.276 Given that here both national and EU
law apply, national principles (if any) may also be relevant. However, they must be
interpreted through the lens of EU law and EU fundamental rights.
In the fourth step, one must formulate the criteria for evaluating proportionality.
While the previous two steps of identifying the interests and principles may be
somewhat opaque, this is a much more concrete and context-specific task. The task is
required in order to provide depth and justification in the evaluation. For example,
simply enumerating the fundamental rights at stake and producing conclusions would
be insufficient. This also helps in avoiding the inflation, reduction to ‘window-dressing’,
or one-sided examination of the fundamental rights.277 Based on this step, one should
be able to answer the question ‘what are the concrete factors to consider when
assessing proportionality in this case?’
Various criteria have been suggested for evaluation; whichever ones are used is
beside the point.278 The key is to identify more precise criteria for evaluation and to
improve justification.279
The final step is applying the criteria in the light of the legal basis, interests and
rights, and principles at issue and conducting a proportionality evaluation. This also
links back to the issue of intensity of scrutiny. Formulating the criteria usually helps in
uncovering many sensitive spots. The four-step test provides a basis for consideration:
one must assess the legitimacy of the objective, the suitability of the means, the
necessity in the form of the least restrictive means, and finally proportionality as a
whole. In addition to these perspectives, other legislated criteria (if any) may also be
examined. Especially when conducting an interpretive balancing exercise, one should
be careful to remain critical at each step, and also to keep in mind the previous steps
in the ultimate stricto sensu proportionality evaluation stage.
Here Article 52 EUCFR results in criteria essentially matching the traditional four-
step proportionality evaluation; further requirements (if any) of EU or national law or
case law may also be considered as appropriate. Instead of just declaring a conclusion
proportionate or not, such more precise sub-tests as established in constitutional
scholarship significantly improve the depth of justification.280
All in all, the proposed steps in the evaluation procedure seek to ensure that
each substantial part that needs to be considered is identified and given appropriate
scrutiny.
276 As an example of such detailed evaluation, see Cartier (n 35) paras 158–265.
277 On these and other dangers, see Mylly, ‘The constitutionalization of the European legal order’
(n 119) 128–30.
278 See eg Article VI (paras 65–69) and Section 4 and n 19 therein.
279 As a thorough example, see Cartier (n 35) paras 189–265.
280 As a similar assessment of proportionality, see ibid, 184ff.
Chapter 4
Findings
First, Section 4.1 summarises each publication, focusing on key results. Section 4.2
then provides a synthesis and more general discussion based on Section 4.1 and the
foundations examined in the previous chapter. Most findings are presented in this and
the previous chapter; only more general conclusions will be provided in Chapter 5.
4.1 Summary of publications
4.1.1 Plethora of means and strategies
Article I provided a taxonomy of the means of enforcement and the first glimpse of








  - Website blocking
  - Disconnection










Targeting the main infringer:
Disconnecting the site
Criminal proceedings
Punitive or chilling damages
Eg cutting off the revenue stream
Education, private use levies, digital rights management (DRM), sharing benefits, legal alternatives, voluntary restrictions
Figure 4.1: Classification of the means of enforcement
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The means were divided into preventive and reactive. These are illustrated in
Figure 4.1.1 Preventive ones aim to mitigate impacts, are typically voluntary, or are of
non-legal nature. The following were submitted: 1) education, 2) private use levies,
3) digital rights management, 4) sharing benefits such as advertising income, 5) legal
alternatives, and 6) the provider’s voluntary restrictive measures.
Reactive means could target either the end-users, the main infringer or an inter-
mediary.2 The measures targeting end-users were mass litigation, warning letter, and
graduated response mechanisms. The goal in the first was general prevention by
raising the risk of being caught infringing. In the latter two, the attempt to educate
the user was also prevalent. All of these required some form of support from the
legislation, at least as a legal basis for obtaining subscriber identification from the
connectivity provider.
Targeting the source of infringement was another strategy. This included dis-
connecting the site, using criminal proceedings and/or claiming high damages or
compensation, or affecting the operator in some other way, such as by cutting off
the revenue stream and the business model through financial transactions or adver-
tisement providers. Because so many different parties could be deemed an infringer
(eg, downloading user, uploading user, the user who links to infringing material, the
website operator, or the hosting provider), the IPR holder was again presented with a
choice of which party or parties to pursue. If the website operator was identifiable and
reachable, targeting him/her was often preferable. This would have a preventive effect
on others and infringement could be stopped with one action. The operator’s identity
could possibly also be established using an information disclosure request targeting
the website’s provider or by the police. Failing that, the site could be disconnected
through intermediaries.
Finally, Internet intermediaries could also be targeted, through 1) a subscriber
information disclosure order, 2) a website blocking order, 3) notice-and-takedown
against a hosting provider, 4) more general blocking such as provisions that could
also be used for defamation, or 5) using voluntary means (eg, similar to filtering child
abuse images).
While there were some overlaps and problems with classification, the taxonomy
should still be useful in the abstract and in discerning the strategic and tactical
approaches to enforcement.
1 The former, forward-looking measures try to reduce infringement ex-ante. The latter, backward-
looking measures mitigate infringement ex-post.
2 Similarly, on division to ‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side’ measures, and also separately to educa-
tive/preventive and mitigating/punitive; see Intellectual Property Office, ‘International Compar-
ison of Approaches to Online Copyright Infringement: Final Report’ (9 February 2015) 〈https:
//www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-comparison-of-approaches-to-online-
copyright-enforcement〉 2–3, 17–18.
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Several themes were introduced that would recur in subsequent articles. First,
the plurality and overlapping nature of means and strategies provided ‘shopping’
opportunities to IPR holders to choose the best means in each case. Second, distribu-
tion of expenses for measures where the intermediary action is required was crucial.
Third, the ineffectiveness of costly measures suggested that the ultimate reasons for
copyright enforcement might be other goals, such as a power struggle against service
providers.
4.1.2 Expansion of copyright enforcement in lawmaking
Article II provided a detailed analysis of the IPR holders’ position and activism in
advocacy to expand enforcement through Internet connectivity providers.3 This was
examined from the perspective of legal policy and sociology using critical legislative
theories and Bourdieu’s power analysis. The focus was on the process of preparing
government bills in the phase before parliamentary hearings, ie, the earliest and
most important part of legal drafting. While there has been literature on imbalance
of copyright in general – including the context of lawmaking – a study focusing
on intermediaries is novel, as is the approach of applying Bourdieu and legislative
theories in this context.
It was observed that there were dozens of IPR holder stakeholders, and they
have also assumed a dominant position in various preparatory bodies. Internet
service providers, the industry and the users lack coherence, resources, and long-term
commitment to compete with them on equal terms. The goal of IPR holders appeared
to be to introduce new means of enforcement and expand current ones at the expense
of providers.
It turned out that even moderate ineffectiveness of enforcement mechanisms was
not a major problem for IPR holders, since if existing ones were to turn out to be
inadequate, it would later be used to argue for making them stronger. Indeed, further
reasons for IPR holder activism were submitted. First, the symbolic value of copyright
enforcement was that they must be seen to be ‘doing something’ for the benefit of
the public (ie, that ‘piracy cannot be tolerated’), for their own constituents (eg, the
artists), and to legitimise their further legislative proposals. The second goal was to
try to educate the infringing users, but it was shown that this attempt was also in vain,
3 For similar research from a slightly more general perspective, see Benjamin Farrand, ‘Lobbying and
Lawmaking in the European Union: The Development of Copyright Law and the Rejection of the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’ [2015] OJLS (Advance access); Benjamin Farrand, Networks
of Power in Digital Copyright Law and Policy: Political Salience, Expertise and the Legislative Process
(Routledge 2014). According to Farrand, the keys to successful lobbying are the early supply of
‘right’ information to the policymakers, the ability to frame the issues early in the process, and the
low political salience of the issue (ie, ‘quiet politics’). If the issue gets more public attention, even
otherwise foregone legislative conclusions may be overturned, as was seen with the ACTA. See
Farrand, ‘Lobbying and Lawmaking in the European Union’ (n 3) 6–11.
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because the users were cognisant of their illegal acts. The final explanation, and the
major finding here, was that this was also a political struggle in the legislative field.
On the other hand, having to develop new business models was actively resisted.
Advocating a strong copyright ideology and increasing the responsibility of third-
party intermediaries seemed to be the top priorities for IPR holders. Success in
these would be more important than any specific activities. This would increase
the IPR holders’ power in further struggles. It was further submitted that the issue
of implementation costs had so far only been important in principle and from the
perspective of further obligations. That is, if the connectivity provider could be made
to bear its own costs, perhaps subsequent and more expensive mechanisms could
also be implemented at its expense. In order to shift the balance of profits and costs
toward the equilibrium, it was submitted that IPR holders should be fully responsible
for the costs of third parties. This would focus the requests on the most important
cases and allow employment of the most appropriate mechanisms. These issues would
be revisited during the evaluation of legitimacy of enforcement objectives in Article
VI.
In Finland, copyright law drafting is supported by a 40-person negotiating board
dominated by the right holders. It is obvious that such bodies cannot legitimise the
lawmaking process and having equal standing is impossible. In a way, this increases
the power of civil servants in charge of drafting the bills. This is also sub-optimal
because IPR holders can use their information power to feed the officials with those
pieces of information and advocacy research that support their own agenda. In such a
scenario, avoiding unbalanced results would require attention and critical appraisal
from the law-drafting officials. It will remain to be seen whether this will result in a
rejuvenation of smaller preparatory expert bodies. Further, it was striking – compared
to the other complex topics – how little input is sought from supposedly neutral
experts such as academia.4
The article was a follow-up to the legal policy considerations introduced in Article
I. The focus was solely on connectivity providers and law drafting. The specific
details of enforcement mechanisms suggested or advocated were of less importance
in this context.5 Trying to ascertain the goals of enforcement attempts through
intermediaries was one aspect which was also simultaneously considered from the
doctrinal perspective in the proportionality evaluation in Article VI.
4 In turn, on the academics turning to address the public through popularisation and this leading
to democratic discourse instead, see eg Patrick R Goold, ‘The Evolution of Normative Legal
Scholarship: The Case of Copyright Discourse’ (2013) 5 EJLS 23, 28–32.
5 However, it is worth noting that in the final government bill, Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle
laiksi tekijänoikeuslain muuttamisesta (HE 181/2014), 29–31, 47, the proposals on impeding
access, warning letter mechanisms, and expanding blocking to cover other providers using an
administrative order were rejected as ineffective, uncertain or lacking judicial review.
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4.1.3 Subscriber identity disclosure: a slippery slope
Article III provided a detailed analysis of the provisions of Finnish law relating to
disclosure of identification data, in particular from the fundamental rights perspective.
These were also contrasted to the provisions of the Coercive Measures Act such
as traffic metadata monitoring. Both disclosure to private individuals and public
authorities were examined.
In disclosing identification data in the context of copyright infringement, one
theoretical issue was how the conflicting fundamental rights should be evaluated
and, in particular, how vertical and horizontal dimensions would be taken into
consideration. It was submitted that the interests are horizontal and at least that the
vertical relation cannot be used in a negative fashion. That is, copyright infringement
being a crime should not be used as an argument to justify a privacy violation because
the interest behind such criminalisation is of a private nature. This turned out to be
a recurring issue to be addressed again in evaluating the proportionality of website
blocking.
Another particular issue was the type of subscriber information disclosure proceed-
ings where the user’s interests are not represented unless the connectivity provider
wanted to expend its resources to champion such a cause. In consequence, nobody
provides the court with arguments about why the request should be rejected. A similar
problem is observed in the context of website blocking, where likewise the website
operator and the users are not directly represented.
In Finnish law, subscriber information disclosure in civil proceedings requires that
the subscriber ‘makes material protected by copyright available to the public to a
significant extent’. The evaluation of the significant extent has been very flexible,
and even temporarily sharing one recently published music album on the BitTorrent
network has been considered to qualify. Out of roughly 100 requests per year (over
500 in total), only one has been rejected (in 2012). This flexible and overly inclusive
interpretation of this threshold was heavily criticised.
Another generic thread was the powers of public authorities. Particularly notewor-
thy was that copyright infringement by sharing an album may be a copyright offence,
punishable by up to two years in prison. In the new Coercive Measures Act, this
qualifies for the use of metadata by public authorities as per data retention legislation
that was supposed to only concern ‘serious crime’.6 The second noteworthy and
heavily criticised observation concerned special provisions in the Police Act, originally
6 The directive was subsequently invalidated. Especially with regard to its supposed goal of fighting
organised crime and terrorism, see Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland
EU:C:2014:238, paras 41–42, 51; Orla Lynskey, ‘The Data Retention Directive is incompatible
with the rights to privacy and data protection and is invalid in its entirety: Digital Rights Ireland’
(2014) 51 CMLR 1789. Finland will continue using data retention with some restrictions as a
national solution. See Liikenne- ja viestintävaliokunnan mietintö 10/2014.
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intended inter alia for obtaining phone numbers to reach plaintiffs. The provision
has been used to disclose subscriber identification data and other information from
intermediaries and companies without a court order as would have been required
using traffic metadata monitoring as per the Coercive Measures Act.
4.1.4 Liability for user-generated content as grounds for blocking
Article IV explored linking as copyright infringement from the perspective of the
website operator, and particularly the UK case law on website blocking. A website
operator’s liability for user-generated content and hyperlinks in particular was an
essential topic in considering which sites are eligible for blocking. Specifically, most
peer-to-peer networking indexing sites that have been blocked have only included
user-added descriptions and metadata, and a link to an external tracker, from which
the information on the users sharing copyright-infringing pieces of files could be found.
This indirect linking would result in difficulty in establishing the website operator’s
direct or secondary liability for running the site. However, it was observed that most
case law was not bothered by these details and the lack of a fully convincing legal
basis for blocking.
First, the liability for linking was analysed using the recent CJEU judgement,
Svensson.7 The ruling did not explicitly address the case of unauthorised original
communication to the public, and BestWater also skimmed over that part of the
preliminary reference question; hopefully, hints could be gleaned from the pending C
More Entertainment on circumventing a pay-wall.8 However, strictly speaking this did
not occur here, as the user-generated content might only include a link to a tracker,
instead of a file including a copyrighted work. In the end, it was submitted that direct
infringement of the making available right would be an ill fit in this context.
Another key issue was the non-harmonised secondary liability for copyright in-
fringement. This might be a more appropriate legal basis in this context. However,
the lack of harmonisation has led to broadening the applicability of direct liability
to scenarios in which it does not fit very well. A risk of further expansion was also
apparent.9 This also has significant impact on the legal basis of website blocking,
because if the operator does not infringe or contribute to infringement, there are no
7 Case C-466/12 Svensson EU:C:2014:76.
8 See Case C-348/13 BestWater EU:C:2014:2315 and pending Case C-279/13 C More Entertainment.
There are a number of practical problems if the linker needs to ensure that the original act has
been authorised or otherwise bear liability; this cannot be discussed here, however. See Pekka
Savola, ‘Tekijänoikeuden vaikutus Internet-linkittämiseen erityisesti EU-oikeuden valossa’ in Päivi
Korpisaari (ed), Viestintäoikeuden vuosikirja 2014 (Forum Iuris, forthcoming 2015).
9 From EU case law, see eg Case C-306/05 SGAE v Rafael Hoteles EU:C:2006:764, Case C-162/10 PPI
v Ireland EU:C:2012:141, but also Case C-135/10 SCF v Del Corso EU:C:2012:140. In general, see
Pekka Savola, ‘Taustamusiikki asiakastilassa yleisölle välittämisenä – tekijänoikeuslaki EU-oikeuden
puristuksessa’ [2014] Defensor Legis 47.
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grounds to block the site. The lack of harmonisation of secondary liability means
that the applicability of decisions in other jurisdictions is also limited by differences
in concepts. Further, whether the CJEU has competence to adjudicate these cases
(except by applying direct liability) was doubtful or at least uncertain.
The article also argued briefly for restraint in imposing blocking orders because of
the procedural situation in court, as already noted earlier in Article III. The specifics for
blocking proxy sites were also discussed, and caution was advised the further removed
the blocked site was from the main infringement. This was due to the freedom of
expression considerations and the challenges in proving sufficient participation in
infringing acts (eg, mens rea).
The article made a contribution to evaluating the basis for blocking. It also included
a comparative perspective. Unfortunately, the focus had to be kept on recent UK case
law, and it was not possible to conduct a more extensive comparison. On the other
hand, the Finnish perspective had already been examined10 and the subject would be
touched on again from the continental perspective in Article VI.
4.1.5 International constraints and shopping opportunities
Article V delved in depth into the issues of private international law and jurisdiction
concerning copyright infringing websites and blocking access to them.
First, the article observed significant flexibility in localising infringing acts. In
consequence, the website operator could be sued almost anywhere and under any law
at all.11 Several observations were made that differed from the traditionally estab-
lished view. It was argued that there may be ways to avoid a distributive application
of multiple laws to a globally available website with a different characterisation of
infringement, ie, where and how the infringement is deemed to occur.12 It was also
10 Pekka Savola, Internet-operaattoreihin kohdistetut tekijänoikeudelliset estomääräykset erityisesti
vertaisverkkopalvelun osalta (Licentiate of Science (Technology) thesis, 2013) 154–76.
11 As described in the article, this was affirmed in Case C-170/12 Pickney EU:C:2013:635, in contrary
to the AG Opinion. The solution was later endorsed in Case C-360/12 Coty EU:C:2014:1318, para
55, despite the AG’s puzzlement of the approach and offering an alternative resolution to the case
(see Opinion, paras 66–70). Again, Opinion in C-441/13 Pez Hejduk EU:C:2014:2212 essentially
suggested abandoning the Pinckney doctrine for ubiquitous Internet infringement and adopting an
entirely new interpretation. That is, only the court of the state where the causal event took place
would have the special jurisdiction for ‘delocalised’ damages as per Article 5(3) of the Brussels I
regulation. The CJEU, however, persisted with the earlier approach (Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk
EU:C:2015:28, para 32). The CJEU also clarified in ibid, para 37 that the jurisdiction only applies
to damages caused in the forum state. On previous multiple accepted jurisdictions, practical
difficulties, legal uncertainties, and the need to adopt an entirely new approach to interpreting
Article 5(3) on specific kinds of Internet infringements, see in particular Pez Hejduk (Opinion)
(n 11) paras 20, 39, 42, 44.
12 As a case in point, a UK online store was ordered by a Danish court to block access by Danish
users for online copyright infringement occurring in Denmark. On the other hand, previously in
2013 the court refused to order connectivity providers to block access to such webstores, because
proceedings against the source were deemed preferable. See EDRi, ‘Danish court orders a UK
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observed that the chosen law might not, at least explicitly, always include a strict
territorial limitation. For example, damages and compensation based on Finnish
copyright law do not seem to be restricted to acts that occur in Finland. Further,
forum and choice of law shopping opportunities were particularly interesting in this
case, because the law applicable to the main infringement also applies to determining
the extent of secondary liability. For example, it might be lucrative to apply the law
where the liability is as general as possible, and the damages and compensation are
the highest.
This preliminary examination allowed turning to the main topic, imposing a web-
site blocking order on an Internet connectivity provider. The court where the Internet
connectivity provider has domicile has global jurisdiction for ordering blocking, but
it was still argued that the applicable law of a particular state cannot be applied to
communications that do not go through that state.13 For example, Finnish copyright
law should not be used to impose an order on a Finnish ISP to block access to a site in
Sweden for those users that reside in, say, Estonia and whose communications do not
go through Finland (see Customer3 in Figure 4.2). However, depending on which act
is characterised as the main infringement, another law could be successfully applied.
On the othe hand, if the targeted website was located in Sweden, Swedish copyright
law could be used to block all access provided that the order could be implemented
there. In the example scenario, an Estonian court might or might not have jurisdiction
to block access, depending on whether the ISP has a branch in that state. If the answer
was affirmative, the jurisdiction might be limited only to orders affecting that state, or
the applicable law would limit its cross-border applicability.14
One significant argument was that the special jurisdiction on liability for wrongful
acts in Article 5(3) of Brussels I regulation15 is not a legal basis applicable for issuing
company to block Danish IP addresses’ (3 December 2014) 〈https://edri.org/danish-court-orders-
uk-company-to-block-danish-ip-addresses/〉; Voga Ltd Maritime and Commercial Court judgement
of 12 November 2014 (A-25-14).
13 A Council of Europe committee is working on a recommendation on jurisdiction. Paragraph 2.2 of
the draft version requires states to, inter alia, ‘ensure that orders to block illegal content [...] do
not have impact beyond their national boundaries’; see Council of Europe Committee of experts on
cross-border flow of Internet traffic and Internet freedom (MSI-INT), ‘Draft Recommendation of
the Committee of Ministers to member States on free flow of information on the Internet’ (16 June
2014) 〈http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/MSI-INT/MSI-INT(2014)06_en.pdf〉
3. This draft recommendation goes further than the one suggested. As an example of so-called
upstream filtering affecting other states, see The Citizen Lab, ‘Routing Gone Wild: Documenting
Upstream Filtering in Oman via India’ (12 July 2012) 〈https://citizenlab.org/2012/07/routing-
gone-wild/〉; UNESCO, Fostering Freedom Online: The Role of Internet Intermediaries (2015)
71–72.
14 Cf. when the provider does not even have a branch in a particular state, in practice it may still be
subjected to local obligations; for example, on Facebook being forced to remove objectionable
content in various jurisdictions, see ibid, 26.
15 Likewise in Art 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments
in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ L351/1.












Figure 4.2: International scenarios of an ISP ordered to block access to a website
website blocking injunctions. This was because the ISP has not committed any
wrongful act, the object of this kind of injunction is not to establish liability of the
defendant, and there are no damages to be claimed. In practice, this may not be
very significant, given that interim relief is still possible and there are many other
ways to establish international jurisdiction. However, in earlier case law on patent
infringement Article 3116 for extraterritorial cases had been rejected, suggesting the
use of a local court instead.17 Enforcement might be possible even if it might be
questionable if a third party does not object. In the example above, an Estonian court
could possibly claim global jurisdiction for protective measures and impose a global
blocking order on the branch operating in Estonia. The ISP might not object and risk
being fined for non-compliance. This would also be indicative of issues of a particular
procedural situation in court.
The article also touched upon the case of implementing website blocking through
transit ISPs, that is, major global connectivity providers that provide access to smaller
national or global ISPs. Examples of transit providers are AT&T, Sprint, Verizon
Business, Sprint, TeliaSonera International Carrier, NTT Communications, and Level
3 Communications. If domiciled in the EU, a single court would have EU-wide
jurisdiction to impose blocking orders, but again, depending on where the website is
16 Likewise in Art 35 of the recast Brussels I regulation.
17 While in Case C-616/10 Solvay v Honeywell EU:C:2012:445 Article 31 was accepted as a basis for
cross-border injunction, many commentaries have emphasised the specifics of the case (eg, the
defendant companies operating in a number of states) and have not made broad interpretations
based on the case.
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located and how the infringing act is characterised, one or multiple laws might need
to be applied to accomplish comprehensive blocking.
So far website blocking has had only a national focus. That is, a blocking order
sought from a local court at the user end has only attempted to block access from that
state. While the situation appears to be straightforward, a key point was the precise
wording of the blocking order, because in many cases the ISPs are also operating in
other states. For example, the Finnish orders seemed to be inadvertently too broad,
also affecting communications that did not go through Finland.
All in all, the article provided a glance at the intricacies of private international
law and jurisdiction in this context. In hindsight, the complexity and the number
of issues observed would have sufficed as a thesis in its own right and not all the
scenarios could be fully analysed. The article demonstrated that courts will need to
be cognisant of the international implications even in simpler cases. The article also
demonstrated the general trend of flexibility that affords the right holders significant
advantages in the characterisation of acts, choice of forum, and choice of law. These
shopping opportunities revisited the theme of Article I where a large number of
different enforcement mechanisms and strategies were discussed. The international
considerations would also have an impact on the evaluation of proportionality in
Article VI.
4.1.6 Proportionality of website blocking
Article VI provided a detailed overview of website blocking case law in the EU
and analysed in particular the proportionality of such orders. In a way, it was the
cornerstone of this study.
The article first summarised the legal foundations of blocking, including different
interpretations of providers and the related liability exemption provisions. Restrictions
imposed by the prohibition of the general monitoring obligation were also discussed.
The private and public interests at stake were summarised, and IPR enforcement
principles both in EU and national law were described. The coverage was by necessity
limited or included only the conclusions; these foundations are more extensively
covered in Chapter 3.
A major contribution in the article was an analysis of CJEU case law and a system-
atic coverage of all cases from EU/EEA countries from the perspective of proportional-
ity.18 The article attempted to discern the grounds (or lack thereof) courts have used
18 A simultaneously conducted but more superficial contribution is Ellen Marja Wesselingh, ‘Website
Blocking: Evolution or Revolution? 10 Years of Copyright Enforcement by Private Third Parties’
in Internet, Law and Politics. A Decade of Transformations. Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Internet, Law & Politics, Barcelona, 3–4 July, 2014 (UOC-Huygens Editorial 2014);
another simultaneous review is Petteri Günther and Marcus Norrgård, ‘Blocking Websites: Copy-
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to analyse proportionality. These findings and views from the literature were used to
construct criteria for assessing proportionality.
The criteria submitted were 1) degree and basis of illegality, 2) effectiveness, 3)
negative burden on the provider, 4) subsidiarity, and 5) avoiding collateral damage.19
The basis of illegality linked back to Article IV and suggested that the type and severity
of infringement was relevant in consideration of the extent and invasiveness of the
mitigating measures used. The effectiveness required considering the objective of
blocking: if the goal of blocking was construed as preventing economic losses, the
means used must indeed help in that regard. On the other hand, if for example the
symbolic value of copyright enforcement was emphasised, a lesser degree of effective-
ness might be acceptable.20 The negative burden required minimising detrimental
impacts (eg, legal and implementation expenses and restrictions on network technol-
ogy) to the connectivity provider. Subsidiarity emphasised targeting the problem at its
source first, provided that it was possible to do so. The implication was that at least
intra-EU measures should only be used as a last resort if at all. Avoiding collateral
damage referred to the prohibition of impacting legal communications and imposed
requirements on the blocking mechanisms under consideration to avoid overblocking
and other negative effects. It could also preclude blocking completely if there was no
appropriate mechanism that could be used in a particular case. For example, proxies
and less prominent sites that share an IP address with a third party might be ineligible
for blocking using IP address based mechanisms – and the more advanced mechanisms
might be overly burdensome for the provider. In that case, the result might be that all
forms of blocking would be disproportionate for one reason or another.
These criteria should be evaluated in a proportionality test consisting of evaluating
1) the legitimacy of the objective, 2) suitability for the purpose, 3) necessity, ie, using
the least restrictive means, and 4) proportionality, ie, weighing the burden against the
objective. Analysis in courts seemed either to have focused mainly only on the last one,
or the analysis may have been omitted completely. Which objectives were accepted as
right Enforcement Online and Responsibilities of Internet Intermediaries in Europe’ [2014] JFT
97, 113–19.
19 Since then new criteria have been adopted by Arnold J in Cartier [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch),
paras 189–265 and re-applied the copyright context in 1967 Ltd [2014] EWHC 3444 (Ch), para 27.
These were: i) the comparative importance of the rights and justifications for interfering with
them, ii) the availability of less onerous alternative measures, iii) the efficacy of the measures and
in particular whether they will seriously discourage the users from accessing the target websites,
iv) the costs and in particular implementation costs, v) the dissuasiveness of the measures, vi)
the impact of the measures on lawful Internet users, and in addition, the substitutability of other
websites for the target websites. As a brief comparison with my submission, i) corresponds to
a prior step and is partially discussed in 1); ii) is discussed in 4); iii) corresponds to 2); iv)
corresponds to 3); v) is also discussed in 2); vi) is discussed in 5); and substitutability is examined
in 2) and 4).
20 This legitimacy perspective was also linked to the legal policy discussion in Article I and in
particular Article II.
86 CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS
legitimate had major implications for the subsequent evaluation of proportionality as
well as the previous proportionality criteria.
More precisely, the objective should be formulated at a sufficiently high level so as
not as such to stipulate the means to achieve the goal. On the other hand, the objective
should be both realistic and measurable. An objective of ‘stopping infringement’ would
be unacceptable as impossible, and simply ‘reducing infringement’ unmeasurable and
in consequence difficult to evaluate and balance. Further, a closer examination
revealed an essential underlying issue: is the goal of enforcement entirely economic
(to mitigate losses and create gains), or does it also serve the symbolic value of
even ineffective enforcement, education or political struggles by IPR holders? It was
submitted that the law does not explicitly require provision of symbolic copyright
enforcement and attempts to educate the users and these could even be at odds with
the intent of legislation.
Next, the accepted objectives influence the potentially suitable means for that
purpose. The economic objective requires effectiveness, but symbolic value of enforce-
ment, education attempts, and political struggles may also be ‘suitable’ even in the
face of ineffectiveness. Likewise, the objective also affects whether it is possible to
identify alternative, less restrictive means to achieve an essentially similar result. If
efficient enforcement is deemed to be the goal, blocking on the user side should be
only used when there are no viable alternatives.
Finally, whether the burden is excessive in terms of the objective must be balanced.
The preceding three steps provide arguments to take into account. This was also often
the only step which courts focus on in practice, sometimes with unfortunate results.
Here the burden and costs on other parties seemed crucial. However, the valuation of
public and private interests and what objectives are considered legitimate was deemed
to have decisive influence on the evaluation of the balance.
4.2 Patterns and trends
As the analysis moves from specifics to general issues, the focus of discussion also
slowly shifts from doctrinal scholarship to legal policy considerations and de lege
ferenda.
First, two recurring and quite specific issues, the procedural situation in court and
balancing the burden and cost are discussed. The focus then shifts to the more general
and forward-looking issues: why the intermediaries have become more involved,
where we are heading, and a case against the more active role of service providers.
These pave the way to moving on to conclusions in the next chapter.
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4.2.1 The procedural situation in court
As was discussed in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.3,21 the complexity of the procedural situation
in court depends on the national modalities as summarised based on Articles IV, V
and to lesser degree VI.22
All the enforcement actions discussed include a special procedural situation. That
is, typically only the IPR holder (as claimant or plaintiff) and connectivity provider are
parties in court.23 Users or main infringers (eg, website operators) are typically not
represented. This raises the question of how their interests and fair trial requirements
are taken into account.
In subscriber information disclosure cases there is typically nobody to argue on
behalf of the subscriber. Courts may not even have explicitly considered this issue.24
These problems are exacerbated when the user’s Internet connection is disconnected
in a similar fashion without asking for a statement.25 On the other hand, a similar
situation in disclosing wire-tapping metadata or search warrants include at least some
procedural safeguards.26 This situation needs improvement, especially in the face of
increased ‘copyright trolling’ bordering on blackmail and extortion.27
Some connectivity providers have been active advocates in arguing for the interests
of their users. This has occurred as long as the goals coincide. Nonetheless, this is
not a sufficient guarantee of adequate representation. For example, Daly and others
have observed that ‘[c]onsequently there is a real risk that hearings to disclose user
identities will be determined based entirely on the case of the plaintiff as there is
generally no incentive for the ISP to fight such applications.’28
21 Specifically, see nn 94 and 216–217 in the previous chapter.
22 As noted in Article II, the lack or weakness of user representation is also striking in the legislative
field, but that is out of scope here.
23 The formal position of the provider may be ‘defendant’ or something else; the latter Finnish
procedural detail is summarised in Article V (at 308).
24 A formalistic reason might be that such a structural issue is one of policy and immaterial to adjudi-
cation. Such reasoning should be rejected as being at the very least dubious from the fundamental
rights perspective. Another reason may be a feeling of impotence or lack of resources to address
the case properly. Finally, the opportunity to defend oneself at the subsequent proceedings might
be deemed sufficient.
25 In a Spanish case, the provider did not even respond or arrive at court; see Martin Husovec and
Miquel Peguera, ‘Much Ado About Little: Privately Litigated Internet Disconnection Injunctions’
(2015) 46 IIC 10, 25, 29. On issues from Finland, see Pekka Savola, ‘Internet-operaattori ja
perusoikeudet’ in Tapani Lohi (ed), Oikeustiede–Jurisprudentia XLVI:2013 (Suomalainen Lakimiesy-
hdistys 2013) 154–56. In contrast, in a single case, Disconnection and temporary seizure District
Court of Oulu decisions of 14 February and 27 March 2008 (H 08/1438), the subscriber submitted
a written statement on the proportionality of disconnection and the request was later rejected.
26 Issues with these ‘one-party proceedings’ were elaborated in Article III (at 893–95). On the other
hand, in Ireland and the UK for example, courts have instituted some safeguards, and a consumer
representative has also argued before the court. See Section 3.1.3 and n 50 therein.
27 See Section 3.1.3 and in particular n 52 therein.
28 Maureen Daly, ‘Is there an entitlement to anonymity? A European and international analysis’
(2013) 35 EIPR 198, 201, similar to Søren Sandfeld Jacobsen and Clement Salung Petersen, ‘In-
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Similar considerations also apply to the website blocking injunction, with some
variation.29 The provider usually has own incentive to contest a new kind of obligation.
This is true in particular if it has a chance of success, delaying the application, deferring
subsequent requests, or winning sympathy from users. Therefore, it can use supporting
arguments from the user or operator perspectives to augment its own.
Yet in both kinds of case, at the latest when new requests are routinely approved
despite counter-arguments (if any), the provider usually gives up, no longer wanting
to expend its resources for, inter alia, legal services. This has been the approach
in Finland to subscriber information disclosure requests for a long time now. This
has also been observed in the UK for website blocking after the initial proceedings.
Providers have fallen back to a neutral position or have not participated actively in
the proceedings. The reasons may be to save their expenses, avoid having to pay the
plaintiffs’ legal costs if their arguments fail, or to make the point that it is not their
role to argue for users or infringers before the court.30 In summary, providers have
argued vigorously to date in most new kinds of cases but this is not guaranteed to
continue, because doing so will generate unrecoverable expenses.
At least UK courts have explicitly taken the view that they have a duty to consider
the interests of unrepresented parties on their own motion.31 The Supreme Court
of Finland has also held in the context of coercive measures that the courts have a
duty to protect the interests of the suspect and third parties when they cannot do so
themselves.32 Even this is not completely satisfactory: it is sub-optimal for the court to
junctions against mere conduit of information protected by copyright: A Scandinavian perspective’
(2011) 42 IIC 151, 173–74. Indeed, this risk has materialised as discussed below.
29 See eg Sandfeld Jacobsen and Salung Petersen (n 28) 171–75.
30 See Article VI (para 48). On legal costs, see Newzbin2 (No 2) [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch), paras 53–
55. On the lack of participation, see eg Dramatico Entertainment [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), para 7;
Emi v Sky [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), para 90; Paramount v Sky [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), para 3;
Cartier (n 19) para 4; 1967 Ltd (n 19) paras 3, 26; Husovec and Peguera (n 25) 25, 33; Urs
Gasser and Wolfgang Schulz, Governance of Online Intermediaries: Observations From a Series of
National Case Studies (The Berkman Center for Internet & Society Research Publication Series
2015-5, 2015) 15. On saving costs in general, see also Martin Senftleben, ‘Breathing Space for
Cloud-Based Business Models: Exploring the Matrix of Copyright Limitations, Safe Harbours and
Injunctions’ (2013) 4 JIPITEC 87, para 67.
31 See Article VI (para 48) and specifically Dramatico Entertainment (no 2) [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch),
para 11.
32 This concerns the secret surveillance proceedings in particular. This has not (at least yet) been
explicitly endorsed in these injunctions. Probably it will not be, given that there is nobody to
appeal these decisions (see below). See Article III (893–94 fn 43); Coercive measures KKO 2009:54,
para 9. Going even further, and perhaps too far in general, Husovec and Peguera (n 25) 29
argue that the court as a public authority ‘should not enter any favourable decision if any of the
perceptibly affected parties is somehow unrepresented in the proceedings’.
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have to assume the role of both the defender and judge.33 At the very least, it should
be possible to contest the legality afterwards.34
UPC Telekabel Wien was interesting in this respect. Essentially it was held that users
must be able to assert their rights before the court unless the court had evaluated the
reasonableness of blocking from their perspective.35 This forces the court to either
act as an evaluator or to shift the responsibility to the provider while also affording
the users locus standi before the court.36 This may also suggest that the practice in
the UK and Ireland by which the terms of the blocking order are agreed between the
IPR holders and providers, but not at least publicly and explicitly evaluated by the
court might be insufficient.37 Further, this also raises doubts on the appropriateness
of voluntary enforcement measures.
Finally, the lack of proper representation and incentive for appeal suggests that for
the court it might be better to err on the side of restraint than on over-activism. That is,
the IPR holder can always appeal if the request is denied. On other hand, the provider
is unlikely to do so because of the expenses and others are not represented and cannot
do so. Otherwise, few cases will end up being considered by higher instances or the
CJEU, leading to under-developed case law.38
4.2.2 Balancing the burden and incentives
Another recurring theme in many articles and this overview has been how the burden
of online copyright enforcement (in particular, cost) and the associated incentives
should be balanced. What costs should be borne by the IPR holder and what by the
provider (or a public authority), assuming that it is not in practice possible to claim
costs from infringers?
33 Likewise, there has been publicity in Finland that secret surveillance has been granted with
insufficient substantiation. See Susanna Reinboth and Minna Passi, ‘Luvan puhelinkuunteluun voi
saada kevyin perustein’ (31 August 2014) 〈http://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/Luvan+puhelinkuunteluun+
voi+saada+kevyin+perustein/a1409368131412〉.
34 In Finland, coercive measures such as wire-tapping can be appealed afterwards and the possibility
of review bodies is being investigated; see Article III (at 894 fn 48). The chance for judicial review
is required by ECHR case law; see, for example, Ravon and others v France App no 18497/03
(ECtHR, 21 February 2008).
35 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien EU:C:2014:192, para 57. See Article VI (para 36).
36 On the reaction to the domestic ruling, see Martin Husovec, ‘Austrian Supreme Court Confirms
Open-Ended Website Blocking Injunctions [UPC Telekabel Wien]’ (1 August 2014) 〈http://www.
husovec.eu/2014/08/austrian-supreme-court-confirms-open.html〉. In contrast, in the Finnish
bill submitted – on specific rather than generic orders – only the applicant, provider or website
operator may request modifying or discharging the order. Others such as the users or affected
third parties cannot. See Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi tekijänoikeuslain muuttamisesta
(HE 181/2014), 55–56, 59. In contrast, the Law Committee noted that the operator could identify
him/herself before the court and request that the order be discharged; see Lakivaliokunnan
lausunto 22/2014, 4.
37 See Article VI (para 48); Dramatico Entertainment (no 2) (n 31) para 13.
38 See Article IV (at 287).
90 CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS
In many countries, costs are borne by the providers or occasionally shared with
the IPR holders or reimbursed by the state.39 On the other hand, in Finland IPR
holders will need to pay all implementation and legal costs for subscriber information
disclosure requests.40 Later, a now lapsed legislative proposal on a notice-and-notice
mechanism would also have required reimbursement of all costs. IPR holders deemed
the costs prohibitive, saying they would not send any warning letters.41 Similarly,
in the UK, IPR holders would pay providers an annual fixed amount for operating
expenses and 75% of the investment for the upcoming graduated response mecha-
nism.42
Website blocking typically needs to be implemented at the provider’s expense. In
Finland, so far everyone has also had to bear their own legal costs.43 The general
pattern in European website blocking case law has been that the implementation
costs, usually of the order of 5000–10000 euro for the initial investment and a smaller
amount for changes in the blocked targets, are borne by the providers. Everyone
typically also needs to cover their own 10–30 times larger legal expenses, although
depending on jurisdiction and court’s discretion, the lack of merit might shift these
costs around.44 However, some courts have admitted that depending on circumstances,
proportionality might require that in the future all or some costs would need to be paid
39 Intellectual Property Office (n 2) 4, 24.
40 This approach to implementation costs was explicitly adopted in travaux préparatoires in order
to focus requests on the appropriate (significant) cases only. In case law, legal costs have been
subsumed under the label of implementation costs. See Article II (at 211–12).
41 Such ‘unused’ mechanisms are not unheard of. For example, a warning letter system in New
Zealand resulted in little use. This also demonstrates inefficiency in lawmaking, particularly in
a field such as copyright where struggles between parties are commonplace. A lot of time and
energy was wasted in preparatory work when the result would be an unused law. See Article II (at
211–12, 239 fn 158).
42 TorrentFreak, ‘UK ISPs Agree to Send Out Music & Movie Piracy Warnings’ (9 May 2014) 〈http:
//torrentfreak.com/uk- isps-agree-to-send-out-music-movie-piracy-warnings-140509/〉. In
contrast, in France the graduated response system is mainly publicly funded, which has also led
to criticism; see eg Rebecca Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2014) 37 ColumJLA 147,
155–56; Rebecca Giblin, ‘When ISPs Become Copyright Police’ (2014) 18 IEEE Internet Computing
84, 86.
43 See Article II (at 211) and Article VI (para 55 and in particular note 120). In the submitted bill,
Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi tekijänoikeuslain muuttamisesta (HE 181/2014), 59, in
the proposed Section 60f, the implementation costs for blocking of websites with identifiable
operators which can be sued would have been practically borne by the providers, but against
anonymous operators solely by the applicants. However, the Education and Culture Committee
overturned the proposal and shifted the costs (in practice) in this case as well to providers; see
Sivistysvaliokunnan mietintö 26/2014, 4, 6.
44 See Article VI (paras 78–80); Newzbin2 (No 2) (n 30) paras 32, 53–55. For recent estimates
of the cost of blocking in the UK, see Cartier (n 19) paras 61–65; TorrentFreak, ‘The Soaring
Financial Cost of Blocking Pirate Sites’ (19 October 2014) 〈http://torrentfreak.com/the-soaring-
financial-cost-of-blocking-pirate-sites-141019/〉, and on the division of costs, see Cartier (n 19)
paras 239–53. In consequence, implementation costs have been insignificant compared to the
issue of legal costs. For example, ibid, paras 54, 60 report that an unopposed application for a
single website costs around 14000 GBP, and annual monitoring 3600 GBP.
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by the IPR holders.45 In contrast, the cost for the more advanced blocking techniques
as implemented in the UK also covering parental controls and preventing child abuse
have been reported to be several orders of magnitude higher; even in the dozens of
millions in investment and a million euros in annual operations.46
The allocation of costs is a modality left to the domestic legislation.47 It is argued
that the further removed the connectivity provider is from the blocked website, the
less justified it is to require the provider to participate actively and at its own expense
in copyright enforcement. Essentially the approach adopted in case law constitutes
partially shifting the costs of enforcement to the intermediaries.48 The most convincing
argument for the major providers to bear their implementation costs is that so far
the costs have been insignificant and only important in principle and as a precedent.
From that perspective, for a court it may have been the simplest to deem them normal
costs of carrying out Internet connectivity business.49 On the other hand, arguing that
the connectivity provider would profit from infringement as an increased demand
of broadband connections and therefore should participate in or be responsible for
preventing infringing use of its services is not very convincing.50 Likewise, the
technical ability to do something is an understandable, but not very convincing reason
for a major role in policing the Internet. This is the case especially when there are
others who are equally or more able to act or are ‘closer’ to infringement.51
Further, there have been arguments that various kinds of online intermediaries
are ‘least cost avoiders’ in an economic sense. Due to the difficulties of otherwise
addressing undesirable behaviour, arguably it would make sense to allocate the
45 Opinion in C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien EU:C:2013:781, para 106; Newzbin2 (No 2) (n 30)
paras 32–33.
46 For details, see Cartier (n 19) paras 38–51.
47 See Article VI (para 78 and in particular note 176); Newzbin2 (No 2) (n 30) paras 30–31. This
also appears to be the approach in national case law on legal costs; there have been only a few
cases where providers have been ordered to pay some legal expenses even if the request has been
granted (see n 44). According to Article 14 of the Enforcement Directive, as a general rule, the
unsuccessful party should bear the reasonable costs of the successful party, unless equity does
not allow that. Applying this principle as-is to third-party intermediaries seems questionable, and
even if an intermediary was deemed a ‘party’ in this context, equity could prevent applying the
principal rule.
48 See Taina Pihlajarinne, Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus
2012) 59–60, 147; Martin Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of
Website Blocking’ (2013) 4 JIPITEC 116, paras 47–50; Blayne Haggart, Copyright: The Global
Politics of Digital Copyright Reform (University of Toronto Press 2014) 23.
49 See eg Newzbin2 (No 2) (n 30) para 32. More recently, see Cartier (n 19) paras 239–53, where
Arnold J essentially held that there would be no problem as long as all the providers have to bear
costs; the costs would either be absorbed by the providers or passed on to their subscribers. In
that sense, Internet subscribers as a whole would pay for the cost of copyright enforcement.
50 See more in Pihlajarinne, Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus (n 48) 25, 60. Actually,
heavy infringers typically use a disproportionate amount of network resources and are therefore
bad customers for the provider.
51 See further in Section 4.2.3. See also Section 3.4.2 and n 252 therein for the inapplicability of the
‘the only possibility’ argument of Case C-557/07 LSG EU:C:2009:107, para 45 when it comes to
website blocking.
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responsibility for wrongful conduct to the least cost avoider. This would replace a
fault-based standard with a form of ‘gatekeeper responsibility’ by shifting the burden
of preventing harm to the party for which doing so is cheapest.52 This is a tort law
concept from the U.S., and it is not a very good fit in this context for various reasons.
Most important of all, since the connectivity provider is a faultless third party, concepts
related to torts and negligence are not immediately applicable. This approach would
also result in stifling of innovation and shift costs. Further, it is not obvious that the
connectivity provider is really the least cost avoider, because it does not have precise
knowledge of the content and its authorised uses (eg, lawful licenses or whether
a license is needed at all) or legal uses (eg, applicability of a copyright exception),
possibly in contrast to certain kinds of hosting providers more intimate with the
content. Finally the predominance of secondary liability and economic considerations
in the U.S does not suggest that these can be transplanted as-is to the different legal
systems in the EU.53
In contrast, the IPR holder is the sole beneficiary if an enforcement action were to
be successful (ie, reduce infringement and increase sales). This imbalance of incentives
motivates the IPR holders to seek maximally effective and expensive mechanisms first
through lobbying legislators, and subsequently from connectivity providers and courts.
This would be exacerbated if the providers were to bear the costs of such orders,
causing a so-called moral hazard by one party taking risks, the burden of which is
borne by others. On the other hand, requests might be rationalised if the IPR holder
was required to compensate the costs. Likewise, moral hazard may also be argued to
apply in the inverse by ‘rewarding’ third parties from lack of action or knowledge.54
Further, deploying more effective means might be possible if the IPR holder feels it is
economically justified, because doing so would be less burdensome (ie, costly) on the
provider. This might also result in IPR holders and providers developing a healthier
dialogue.55
52 See eg Ronald J Mann and Seth R Belzley, ‘The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability’ (2005)
47 William & Mary LR 239.
53 For a summary, see eg Michael Carrier, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief on Viacom v. YouTube, in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit’ (7 April 2011) 〈http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-
courts/ca2/10-3270/327〉. It is not possible to discuss the law and economics aspect of preventing
copyright infringement. Cf. Graeme B Dinwoodie, ‘Secondary Liability for Online Trademark
Infringement: The International Landscape’ (2014) 37 ColumJLA 463, 493 fn 178 submits that
injunctions under the Enforcement Directive are ‘clearly motivated by that kind of principle’,
because intermediaries are sometimes best placed to bring infringement to an end. However, while
this may have implications for actionability, it suggests nothing on the distribution of costs. This
principle was also referred to in Cartier (n 19) para 251. See also Husovec and Peguera (n 25) 20.
54 For example, on ‘willful blindness’ in secondary liability standards, see Sverker K Högberg, ‘The
Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law’ (2006) 106 Columbia
LR 909, 940–47.
55 See Article II (at 239).
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These observations contribute especially to the legal policy discussion on what
should be a reasonable distribution of expenses and how to adjust the incentives
of copyright enforcement. Apart from a minimal threshold, it appears that the
incentives and costs would be most appropriately balanced when the IPR holder has
to compensate most or all expenses. This would align the benefits of enforcement
with the associated risks and burden. Depending on the constraints imposed by the
legislation, these considerations may also be useful in doctrinal scholarship.
4.2.3 Why have online intermediaries become more involved?
Upping the level of discussion a bit, the role of online intermediaries has evolved over
the years. It is not possible to cover the history here, but a few observations on recent
trends are in order.56 Why has this evolution occurred? Several reasons are suggested:
1. The capability to act exists and has improved;
2. illegality on the Internet needs to be addressed somehow and previous strategies
have not been sufficient;
3. ISPs have had difficulty in resisting the emergence of new obligations;
4. an increased role is also irresistible for unrelated public policy reasons; and
5. some ISPs also have an incentive of their own to do the same.
First, the abilities are obviously essential.57 In contrast, should a traditional post
office or mail delivery company be required to block mail or packages delivered to
certain persons or premises or after screening make decisions based on the envelope
or the contents? This is essentially what is required of (or advocated for) Internet
connectivity providers. Yet for traditional mail, there has been aversion to introducing
such mechanisms even if they were technically possible.58 In the Internet context,
56 This discussion is continued more generally in Section 5.2.
57 For example, Fanny Coudert and Evi Werkers, ‘In the Aftermath of the Promusicae Case: How to
Strike the Balance?’ (2008) 18 IJLIT 50, 71 put it: ‘[...] ISPs have enormous power of control.
If they were to be obliged to screen, monitor, filter or in any way interfere with content passing
through their systems, the consequences would be considerable.’ Also on the ability to act, see
Pihlajarinne, Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus (n 48) 60, Günther and Norrgård (n 18)
123 and Commission, ‘Synthesis Report on Stakeholders’ Dialogue on Illegal Up- and Downloading
2009–2010’, 5, 7 where the rightholders ‘consider that ISPs [should] bear a specific responsibility
to address infringement because they operate the networks used by the infringers’ and that ‘ISPs
have the capability to exercise significant control over the traffic generated by their subscribers’.
58 Monitoring mail envolopes is actually a widespread form of surveillance in the U.S.; see Ron
Nixon, ‘Report Reveals Wider Tracking of Mail in U.S.’ (27 October 2014) 〈http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/10/28/us/us- secretly-monitoring-mail- of- thousands.html〉. Likewise, Haggart
(n 48) 68 asks whether a telephone company should be responsible for two people using their
telephone system to plan a murder, and that this is in the end a political question. By contrast,
various automatic voice recognition technologies could be deployed to monitor and then prevent
or provide evidence of various civil and criminal activities committed or planned over the phone.
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such basic capacities have existed (to varying degrees), boosted by a vibrant market
in enterprise solutions for such products. Therefore, when technical means exist, it is
straightforward to argue for deploying and using them in the networks of connectivity
providers.59 Resistance seems to require more sophisticated and convincing arguments
than that doing so is ‘practically impossible’ or ‘against the freedom of expression’.60
This brings us to the next three points.
Second, there is undeniably a lot of illegality on the Internet and there must be
some way of addressing at least its most serious forms. Whether copyright infringe-
ment, and particularly its minor forms, is sufficiently serious in the spectrum of civil or
criminal activity is another question. Nonetheless, the key point is how and what par-
ties should be targeted. As has been examined, the portfolio of applicable enforcement
mechanisms and targeted intermediaries has grown and IPR holders have adjusted
their strategy in the interest of seeking optimal solutions from their perspective.61
In contrast, the connectivity providers in the U.S. have been practically immune to
website blocking requests and the sky has not fallen. Rather, the focus has been
more on the infringers, facilitators, and to a degree hosting providers.62 Currently it
seems like swimming against the tide to argue for completely rejecting all forms of
involvement.63 In consequence, the question is more about ‘which’, ‘when’, ‘what’,
and ‘how’ rather than ‘whether’ providers should have some role. This emphasises
the focus on the issues of proportionality. But why have connectivity providers in
particular been targeted with these responsibilities? This is discussed in the following
points.
59 However, there has been significant success in arguing that so-called deep-packet inspection
systems would be in many ways too burdensome and intrusive; see Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended
EU:C:2011:771.
60 As an example of the practical impossibility argument,see ibid, paras 21–22, where the appointed
technical expert concluded that ‘despite numerous technical obstacles, the feasibility of filtering
and blocking the unlawful sharing of electronic files could not be entirely ruled out’ (emphasis
added). In the domestic court, the provider was ordered to implement such ‘almost impossible’
mechanism; this was overturned in the CJEU.
61 If one solution (eg, suing the users in the U.S.) has not been very successful, IPR holders have
tried adopting a different approach, in particular by increasing the role of intermediaries.
62 See eg Article V (at 304 fn 89); Lucas Feiler, ‘Website Blocking Injunctions under EU and
U.S. Copyright Law – Slow Death of the Global Internet or Emergence of the Rule of National
Copyright Law?’ [2012] TTLF Working Papers 13, 46; Daniel W Kopko, ‘Looking for a Crack
to Break the Internet’s Back: The Listen4ever Case and Backbone Provider Liability Under the
Copyright Act and the DMCA’ (2003) 8 Computer Law Review and Technology Journal 83, 116–17;
Haggart (n 48) 138–39; Patrick Van Eecke, ‘Online service providers and liability: A plea for
a balanced approach’ (2011) 48 CMLR 1455, 1501. See also n 111. Yet on recent attempts,
see TorrentFreak, ‘MPAA Prepares to Bring Pirate Site Blocking to the U.S.’ (11 December 2014)
〈http://torrentfreak.com/mpaa-prepares-to-bring-pirate-site-blocking-to-the-u-s-141211/〉.
63 Similarly Farrand, Networks of Power in Digital Copyright Law and Policy (n 3) 169–70, 179
observes that the discourses of the protection of copyright being ‘fundamental’ and intermediary
responsibility are not challenged, calling this ‘micro-resistance’ in contrast to more successful
macro-level resistance.
4.2. PATTERNS AND TRENDS 95
Third, ISPs have had difficulty in resisting new obligations. Traditionally, they
have not been very active or prominent in lobbying activities.64 For example, Geiger
wrote in 2006: ‘Furthermore, the concrete design of the law in recent years was
characterised more by the protection of private interests (legislators being put under
pressure by strong lobby groups) than by systematic reasoning.’65 Also, established
early lobbying, early information provisioning and frame setting usually prevails
unless the issue becomes ‘high profile’, ie, gets significant public attention that forces
the politicians to pay attention.66 That is, it is difficult to exceed the IPR holders in
lobbying or provide disruptive framing in such a manner that it would excite the
public. In consequence, it has been relatively straightforward to extend the role using
both ‘divide and conquer’ and ‘slippery slope’ tactics. In the former, ISPs and possibly
other interest groups such as consumers have been heterogeneous and undivided.67
In the latter, a piecemeal approach to new requirements has made it more difficult to
argue against the ever expanding role.68
Fourth, governments also have public policy reasons for using powerful monitoring
and enforcement capabilities in other contexts. For example, Van Eecke observes
that ‘[w]e are therefore witnessing the “perfect storm”, where the fight against anti-
terrorism, child pornography, obscene content and intellectual property infringements
64 This is discussed in Article II. On increasing emphasis, see eg Tom Hamburger and Matea Gold,
‘Google, once disdainful of lobbying, now a master of Washington influence’ (12 April 2014) 〈http:
//www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-google-is-transforming-power-and-politicsgoogle-
once-disdainful-of-lobbying-now-a-master-of-washington-influence/2014/04/12/51648b92-
b4d3-11e3-8cb6-284052554d74_story.html〉. In general, see, for example, Haggart (n 48) 67–69;
Farrand, Networks of Power in Digital Copyright Law and Policy (n 3) 118, 127–29, 183; Farrand,
‘Lobbying and Lawmaking in the European Union’ (n 3) 16–17; Sebastian Haunss, Conflicts in the
Knowledge Society: The Contentious Politics of Intellectual Property (CUP 2013); Sebastian Haunss
and Lars Kohlmorgen, ‘Conflicts about intellectual property claims: The role and function of
collective action networks’ (2010) 17 JEPP 242, 257; Sebastian Haunss and Lars Kohlmorgen,
‘Lobbying or politics? Political claims making in IP conflicts’ in Sebastian Haunss (ed), Politics of
Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2009) 107–09; Susan K Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The
Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (CUP 2003) 7–8, 99; Bernt Hugenholtz, ‘Why the
Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid’ (2000) 22 EIPR 501, 501.
65 Christophe Geiger, ‘‘Constitutionalising’ intellectual property law? The influence of fundamental
rights on intellectual property in the European Union’ (2006) 37 IIC 371, 378, citing earlier
tendencies noted in studies by Laddie, Gerhardt, Gyertyánfy, Quaedvlieg, and Hilty.
66 Farrand, ‘Lobbying and Lawmaking in the European Union’ (n 3) 7, 26.
67 Certain types of intermediaries (eg, connectivity providers) might also argue that the obligations
are imposed on other kind of intermediaries (eg, hosting providers, search engines, or payment
or advertisement providers). In general, Marianne Levin, ‘A Balanced Approach on Online
Enforcement of Copyrights’ in Johan Axhamn (ed), Copyright in a Borderless Online Environment
(Norstedts Juridik 2012) 147–48, 156 observes that everyone just wants to strengthen their own
position, and that the fight over Internet access and control being primarily a battle for big IPR
holders and ISPs.
68 See eg Maurice HM Schellekens, ‘Liability of internet intermediaries: A slippery slope?’ (2011) 8
SCRIPTed 154; Pihlajarinne, Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus (n 48) 162. These were
explored at length in Article II.
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shifts online intermediaries from their unengaged middlemen status.’69 To these one
could also add mundane criminal investigation and protecting public interests, for
example, by upholding national gambling monopolies.70 When the government also
wants to involve intermediaries, private interest groups can ride on their coattails –
or the other way around.71 A concrete example of this is provided by the UK, where
the push for parental controls (ie, pornographic filters enabled by default) and the
fight against child abuse have forced the providers to invest millions of euro into
blocking technologies. As a result, it has been straightforward to apply these also
in copyright and trademark infringement contexts, even without having to imburse
implementation costs.72 With some exaggeration, governments and IPR holders share
the common objective of opposing liberal and open Internet policies by compromising
users and subjugating ISPs.73
Fifth, in some jurisdictions ISPs are also interested in applying similar control-
ling and policing for selfish reasons.74 Such reasons include traffic management
(throttling) to avoid investments in network infrastructure or targeting the users with
advertisements or services of their own.75 This also provides a capability for acting,
69 Van Eecke (n 62) 1499. See also Pihlajarinne, Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus (n 48)
150, on government roles Gasser and Schulz (n 30) 9–11, and references in Chapter 1.
70 The data retention legislation, now invalidated by Digital Rights Ireland (n 6) is a good example
of the former; see n 6. In Finland, there are about 250 different criminal offences that, if
committed online, may qualify for using data retention metadata (see Article III, at 899 fn 74),
including copyright offences via online filesharing (see Article III, at 908). The metadata outside
the data retention regime can also be used in other contexts such as civil proceedings. As a
further example related to both perspectives, IPR holders in Finland lobbied (unsuccessfully) for a
legislative change to enable the use of data retention metadata in civil litigation (see the briefs in
Sivistysvaliokunnan lausunto 5/2014).
71 See eg Mike Masnick, ‘Anti-Piracy Group Says: ‘Child Porn Is Great’ Since It Gets Politicians
To Block File Sharing Sites’ (28 April 2010) 〈https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100427/
1437179198.shtml〉; TJ McIntyre, ‘Child abuse images and cleanfeeds: Assessing internet blocking
systems’ in Ian Brown (ed), Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet (Edward Elgar 2013)
295–97, 302.
72 See Cartier (n 19) paras 28–29, 38–50, 252. Requiring such investments would likely not be
proportionate in countries which do not have such blocking regimes.
73 Similarly in Pheoh Hoon Lim and Louise Longdin, ‘P2P online file sharing: transnational con-
vergence and divergence in balancing stakeholder interests’ (2011) 33 EIPR 690, 691, 698 on
‘coercing ISPs into a sentry or policing role to assist right holders to track down and sue persistent
or repeat infringers’. For example, Haggart (n 48) 132, 136 refers to ‘unholy alliances’ (in that
context, with ISPs and IPR owners against users).
74 Jeremy de Beer and Christopher D Clemmer, ‘Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement:
A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?’ (2009) 49 Jurimetrics 375, 375–76 observes
‘events in several jurisdictions demonstrate a new trend away from a passive-reactive approach
toward an active-preventative approach instead’ and to a voluntary shift away to being active
enforcers. These patterns have been more prevalent outside Europe, however.
75 See Article III (at 887–88) and eg Paul Ohm, ‘The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance’
[2009] University of Illinois LR 1417, 1422–37. For example, according to BEREC, ‘A view of
traffic management and other practices resulting in restrictions to the open Internet in Europe
(BoR (12) 30)’ (29 May 2012) 〈http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/
berec/reports/45-berec-findings-on-traffic-management-practices-in-europe〉 21–22, in Europe
some restrictions are in place in 21% of wireline and 36% of wireless broadband subscribers.
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as mentioned above. A case can be made that employing such existing means of
copyright enforcement would not be disproportionate. In consequence, some ISPs
may share objectives with IPR holders and co-operation might be beneficial.76
4.2.4 Where are we heading with online enforcement?
Do we know yet where we are with enforcement and how it is expected to develop in
the future? Lim and Longdin have observed three distinct phases in the ‘moral panics’
related to copyright enforcement. Such panics are by no means new.77 Here the first
stage includes ‘strenuous lobbying’ to keep traditional business models intact through
strengthened enforcement and investigative mechanisms. Indeed, ‘[d]raconian penal-
ties and intrusive tracking methods are best regarded as signs of futility rather than
success’. The second stage includes a consumer/user backlash that may give the
initially panicked legislators cause for thought, possibly leading to rationalising en-
forcement mechanisms. In the third final stage, belated evolution of new business
models offer users alternatives to infringing activity.78
Various stakeholders would obviously have different answers to these questions.
So far, most IPR holders have been stuck in the first stage, lobbying for stricter
enforcement rather than adapting to the new market structures and consumption
habits.79 For example, producers in Finland have been unwilling to lower the prices
76 Heavy peer-to-peer users are not ideal customers, as they use a disproportionate amount of
bandwidth; see Pihlajarinne, Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus (n 48) 25, and in many
countries the enforcement regime is based on co-operation; see Intellectual Property Office
(n 2) 6. Nonetheless, active and visible participation in suing your own customers may have
significant negative PR consequences and be a bad business decision. See eg Article I (at 53);
Justin Hughes, ‘On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of Infringement-Based
Business Models’ (2005) 22 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment LJ 725; Lilian Edwards, ‘The Role
and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights’ (2011)
〈http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibility_of_the_
internet_intermediaries_final.pdf〉 25–26.
77 Lim and Longdin (n 73) 690, 698. Almost every technology (radio, TV, theatres, VHS tapes,
Internet, etc.) has invoked similar suppressive reactions and doomsday scenarios. See Article II
(at 232 fn 115) and Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Prometheus Books 2006) 106–08; William
Patry, How to Fix Copyright (OUP 2011) 141ff; Peter K Yu, ‘Digital Copyright and Confuzzling
Rhetoric’ (2011) 13 VandJETL 881, 887–90; Brad Sherman and Leanne Wiseman (eds), Copyright
and the Challenge of the New (Kluwer Law International 2012); Nate Anderson, ‘100 years of Big
Content fearing technology—in its own words’ (12 October 2009) 〈http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2009/10/100-years-of-big-content-fearing-technologyin-its-own-words/〉.
78 Lim and Longdin (n 73) 690, 698. More generally, Tuomas Mylly, Intellectual Property and European
Economic Constitutional Law: The Trouble with Private Information Power (IPR University Center
2009) 262–65, 274–75 describes common market, reconciliation, and proprietarian phases, and
that (in 2009) ‘the time was not yet ripe to pronounce the emergence of a fourth phase in European
intellectual property protection’. It is argued that there have been significant improvements since
then, in particular in the context of enforcement, as also discussed, although more critically, in
Tuomas Mylly, ‘The constitutionalization of the European legal order: Impact of human rights on
intellectual property in the EU’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights
and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2015) 112–26.
79 Levin (n 67) 149–50.
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or increase offerings in the interest of reducing piracy. Indeed, IPR holders have
considered it inappropriate to require reform of their business model unless effective
means of online copyright enforcement are provided at the same time.80 No doubt
there have been some trials and attempts at innovation, but the major IPR holders have
not yet given up on advocating stronger enforcement. In summary, their preferred
stage requires no further argument.
However, in academia most commentators have been critical for quite a while.81
It is no surprise that they have generally advocated rationalisation of enforcement,
sought alternatives, and advocated the evolution of business models. A typical example
is provided by Geiger:
The strategies adopted in recent years to combat unauthorised uses of copyright works
on the Internet show very uncertain results. This should lead to an in-depth discussion
of possible alternatives. More fundamentally, the experience of recent years raises the
question of whether it is always appropriate to respond to technological changes by
strengthening the protection of copyright and its enforcement mechanisms.82
Further, the contribution by an expert study group led by Professor Ian Hargreaves
is interesting as it was a commissioned and independent pre-legislative review in the
UK. It also suggested rationalising enforcement. The report argued that ‘investment
to date in stronger enforcement has not significantly reduced piracy’.83 The report
also advocated the inevitability of change, observing that ‘[c]ompeting with the free
[alternatives] will be an ongoing feature of the business challenge’ and ‘what rights
80 See Article II (at 232 fn 114) and references, in particular Anna Vuopala, Luvattomien verkkojakelun
vähentämiskeinojen arviointia. Selvitykset lainvalmistelun tueksi (OKM:n työryhmämuistioita ja
selvityksiä 2013:13, Ministry of Education and Culture 2013) 25, 53. Similarly, in Commission,
‘Synthesis Report on Stakeholders’ Dialogue on Illegal Up- and Downloading 2009–2010’, 5, ‘the
rightholders consider that legal offers alone are not likely to reduce piracy’, while ISPs call for
more attractive legal offers at fair conditions.
81 For a summary, see Farrand, Networks of Power in Digital Copyright Law and Policy (n 3) 46,
50, 175. On the other hand, citing Phil Zemer, ‘Rethinking copyright alternatives’ (2006) 16
IJLIT 137, 140, legislators are deemed to be ‘hostages of strong lobby groups whose interests
usually prevail over those of the general public’. More critically and earlier in 2000 Hugenholtz,
‘Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid’ (n 64) 501 wrote that ‘The
unprecedented lobbying, the bloodshed, the vilification, the media propaganda, the constant
hounding of EC and government officials, certainly suggested [that the Infosoc Directive] was [‘a
vitally important dossier’].’ For the history of influencing the Infosoc and Enforcement Directives,
see Farrand, ‘Lobbying and Lawmaking in the European Union’ (n 3) 11–16. On ignoring the
academic views in lawmaking, see Goold (n 4) 27–29.
82 Christophe Geiger, ‘Challenges for the Enforcement of Copyright in the Online World: Time for
a New Approach’ in Paul Torremans (ed), Research Handbook on Cross-Border Enforcement of
Intellectual Property (SSRN Version, Edward Elgar 2015) 22.
83 Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: Review of Intellectual Property and Growth (2011) 77–78,
also citing Joe Karaganis, ‘Rethinking Piracy’ in Joe Karaganis (ed), Media Piracy in Emerging
Economies (Social Science Research Council 2011) 30: ‘Despite the stream of lawsuits and site
closures, we see no evidence — and indeed very few claims — that these efforts have had any
measurable impact on online piracy. The costs and technical requirements of running a torrent
tracker or indexing site are modest, and new sites have quickly emerged to replace old ones.’
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holders face is a particular form of challenge shared by many businesses, namely how
to construct a distinctive product offering that consumers are willing to pay for’.84
The Hargreaves Report concluded that ‘we need a combination of enforcement,
education and a big push to expand the legitimate market for digital content’ and
that ‘[e]mphasising enforcement as an alternative to improved digital licensing and
modernised copyright law is the wrong approach’.85
In summary, the academic efforts are indicative of the second stage, with a hope
projected at the legislators of moving towards the third. This brings us to the more
practical question of what the position adopted by legislators, EU legislators in
particular is.86
Given the Commission’s monopoly of legislative initiatives, its views are the most
important.87 An increasing pressure for change has been recognised. For example,
Ladenburger writes (in an unofficial capacity):
In the coming years, ‘the digital internal market’ is prone to become a major reference field
[... where] an increasing challenge will be to find the right balance between the protection
of intellectual property rights [...] and fundamental rights invoked by businesses and
users wishing to reap more fully the potentials of the internet [...]88
This and the related challenges and deficiencies have also been acknowledged in the
IPR strategy white paper of 2011: ‘so far, the EU’s IP enforcement framework has
not been reconciled with the new digital environment’. Further strengthening IPR
enforcement in parallel with general reflection of EU policies and development of
84 Hargreaves (n 83) 80. This has also been voiced more generally and forcefully, for example, by Yu,
‘Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric’ (n 77) 890: ‘Given the continuous evolution of our
economy, the [copyright] industry has yet to convince us why its business model deserves to be
singled out for protection while other equally important industries had to adapt to technological
change.’ Likewise on IPR enforcement biasing large well-established organisations which also
focus on the short-term preservation of their business models, see Haggart (n 48) 59.
85 Hargreaves (n 83) 81. Also on greater availability of legal alternatives, see Intellectual Property
Office (n 2) 14. As a case in point, in Norway music ‘piracy’ has been essentially eliminated
without enforcement actions with the rise of various legal streaming alternatives; see James
Cook, ‘Norway Has Figured Out How to Solve The Problem Of Music Piracy’ (27 January 2015)
〈http://uk.businessinsider.com/norway-music-piracy-statistics-2015-1〉.
86 National legislators seem typically very sympathetic to IPR holders, possibly because they are
inundated with copyright ideology and through participation in various international pro-IPR
bodies. See Article II (at 225 fn 97, 236–37) and eg Mylly, Intellectual Property and European
Economic Constitutional Law (n 78) 260; Sell (n 64) 7, 99.
87 However, as has been observed in IPR legislative efforts (see eg Farrand, ‘Lobbying and Lawmaking
in the European Union’ (n 3) 22–28), the EU parliament has also intervened in some circumstances
and essentially halted or changed proposals in the face of major public protests.
88 Clemens Ladenburger, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon’ (2012) 〈http://www.
fide2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=88〉 39. In a similar fashion, later, Maria Martin-Prat, ‘The Future
of Copyright in Europe’ (2014) 38 ColumJLA 29, 29, the head of the copyright department in the
Commission, writes that ‘a rational review of copyright rules is required to maintain the legitimacy
and robustness of the system in Europe’ and that this needs to be done at the European rather
than at the national level.
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attractive legal offers of digital content was however still on the agenda.89 At that
point, a review of the Enforcement Directive was under way. One goal was to respect
all fundamental rights of the EUCFR and tackle the infringements at their source in
co-operation with intermediaries.90
The action plan of July 2014, ‘aiming at renewing the consensus on the enforce-
ment of IPR’, includes 10 steps. A major trend appears to be the shift to a new
‘follow the money’ model intended to target the revenue stream of commercial-scale
infringement.91 It is also noteworthy that the communication does not include any
identifiable actions against Internet connectivity providers. According to Kroes,
We agreed that focusing on ordinary users would be heavy-handed, disproportionate,
and ineffective. We agreed that new powers were not the answer either. Instead we
will pursue non-legislative measures, under existing powers, focused on large-scale
commercial infringements. That is the right way forward.92
This was echoed in the mission statements of the Juncker commission, calling for
drafting new legislative proposals on modernisation of copyright within the first six
months, and then adopted in the Commission 2015 work programme as modernisation
of EU copyright legislation to support a connected digital single market.93
The lack of coherence and active steps may have been partially due to the number
of Commission departments involved. For example, Communications Networks, Con-
tent & Technology (DG CONNECT) oversaw the Digital Agenda, Internal Market and
Services (DG MARKT) IPR and its enforcement, and Trade (DG TRADE) international
treaties including IPR. It is obvious that they have had different views and priorities
on how to proceed.94
89 Commission, ‘A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights’ (Communication) COM(2011) 287
final, 6.
90 Ibid, 19 (as was also observed above by Ladenburger (n 88) 39): ‘Any amendments should have
as their objective tackling the infringements at their source and, to that end, foster cooperation
of intermediaries, such as internet service providers, while being compatible with the goals of
broadband policies and without prejudicing the interests of end-consumers.’
91 Commission, ‘Towards a renewed consensus on the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights:
An EU Action Plan’ (Communication) COM(2014) 392/2, 1.
92 Neelie Kroes, ‘Our single market is crying out for copyright reform’ (2 July 2014) 〈http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-528_en.htm〉. In addition to enforcement perspective, Kroes
(Former VP of Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda) also called for a more balanced
and reformed copyright: ‘But even that approach to enforcement cannot stand alone. It must
be accompanied by wider and significant reform. It would be highly regrettable if the current
Commission could not achieve that.’
93 Future of Copyright, ‘EU copyright reform in fast lane: New legislative proposals coming soon’
(12 September 2014) 〈http://www.futureofcopyright.com/home/blog-post/2014/09/12/eu-
copyright- reform- in- fast- lane- new- legislative- proposals- coming- soon.html〉; Commission,
‘Commission Work Programme 2015: A New Start’ (Communication) COM(2014) 910 final 6.
94 See eg Kennisland, ‘Barnier and Kroes in a copyright reform stand-off’ (18 July 2014) 〈http:
//www.kennisland.nl/filter/opinies/barnier-and-kroes-in-a-copyright-reform-stand-off〉. The
specific implications of the 2015 work programme remain to be seen. The emphasis on fast-track
modernisation is striking, but it is not yet clear which changes this might imply to copyright
enforcement. Cf. Martin-Prat (n 88) 31, 38 observes that typical advocates for copyright review
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This is illustrated in the internal draft of the still unpublished copyright white paper
of June 2014 and its public follow-up. The white paper was from the enforcement
perspective unambitious and looked like the ‘traditional canon’, for example, in noting
that ‘rights that cannot be enforced are of no (economic) value’. Effective cross-border
court orders were deemed necessary because of difficulty in enforcement. According
to the white paper, ‘the key challenge to tackle was to rapidly identify and tackle
the source of such activities with the assistance of intermediaries, in particular the
most harmful commercial-grade infringements that seek to generate profits’.95 As
a way forward, ‘enhancing due diligence obligations for all the actors in the value
chain of digital content distribution could be considered’. Intermediaries ‘could be
encouraged to pro-actively help in addressing the commercial offer of copyright-
infringing content on the internet’. This could be achieved using means that should be
‘proportionate and balanced, and would help uphold the reward function of copyright
for the creative industries’. Clarification on the requirements and articulation of the
various fundamental rights interests involved could be provided. These potential
activities would be in addition to the ‘follow the money’ approach.96 The striking
focus on observing, evaluation, ‘coulds’ and still open activities – similar to the earlier
IPR strategy communication of 2011 – suggests that the Commission had not yet
committed to any particular direction and was watching the events unfold and the
world move on.
It remains to be seen whether this approach is going to remain – or indeed,
whether the white paper has been abandoned altogether. The earlier IPR enforcement
action plan, inter-departmental consultations, and the new 2015 work programme for
modernising EU copyright imply that at least the main focus has shifted away from
enforcement and strengthening it in particular.97
In summary, there appear to be signs of all stages from Commission white papers.
Enforcement no longer appears to be an exclusionary approach or a priority, but is
always – at least on paper – balanced against other priorities such as the evolution of
business models or modernising cross-border licensing. Since the 2011 IPR strategy,
there have been signs of focus on tackling the issues at their source. This would be
in contrast to enforcement through user-end connectivity providers. For example, in
have maintained that there is no need to review the E-Commerce and Enforcement Directives; on
the other hand, the rightholders have requested such review to enhance enforcement.
95 Paul Keller, ‘Leaked draft of Commission copyright white paper based on flawed assumptions’
(25 June 2014) 〈http : / / www. communia - association . org / 2014 / 06 / 25 / leaked - draft - of -
commission-copyright-white-paper-based-on-flawed-assumptions/〉 17. The release in July 2014
was postponed to September in order to attempt to build greater consensus in inter-departmental
consultations; see Kennisland (n 94). However, the continued delay suggests that the paper may
have been abandoned.
96 Keller (n 95) 18.
97 On a slightly different take, see Eleonora Rosati, ‘2015: The year of blocking injunctions?’ (2015)
10 JIPLP 147.
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the draft white paper enforcement should be done ‘with assistance of intermediaries’,
which might imply disconnecting the website as the primary approach. However, there
were still some alarming signs of considering more sophisticated forms of enforcement
and increased responsibility for Internet service providers, especially in the draft white
paper. The modernisation of EU copyright in 2015 work programme will also likely
ripple some effects to the enforcement.98 Regardless of the approach, ‘the proof is in
the pudding’. That is, white papers matter a great deal less than the completed and
approved explicit actions, legislative acts in particular.
4.2.5 A case against a more active role for ISPs
We have explored the reasons why ISPs have involuntarily become more active in
enforcing activities. Here it is argued that this is undesirable at least in general
and more so as the intensity of enforcement increases. There are many somewhat
interconnected reasons for this, including in particular:
1. approaches have not been successful or impact assessments have been lacking;
2. the goals pursued lack legitimacy; and
3. approaches have overly burdensome negative consequences.
The first reason is that the mechanisms have not been adequately effective com-
pared to their economic and social cost.99 For example, while website blocking in its
most simplistic forms could be conducted with relative ease, its cost, expansion and
at best moderate efficiency are somewhat discouraging. The seriousness of problems
increases with the more advanced and automated mechanisms. For example, Giblin
has been very explicit in her critique of graduated response mechanisms:
So, what happens when ISPs become copyright police? The evidence suggests that the
answer is “very little.” Tens of millions of dollars of largely public money has gone toward
implementing the various graduated responses, in experiments that are now several
years long, but evidence is surprisingly lacking that they’re doing anything to achieve
copyright’s underlying aims. The evidence simply does not support the big claims that
have been made about the success and efficacy of graduated response.100
Given that many approaches have been failures, should we not employ better
mechanisms instead? The answer would be affirmative if a non-intrusive and yet more
98 According to Martin-Prat (n 88) 45, improving the internal market ‘also implies examining whether
the current system of enforcement of rights is equipped to function across borders’.
99 See earlier discussion on this, for example, at n 83 and Hargreaves (n 83) 77–78 on ineffectiveness
and the lack of evidence-based lawmaking.
100 Giblin, ‘When ISPs Become Copyright Police’ (n 42) 86. See also TorrentFreak, ‘U.S. ‘Strikes’
Scheme Fails to Impact Piracy Landscape’ (11 January 2015) 〈http://torrentfreak.com/u-s-strikes-
scheme-fails-to-impact-piracy-landscape-150111/〉.
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effective mechanism was devised. This has proved to be challenging. Therefore, in
practice one should also be willing to accept the negative answer that a proportionate
mechanism may not exist.101 Indeed, resisting the urge to answer ‘yes’ to this line of
questioning has been observed by Giblin:
Rights holders might well use this lack of effect to argue that current ISP policing measure
don’t go far enough, and push for ISPs to do yet more to police their users. No doubt
right holders would like to do so: IFPI has already proposed deep-packet inspection by
ISPs as a not “overly burdensome or expensive” solution to piracy.102
The second reason concerns the lack of legitimacy. In previous sections, the prob-
lems of strong lobbying and even bias in the legislative processes were discussed.103
In de lege ferenda sense, this can be argued to provide a case against more such
favourable and one-sided legislation. This is also underlined from a different perspec-
tive in private enforcement mechanisms.104
The lack of legitimacy also concerns a more specific topic, the objective of copyright
enforcement. This applies both to adjudicative situations in proportionality analysis as
well as imbalance in legislative efforts. When the measures are ineffective, the goals
of conducting enforcement anyway through intermediaries seem to be 1) the symbolic
value of copyright enforcement, 2) the importance of winning in a power struggle
against Internet service providers as a matter of principle and in order to acquire
further obligations in the future, and 3) vain attempts to educate already-cognisant
users. None of these are very convincing as justification.105 This is emphasised when
101 This was argued as one possibility in Article VI (paras 76, 87). Two specific reasons for rejection
might be inefficiency and the lack of a proportionate mechanism which would not cause collateral
damage (such as blocking third-party sites). Similarly, on the reality that there may not be a
mechanism satisfying the criteria required in UPC Telekabel Wien, see Julia Hörnle, ‘On whose
side does the internet access provider stand? Blocking injunctions against communication service
providers. Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film’ (2014) 19 CommsL 99,
100; Christina Angelopoulos, ‘Are blocking injunctions against ISPs allowed in Europe? Copyright
enforcement in the post-Telekabel EU legal landscape’ (2014) 9 JIPLP 812, 819.
102 Giblin, ‘When ISPs Become Copyright Police’ (n 42) 86. This ‘ineffectiveness is a sign that more
effective measures must be used’ argument was also observed in Article I (at 51 and 65) and
Article II (at 238). Similarly earlier Rohan Massey, ‘Independent service providers or industry’s
secret police? The role of the ISPs in relation to users infringing copyright’ (2008) 19 EntLR 160,
160 writes of IFPI eloquently speaking of ‘the wind of change blowing through the music industry,
heralding a new dawn of ISP responsibility and co-operation, backed by a collective will on the
part of national legislatures to mandate that responsibility’. See also Günther and Norrgård (n 18)
123, referring to Commission, ‘Synthesis Report on Stakeholders’ Dialogue on Illegal Up- and
Downloading 2009–2010’, 7.
103 This was thoroughly examined in Article II. In this chapter, see eg nn 64 and 81 and the corre-
sponding text.
104 Giblin, ‘When ISPs Become Copyright Police’ (n 42) 86: ‘Digital technologies and Internet distri-
bution have brought huge challenges [...]. However, this does not justify public policy responses
that are expensive and ineffective, or private enforcement that bypasses democratic lawmaking
processes and safeguards.’
105 However, some degree of symbolic law enforcement may admittedly also be in the public policy
interest. Since Article II, it has been suggested by Kevin T O’Sullivan, ‘Enforcing copyright online:
Internet provider obligations and the European Charter of Human Rights’ (2014) 36 EIPR 577,
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conducted at the expense of connectivity providers instead of as regulated by law and
fully compensated by the IPR holders. The approaches essentially externalise the risks
and costs of enforcement to ISPs, yet the IPR holders solely reap the alleged benefits
of such activities.106
The third reason concerns negative impacts or the implications of such measures.
In addition to the general issues related to freedom of expression, freedom to conduct
a business, and other such rights, a couple of more specific concerns should be
examined. Specifically, increasing the evaluative role of ISPs in making judgement
calls would turn them into judges, incur costs, and also undermine privacy. In order
to prevent these problems, ISPs would need to become more conservative, resulting
in suppressing even legal communications or services, and stifling innovation in order
to play safe.107
For example, Levin articulates this as: ‘there is an obvious danger that ISPs would
be obliged to actively evaluate the activities of their clients in order to insulate
them from legal liability for contributory copyright infringement and involvement in
costly legal proceedings’, resulting in only ‘permissive innovation’ and impediment
to development.108 On the other hand, Levin also argues that ISPs cannot act as if
they were blind. While neither filtering nor blocking is a sustainable solution, she
argues for a review that would nuance the rules on the liabilities of ISPs as a part of
the solution. However, the role of enforcement should still fall on the IPR holders,
not intermediaries.109 In a similar vein, Coudert and Werkers put it thus (emphasis
added):
ISPs should not be converted into judges and be asked to evaluate, on their own, the
lawfulness of downloaded content. Users’ fundamental rights, such as their right to
privacy, but also their right to a fair trial, could, as a result, end up seriously diminished.
580 that the objective is to ‘shape the behaviour of those engaged in piracy online’ and blocking
forms a limb of a greater strategy of deterrence by negatively impacting piracy and raises the
transaction costs of infringers. It is not obvious how this would be a strong argument for this kind
of enforcement.
106 These were examined in Section 4.2.2 and Articles II and VI. On general indifference and ignoring
the law, see eg Alexander Peukert, ‘Why do ‘good people’ disregard copyright on the Internet?’
in Christophe Geiger (ed), Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2012);
Jonas Andersson Schwartz and Stefan Larsson, ‘The Justifications of Piracy: Differences in
Conceptualization and Argumentation Between Active Uploaders and Other File-sharers’ in Martin
Fredriksson and James Arvanitakis (eds), Piracy: Leakages from Modernity (Litwin Books 2014).
107 This discussion is continued more generally in Section 5.2.
108 Levin (n 67) 152. Similarly, Gasser and Schulz (n 30) 7–8, 12–13 describe the issue of ‘incentive
structures’ for providers leading to ‘over-compliance’; providers may be quick to take down even
legal content in order to avoid costs and potential liability, and that the provider should not
be put in the position of whether to remove content or not; similarly in Peter K Yu, ‘Digital
copyright enforcement measures and their human rights threats’ in Christophe Geiger (ed),
Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2015) 463.
109 Levin (n 67) 167, 169. Within this ‘nuancing’, it is submitted that those who have a more direct
link to the infringement should also have a bigger role in addressing the issue. See Pihlajarinne,
Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoikeuden loukkaus (n 48) 59–60, 147 and n 48.
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Turning ISPs into assistants of copyright societies and right holders in their battle for
the protection and enforcement of copyrights against piracy on the Internet will have a
baleful influence on the freedom of communication and the right to privacy of their clients,
giving way to massive monitoring of electronic communications for the sake of private
interests.110
Van Eecke, citing inter alia De Beer and Clemmer, has also made similar observa-
tions on the alarming trends on ISPs in general, not just connectivity providers:
Based on the State and the EU level, we foresee that the trend to force online interme-
diaries into a policing role and to monitor their users ex ante will continue to increase,
based on national rules that increase the general duty of care of service providers while
simultaneously targeting end-users. Neither the service providers, nor the end-users,
nor the European industry would benefit from this shift from passive-reactive to active-
preventative.111
If the trend to blocking continues, it is inevitable that the likelihood of collateral
damage in the form of blocking third party websites will increase. It may also be
challenging or impossible to verify in advance whether the implementation of blocking
will affect other sites.112 Further, the more advanced mechanisms avoiding these risks
might be significantly more burdensome for the providers. This constitutes a risk
that courts might be overly sensitive to blocking requests and the acceptable level of
burden might start shifting upward.
Comparatively, in the U.S. there have been arguments in particular against open-
ended secondary liability standards – which are more applicable to hosting providers
than connectivity providers – and the negative implications of unforeseeability. Most
fundamentally, Blevins observes that the liability of Internet platforms should be
both narrow and clear.113 Lack of clarity increases the grey area surrounding the line
of liability, leading to over-deterrence by risk-averse actors.114 Further, uncertainty
‘outsources’ enforcement costs to Internet platforms, incentivising them to become co-
enforcers of copyrights.115 He observes that the rules are too broad if they effectively
shift the burden of monitoring and enforcement to platforms.116 Finally, enforcement
110 Coudert and Werkers (n 57) 71.
111 Van Eecke (n 62) 1501; de Beer and Clemmer (n 74) 389, 404. Van Eecke also compares the
situation to online intermediaries enjoying an ‘almost absolute form of protection’ in the U.S. with
the flourishing state of U.S. services.
112 This concerns IP address based blocking in particular, because one needs to know a priori whether
the website shares an IP address with some other site. This information can be obtained reliably
only from the hosting provider or the website operator. On average, the vast majority of websites
do share the address – yet most blocked sites are not typical average websites – and this has also
led to inadvertent overblocking. See Article IV (at 287); Cartier (n 19) para 67; Hörnle (n 101)
160.
113 John Blevins, ‘Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expansion of Secondary Copy-
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against Internet platforms may succeed merely by increasing the potential costs of
enforcement proceedings. IPR holders in particular ‘prefer statutory interpretations
that impose vague fact-intensive standards’, resulting in costly and lengthy proceedings
which would be prohibitive for Internet platform companies.117
Indeed, Lemley and Reese and also Helman observe the same problems with sec-
ondary liability standards: the former two with the option of litigation against makers
of technology (facilitators) stifling innovation, the latter against hosting providers as
‘deep-pocket defendants’ and as gatekeepers against direct infringement.118
These U.S. perspectives are not directly applicable in this EU context, because
their focus was on hosting providers and the extensions of secondary liability.119
Nonetheless, these demonstrate the issue of uncertainty. Here it comes up particularly
when the provider decides whether to participate and how in the legal proceedings.120
The lack of opposing arguments in court results in judges accepting the requests more
easily, leading to various implications such as the stifling of innovation and increasing
the gatekeeper role. Further, as an analogue of going after ‘deep-pocket defendants’
one could submit going after ‘local and technologically capable defendants’, ie, the
local providers instead of remote providers or infringers.
117 Blevins (n 113) 1824–25.
118 Mark A Lemley and R Anthony Reese, ‘Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement without Restricting
Innovation’ (2004) 56 Stanford LR 1345, 1349–50; Lital Helman, ‘Pull too Hard and the Rope May
Break: On the Secondary Liability of Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement’ (2010) 19
Texas Intellectual Property LJ 111, 155–65.
119 See eg Miquel Peguera, ‘Converging Standards of Protection from Secondary Liability for Trade-
mark and Copyright Infringement Online’ (2014) 37 ColumJLA 609, 610–13.
120 General blocking orders that leave the implementation choice to the provider could also increase
uncertainty; see Hörnle (n 101) 162. However, it has been argued that the provider can use the




First, the research question is addressed in Section 5.1.1 The main focus is on three
more general aspects of the conclusions. In Section 5.2, general observations are made
on the evolving role of Internet intermediaries and the history thereof. Section 5.3
summarises certain key findings of doctrinal legal scholarship. These are indicative of
an ideal interpretation of the law. Section 5.4 introduces a few considerations of legal
policy. These suggest why the law is as it is and what changes might be appropriate.
Because these are based on earlier chapters, the formulation is both concise and
incomplete.2
5.1 The research question
The research question encompassing the whole study was formulated as follows: On
what conditions and why may an Internet connectivity provider be forced to participate
in online copyright enforcement? This was further divided into sub-questions:
1. How may Internet connectivity providers be used for copyright enforcement and
how do these mechanisms fit into the general copyright enforcement landscape?
2. What are the requirements and considerations to be evaluated, in particular
with regard to fundamental rights, in order to issue a website blocking order?
3. What motivations can be observed in the expansion of copyright enforcement
through providers?
4. What trends can be discerned as general observations and conclusions?
1 However, discussion is quite brief, given that the question reflected the whole study, rather than
just this overview.
2 That is, only a few issues can be mentioned here. For a full account, the main text should be
consulted. The text also provides hints on potential topics for future research.
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As was stated in Section 2.1, it is not possible to fully substantiate the answers to
these questions in this overview. All the questions were already addressed or at least
touched upon in the articles, summarised in Section 4.1.
The first introductory sub-question was addressed in Article I and as an update
in Article II. The applicable enforcement mechanisms were discussed in particular
in Articles III and VI. In short, connectivity providers may be leveraged in multiple
ways, the most common and significant ones being website blocking and subscriber
information disclosure. There are also some instances of automated monitoring
and notification systems as well as user disconnection. These are in contrast to a
large number of other means directed against infringers or users at large. Given
that the provider is a faultless third party, the basis for these measures differs in
many respects from actions against infringers. These differences require one to be
alert and to consider issues such as the rights of various parties and the appropriate
interpretation of IPR enforcement principles, as well as subsidiarity and the objective
during proportionality evaluation.
The second sub-question was examined in Articles IV, V and in particular VI.
The framework of fundamental rights and proportionality evaluation was expanded
in this overview and finally a more general proportionality evaluation procedure
was submitted. The requirements for imposing a blocking injunction are the legal
basis, the grounds for injunction, ie, conditions of eligibility of blocking a website,
proportionality evaluation, and procedural requirements and national modalities.
In the proportionality evaluation procedure, inter alia the rights and interests at
stake need to be examined, the interpretation of IPR enforcement principles in this
context identified, more precise evaluation criteria formulated, and a proportionality
test conducted. The more specific criteria for proportionality of website blocking
suggested are 1) degree and basis of illegality, 2) effectiveness, 3) negative burden on
the provider, 4) subsidiarity, and 5) avoiding collateral damage.
The third sub-question was examined in Article II. It is suggested that there are
more, and perhaps even stronger, motives for pursuing enforcement through interme-
diaries than belief in efficacy. The first is the symbolic value of copyright enforcement.
That is, IPR holders want to be seen ‘doing something’ for the benefit of the public,
their own constituents, and to legitimise further legislative proposals. Secondly, a vain
attempt to educate already-cognisant infringing users can be discerned. Finally and
perhaps most importantly, there appears to be a political struggle in the legislative
arena, that is, advocating strong copyright ideology and fighting off calls to evolve
outdated business models. In this struggle, increasing the responsibility of third-party
intermediaries is crucial, especially if enforcement can be done at their expense. Suc-
cess invites further proposals; one could always do more. On the other hand, failure
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and the lack of impact can be argued to warrant further extensions or trying again,
with the hope that the next steps are more efficient in curbing ‘piracy’.3
The fourth sub-question was discussed in Articles II and VI in particular and also
revisited in Section 4.2. Enforcement through connectivity providers has been a major
approach in trying to tackle Internet infringement. However, in recent years, the
criticism and calls for legitimacy have increased, particularly since the protests and
rejection of the ACTA by the European Parliament in July 2012.4 The publication of a
new IPR strategy in July 2014 was also indicative of a possible shift in enforcement to
a ‘follow the money’ approach; the strategy did not involve any identifiable actions
on connectivity providers. Still, another early version of the Commission white paper
suggested continuation and even expansion of the responsibility of intermediaries,
although this has likely been superseded by the new 2015 work programme including
modernising EU copyright. It remains to be seen what the final resolution will be.
In any case, pressure clearly seems to be mounting to find new ways to enhance
the availability of legal offerings and to seek new, less contested means of copyright
enforcement.5 It will be particularly interesting to see which third party intermediaries
– for example, search engines, social media sites, domain registries, payment and
advertisement intermediaries – will be in a key position in the future.6
3 A more appropriate and realistic take would be that ineffectiveness is a warning sign that other
approaches might also prove to be ineffective. This also suggests that the root cause may be
elsewhere and the focus should be on understanding and then addressing it.
4 European Parliament, ‘European Parliament rejects ACTA’ (4 July 2012) 〈http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/news/en/news- room/content/20120703ipr48247/html/European- Parliament-
rejects-ACTA〉; Blayne Haggart, Copyright: The Global Politics of Digital Copyright Reform (Uni-
versity of Toronto Press 2014) 252–55; Patrick R Goold, ‘The Evolution of Normative Legal
Scholarship: The Case of Copyright Discourse’ (2013) 5 EJLS 23, 28–29; Benjamin Farrand,
‘Lobbying and Lawmaking in the European Union: The Development of Copyright Law and the
Rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’ [2015] OJLS (Advance access); Benjamin
Farrand, Networks of Power in Digital Copyright Law and Policy: Political Salience, Expertise and
the Legislative Process (Routledge 2014) 190–94, and on earlier failed attempts to challenge the
Infosoc and Enforcement Directives, see eg ibid, 197–98; Farrand, ‘Lobbying and Lawmaking in
the European Union’ (n 4) 11–17. In particular Farrand argued that a key success factor was
framing the problems as issues of democracy rather than as more abstract problems in enforcing
intellectual property. Nonetheless, Haggart (n 4) 66 submits that the rising consumer interest
has the potential to inject greater recognition of societal effects of copyright into legislative
deliberations.
5 Similarly on the enforcement measures being insufficient and the need to improve the attractive-
ness of legal alternatives, see Petteri Günther and Marcus Norrgård, ‘Blocking Websites: Copyright
Enforcement Online and Responsibilities of Internet Intermediaries in Europe’ [2014] JFT 97,
129. Intellectual Property Office, ‘International Comparison of Approaches to Online Copyright
Infringement: Final Report’ (9 February 2015) 〈https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
international- comparison-of- approaches- to-online- copyright- enforcement〉 8 also describes
online copyright enforcement as a complex phenomenon, to which many factors contribute to,
for instance enforcement measures in other jurisdictions, technological development, and the
availability and affordability of legal services.
6 86% of sites depend on advertisements, and many also on online payment facilities. See
PRS for Music, ‘Report reveals the six business models behind online copyright infringement’
(18 July 2012) 〈http : / / www. prsformusic . com / aboutus / press / latestpressreleases / Pages /
Reportrevealsthesixbusinessmodelsbehindonlinecopyright.aspx〉.
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5.2 The evolving role of Internet intermediaries
A few concluding observations should be made on the evolving role of Internet
intermediaries and connectivity providers in particular. The first wave of enforcement
targeted naturally the hosting providers and other such intermediaries which had or
arguably should have had knowledge of the content. At first, this included mainly
a passive notice-and-takedown regime, but later there has been an expansive trend
to include also some responsibility for preventing future infringement. At that point,
connectivity providers were not seriously disturbed, and their role was to act as mere
conduit and nothing else. Their increased involvement started with requests to provide
subscriber information for litigation against infringing users,7 and once the genie was
out of the bottle, arguments for further actions began to appear in the earnest.
Specifically, starting from around 2005 and increasingly in the 2010’s, there has
been increased focus on expanding the role of connectivity providers in parallel with
other activities, such as targeting hosting providers, search engines, and the revenue
stream of infringing sites. The relative merits and success in these enforcement
attempts remains a mystery; reliable research is lacking. In any case, there has been a
paradigm shift from completely content-wise neutral connectivity providers to some
form of actionability. While the use of deep-packet inspection and more advanced
mechanisms for filtering communications has typically been rejected, except when
such systems are already used for other purposes, the possibility for website blocking
using manually given orders has become relatively commonplace.
Connectivity providers have successfully fought back attempts that they should
be liable for their users’ infringing communications, and this is rarely, if ever, even
argued nowadays. In contrast, for hosting providers the awareness of illegality may
more easily cause liability. In consequence, connectivity providers have not had to
assume the role of ‘Internet police’ by preventing user infringement (at the risk of their
personal loss). Likewise, they have not had to act as an ‘Internet judge’ by making
decisions which content is legal and which needs to be blocked. On the other hand,
for example, hosting providers have had to adopt such roles unless they conform to
all, even clearly incorrect notice-and-takedown requests.
When it comes to subscriber information disclosure and to some degree also
website blocking, connectivity providers have been offered the role of an ‘Internet
champion’, to argue on behalf of the users. Some providers have been more willing
to take on such a role, while most have, at least after the first cases, given up. In
consequence, no one might argue against the requests of IPR holders.
7 Notably the uptake of peer-to-peer networking in 1999-2000 was unanticipated and the notice-
and-takedown regime could not address that form of infringement.
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Last, an interesting new role, an ‘Internet fundamental rights judge’, has been
offered by the CJEU in UPC Telekabel Wien. If a generic order blocking order is given by
the court, the provider is assigned responsibility for ensuring that the implementation
achieves an appropriate fundamental rights balance between different competing
interests. One can wonder if the provider is capable and willing to make such
evaluation in an impartial fashion, and should not the responsibility be borne by a
public authority responsible for making such decisions (ie, a court)? In all likelihood,
the provider may not be up to the task and it may have significant incentive to perform
in a cost-efficient, and not in a fundamental rights balancing manner. On the other
hand, such shifting of responsibility can be avoided if courts keep to their role as the
judge and issue only specific orders where the balance has already been struck. This
seems like a more appropriate approach.
5.3 Doctrinal findings
Copyright enforcement through connectivity providers is only one approach in the
toolbox of numerous measures IPR holders may use. It is up to the IPR holder to choose
which one(s) it pursues. There are a number of ways to address ubiquitous Internet
infringement with an international character. The IPR holder has the advantage of
selecting the forum, applicable law and characterising the infringement. However, the
availability of these opportunities does not mandate the court to grant such requests;
one possible answer is that the action requested must be sought elsewhere.8
In both subscriber information disclosure requests and website blocking injunctions
typically only the IPR holder and the provider are parties to the proceedings. Even the
provider may elect not to participate for various reasons. In consequence, the interests
of users and website operators are not usually directly or even indirectly represented
and there may be nobody to argue why the IPR holder’s request should be rejected.
This has similarities to court proceedings on secret surveillance or search warrants. In
consequence, the court must take the interests of unrepresented parties into account
on its own motion in order to respect and protect their fundamental rights and fair
trial requirements. Ideally, some further forms of representation, review and appeal
would be possible. All in all, this special procedural situation requires that the judge
be sensitive and critical in evaluating the requests of IPR holders.
8 As specific examples, according to Article 8(2) of the Infosoc Directive, a Member State has
obligation to provide remedies against infringers only when the infringement occurs in its territory;
occurrence abroad is unspecified. Neither is there an explicit requirement to grant website blocking
injunctions against intermediaries as per Art 8(3), but doing so is subject to local legislation and
such things as proportionality requirements. It has been argued that in some cases proportionality
might require that the IPR holder pursue the infringer or target another intermediary in a foreign
court.
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Only infringing websites are subject to blocking. This requires that the website
operator’s infringing acts (including sufficient incitement, participation or contribu-
tion) must have a legal basis and be adequately substantiated. This is particularly
important if this issue is addressed ‘merely’ as a preliminary question in conjunction
with website blocking injunction proceedings with the operator not being represented,
rather than in proceedings against the website operator.
When it comes to international jurisdiction, Art 5(3) of Brussels I regulation, or
correspondingly Art 7(2) of the recast Brussels I regulation, ie, special jurisdiction
on tort, delict and quasi-delict, is likely inapplicable to website blocking injunctions.
However, there are plenty of other legal bases for international jurisdiction. Further,
it is argued that a court may only apply a specific law to those communications that
go through the territory of the state whose law is applied. This requires care in
formulation when providers operating in multiple states are imposed a blocking order.
Proportionality of orders should be evaluated against EU fundamental rights and
IPR enforcement principles as well as, secondarily, the domestic equivalents. Domestic
means, such as warning letter or graduated response mechanisms, are also within
the scope of EU law and must comply with the same requirements. More specific
evaluation criteria must also be established. In the context of website blocking, five
are proposed: 1) degree and basis of illegality, 2) effectiveness, 3) negative burden
on the provider, 4) subsidiarity, and 5) avoiding collateral damage. These should
be evaluated in the four-step proportionality test consisting of the legitimacy of the
objective, suitability for the purpose, necessity, and proportionality in the narrow
sense.
In general, the more significant the negative economic impact infringements cause
to the IPR holder, the stronger the enforcement mechanisms that should be available.
Inversely, the more costs or constraints blocking causes to the provider, and the more it
is impacting freedom of information of the users or other parties, the more significant
the losses must be to IPR holder to justify blocking. Specifically, effectiveness and
costs (or burden in general) are very important. If blocking is ineffective, it cannot
mitigate the economic losses of IPR holders. Such blocking would only have symbolic
value. On the other hand, if blocking is cheap, non-intrusive, and precise, it usually
does not have an immediate major impact on providers and users. The more intrusive,
expensive or vague blocking becomes, the stronger its justification and effectiveness
needs to be in order to be proportionate. It is also possible that no proportionate
mechanism exists to block a specific target.
The objective(s) which are accepted as legitimate may have a major impact on
proportionality. Blocking may be portrayed as a technical measure aimed at reducing
the economic losses caused by infringement by increasing sales. The legitimacy of
this objective requires substantial impact and effectiveness. On the other hand, if it is
5.4. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 113
accepted that IPR holders may legitimately compel connectivity providers (at their
expense) to perform vain attempts at educating users, make symbolic gestures of
enforcement, or political moves to increase their own power, inefficient mechanisms
might be considered more readily acceptable as well. While some degree of symbolic
private law enforcement may be accepted – the degree might vary by jurisdiction –
these alternative justifications for copyright enforcement should be critically assessed
in evaluating proportionality.
5.4 Policy considerations
The large number of enforcement mechanisms and ways how to apply them, for
example, in international settings, provides IPR holders with various strategies and
a number of opportunities to choose the one that is best for them, ie, ‘game the
system’. This implies unpredictability and lack of legal certainty for other parties.
Some simplification might be warranted; however, the specifics would be a topic for
future research.
Legislators and the early lawmaking processes seem to be particularly receptive
(or: vulnerable) to professional lobbying activities from parties such as IPR holders.
In the later phases, imbalance was also observed when IPR holder representatives
typically form a majority of various preparatory bodies, boards, or parties that are
called to comment at committee hearings. This should be balanced. One possibility
is to drastically reduce the number of IPR holder representatives on these bodies.
Given that IPR holders conduct active coordination, dozens of ‘parroted’ responses are
unnecessary. In any case, the legislators should be more critical and focus on evidence-
based lawmaking rather than being led by advocacy research. The legislators and in
particular sectoral legal draftsmen should also be critical of their own preconceptions,
recognising that they are the representatives of the public good rather than proponents
of copyright ideology.
The procedural situation in court should be made more robust by improving the
safeguards, at least to be similar to the secret surveillance proceedings. Yet even
this is not enough, given the shortcomings noted in the latter. Further, alternatives
to ‘one-sided proceedings’ should be examined. Clarification of the Enforcement
Directive is also needed on whether and how the infringer must be heard during
or after issuing interlocutory injunctions against intermediaries. More generally,
distinguishing, clarifying and researching the differences between injunctions against
infringers versus third parties would be most welcome.
The rules on liability and in particular the secondary liability of website operators
with user-generated content are not clear. Liability has been found on grounds which
are not completely convincing and which make the demarcation between legal and
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illegal difficult and unpredictable. This results in legal uncertainty and may stifle
innovation for new kinds of services. The problem is particularly severe when it comes
to criminal liability.
Private international law and jurisdiction issues of online copyright infringement
are a mess, and it is no surprise that a number of academic efforts have made sugges-
tions on how to overhaul the legislation. This should be encouraged. The CJEU could
also take a role in this respect. This might require rejecting the fallacy of ‘national’
copyright and damages delimited by territoriality, given European harmonisation and
convenions, and embracing more pragmatic solutions. Specifically, one should aim
at a more predictable set of jurisdictions and choices of law, and explicitly endorsing
the idea that one may be required to go abroad and sue in a foreign court, in contrast
to practically always accepting the jurisdiction of a local court. This would reinforce
Pan-European justice system and increase legal certainty.9
The four-step proportionality test should be further developed to better ‘defend’
against maximalist formulation tendencies and cases of balancing multiple conflicting
rights. Currently all cases essentially fall back to the final proportionality stricto sensu
stage. More research would also be welcome on how the proportionality test should be
applied in interpretative situations, rather than the traditional focus on constitutional
review of primary decisions or acts.
The objectives of copyright enforcement should be more clearly articulated in
legislation. This comes up in the proportionality evaluation. In particular, it is unclear
what degree of effectiveness and economically quantifiable impact is required and
whether merely symbolic copyright enforcement attempts are acceptable.
9 AGs have suggested such approaches in a number of cases, the latest being Pez Hejduk but the
CJEU has chosen not to adopt them. See Section 4.1 and n 11 therein.
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TEKIJÄNOIKEUS INTERNETISSÄ –
SUOJAAMISEN KEINOT JA STRATEGIAT
Tiivistelmä: Tekijänoikeuden noudattamisen varmistaminen (suojaaminen) Internetissä on viime aikoi-
na herättänyt runsaasti keskustelua. Keskustelun ja keinovalikoiman jäsentämiseksi ja kokonaisuuden hah-
mottamiseksi esitetään taksonomia ja analysoidaan keinoja ja strategioita. Erilaisia keinoja voidaan hah-
mottaa lähemmäs parikymmentä, ja niitä voidaan jaotella eri tavoin esimerkiksi ennaltaehkäiseviin ja jäl-
kikäteisiin oikeudellisiin keinoihin. Tämän lisäksi voidaan tarkastella teknisiä estomenetelmiä ja niiden
kohdistamista. Jälkikäteiset keinot voivat kohdistua käyttäjiin, loukkaajiin ja Internet-välittäjiin. Keino-
valikoima muodostaa moninaisen ja monilta osin lainsäädännössä päällekkäisen vyyhdin, joista oikeudenhaltija
voi muun muassa omien strategisten intressien ja kustannusvastuun määräytymisen perusteella valita mie-
leisensä keinon ja kohteen. Keinoja ja strategioita arvioidaan myös Bourdieun käsittein kamppailuna te-
kijänoikeuden kentän herruudesta. Oikeudenhaltijoilla todetaan olevan vahva asema tekijänoikeuden tul-
kinnallisen sisällön määrittämisessä ja lainsäädäntöön vaikuttamisessa.
Asiasanat: Internet, tekijänoikeus, piratismi, oikeuspolitiikka, Pierre Bourdieu
1. Johdanto
Tekijänoikeudet ja tekijänoikeuspolitiikka tietoverkossa ja erityisesti vertaisverkkopalve-luissa on ollut viime aikoina esillä monin eri tavoin. Käyttäjäpään Internet-yhteydentar-
joajille (teknisille välittäjille) annettiin keskeyttämismääräyksiä The Pirate Bay -sivustolle
pääsyn estämiseksi.1 Tekijänoikeustoimikunta ehdotti muutoksia estomenettelyn helpotta-
miseksi.2 Kesällä 2012 opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriö julkaisi keskustelumuistion tekijänoike-
uspolitiikasta, siitä saatiin elokuussa lausunnot, ja asiasta on sittemmin keskusteltu myös te-
kijänoikeusfoorumissa.3 Hankkeiden osalta on kuitenkin epäselvää, kuinka niissä tullaan ete-
nemään. Jo aiemmin lanseerattiin kansallinen IPR-strategia, ja hallitusohjelmassa esitettiin
yleisluontoisia tavoitteita muun muassa hyvitysmaksujärjestelmästä, lainsäädännön kehittä-
misestä ja lainsäädännön täytäntöönpanon tehostamisesta.4 Tämä osaltaan aiheuttaa pai-
netta saada jotakin aikaiseksi hallituskauden aikana. Vastaavasti komission IPR-strategias-
sa tähdätään tehokkaisiin sisämarkkinoihin muun ohella lisensointia helpottamalla. Lisäksi
mainitaan muun muassa kansalaisten valistaminen, loukkausten käsittely niiden lähteellä ja
Internet-yhteydentarjoajien kanssa tehtävän yhteistyön edistäminen.5
1 Elisa Oyj:n osalta HelHO 15.6.2012 (S 11/3097), DNA Oy:n ja TeliaSonera Finland Oyj:n osalta HelKO
11.6.2012 ja 28.6.2012 (H 11/51554 ja H 11/48307). Kommentaarit ks. Savola 2013a; Norrgård 2012; Pih-
lajarinne 2012b.
2 OKM 2012a; OKM 2012b. Lausuntokierroksen jälkeen asia on ollut jäissä odottaen tekijänoikeuspolitiikan
ratkeamista.
3 OKM 2012c. Muistiossa referoidaan myös aiempaa tekijänoikeuspolitiikkamuistiota ja lausuntoja (OKM 2012c,
s. 25–33).
4 OKM 2012c, s. 16–17.
5 KOM(2011) 287 lopullinen, s. 10–14, 20–21.
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Toisaalta kansalaisaktivismin jälkeen Euroopan parlamentti 4.7.2012 torjui Anti-Coun-
terfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) -sopimuksen, vaikka sopimus ei ollut voimassa ole-
vaan oikeuteen nähden edes kovin merkittävä. Ns. Chisugate -tapaus popularisoi ja proble-
matisoi tekijänoikeuden valvontaan liittyviä säännöksiä ja käytäntöjä.6 Tekijänoikeuslakiin
huomattavia muutoksia esittävä ”Järkeä tekijänoikeuslakiin” -kansalaisaloite keräsi hetkes-
sä yli 10000 sähköistä kannatusilmoitusta.7 Tekijänoikeuden rajoittaminen ei ole aivan poik-
keuksellista, sillä esimerkiksi Kanadassa kuluttajan asemaa parannettiin vastikään useilla
eri tavoin.8 Jo aiemmin tekijänoikeuden on todettu edellyttävän tasapainottamista muiden
intressien kanssa.9
Nyt näyttäisi olevan käsillä pysähtyneisyyden ja jopa osin kyseenalaistamisen vaihe.
Tekijänoikeuspolitiikan hahmottelu voidaan nähdä mahdollisuutena, vaikka kovin suuria lin-
janvetoja tuskin onkaan luvassa. Opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriössä on meneillään verkkopi-
ratismiin liittyvien vaihtoehtoisten ratkaisujen kokonaiskartoitus ja arviointi.10 Artikkelissa
esitän sekä yleiskatsauksen että kriittisiä arvioita pyrkien aktivoimaan tätä keskustelua.
2. Suojaamisen keinot ja strategiat
2.1. Keinojen taksonomia
Tietoverkossa tapahtuviin tekijänoikeuden loukkauksiin on mahdollista vaikuttaa monilla eri
tavoin. Keinovalikoimaa ei ole juurikaan systematisoitu, jolloin kokonaisuuden hahmottami-
nen hankaloituu ja keinot ja tutkimukset jäävät irrallisiksi. Pyrin tässä yhdenlaiseen jäsen-
nykseen. Hyödynnän osaltaan Edwardsin vaihtoehtokeinojen jäsennystä.11 Varsinaisten
keinojen osalta olen eritellyt keinoja vielä niiden kohteen (käyttäjä, loukkaaja tai välittäjä)
näkökulmasta ja tämän lisäksi teknisen kohdistamisen ja estomenetelmän avulla. Jaottelu ei
ole tietyistä päällekkäisyyksistä johtuen täysin ongelmaton, mutta se toiminee kuitenkin riit-
tävänä kannustimena taksonomioiden jatkokehittelylle.
Ensimmäiseksi pääkategoriaksi voidaan hahmottaa ennaltaehkäisevät, vapaaehtoiset tai
vaikutuksia hyvittävät keinot. Käsittelen näitä luvussa 3. Toiseksi pääkategoriaksi voidaan
hahmottaa jälkikäteiset, reagoivat tai oikeudelliset keinot, joiden kohteena voi olla käyttäjä,
varsinainen loukkaaja (lähde) tai välittäjä (esimerkiksi Internet-yhteydentarjoaja). Käsitte-
len näitä vastaavasti luvuissa 4–6.
Jälkikäteisillä keinoilla voidaan pelkistäen tavoitella käyttäjien käyttötapojen muuttamis-
ta, lähteen (loukkaajan) sammuttamista tai välittäjien verkossa tapahtuvaa käytön estämis-
tä. Välittäjään kohdistuvat vaatimukset voidaan jakaa vielä käyttäjän selvittämiseen, pää-
syn estämiseen ja aineiston poistamiseen. Teknisiä estotoimia käytettäessä voidaan esto-
6 EFFI 2012. Asian selostus ja problematisointi ks. Savola 2013b, s. 37, 45–47.
7 Kansalaisaloite 2013.
8 Geist 2012.
9 Kokoavasti ks. esim. Savola 2013b, s. 23–24; Pihlajarinne 2012b, s. 31–46; Kemppinen 2011, erit. s. 54–
62.
1 0 OKM 2012c, s. 21.
11 Edwards 2011, s. 62–70. Vrt. vastaava erittely ks. Reynolds 2008, s. 988–1008.
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kohteita systematisoida edellisistä riippumattomasti vielä estotoimenpiteen kohteen (esimer-
kiksi www-sivu, seurantapalvelu, hakukone tai käyttäjä) ja teknisen estomenetelmän (esi-
merkiksi IP-, DNS- tai hakukone-esto) perusteella. Näitä en voi käsitellä tässä tarkemmin.12
2.2. Strategiat ja kamppailu tekijänoikeuden kentällä
Tarkastelen keinojen rinnalla myös oikeudenhaltijoiden strategioita. Strategialla tarkoitan
keinojen valintaa ja niihin liittyvää sisällöllistä vaikuttamista muun muassa lainsäädännön,
lainkäytön ja esitutkinnan saralla. Havainnollistan tätä myös Bourdieun valtateoreettisella
viitekehyksellä.
Oikeudenhaltijat ovat nähneet Internet-yhteydentarjoajiin kohdistuvan vastuun kasvat-
tamisen ja sivustoille pääsyn estämisen periaatteellisesti tärkeäksi tavoitteeksi, vaikka tämä
onkin tunnustettu tehottomaksi keinoksi loukkausten torjumisessa.13 Internet-piratismin uh-
kiin on nähty viisi strategista lähestymistapaa: alasotto, ansaintamallien murtaminen, tutkin-
ta, lobbaus ja oikeudenkäynnit. Yhteistyötä, kumppanuuksia ja tietojenvaihtoa lainsäätäjien,
tuomareiden ja poliisi- ja syyttäjälaitoksen kanssa pidettiin ensiarvoisen tärkeänä. Kyseisiä
tahoja tulisi kouluttaa, jotta he pystyisivät vastaamaan tosiasiallisiin tarpeisiin.14
Bourdieun oikeuden kentällä kamppaillaan vallasta määritellä oikeuden tulkinnallinen si-
sältö.15 Tätä kamppailua käydään niin lainsäätämisessä, soveltamisessa kuin oikeustieteessä-
kin. Osallistujat pyrkivät taloudellisen tai kulttuurisen pääomansa lisäämiseen; myös osallis-
tuminen edellyttää tätä pääomaa.16 Oikeudenhaltijat etujärjestöineen ovat tässä vahvoilla,
koska heillä on paljon taloudellisia resursseja muun muassa vaikuttamiseen (lobbaamiseen),
omaa positiota pönkittävien tutkimusten teettämiseen, muiden toimijoiden kanssa tehtävään
kansainväliseen yhteistyöhön ja oikeudellisen asiantuntemuksen käyttämiseen ja kerryttä-
miseen. Tiedollinen ylivoima luo eräänlaisen asiantuntija-aseman, jonka saavuttaminen edel-
lyttää panostuksia, joihin muilla toimijoilla, lainsäätäjä mukaan luettuna, ei ole mahdollisuut-
ta. Tätä pääomaa käyttäen kentän osallistujista pyritään sulkemaan pois maallikot ja teki-
jänoikeuden traditionaaliseen tulkintaan vihkiytymättömät toimijat.17 Vahva positio on myös
johtanut siihen, että osa muista toimijoista on luopunut kamppailusta tällä kentällä, keskitty-
en esimerkiksi popularisointiin.
Oikeudenhaltijoiden tekijänoikeuden sekä yleisen vallan ja politiikan kentille ulottuvan
valtakamppailun päämääränä on vahvan tekijänoikeusideologian edistäminen. Tämä tarkoittaa
lainsäädännön tiukentamista, keinovalikoiman monipuolistamista ja uusia tulkintoja. Tämä
myös pönkittää sekä oikeudenhaltijoiden että heidän etujärjestöjensä vaikutusvaltaa. Mikäli
estot ja tekijänoikeuden laajennukset hyväksytään, oikeudenhaltijat voivat aina keksiä uu-
sia. Jos jokin vaatimus ei menesty, tätä voi käyttää argumenttina oikeussuojan heikkoudelle
ja tarpeelle tehostaa ja korjata lainsäädäntöä.
12 Laajemmin ks. Savola 2013a, erit. s. 68–72, 154 ss.
13 TorrentFreak 2012g.
14 TorrentFreak 2012f.
15 Aiemmin tarkastelua on kohdistettu muun muassa työoikeuteen (Ylhäinen 2005) ja oikeudenalajaotukseen.
16 Ylhäinen 2010, s. 159–162; Ylhäinen 2005, s. 120–122; Bourdieu – Wacquant 1995, s. 36–39, 125–129;
Bourdieu 1987, s. 808–809, 823–825.
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3. Ennaltaehkäisevät keinot
Keinoja, joita voitaisiin luonnehtia esimerkiksi ennaltaehkäiseviksi, loukkausten vaikutuksia
vähentäviksi, vapaaehtoisiksi tai ei-oikeudellisiksi, voidaan hahmottaa seuraavasti:18
1. valistaminen, tiedotus ja propaganda
2. hyvitysmaksujärjestelmät
3. digitaaliset oikeudenhallintajärjestelmät (DRM)
4. mainostulojen jakaminen oikeudenhaltijan kanssa
5. lailliset jakopalvelut
6. välittäjän vapaaehtoiset rajoitustoimenpiteet.
Valistamiseen, tiedottamiseen ja niiden ääri-ilmiöihin liittyy monia kysymyksiä, varsinkin
se, kuka valistusta toteuttaa ja mistä lähtökohdista. Tietynlaisen yleisen tekijänoikeusdiskurssin
luominen, kuten myös yhteistyö poliisi-, lainsäädäntö- ja lainkäyttöelinten kanssa ja näiden
kouluttaminen on osa oikeudenhaltijoiden globaalia strategiaa.19 Nämä tukevat oikeuden-
haltijoiden kamppailua tekijänoikeuden kentällä: tarkoituksena on ylläpitää määräävää posi-
tiota laintulkinnan ja käytännön asiantuntijana ja vaikuttaa tulkintoihin. Tiedotuksen "privati-
soitumista" voidaan problematisoida edellä mainituista syistä ja koska se on omiaan koros-
tamaan vastakkainasetteluita.20 Kansalaisten valveuttaminen on mainittu myös komission
IPR-strategiassa.21
Tekijänoikeuslain (404/1961, jäljempänä TekL) 2 a luvussa (26 a – h §) säädetään hyvi-
tysmaksujärjestelmästä, jolla on tarkoitus korvata tekijöille sallitusta yksityiskopioinnista joh-
tuvia tulonmenetyksiä. Maksu kohdistuu analogisiin ja digitaalisiin tallennusalustoihin ja digi-
taalisiin tallennuslaitteisiin. Maksun uudistamiseksi on perustettu hanke, maksun kattavuut-
ta on esitetty laajennettavaksi ja asiasta on saatu lausunnot.22 Asiallisesti hyvitysmaksujär-
jestelmät voidaan hahmottaa myös pakkolisensoinniksi.23 Hyvitysmaksujärjestelmän laajen-
taminen ja oikeuttamisperuste voidaan kyseenalaistaa muun ohella siksi, ettei sen piiriin kuulu
yksityiskopiointi laittomasta lähteestä. Hyvitysmaksujärjestelmää halutaan laajentaa, mutta
ilmeisesti sen perusteena olevaa yksityiskopiointioikeutta supistaa tai ainakin pitää sellaise-
naan. Kysymys yksityiskopioinnin ja hyvitysmaksujärjestelmien suhteesta on käsillä myös
vireillä olevassa EUT:n ACI Adam -ennakkoratkaisupyynnössä.24
Digitaalisilla oikeudenhallintajärjestelmillä tekijät voivat vapaammin kehittää erilaisia li-
sensointimalleja. Tehokkaiden suojausjärjestelmien murtaminen on kielletty, eikä näin pu-
rettua aineistoa saa kopioida edelleen. DRM-lisensointia ovat vierastaneet sekä useat sisäl-
töpalvelujen tarjoajat että kuluttajat. Se ei olekaan suuremmin menestynyt ja monessa ai-
emmassa käytössä siitä on luovuttu.25
17 Vrt. Ylhäinen 2010, s. 167–168; Ylhäinen 2005, s. 122; Bourdieu – Wacquant 1995, s. 136, Bourdieu 1987,
s. 821–825, 835.
18 Edwards 2011, s. 62–70. Osin vastaavia ratkaisuja esittäen ks. Reynolds 2008, s. 988–1008.
1 9 TorrentFreak 2012f; TorrentFreak 2012g.
20 Ongelmallisuudesta peruskoululaisten oppimateriaalin kontekstissa ks. esim. Nokkonen 2011.
21 KOM(2011) 287 lopullinen, s. 19–20.
22 Hankerekisteri 2012; Leikola 2012.
23 Edwards 2011, s. 62. Hyvitysmaksujärjestelmän laajennuksesta ks. Lewen 2008, s. 197–200; Oksanen 2008,
s. 76–78.
24 EUT (vireillä), ACI Adam (C-435/12); Savola 2013a, s. 151, 172, 215.
25 Edwards 2011, s. 62–64; Lewen 2008, s. 200–202; Oksanen 2008, s. 64–70. Applen DRM:stä vetäytymi-
sestä ks. Katyal 2009, s. 401–403.
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Eräissä palveluissa (esimerkiksi YouTube) on myös mahdollista jakaa tekijälle osa kysei-
seen aineistoon kohdistuvista mainostuloista, jos oikeudenhaltija alasottovaatimuksen ase-
mesta päättääkin, että aineistolla on enemmän markkina- tai muuta arvoa.26 Tällaista tulon-
jakomallien kehittelyä voidaan pitää hyvin tervetulleena. YouTuben laaja käyttö virallisten
musiikkivideoiden jakeluun osoittaa ainakin joidenkin oikeudenhaltijoiden kiinnostusta ja
mahdollisuuksia hyödyntää uusia markkinointikanavia niiden tukahduttamisen sijaan. Toisaalta
toisten oikeudenhaltijatahojen vaatimuksesta tallennuspalvelujen tarjoajiin kohdistuvat vas-
tuuvapausedellytykset ovat myös kiristyneet.
Laillisia jakopalveluita on kokeiltu laajamittaisesti jo ainakin vuodesta 2001 lukien (Apple
iTunes). Tämä on myös houkutellut markkinoille muita tahoja (esimerkiksi Amazon, Sony ja
Netflix) sekä uusia tulokkaita (mm. Spotify, last.fm), jotka usein toimivat osin mainosrahoit-
teisesti. Useat mobiilioperaattorit ovat myös markkinoineet puhelin- ja liittymäpaketteja, joi-
hin sisältyy musiikin käyttöoikeus.27 Eräänä hidasteena tällaisten palveluiden yleistymiselle
on ollut oikeudenhaltijoiden haluttomuus tätä edellyttävään lisensointimalliin tai vaikeus so-
pia riittävistä korvauksista.28 Joissain yhteyksissä on myös väläytelty ajatusta hyvitysmak-
sua vastaavasta pakkolisensointimallista.29 Useat lailliset palvelut ovat saaneet varsin suu-
ren maksavan asiakaskunnan, vaikka kannattavuus onkin saattanut olla kyseenalainen. Vaikka
palvelut eivät lopulta menestyisikään, ne voisivat edistää luovaa tuhoa (Schumpeter), joka
edesauttaisi uuden aikakauden tekijänoikeuden syntymisessä.
Oikeudenhaltijat ovat pyrkineet välittäjien kanssa sopimusperusteisesti estotoimenpitei-
den käyttämiseen, käyttäjien informoimiseen, varoittamiseen tai oikeuteen haastamiseen.30
Välittäjän omilla rajoitustoimenpiteillä viitataan erityisesti yleisluontoisiin verkon suurteho-
käytön rajoituksiin tai vertaisverkkopalvelujen jarruttamiseen. Nämä toimet saatetaan jois-
sakin tapauksissa kokea ns. verkon neutraliteetti -keskusteluissa ongelmallisiksi. Varsinkin
langattomissa verkoissa estoja on toteutettu varsin usein ja nimenomaan verkko-operaatto-
rin omista intresseistä käsin verkon tukkeutumisen estämiseksi ja verkkoinvestointien vält-
tämiseksi.31 Tämän lisäksi välittäjillä on intressi laajentaa liiketoimintaansa tekijänoikeuden
alaista sisältöä hyödyntäviin palveluihin. Näiltä osin välittäjillä ja oikeudenhaltijoilla on yhtei-
siä intressejä. Oikeudenhaltijoilla on kuitenkin myös lyhytnäköinen intressi saada välittäjät
omalla kustannuksellaan suorittamaan estotoimenpiteitä tai olemaan välikätenä välittäjän
asiakkaiden ”jahtaamisessa”. Pitkälle vietynä etenkin viimeksi mainittua on vaikea sovittaa
yhteen välittäjän asiakkaiden tyytyväisenä pitämisen kanssa.32 Näyttää ilmeiseltä, että oi-
keudenhaltijoiden ja välittäjien intresseissä on niin paljon vastakkaisuutta, että vapaaehtoi-
set, pitkälle menevät järjestelyt ovat hyvin haasteellisia. Oikeudenhaltijalle tämä voisi sinän-
sä olla kohtalaisen tehokasta ja halpaakin, mutta edellyttäisi toiminnan mukauttamista ja osin
omista tavoitteista luopumista. Tämä ei edistäisi oikeudenhaltijoiden valtapositiota.33
26 Edwards 2011, s. 66–67. Esim. YouTube-markkinointihyödyistä musiikkituottajille ks. Masnick 2012.
27 Edwards 2011, s. 64–66.
28 Masnick 2012.
29 Edwards 2011, s. 67–70.
3 0 Ks. esim. Zilkha 2010, s. 698–713.
31 BEREC 2012, s. 21–22; Pihlajarinne 2012b, s. 25; Edwards 2011, s. 26–27; Zilkha 2010, s. 705–706.
32 TorrentFreak 2012b; Edwards 2011, s. 26–27; Zilkha 2010, s. 689, 705.
3 3 Ks. välittäjien vastuun lisäämisen periaatteellinen tärkeys alaviitteessä 13.
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Strategioista yhteenvetona voidaan todeta, että käyttäjiin kohdistuva valistus on lyhyellä
tähtäimellä tehotonta, mutta pidemmällä aikajänteellä onnistuessaan koululaisten asenneil-
mapiiriin vaikuttaminen parantaa positiota. Tähän liittyy ilmeisesti ainakin osin toteutunut
epäonnistumisen ja vastareaktion riski. Yhteistyö oikeusviranomaisten kanssa voi olla myös
lyhyellä tähtäimellä hedelmällistä. Hyvitysmaksut ovat oikeudenhaltijoiden näkökulmasta
hyödyllisiä, jos niiden perusteena olevaa yksityiskopiointioikeutta pystytään supistamaan tai
pitämään samana. Digitaaliset oikeudenhallintamekanismit (DRM) voisivat tilanteesta riip-
puen olla suojakeinoina tehokkaita, mutta kuluttajien hyljeksiminä ne eivät ole kovin käyttö-
kelpoisia. Yksi syy vastustukseen lienee se, että DRM pitää vallan tiukasti oikeudenhaltijal-
la, sillä se voi kontrolloida lisensointimalleja, muuttaa niitä tarvittaessa, lukita käyttäjät ja estää
sen intressien kanssa kilpailevia käyttötapoja. Hyötyjä jaettaessa ja massalisensoiduissa
laillisissa palveluissa oikeudenhaltija saa toivomaansa pienemmän korvauksen ja joutuu pal-
veluntarjoajaan nähden valtanäkökulmasta alisteiseen asemaan. Välittäjien vapaaehtoiset
ja omista lähtökohdistaan suorittamat rajoitustoimenpiteet voivat olla kohtalaisen tehokkaita
ja oikeudenhaltijan näkökulmasta jopa ilmaisia, mutta ne edellyttäisivät kompromisseja ja
vetäytymistä tekijänoikeuden kentällä.
4. Käyttäjään kohdistuvat keinot
4.1. Tavoitteena yleispreventiivinen vaikutus
Käyttäjiin voidaan yrittää kohdistaa suoria keinoja silloin, kun käyttäjät toimivat itsekin lain-
vastaisesti. Käsittelen kysymystä kuka on loukkaaja ja mitkä teot ovat loukkaavia jäljempä-
nä. Tarkastelen tässä välittömiä, käyttäjiin kohdistuvia toimenpiteitä. Yleisesti ottaen toimen-
piteiden tarkoitukseksi voidaan hahmottaa rangaistus- tai korvausuhan kautta yleispreven-
tiivinen, muiden käyttäjien käyttäytymistä ohjaava vaikutus, sillä keinojen käyttö aiheuttaa
huomattavasti enemmän kuluja kuin tuloja.34 Tältä osin keinovalikoima on kiinteässä kyt-
köksessä edellä käsiteltyihin ennaltaehkäiseviin ja käyttäytymiseen kohdistuvaan vaikutta-
miseen liittyviin keinoihin. Erilaisiksi keinoiksi voidaan hahmottaa 1) massakanteet käyttäjiä
vastaan, 2) varoitusmenettely ja 3) asteittaisen puuttumisen keinot. 35
4.2. Massakanteet
Massakanteilla tarkoitetaan laajamittaista oikeudellisten toimenpiteiden kohdistamista käyt-
täjiin. Niitä ja niihin liittyvää julkisuutta voitaisiin kutsua myös pelottelutaktiikaksi. Taloustie-
teellisesti ilmaistuna keinoilla osaltaan pyritään nostamaan käyttäjien kokemaa riskiä kiinni-
jäämisestä.36 Verkossa onkin uutisoitu runsaasti tiedostojen jakamisesta aiheutuneista kor-
34 DeBriyn 2012, s. 85, erit. alaviitteet 42 ja 45. Esim. viidessä vuodessa RIAA käytti 90 miljoonaa oikeudelli-
siin palveluihin saaden vain 2,5 miljoonaa dollaria korvauksia.
3 5 Korvausuhasta ja kanteista ks. esim. DeBriyn 2012, s. 84–100; Edwards 2011, s. 25–26; Swartout 2011, s.
504–513; Zilkha 2010, s. 669–689; Reynolds 2008, s. 980–986.
36 Oksanen 2008, s. 71–74; Oksanen – Välimäki 2007.
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vausvaatimuksista ja -oikeudenkäynneistä. Samalla kun jakaminen assosioidaan lataamiseen,
saadaan lataaminenkin näyttämään rikolliselta toiminnalta. Kuolleet isoäidit tai henkilöt, jot-
ka eivät olleet koskaan koskeneet tietokoneeseen, eivät säästyneet vahingonkorvauskan-
teilta.37 Vaatimuksissa ei myöskään aina näytetty, että liittymän haltija olisi itse oikea louk-
kaaja, tai että kyse olisi edes loukkauksesta.38 Summaaristen alasottovaatimusten tunnista-
mis- ja kohdentamismenetelmät ovat myös aiheuttaneet vääriä ilmoituksia, ja muun muassa
verkkotulostinten on väitetty jakavan aineistoa vertaisverkossa.39
Korvausvaatimukset ovat olleet varsin tuntuvia, ja niillä onkin merkittävä pelotevaiku-
tus. Korvausvaatimuksiin liittyvä painostuselementti, epätasapainoinen neuvotteluasema ja
salaiset sovinnot ovat oikeusturvan kannalta ongelmallisia.40 Yhdysvalloissa esimerkiksi
Tenenbaum-tapauksessa 30 kappaleen jakaminen johti 675000 dollarin korvaukseen.41 Jou-
lukuussa 2008 Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) ilmoitti lopettavansa
käyttäjiin kohdistuvat massakanteet, siirtyvänsä Internet-palveluntarjoajien kanssa tehtäviin
sopimuksiin ja keskittyvänsä erityisen vakaviin tapauksiin.42 Massakanteiden käyttö lienee
aktivoitumassa Kanadassa.43 Massakannemalli näyttää aktivoituneen myös Saksassa, jos-
sa yritykset ovat rekrytoineet opiskelijoita etsimään verkosta laitonta musiikkia, lataamaan,
koekuuntelemaan sitä ja keräämään asiasta tarpeelliset todisteet (esimerkiksi kuvaruutu-
kaappaukset).44
4.3. Varoituskirjemenettely
Muutamissa maissa on käytössä varoitusmenettely, jonka avulla tekijänoikeusjärjestö voi
Internet-yhteydentarjoajan kautta lähettää käyttäjälle huomautuskirjeen. Tällaista menette-
lyä koskeva lakiehdotus oli esillä Suomessakin, mutta se raukesi eduskuntakauden vaihtu-
essa. Menettelyn hyödyllisyyttä yksistään on epäilty. Kuitenkin eräiden tutkimusten mukaan
33–70 % käyttäjistä ilmoittaisi lopettavansa varoituksen saatuaan.45 Varoituskirjeiden käyt-
tö saattaisi kuitenkin täydentää ja toimia massakanteita osaltaan ehkäisevänä keinona. Päi-
värinne on analyysissään katsonut, että Suomessa ehdotettu varoituskirjemalli ei olisi kovin
tehokas eikä se täyttäisi perusoikeuksien yleisiä rajoitusedellytyksiä.46
37 Ks. esim. Orlowski 2005.
38 Ks. Ylivieska-Raahen käräjäoikeus 14.5.2012 (L 11/3769), jonka mukaan avoimen WLAN-yhteyden omaavan
liittymän haltijan ei näytetty itse toteuttaneen loukkausta eikä hän ollut vastuussa siitä, jos liittymässä oli
jollakin DirectConnect-tiedostonjako avoimena. Vastaavasti Yhdysvalloissa, ks. Stoltz 2012. Sittemmin DC++-
käyttäjä on tuomittu hyvityksiin langattomasta verkosta huolimatta asiassa ilmenneisiin tosiseikkoihin ja
näyttöenemmyysperiaatteeseen tukeutuen, ks. Itä-Suomen hovioikeus 4.10.2012 (S 12/306), s. 1–2.
39 Tästä ja teknisistä haasteista yleisemmin ks. Piatek ym. 2008.
40 DeBriyn 2012, s. 97–110.
41 Future of Copyright 2012b; Zilkha 2010, s. 685–688. Määrää oli tarkoitus leikata 90 %:lla, mutta ilmeisesti
prosessioikeudellinen virhe esti tämän.
42 DeBriyn 2012, s. 84–85. Ks. myös alaviite 35.
4 3 TorrentFreak 2012i.
44 Essers 2012; Weber 2012. Yhdysvaltalaisista piraattimetsästyksen keinoista ks. Katyal 2009, s. 403–411.
45 HE 235/2010 vp; Päivärinne 2011, s. 53–74; Norrgård 2010. Kansainvälisesti ks. Edwards 2011, s. 29–30.
46 Päivärinne 2011, s. 72–74.
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4.4. Asteittaisen puuttumisen keinot
Eräissä maissa on otettu käyttöön asteittaisen puuttumisen keinoja eli esimerkiksi ns. ”three
strikes” -menettely. Tämä lienee seurausta hiukan pehmeämmästä linjasta eli pyritään vält-
tämään massakanteista tuttuja julkisuusmielessä ikäviä vääriä hälytyksiä. Toisaalta merkit-
tävimpiin tapauksiin reagoimalla halutaan säilyttää osa käyttäjiin kohdistuvasta pelotevaiku-
tuksesta. Ensimmäisenä vaiheena on useimmiten edellä mainittu varoittaminen. Keinoista
on tiettävästi säädetty ainakin Ranskassa, Yhdistyneessä kuningaskunnassa, Etelä-Kore-
assa, Taiwanissa, Kiinassa, Chilessä ja Uudessa-Seelannissa sekä vapaaehtoisuuteen pe-
rustuen Irlannissa. Malli on torjuttu tiettävästi Saksassa ja Euroopan parlamentissa.47 Eri-
tyisesti useimpiin menettelyihin liittyvää Internet-yhteyden määräaikaista katkaisemista on
kritisoitu tarpeettomana ja perusoikeuksien kannalta kyseenalaisena, kuuluuhan järjestelmään
usein mahdollisuus sakko- tms. maksuihin.48
Ranskan otettua käyttöön tällaisen ns. Hadopi-lain International Federation of the Pho-
nographic Industryn (IFPI) tutkimusten mukaan tiedostonjakajien osuus väheni vuodessa
26 %. Kyselyn mukaan 50 % tiedon tai huomautuksen saaneista lopetti jakamisen ja lisäksi
22 % vähensi sitä. IFPI:n tutkimuksen mukaan 10 % vertaisverkkokäyttäjistä oli saanut
huomautuksen. Etelä-Koreassa 70 % ensimmäisen ja 70 % jäljelle jäävistä huomautuksen
saaneista lopettaa loukkaukset.49 Ranskassa kahden vuoden aikana IP-osoitteita on selvi-
tetty noin kolme miljoonaa, ensimmäisiä varoituksia on lähetetty 1,15 miljoonaa, toisia noin
103000 ja kolmansia 340 kappaletta. Oikeustapauksia on kymmenkunta ja ensimmäinen
sakkotuomio annettiin vastikään.50 Lain tehokkuudesta ja sen toimeenpanemiseksi peruste-
tun viraston kustannuksista on kuitenkin herännyt ministeritasolla epäilyjä.51 Uudessa-See-
lannissa pelkän lain voimaantulon väitettiin vähentäneen elokuvien latausta puoleen, vaikka
yhtäkään ilmoitusta ei vielä ollut lähetetty.52
Myös toisenlaista menettelyä on esitetty muun muassa Yhdysvalloissa. Tekijänoikeudel-
liset asiat voitaisiin ratkaista erillisessä hallinnollisessa menettelyssä vaihtoehtoisessa riidan-
ratkaisumenettelyssä verkkotunnuksia ja tavaramerkkejä koskevaa Uniform Dispute Re-
solution Policyä (UDRP) mukaillen.53
4.5. Keinojen vertailua
Varoitusmenettelyn ja asteittaisen puuttumisen keinojen käyttöalttiuden määrittelee hyvin
pitkälti se, millaisia korvauksia välittäjät saavat toimenpiteistä periä. Uudessa-Seelannissa
47 Bridy 2011, s. 727–736; Edwards 2011, s. 31; Päivärinne 2011, s. 60–61. Ks. laajemmin Swartout 2011, s.
520–534; Benabou 2010, s. 170–182; Strowel 2010, s. 147–162. Kanteiden haitoista ks. DeBriyn 2012, s.
92–110; Zilkha 2010, s. 689–705. Komissio ei ole toistaiseksi puuttunut menettelyihin, vaikka onkin ko-
rostanut muun muassa asiaan liittyviä käyttäjien laajakaistaintressejä ja perusoikeuksia. Ks. KOM(2011) 287
lopullinen, s. 19.
48 Katkaisemisesta ks. Savola 2013b, s. 25–27. Kokoavasti ks. esim. Edwards 2011, s. 26–49, 71–72.
49 IFPI 2012, s. 9, 17, 20.
50 Future of Copyright 2012c; Reitman 2012.
5 1 Future of Copyright 2012a.
5 2 TorrentFreak 2012e.
53 Bridy 2011, s. 731–733. Myös Norjassa esitettiin hallinnollisen puuttumisen vaihtoehto (OKM 2012a, s. 46).
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tämä on ilmeisesti 25 Uuden-Seelannin dollaria huomautukselta. Eri oikeudenhaltijatahot
haluaisivat sen olevan huomattavasti alhaisempi, 2 dollaria tai ”pennejä”. Internet-yhtey-
dentarjoajat ovat esittäneet, että menetelmän rakentamiseen on kulunut yli puoli miljoonaa
dollaria ja näin ollen yhdestä huomautuksesta korvattavien kustannusten tulisi olla noin 100
dollaria. Elokuvatuottajat eivät ole lähettäneet yhtään ilmoitusta. Tämä on ilmeisesti johta-
nut siihen, että menetelmä ei ole tosiasiassa käytössä.54 Suomessa ehdotetun varoituskirje-
menettelyn yhteydessä kuluista olisivat vastanneet oikeudenhaltijat, mutta kustannuksista
olisi tullut sopia etukäteen.55
Massakanteiden käyttö riippuu lähinnä tunnistamistietojen luovuttamisedellytyksistä, tä-
hän liittyvistä oikeudenhaltijoille aiheutuvista kustannuksista ja keinojen strategisesta valin-
nasta. Massakanteet ovat tehokkaasti vähentäneet jakamista tai ainakin vieneet sitä maan
alle. Massakanteista saadut korvaukset eivät ole kattaneet niistä aiheutuneita kustannuksia,
mutta niiden tarkoituksena onkin ollut käyttäytymiseen vaikuttaminen. Keinon pelotevaiku-
tus on myös huomattava. Varoitusmenettely ilman muita seuraamuksia olisi todennäköisesti
varsin tehoton, kustannuksia aiheuttava ja sanktioiden puuttuessa myös valtapositiota na-
kertava. Kovenevat keinot sisältävät laajemman sanktioarsenaalin ja ovat siksi tehokkaam-
pia ja oikeudenhaltijoiden valtaa edistäviä, mutta toisaalta ne myös aiheuttavat suurempia
kustannuksia monivaiheisuuden vuoksi.
5. Loukkaavan lähteen sammuttaminen
5.1. Kuka on loukkaaja
Ensiksi on syytä tarkastella loukkaavia tekoja ja loukkaajaa. Lain säännökset sisältävät vain
yleiset raamit, ja tulkinnanvaraisten säännösten sisällön selvittämisessä tuomioistuin on kes-
keisessä roolissa.56 Loukkaustapoja ovat muun muassa julkinen tai suljettu vertaisverkko-
käyttö, jaetut tallennuspalvelut (ns. cyberlocker) ja tietojenvaihto irrotettavilla tallennusme-
dioilla (ns. sneakernet).57 Tässä yhteydessä kiinnostavin on vertaisverkkokäyttö. Siihen liit-
tyvät vaikeimmat kysymykset koskevat vastuuta ja sen kohdentamista vaihtoehtoisten ja
rinnakkaisten loukkaajien kesken. Useimmiten vaatimuksia halutaan kohdistaa sellaiseen
loukkaajaan tai avunantajaan, johon kohdistaminen on tehokkainta. Mahdollisia loukkaaja-
tahoja voidaan hahmottaa seuraavasti:58
1. aineiston verkosta lataava käyttäjä
2. aineiston verkkoon jakava käyttäjä
3. aineistoon osoittaneen linkin asettanut käyttäjä
4. sen sivuston ylläpitäjä, jolle linkki on asetettu
5. (vastuuvapauden estyessä) sivuston tallennuspalvelun tarjoaja.
5 4 TorrentFreak 2012e.
5 5 HE 235/2010 vp, s. 19–20 (kustannukset yleensä), 25–26 (kustannukset varoitusten lähettämisestä).
5 6 Eri tulkintamalleista ja niiden karikoista ks. Norrgård 2005, erit. s. 511–514.
57 TorrentFreak 2012f.
5 8 Laajemmin ks. Savola 2013a, s. 154–176.
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Lataaja ei sallitun yksityiskopioinnin puitteissa syyllisty rangaistavaan tekoon, vaikka teko
sinänsä loukkaakin tekijänoikeutta, ja voi johtaa hyvitys- tai vahingonkorvausvelvollisuuteen.
Useimmissa tapauksissa lienee selvää, että jakaja on loukkaaja.59 Linkittäjä saattaisi myös
olla loukkaaja. Linkkisivuston ylläpitäjän toimiminen loukkaajana on konstruoitu oikeuskäy-
tännössä osallisuusoppien avulla.60
Vaatimuksia halutaan kohdistaa ylläpitäjään monesta syystä. Ensinnäkin keskeisimmän
kohteen valinnalla saatetaan toivoa, että kokonaisloukkaus loppuisi. Toiseksi yksittäisten
käyttäjien selvittäminen voi olla työlästä tai lakien puitteissa jopa mahdotonta. Mikäli käyt-
täjiä on hyvin suuri määrä, tällöin ei välttämättä myöskään saavutettaisi kokonaisloukkauk-
sen loppumista palvelevaa tavoitetta. Tässä mielessä tarve keskitettyihin toimenpiteisiin on
ymmärrettävä ja ehkä tarpeellinenkin. Ongelmallista tämä on kuitenkin siksi, että lainsää-
dännöllinen perusta on huomattavasti löyhemmällä pohjalla kuin toisiin loukkaajiin, erityises-
ti jakajiin, vaatimuksia kohdistettaessa. Epävarmuus korostuu sitä enemmän, mitä heikompi
kytkös sivuston ylläpidon ja loukkauksen välillä on.61
Sivuston ylläpitäjän (joka voi toimia tekijänä, avunantajana tai vastuusta vapaana) ja tal-
lennuspalvelun tarjoajan raja voi olla hiuksenhieno.62 Useimmiten esitetäänkin vähintään
väitteitä toimimisesta ainoastaan palveluntarjoajana siten ehdollisen vastuuvapauden piiris-
sä. Väitteet eivät ole tiettävästi menestyneet.63
5.2. Loukkaajan henkilötietojen selvittäminen
Palvelun ylläpitäjällä ei ole lähtökohtaista velvollisuutta julkaista henkilö- tai yhteystietojaan.
Joitakin tietoja saattaa olla julkaistu esimerkiksi julkisissa verkkotunnus- tai IP-osoiterekis-
tereissä (whois-tiedot). Kuitenkin mikäli kyse on tavallisesti vastiketta vastaan suoritetusta
palvelusta, on tietoyhteiskunnan palvelun tarjoajalla velvollisuus eräiden tunniste- ja yhteys-
tietojen julkaisemiseen (laki tietoyhteiskunnan palvelujen tarjoamisesta (458/2002), jäljem-
pänä sähkökauppalaki tai SähköKL, 2.1,4 §, 7 §).64 Palvelun ei tarvitse olla nimenomaisesti
sen käyttäjille vastikkeellinen, mutta sillä on oltava taloudellista merkitystä ja sen on liityttä-
vä taloudelliseen toimintaan. Puhtaasti mainosrahoitteinen palvelu voi olla tässä mielessä
kaupallinen palvelu.65 Kuitenkaan esimerkiksi vertaisverkkopalvelun seurantapalvelimen
ylläpitäjää ei ole syytä pitää sellaisena organisoituna tietoyhteiskunnan palvelun tarjoajana,
59 Useimmat vertaisverkko-ohjelmistot jakavat ladatessaan ja aiemmin ladattua aineistoa. Tämä on mahdollis-
ta estää tai sitä voi rajoittaa. Tästä syystä puhdas lataaminen ja jakava lataaminen on erotettava toisistaan
(Savola 2013a, s. 37–38).
6 0 Aineistokuvauksen lisääjästä ks. KKO:2010:48. Ylläpitäjistä ja käyttäjistä ks. KKO:2010:47.
61 Laajemmin ks. Pihlajarinne 2012b, s. 72–90.
62 Vastaavasti ks. Pihlajarinne 2012b, s. 17–18, jossa myös verrataan aiempaan ”staattisempaan” katsantoon
(Sorvari 2005, s. 58–68). Ks. myös Oesch ym. 2007, s. 192–202. Ks. esim. Edwards 2011, s. 55–61; Van
Eecke 2011, s. 1465–1487.
63 Näin myös Finreactor-tapauksessa, ks. KKO:2010:47, 29–32 kohta; OKM 2012a, s. 41–42; Pihlajarinne 2012a,
s. 104–105.
64 Vrt. laajemmin OKM 2012a, s. 57, 64. Sen mukaan laittomissa palveluissa sähkökauppalain ja muun lain vastaisesti
piilotetaan henkilötietoja, mikä estää henkilöiden oikeudellisen vastuun toteuttamisen. Käsitys perustuu nähdäkseni
virheelliseen arvioon palveluiden kaupallisesta luonteesta tai oletuksesta, että kaikki loukkaavat verkkosi-
vustot olisivat tässä mielessä kaupallisia.
65 HE 194/2001 vp, s. 28.
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jolla olisi velvollisuutta julkaista yhteystietoja ainakaan silloin, kun aineistojen vaihto tapah-
tuu vastikkeetta.66
Ylläpitäjä voisi olla saatavissa selville esimerkiksi välittäjään kohdistetulla tunnistamis-
tietojen selvittämishakemuksella tai mahdollisesti poliisin esitutkinnallisin keinoin. Muuten
koska henkilötietojen julkaisuvelvollisuutta ei ole, henkilöiden selvittäminen voi olla ongel-
mallista oikeudellisen vastuun toteuttamisen näkökulmasta. Haastehakemuksessa on ilmoi-
tettava asianosaisten nimet. Tuntemattomia henkilöitä vastaan ei voi nostaa kannetta. Ai-
emmat ylläpitäjät voivat lopettaa toimintansa.67 Vastaajan väite siitä, että kanne on kohdis-
tettu väärään henkilöön, ei useinkaan ole asialegitimaation puuttumista tarkoittava prosessi-
väite, vaan asiaväite siitä, ettei kantaja voi saada vastaajaa vastaan kanteen hyväksyvää
tuomiota. Varallisuusoikeudellisissa asioissa kuten tekijänoikeudellisissa vahingonkorvaus-
vaatimuksissa väärään vastaajaan kohdistaminen johtaisi kanteen hylkäämiseen tältä osin.68
5.3. Lähteen sammuttaminen
TekL 56 g §:n mukaan jos joku loukkaa tekijänoikeutta, tuomioistuin voi kieltää häntä jatka-
masta tai toistamasta tekoa. TekL 60 b §:n mukaan tekijällä tai hänen edustajallaan on louk-
kauksen jatkamisen kieltämiseksi oikeus ajaa kannetta sitä vastaan, joka saattaa tekijänoi-
keutta loukkaavaksi väitettyä aineistoa yleisön saataviin ja sen hyväksyessään määrättävä
lopettamisesta. Näitä varsinaisia kieltotuomioita voidaan antaa vain varsinaista loukkaajaa,
ei esimerkiksi välittäjää vastaan.69 Käytännössä estämisen lopputuloksen kannalta kielto-
tuomiolla ja keskeyttämismääräyksellä ei ole kuitenkaan juuri eroa. Lähteen sammuttami-
nen voi tapahtua myös sähkökauppalain tallennuspalvelujen tarjoajaan kohdistuvan vapaa-
ehtoisen (korvausuhkaisen) alasottomenettelyn avulla. Vaatimus on ensiksi kohdistettava
sisällön tuottajaan (SähköKL 20.2 §).70 Alasottomenettelyä täydentää tallennuspalvelujen
tarjoajaan kohdistettu estomääräysmenettely (SähköKL 16 §). Lisäksi tuomioistuin voi
määrätä keskeyttämään julkaistun verkkoviestin jakelun, jos viestin sisällön perusteella on
ilmeistä, että sen pitäminen yleisön saatavilla on säädetty rangaistavaksi (laki sananvapau-
den käyttämisestä joukkoviestinnässä (460/2003), jäljempänä SananvapL, 18 §).
5.4. Rikosvastuu ja korkeat hyvitykset
Kun ylläpitäjä Suomessa tuomitaan tekijänä, hänet on katsottu hyvitysvelvolliseksi palvelun
kautta yleisön saataville saatetusta aineistosta. Avunantajaan ei kohdistu TekL 57 §:n mu-
kaista hyvitysvelvollisuutta. Tätä on kutsuttu yksi maksaa kaikkien puolesta -periaatteek-
si.71 Tätä voidaan verrata käyttäjien pelottelutaktiikkaan: kun linkkisivustojen ylläpitokin on
kyseenalaista ja uhkana ovat suuret hyvityskorvaukset, potentiaaliset ylläpitäjät jättävät
66 Helsingin hallinto-oikeus 23.2.2011 (Dnro 06180/09/7506), s. 7–9.
6 7 Esim. The Pirate Bayn osalta ilmeisesti ainakaan osa ei ole tehnyt ylläpitotoimia, ks. TorrentFreak 2012c.
68 Frände ym. 2012, s. 406–411.
6 9 OKM 2012a, s. 57.
70 HE 194/2001 vp, s. 44.
71 Hatanmaa 2011.
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mahdollisesti laillisenkin palvelun perustamatta. Kohtuuttomat korvaukset voivat olla Euroopan
ihmisoikeussopimuksen 10 artiklan vastaisia, jos ne johtaisivat sananvapauden käytön ra-
joittumiseen (ns. hiljennysvaikutus).72
Kysymyksiä on herättänyt erityisesti hyvityskorvausten suuri määrä ja laskentaperus-
te.73 Tapauksessa KKO:2010:47 jakelutavasta ja ansiotoiminnan puuttumisesta johtuen kor-
kein oikeus perusti hyvityksen määrän arvioon ja tapauskohtaiseen harkintaan. Tämä oli 15
% vähittäismyyntihinnasta muiden kuin musiikkitiedostojen osalta ja 25 % musiikkitiedosto-
jen tukkumyyntihinnoista eli yhteensä noin 420 000 euroa korkoineen. Laskuperusteena oli
ilmeisesti teosten latausmäärä.74 Turun hovioikeudessa vastikään tuomittiin kahdelle ylläpi-
täjälle maksettavaksi yli 800 000 euron hyvitykset.75 Hyvityksen perusteena oli laillisen In-
ternet-latauksen 1,20 euron kappalehinta, erillisten kappaleiden arvioitu määrä 8000, keski-
arvokäyttäjämäärä 1000 ja arvio, että joka kymmenes käyttäjä olisi ladannut teoksen. Hyvi-
tyksessä huomioitiin 85 % näiden tulosta tekijänoikeusjärjestön kehittämän laskentakaavan
mukaisesti.76
Edellä mainitut esimerkit kuvastavat TekL 57 §:n mukaisen kohtuullisen hyvityksen eri-
tyispiirteitä. Korvauksena on suoritettava vahingon täysi määrä, ei enempää.77 Kyse on
selvästi kohtuullisuudesta nimenomaan oikeudenhaltijan näkökulmasta. Niin ikään jos hyvi-
tyksenä on korvattava ”vahingon täysi määrä”, jolla viitataan oletettuihin saamatta jäänei-
siin myyntituloihin, kyse on usein vahingonkorvausta ankarammasta seurauksesta. Vahin-
gonkorvauksen määräämisen edellytyksenä nimittäin on, että kantaja pystyy näyttämään
toteen vahingon syntymisen, vahingon määrän ja syy-yhteyden toiminnan ja vahingon välil-
lä. Hyvityskorvauksia vastaavat vahingonkorvausvaatimukset menestyisivät todennäköisesti
heikosti, jos niitä jouduttaisiin arvioimaan näistä lähtökohdista.78 Asianomistajatahon itsensä
kehittämän hyvityksen laskentakaavan soveltamista tuomioistuimessa ja vahingonkorvauk-
sellisista periaatteista irrotetun ja näitä laajemman hyvityskorvauksen käyttöä voidaan pitää
esimerkkinä merkittävästä voitosta tekijänoikeuden kentällä tapahtuvassa valtakamppailus-
sa.
5.5. Muunlainen vaikuttaminen ja yhteenveto
OiNK- ja SurfTheChannel-tapauksissa ylläpitäjiin kohdistettiin muita kuin tekijänoikeuslain
mukaisia vaatimuksia (“consipiracy to defraud”). Ensimmäisessä tapauksessa epäilty va-
72 Savola 2013a, s. 130–131.
73 Laajasti hyvityskorvauksesta ks. Sorvari 2007, s. 281–297.
7 4 KKO:2010:47, 33–43 kohta; Hatanmaa 2011.
7 5 Hovioikeustasolla on vireillä ainakin toinen vastaava asia, ks. EspooKO 7.12.2011 (R 10/969), valitus Hel-
HO (R 12/496).
7 6 TurHO 6.7.2012 (R 11/720), s. 5, 8. TurHO ei ratkaisussaan käsitellyt kysymystä puolta sivua pidemmälti,
todeten hyvityksen kohtuulliseksi. Ks. Länsi-Uudenmaan käräjäoikeus 20.1.2011 (R 10/729), s. 17, 26–28.
77 Haarmann 2005, s. 363–364.
78 Sorvari 2007, s. 297–315; Haarmann 2005, s. 362–366; Sorvari 2005, s. 348–362. Esimerkkinä ratkaisu
KKO:1999:115: ”[yhtiöt olivat viitanneet] ohjelmistojen laittomasta kopioinnista ja levittämisestä ohjel-
mistoteollisuudelle yleisesti aiheutuviin menetyksiin. Sen sijaan yhtiöt eivät ole yksilöineet sitä vahinkoa, joka
niille on nimenomaan A:n toiminnasta aiheutunut, tai esittäneet siitä mitään selvitystä. Näin ollen asiassa ei
voida katsoa näytetyksi, että A:n toiminnasta olisi aiheutunut yhtiöille sellaista tekijänoikeuslain 57 §:n 2
momentin mukaan korvattavaa vahinkoa, jonka määrä voitaisiin arvioida oikeudenkäymiskaaren 17 luvun
6 §:n nojalla.”
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pautettiin, jälkimmäisessä tuomittiin.79 Suomessa pelastakaa pedofiilit -jutussa parodiasi-
vuston väitettiin loukkaavan tekijänoikeutta. Pääsyn estämistä vaadittiin ja esto toteutettiin
sähkökauppalain eikä tekijänoikeuslain nojalla. Hakijan ratkaisussa saattoi olla kyse strate-
gisesta valinnasta, sillä tämä ”lainvalinta” oli hakijan näkökulmasta edullisempi. Ruotsissa
PowerBits-tapauksessa ylläpitäjä todettiin syylliseksi tekijänoikeuden loukkaamisen avun-
antoon sekä kirjanpito- ja verorikoksiin, koska hän ei ollut merkinnyt sivustolta saatuja lah-
joituksia tuloksi.80 Italialainen tiedostonjakosivustojen ylläpitäjä pidätettiin tekijänoikeuslouk-
kausten lisäksi muun muassa veronkierrosta, väärennyksestä, petoksesta ja käyttäjätieto-
kannan myymisestä epäiltynä.81 The Pirate Bay -palvelun yhdestä ylläpitäjästä annettiin
kansainvälinen pidätysmääräys ja hänet palautettiin Ruotsiin tietomurrosta epäiltynä.82 Näin
ollen varsinkin silloin, jos on epävarmuutta tekijänoikeudellisten vaatimusten menestymises-
tä, on usein pyritty saamaan aikaan toivottu vaikutus muilla perusteilla.83
Ylläpitäjien tulolähteisiin on myös pyritty vaikuttamaan sulkemalla verkkomaksamiseen
liittyviä tilejä (esimerkkinä PayPal) tai rajoittamalla ylläpitäjien mahdollisuuksia hankkia
mainostuloja kohdistamalla estoja mainostoimittajiin.84 Joitakin verkkotunnuksia on myös
otettu haltuun. Myös estäminen hakukoneista on vähentänyt sivuston kävijämääriä.
Yhteenvetona voidaan todeta, että oikeudenhaltijat ovat oikeusteitse kohdistaneet vaati-
muksia sivustojen ylläpitäjiin. Kyse on useimmiten ollut osaltaan myös julkisen vallan aja-
masta rikosprosessista. Pääsääntöisesti ennemmin tai myöhemmin kanteet ovat menesty-
neet, vaikka eräissä tapauksissa palvelujen ylläpitäjiä on myös vapautettu syytteistä ja kor-
vausvelvollisuudesta. Asiassa huomionarvoista on ollut se, että vaikka varsinaisia loukkaa-
jia ovat useimmiten olleet palvelun käyttäjät, ylläpitäjä on silti joutunut vastaamaan ja kor-
vaamaan vahinkoja myös käyttäjien puolesta. Ratkaisuilla lienee ollut varoittava vaikutus,
mutta ilmeisestikään tämä ei ole merkittävällä tavalla vähentänyt vastaavia sivustoja Inter-
netissä.
6. Välittäjään kohdistuvat keinot
6.1. Välittäjän vastuuvapaudesta
Internet-yhteydentarjoajaan ei voi kohdistaa vahingonkorvaus- tms. vaatimuksia välitetyn
aineiston johdosta, mutta säännös ei estä kielto- tai estomääräysten antamista (SähköKL
13, 19 §). Tallennuspalvelun tarjoaja on vastuuvapauden piirissä toimiessaan viipymättä tal-
lentamansa tiedon saannin estämiseksi saatuaan tuomioistuimen määräyksen, tekijänoike-
usloukkauksesta määrämuotoisen ilmoituksen tai tosiasiallisesti tiedon eräistä rikoksista. Tässä
kyse on esimerkiksi www-sivuja tarjoavasta yrityksestä, joka saa vastuuvapauden sisällön
79 BBC 2012; TorrentFreak 2010.






suhteen näin ollen vain ehdollisesti. Tietoisuus lainvastaisesta sisällöstä voi johtaa siihen, ettei
vastuuvapauteen voi vedota.85
6.2. Tunnistamistietojen selvittäminen
TekL 60 a §:n mukaisesti oikeudenhaltijalla on oikeus tuomioistuimen määräyksellä saada
yhteystiedot sellaisesta teleliittymästä, josta tekijän oikeuksien suojan kannalta merkittäväs-
sä määrin saatetaan yleisön saataviin tekijänoikeudella suojattua aineistoa ilman tekijän suos-
tumusta. Oikeudenhaltijan on korvattava luovuttamismääräyksen täytäntöönpanosta aiheu-
tuneet kulut sekä mahdollinen vahinko. Tiettävästi kaikki hakemukset on hyväksytty.86 Kor-
vaussäännöksen laajuudella on haluttu kohdistaa selvittäminen merkittäviin tapauksiin.87
SananvapL 17 §:ssä säädetään samalla tavoin rangaistavaksi säädettyjen verkkoviestien
julkaisemisen osalta. Poliisi voi saada myös Internet-palveluntarjoajilta tunnistamistietoja liit-
tymästä tai laitteesta, jos tietoja yksittäistapauksessa tarvitaan poliisille kuuluvan tehtävän
suorittamiseksi (poliisilaki 493/1995, jäljempänä PolL, 36.2 §). Tämä ei edellytä merkittä-
vyyskynnyksen täyttymistä.88
6.3. Tekijänoikeudellinen estomääräys
TekL 60 c §:n mukaan tuomioistuin voi määrätä välittäjän keskeyttämään tekijänoikeutta
loukkaavaksi väitetyn aineiston saattamisen yleisön saataviin. Määräyksen kohdetta ja yllä-
pitäjää on pääsääntöisesti kuultava. Hakijan on nostettava loukkaajaa vastaan TekL 60 b
§:n mukainen kieltokanne. Mikäli kanne ei menesty, hakija on velvollinen korvaamaan välit-
täjän kuluja. Määräyksen on oltava kaikille osapuolille kohtuullinen eikä se saa vaarantaa
kolmannen oikeutta lähettää ja vastaanottaa viestejä. Määräys voidaan antaa kanteen kä-
sittelyn yhteydessä tai sitä voidaan hakea etukäteen. Etukäteen haettuna kanne on nostet-
tava kuukauden kuluessa keskeyttämismääräyksen antamisesta tai se raukeaa. Kuluja voi
myös hakea korvattavaksi pääasian yhteydessä. Keskeyttämismääräykset voivat kohdis-
tua ja ovatkin kohdistuneet myös teknisiin välittäjiin.89 EUT:n Scarlet-ratkaisusta ilmenee,
että automaattiset estojärjestelmät eivät välttämättä ole EU-oikeuden mukaisia. EUT:ssa
vireillä olevassa UPC Telekabel Wien -ennakkoratkaisupyynnössä on kyse yksittäisen es-
tomääräyksen edellytyksistä.90 En voi tässä artikkelissa tarkemmin syventyä näiden herät-
tämiin kysymyksiin.91
Tekijänoikeustoimikunta on mietinnössään ehdottanut TekL 56 g §:n soveltamisalaa laa-
jennettavaksi siten, että sen perusteella välittäjiinkin olisi mahdollista kohdistaa lopullisia kiel-
85 KKO:2010:47, 29–32 kohta; HE 194/2001 vp, s. 40–41; OKM 2012a, s. 41–42; Innanen – Saarimäki 2012,
s. 259–262; Pihlajarinne 2012a, s. 104–105; Pihlajarinne 2012b, s. 67–100; Edwards 2011, s. 55–61; Van
Eecke 2011, s. 1465–1487.
86 HelKO 11.6.2012 (H 11/51554), s. 14; Järvinen 2009.
87 LaVL 5/2005 vp, s. 9.
8 8 Laajemmin ja kriittisesti ks. Savola 2013b, s. 36–40, 45–47.
89 Ks. alaviite 1.
9 0 EUT 24.11.2011, Scarlet (C-70/10); EUT (vireillä), UPC Telekabel Wien (C-314/12).
91 Laajemmin ks. Savola 2013a; Savola 2013b, s. 67–73.
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tomääräyksiä.92 Keskeisimpiä vaikutuksia ehdotuksella olisi pääasiakannekytköksen pois-
tuminen, välittäjän ehdoton vastuu kaikista omista kuluista ja kolmannen viestintämahdol-
lisuuksien vaarantaminen -kriteerin poistuminen. Säännösehdotuksesta tehtiin yleisluon-
toinen, tosin ns. perusteluilla säätäen kysymyksiä käsiteltiin kohtalaisen kattavasti. Lausun-
noissa asian jatkovalmisteluun nostettiin lukuisia kysymyksiä muun muassa perusoikeuksis-
ta, teknisestä toimivuudesta, prosessuaalisista säännöksistä, prosessista ja eston täytäntöön-
panosta aiheutuvista kuluista ja niiden jakautumisesta. Erityisesti useissa lausunnoissa kat-
sottiin, että hakijan tulee olla vähintään yhteisvastuullinen täytäntöönpano- ja oikeudenkäyn-
tikuluista.93
Pelkästään välittäjiin kohdistuvissa The Pirate Bay -estoissa väitettyjen oikeudenkäynti-
kuluvaatimusten perusteella voidaan arvioida, että kunkin operaattorin osalta oikeudenhalti-
joille syntyy kaikissa muutoksenhakuasteissa oikeusprosessista yhteensä suuruusluokaltaan
100 000 euron oikeudenkäyntikulut.94 Kun Euroopan tasolla kyse on ollut 50–100 välittäjäs-
tä, voidaan arvioida, että operaatioiden kustannukset ovat olleet ainakin viisi miljoonaa eu-
roa. On ilmiselvää, ettei kustannuksia tulla koskaan saamaan palvelun ylläpitäjiltä ja että ne
jäävät tekijänoikeusjärjestöjen ja viime kädessä tuottajayhtiöiden ja tekijöiden itsensä kan-
nettaviksi. Tämän kääntöpuoli on myös se, että operaattoreiden vastaavat kustannukset
ainakin Suomen lain mukaisesti jäävät rasittamaan operaattoreita. Estot tuskin täyttävät
tarkoitustaan, koska esimerkiksi Google-haulla “The Pirate Bay” toisena osumana esiintyy
välityspalvelimia luetteleva sivusto ja kolmantena UnblockedPiratebay.com-sivusto.95 Es-
tojen vähintäänkin toissijainen tarkoitus lienee ilmeisesti edellä kuvattu kamppailu tekijänoi-
keuden kentällä tai strateginen periaatteellinen päätös keinon käyttämisestä.
6.4. Korvausuhkainen alasotto ja estomääräys
Tallennuspalvelun tarjoajaa voidaan vaatia estämään tekijänoikeutta loukkaavan aineiston
saanti lähettämällä tälle määrämuotoisen ilmoituksen (ns. alasottomenettely) (SähköKL 20–
25 §).96 SähköKL 16 §:n mukaisesti tuomioistuin voi määrätä tallennuspalvelujen tarjoajan
sakon uhalla estämään tallentamansa tiedon saannin, jos tieto on ilmeisesti sellainen, että
sen sisällön pitäminen yleisön saatavilla tai sen välittäminen on säädetty rangaistavaksi tai
korvausvastuun perusteeksi. Määräys raukeaa pääsääntöisesti kolmen kuukauden kuluttua,
mikäli perusterikoksesta ei nosteta syytettä tai vahingonkorvauskannetta tämän kuluessa.
Estotuomio tulee voimaan heti ja pysyy voimassa mahdollisen kumoamishakemuksen tai
valituksen ollessa vireillä. Lähtökohtaisesti palvelun ja sisällön tuottajaa on kuultava ennen
määräyksen antamista, ellei asian kiireellisyys välttämättä muuta vaadi. Estomääräyksen
voi periaatteessa kohdistaa vain tallennusvälittäjään, vaikka oikeuskäytännössä, asiaa pe-
rustelematta, se on myös kohdistettu nimipalveluntarjoajaan.97 Tältä osin menettely lienee
92 OKM 2012a, s. 53–69, vrt. eriävä mielipide s. 119–127. Ks. kommentaari Pihlajarinne 2012b, s. 130–148.
9 3 OKM 2012b, s. 5–15. Ehdotuksen tulevaisuudesta ks. alaviite 2.
94 HelKO 26.10.2011 (H 11/20937), s. 2; HelHO 15.6.2012 (S 11/3097), s. 1, 5.
9 5 Kokeiltu 29.1.2013.
96 Ks. lähemmin esim. Hyyrynen 2009.
97 Ns. pelastakaa pedofiilit -tapaus. Ks. HelHO 29.5.2008 (R 07/3400); Poropudas 2008.
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perustunut tekniikan väärinymmärrykseen.
6.5. Verkkoviestin jakelun keskeyttämismääräys
SananvapL 18 §:n mukaan tuomioistuin voi määrätä lähettimen, palvelimen tai muun sellai-
sen laitteen ylläpitäjän keskeyttämään julkaistun verkkoviestin jakelun, jos viestin sisällön
perusteella on ilmeistä, että sen pitäminen yleisön saatavilla on säädetty rangaistavaksi.
Sovellettavuutta rajaa muun muassa se, mikä katsotaan verkkoviestiksi ja se, mikä on pal-
velin tai muu sellainen laite. Verkkoviesti edellyttänee jonkinasteista yksilöintiä.98 Laite ra-
jautunee siihen palvelimeen, jolle viesti on tallennettu ja josta se saatetaan yleisön saataville,
eli käytännössä tallennuspalvelun tarjoajaan.99
Fin-tv.com -tapauksessa käräjäoikeus hylkäsi Internet-yhteystarjoajiin kohdistetun vaa-
timuksen ulkomailla sijaitsevan palvelun estämiseksi.100 Sivustolla väitettiin jaettavan mm.
suomalaisia elokuvia ilman tekijänoikeuksien haltijoiden lupaa. Käräjäoikeus katsoi muun
ohella, että 1) teknisillä välittäjillä ei ole vaikutusmahdollisuuksia kyseiseen ulkomailla sijait-
sevaan palveluun, 2) ne eivät ole lähettimen, palvelimen tai muun sellaisen laitteen ylläpitä-
jiä, 3) teknisiin välittäjiin kohdistuu vastuuvapaus, 4) teknisten välittäjien käytettävissä ole-
vat menetelmät estämiseksi ovat käytännössä tehottomia ja 5) vaatimuksessa ei ollut riittä-
västi yksilöity, minkä verkkoviestien jakelua pyydettiin keskeytettäväksi.101 Kolmas osape-
rustelu lienee kuitenkin hylättävä, koska kielto- ja keskeyttämismääräykset ovat nimenomai-
sesti teknisiinkin välittäjiin kohdistuvina sallittuja (SähköKL 19 §).102
6.6. Vapaaehtoiset estokeinot
Internet-yhteydentarjoajat voivat elinkeinovapauden nojalla tarjota palveluja myös sisällöl-
tään rajoitettuina.103 Laajemmin ilmaistuna yhteyden tarjoaminen perustuu yleensä sopimuk-
seen, ja ainakaan sopimusehtojen puitteissa Internet-yhteydentarjoajilla ei ole velvollisuutta
tarjota suodattamatonta Internet-yhteyttä ja niillä on myös oikeus keskeyttää pääsy esimer-
kiksi selvästi lainvastaisiin viesteihin.104 Erityislailla on kuitenkin luonteeltaan toteavasti to-
dettu, että Internet-yhteydentarjoajilla on oikeus estää pääsy lapsipornosivustoille (laki lap-
sipornografian levittämisen estotoimista, 1068/2006, 3 §). Poliisi ylläpitää salassa pidettä-
vää listaa sivustoista sekä tuottaa ilmoituksen, joka eston aktivoituessa näytetään (4–6 §).
Listalle on tarkoitettu lisättäväksi vain ulkomaisia sivustoja (1 §).105
98 Perustuslakivaliokunta katsoi soveltamisalan laajaksi, mutta korosti viestin selvää rikollista luonnetta ja tuo-
mioistuimen suhteellisuusharkintaa (PeVM 14/2002 vp, s. 7).
99 Innanen – Saarimäki 2012, s. 334–337, 339–340; Pihlajarinne 2012b, s. 127–128.
100 HelKO 29.4.2011 (R 11/3075); Pihlajarinne 2012b, s. 127–128.
101 HelKO 29.4.2011 (R 11/3075), s. 2, 4.
102 Vastaavasti Pihlajarinne 2012b, s. 127–129. Laajemmin ks. Savola 2013b, s. 74.
103 HE 99/2006, s. 12.
104 PeVM 14/2002 vp, s. 7; HE 99/2006, s. 12; Innanen – Saarimäki 2012, s. 337. Vrt. toisin tekijänoikeustoi-
mikunnan mietinnössä, jonka mukaan VML 68 § (puhelinverkon liittymäsopimuksen tekijän oikeus valita
sisältöpalvelujen tarjoaja) olisi esteenä palveluntarjoajan estoille (OKM 2012a, s. 60). Laajemmin ks. Savo-
la 2013b, s. 64–66. Ks. myös alaviite 31.
105 HE 99/2006 vp, s. 1. Säädös on monin tavoin ongelmallinen, ks. Savola 2013b, s. 66.
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6.7. Yhteenveto ja vertailua
Oikeudenhaltijat ovat oikeusteitse kohdistaneet vaatimuksia myös välittäjiin. Vaatimusten
kohteena on usein tallennuspalvelun tarjoaja, mutta muun muassa The Pirate Bay -tapauk-
sessa vaatimuksia on kohdistettu teknisiin välittäjiin käyttäjä- ja lähdepäässä. Käyttäjäpään
teknisiin välittäjiin kohdistuvat estomääräykset ovat tiettävästi voimassa Suomen lisäksi
kuudessa Euroopan maassa ja muutamissa muissa maissa. Joissakin maissa vaatimukset
on hylätty ja suuressa osassa Euroopan maita niitä ei ole edes esitetty.106 Samanaikaisesti
on ajettu lainsäädäntöuudistuksia linjan tiukentamiseksi ja joissakin maissa piratismin vas-
taista toimintaa varten on myös erityisyksiköitä (Italian poliisi ja Ranskan Hadopi-virasto).
Kaikissa välittäjään kohdistuvissa tai välittäjän tietoja hyödyntävissä keinoissa (varoitus-
kirjeet, asteittaisen puuttumisen keinot, käyttäjien tunnistamistietojen selvittäminen ja estot)
on oikeastaan keskeisintä kustannusten jakautuminen. Mikäli oikeudenhaltijat ovat joutuneet
korvaamaan välittäjille aiheutuvia kustannuksia, menetelmät ovat saattaneet jäädä hyvin
vähälle käytölle.107 On epäselvää, missä määrin Internet-yhteydentarjoajalla on velvollisuus
osallistua oikeudenhaltijoiden yksityisten intressien ajamiseen. Muun muassa Pihlajarinne
on korostanut toissijaisperiaatteen merkitystä ja esittänyt, että mitä enemmän välittäjä hyö-
tyy välillisesti loukkauksista, sitä vahvemmat perusteet valvontakustannuksiin osallistumis-
velvollisuudelle olisi.108 Välittäjille velvollisuuksien perustamiseen tulisi suhtautua varauksella
varsinkin, jos niistä hyödyt tulevat oikeudenhaltijoille ja he eivät ole korvausvelvollisia aiheu-
tuneista kustannuksista ja haitoista. TekL 60 a §:n esitöitä mukaillen korvausvelvollisuus olisi
omiaan suuntaamaan resursseja merkittäviin ja tarkoituksenmukaisiin tapauksiin. Korvaus-
velvollisuus voisi myös mahdollistaa tarkoituksenmukaisempien ja tehokkaampien estokei-
nojen käytön.
Käyttäjäpään välittäjiin kohdistuvat estot ovat tehottomia ja kalliita, mutta ne edistävät
oikeudenhaltijoiden valta-asemia, varsinkin jos keinojen tehottomuuden johdosta saadaan
hyväksytettyä tiukempaa lainsäädäntöä. Lähdevälittäjään kohdistuvat keinot ovat varsin
tehokkaita ja kustannuksiltaan kohtuullisia, mutta ne edellyttävät oikeudenhaltijoilta aktiivi-
sia toimenpiteitä ja uusia prosesseja sivustojen siirtymisten seuraamiseksi. Lähteen alasotto
on niin ikään varsin tehokasta ja siihen liittyvät ankarat rangaistukset ja suuret korvaukset
lisäävät pelotevaikutusta ja valtaa.
7. Lopuksi
Olen edellä käsitellyt eri keinoja ja strategioita ja arvioinut niitä myös kriittisesti. Yleisesti
ottaen on huomionarvoista eri tahojen (mm. käyttäjät, yritykset, välittäjät ja oikeudenhalti-
jat) intressien vastakkaisuus. Niin ikään huomionarvoista on oikeudenhaltijatahojen hyvin
vahva positio tekijänoikeuden, vallan ja politiikan kentillä. Kyseiset tahot ovat varsin pitkälle
106 Estot ovat voimassa Itävallassa, Belgiassa, Italiassa, Tanskassa, Alankomaissa ja Yhdistyneessä kuningaskunnassa.
Tällainen esto on torjuttu muun muassa Irlannissa, Norjassa, Saksassa ja Espanjassa (Savola 2013a, s. 145–
148).
107 Uuden-Seelannin kokemuksista varoituskirjeistä ks. alaviite 54.
108 Pihlajarinne 2012b, s. 156–159. Vrt. suurtehokäyttäjien kustannuksista välittäjälle ks. alaviite 31.
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onnistuneet vaikuttamaan lainsäädäntöön, ja ilmeisesti myös soveltamiseen ja täytäntöön-
panoon. Esimerkiksi kuluttajien tosiasialliset vaikutusmahdollisuudet lainsäädäntöprosessis-
sa ovat olleet niukat, ja lainkäytössäkin oikeudenhaltijoiden tiedollinen ylivoima aiheuttaa
epätasapainoa muihin tahoihin nähden.
Keinovalikoiman kokonaisuutta olisi syytä selkeyttää. Säännösten päällekkäisyys on joh-
tanut ja voi johtaa edelleen ”lainvalintatilanteisiin”, joissa hakijan omasta positiosta käsin
valitaan edullisin säännös. Lainvalmistelussa tulisi erityisesti pyrkiä konkreettiseen dialogiin
eri menetelmistä aiheutuvista kustannuksista ja niiden korvaamisesta, ja päättää näistä hy-
vissä ajoin jo ennen lausuntokierrosta. Esimerkiksi varoituskirjemenettelyä koskeneessa
hallituksen esityksessä mainittiin neuvotteluvelvollisuus kustannuksista ennen toimenpiteitä.
Mikään ei kuitenkaan takaisi sitä, että neuvotteluissa päädyttäisiin osapuolia tyydyttävään
ratkaisuun. Edellytysten olemassaolo pitäisikin ratkaista ennen lainvalmistelua tai sen aika-
na. Näin voitaisiin välttää ulkomailla havaittu ilmiö käyttämättä jäävistä laeista.
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Tekijänoikeuslain (TekL, 404/1961) vuonna 2006 voimaan tulleen muu-
toksen jälkeen internet-yhteyspalveluja tarjoaviin välittäjiin (internet-ope-
raattori) on voitu kohdistaa velvoitteita, joilla edistetään tekijänoikeuden 
noudattamista ja täytäntöönpanoa2.3 Näitä velvoitteita ovat tuomioistuimen 
oikeudenhaltijan hakemuksesta määräämä tunnistamistietojen luovuttaminen 
(TekL 60 a §) ja verkkosivuston estäminen (TekL 60 c §), mutta muitakin 
on valmisteilla.4 Keinoja perustellaan sillä, että internet-operaattoreilla on 
joissakin tilanteissa parhaat edellytykset lopettaa kolmansien osapuolten 
suorittama tekijänoikeuden loukkaus.5 Koska internet-operaattorit eivät ole 
vastuussa käyttäjien siirtämästä aineistosta tietoyhteiskunnan palvelujen 
tarjoamisesta annetun lain (SähköKL6, 458/2002) 13 §:n nojalla, operaattorit 
ovat vastustaneet tehottomina pitämiään keinoja ja vaatineet oikeudenhal-
tijoita korvaamaan niistä aiheutuvat kulut. Vastaavasti oikeudenhaltijat 
haluavat ottaa käyttöön ja laajentaa keinoja ilman, että he joutuisivat 
korvaamaan niistä aiheutuneita kustannuksia. Tästä intressiristiriidasta 
aiheutuu valtakamppailua lainvalmistelussa ja -soveltamisessa.
1 Artikkelin tausta on aiemmin esittämissäni hahmotelmissa (Savola 2013a; Savola 
2013b). Näiden jatkokehittely sai alkunsa Risto Kankaan johtamassa oikeussosiologian 
jatko-opintoseminaarissa talvella 2013. Kiitän anonyymejä arvioijia, Tapani Lohea, Taina 
Pihlajarinnettä, Riku Neuvosta, Timo Harrikaria ja Sabine Frerichsiä keskusteluista ja 
palautteesta.
2 Termille ”enforcement” ei ole hyvää suomenkielistä vastinetta. Sellaiseksi näyttää vakiin-
tuneen termi täytäntöönpano. Tämä poikkeaa käsitteen perinteisestä asiayhteydestä, jossa 
kyse on mm. tuomioistuimen päätöksen toteuttamisesta esimerkiksi ulosottoviranomaisen 
toimesta.
3 Muutoksella implementoitiin ns. tietoyhteiskuntadirektiivi (2001/29/EY).
4 Ks. laajemmin OKM 2013:13. Näistä lisää jäljempänä.
5 Tietoyhteiskuntadirektiivin 59 johdantolause.
6 Säädöksellä implementoitiin ns. sähkökauppadirektiivi (2000/31/EY).
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Tekijänoikeutta koskevista tuomioistuinasioista valtaosa on ollut mai-
nittuja hakemusasioita, ja säännöksiä onkin sovellettu kohtalaisen usein.7 
Oikeudenhaltijat ovat hakeneet tuomioistuimelta esimerkiksi määräykset, 
joilla kolme suurinta operaattoria on määrätty estämään pääsy The Pirate 
Bay -sivustolle. Aiemmin myös muutaman kotitalouden internet-yhteys 
on katkaistu.8 Tunnistamistietojen luovuttamisella ja sitä seuraavilla vaa-
timuksilla on pyritty kuluttajien vertaisverkkojakamisen lopettamiseen.9 
Hakemuksia on tehty vuosittain noin sata.10
Tarkastelen artikkelissani lainvalmistelussa tapahtuvaa valtakamppailua, 
kun internet-operaattoreita käytetään tekijänoikeuden täytäntöönpanon vä-
lineinä. Näkökulma on oikeuspoliittinen ja -sosiologinen. Tätä näkökulmaa 
vasten lainvalmistelulla on soveltamistilanteita huomattavasti laajempi 
vaikutus oikeuden sisältöön. Tämä on myös hedelmällisempi maaperä 
tutkimuskohteen tarkastelulle. Keskityn intressiryhmiin, mutta käsittelen 
suppeammin myös lainvalmistelijoiden asennoitumista tekijänoikeuden 
kehittämiseen ja eri intressiryhmien kantojen yhteensovittamista. Mene-
telminä hyödynnän erityisesti kriittistä lainsäädäntöteoriaa ja Bourdieun 
viitekehystä.11 Lähestymistapa on kirjallisuuteen nojautuen teoreettinen ja 
valmisteluaineiston osalta myös empiirinen.12
Yleisesti ottaen tekijänoikeuden alalla oikeudenhaltijat ovat olleet pit-
kään aktiivisia. Oikeudet ovat hyvin laajoja ja tekijänoikeuden rajoitukset 
(poikkeukset oikeuksista) ovat verrattain suppeita. Erityissääntelyä on myös 
syntynyt runsaasti, esimerkiksi muilta oikeudenaloilta puuttuvat siviilioi-
keudelliset täytäntöönpanokeinot. Intressien voimakkuus ja vastapuolten 
hajanaisuus ovatkin johtaneet kokonaistarkastelussa oikeudenhaltijoille 
hyvin myönteiseen lainsäädäntöön. Tähän liittyvää ekspansiota ja valta-
taisteluja on kuvattu jo aiemminkin.13 Yleistä tekijänoikeuden valtakamp-
7 Ks. HE 124/2012 vp s. 29, jossa kaikkien immateriaalioikeudellisten riita- ja hakemus-
asioiden vuosittaiseksi määräksi arvioitiin noin 100, eli suurin piirtein sama määrä kuin 
pelkästään tunnistamistietojen luovuttamismääräyksiä.
8 OKM 2013:13 s. 40; Savola, OTJP 2013 s. 154–156.
9 OKM 2013:13 s. 42.
10 OKM 2013:13 s. 38. Markkinaoikeuteen tuli vajaan yhdeksän kuukauden aikana 
1.9.2013–21.5.2014 vireille 66 hakemusta (22 vuonna 2013, 44 vuonna 2014), joista yksi 
peruutettiin ja muut hyväksyttiin (Reima Jussila/MAO 21.5.2014). Marraskuussa 2012 
annettiin ensimmäinen ja tiettävästi ainoa hylkäävä päätös, ks. Savola, LM 2013 s. 895 
av. 51; Helsingin käräjäoikeus 28.11.2012 (H 12/57279).
11 Aiemmin laajemmasta näkökulmasta ks. Savola 2013b.
12 Empiirisellä tarkoitetaan tässä laajan käytännön aineiston läpikäyntiä ja sen analysointia. 
Aineistosta ks. luku 4.1.1 ja sen alaviitteet 73–79.
13 Ks. esim. Mylly 2013; Levin 2012 erit. s. 136–137; Patry 2011; Mylly, LM 2004 erit. s. 
246–250; Litman 2001. Ks. myös teoksen Mylly ym. (toim.) 2007 kirjoitukset, erit. s. 111 
ss.; Välimäki, LM 2004; Koulu 2004.
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pailua ei voida asian laajuuteen nähden käsitellä enemmälti. Artikkelissa 
tarkastellaankin vain viime aikoina esillä ollutta internet-operaattoreiden 
täytäntöönpanoroolin kasvattamiseen liittyvää vaikuttamista.
Tarkastelun kohteena on kansallista eduskuntakäsittelyä edeltävä lain-
valmistelu. Hallituksen esityksen antamisen jälkeisellä valiokuntavaiheella 
on keskimäärin vain vähäinen merkitys lain sisältöön, joten se on rajattu 
pois tutkimuksesta.14
Kansalliset säännökset perustuvat EU-oikeuteen ja kansainvälisiin so-
pimuksiin. Tältä osin olennaiset ratkaisut on jätetty kuitenkin kokonaan 
kansalliselle lainsäätäjälle.15 Yleisluontoisuudesta johtuen kansallisille 
täytäntöönpanosäännöksille asetettavia reunaehtoja, arviointikriteerejä ja 
rajoituksia voidaan (yrittää) hakea EU-tuomioistuimen oikeuskäytännöstä.16 
Toisaalta minimitasoa ei ole asetettu, eikä jäsenvaltion tarjoamien täytäntöön-
panokeinojen riittävyys ole ollut EU-tuomioistuimen käsiteltävänä. Koska 
oikeuskäytäntö ei aseta tiukkoja edellytyksiä tai huomattavia rajoituksia 
kansalliselle sääntelylle, marginaali on toistaiseksi varsin suuri. Näin ollen 
tässä artikkelissa on riittävää keskittyä kansallisiin lainsäädäntöratkaisuihin.
EU-lainsäädännön uudistamissykli on hyvin pitkä. Etujärjestöt voivat 
pyrkiä EU-päätöksenteossa vaikuttamaan Suomen neuvottelukantoihin, 
eurooppalaisten kattojärjestöjen kautta, itsenäisesti lobbaamalla tai avoi-
missa kuulemistilaisuuksissa. Tehokkainta vaikuttaminen on silloin, kun 
keinoja käytetään rinnakkain.17 Niin ikään viemällä valittuja oikeusta-
pauksia määrätietoisesti EU-tuomioistuimeen voitaisiin saavuttaa vastaavia 
tuloksia, ja se onkin intressiryhmille lainvalmisteluun vaikuttamisen ohella 
toinen strateginen keino.18 Näillä tavoilla EU-tasolla vaikuttaminen vaatii 
merkittävästi aikaa ja resursseja.19  Tässä artikkelissa aikaperspektiivi on 
lyhyempi ja tarkastelu kohdistuu vain kansalliseen vaikuttamiseen.
Tutkimuskysymys on: millaisessa lainvalmistelun valtakamppailussa 
internet-operaattoreihin kohdistuvat tekijänoikeudelliset täytäntöönpanovel-
voitteet muotoutuvat? Kyse on erityisesti intressiryhmien koostumuksen, 
dynamiikan ja tavoitteiden sekä lainvalmistelijan toimintatapojen vaikutuk-
14 Tästä vielä lyhyesti luvussa 4.1.1.
15 Ks. jäljempänä esitettävä tietoyhteiskuntadirektiivin 8(3) artikla ja 59 johdantolause.
16 Ks. erityisesti Promusicae (C-275/06); LSG v Tele2 (C-557/07); L’Oréal v Ebay (C-324/09); 
Scarlet Extended (C-70/10); UPC Telekabel Wien (C-314/12). Yhteenvetona ks. esim. Savola 
2014; Husovec 2013; Kohl 2012; Van Eecke 2011.
17 Hyvärinen 2008 s. 367–371.
18 Ks. esim. Bouwen – McCown 2007.
19 EU-lainvalmisteluun vaikuttamisesta enforcement-direktiivin yhteydessä ks. esim. 
Haunss – Kohlmorgen 2009; Haunss – Kohlmorgen 2010 ja yleisemmin ks. esim. Farrand 
2014 erit. s. 117–128.
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sen tutkimisesta. Kysymykseen vastaaminen edellyttää tutkimuskohteena 
olevien velvoitteiden hahmottamista sekä lainvalmistelukäytännön ja -teo-
rian esittämistä. Täytäntöönpanoroolin muotoutumista esitellään lyhyesti 
luvussa 2, ja luvussa 3 esitetään teoreettinen viitekehys valtakamppailusta 
lainvalmistelussa ja Bourdieun valtateoreettisesta ns. lainsäädäntökentästä. 
Lisäksi on kartoitettava relevantit toimijat ja niiden positiot, valtasuhteiden 
väliset rakenteet, kamppailukentän suhde vallan kenttään sekä tarkastel-
tava toimijoiden uraa kentällä.20 Nämä käydään läpi luvun 4 analyysissä. 
Lopuksi luvussa 5 esitetään johtopäätökset.
2 OPERAATTORIN TÄYTÄNTÖÖNPANOROOLIN 
 MUOTOUTUMINEN
Säännökset tunnistamistietojen luovuttamisesta ja estomääräyksestä 
(TekL 60 a–d §) ovat saaneet alkunsa varsin poikkeuksellisella tavalla, 
vasta eduskuntavaiheessa. Niiden syntymekanismia on hyvä tarkastella 
lyhyesti esimerkkinä poikkeuksellisesta valmistelusta ja koska säännökset 
loivat pohjan velvoitteiden laajentamisesityksille. Tarkastelu taustoittaa 
myöhempää esitystä ja kytkee alkuperäiset keinot uudempiin ehdotuksiin. 
Koska tutkimusintressi ei ole lainopillinen, tässä ei keskitytä säännösten 
tarkempaan sisältöön vaan yleiskatsaukseen ja muotoutumisprosessiin.
Hallituksen esityksessä tietoyhteiskuntadirektiivin implementoimiseksi 
katsottiin tältä osin riittävän, että tekijänoikeuslakiin lisättäisiin viittaus-
säännös SähköKL:n säännöksiin.21 Direktiivin 8(3) artiklan vaatimus 
on suppea ja yleisluontoinen: ”Jäsenvaltioiden on varmistettava, että 
oikeudenhaltijoilla on mahdollisuus hakea kieltoa tai määräystä sellaisia 
välittäjiä vastaan, joiden palveluita kolmas osapuoli käyttää tekijänoi-
keuden tai lähioikeuden rikkomiseen”.22 Eduskunnan lakivaliokunnan 
asiantuntijakuulemisissa oikeudenhaltijat esittivät viittaussäännöksen 
korvaamista laajemmalla ja pysyvällä estomääräysmenettelyllä, koska 
ne epäilivät säännöksen soveltuvuutta internet-yhteyspalveluja tarjoaviin 
operaattoreihin.23 Tässä vaiheessa oli kyse vain estämisestä, eikä kukaan 
20 Bourdieu – Wacquant 1995 s. 132–133.
21 HE 28/2004 vp s. 44–46, 134.
22 Direktiivin 59 johdantolauseen mukaan tämän yksityiskohdat on jätettävä kansallisesti 
määriteltäviksi. Johdantolauseen ja ns. enforcement-direktiivin (2004/48/EY) 3 artiklasta 
ilmenevien periaatteiden keskinäinen punninta jättää myös laajan kansallisen marginaalin. 
Ks. esim. Norrgård 2005.
23 LaVL 5/2005 vp, lausunnot: GRAMEX, Teosto, Kopiosto, Tuotos, TTVK ja Kuvasto. 
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ollut ehdottanut erityistä säännöstä tunnistamistietojen luovuttamiseksi. 
Oikeusministeriö, Viestintävirasto ja operaattorit kritisoivat järjestöjen 
ehdotusta. Ehdotus ei olisi edellyttänyt ns. pääasiakannetta vaan turvaa-
mistoimiratkaisu olisi jäänyt pysyväksi. Lisäksi turvaamistoimi olisi myön-
netty ilmeisesti hyvin vähäisin edellytyksin, eikä ehdotettu säännös olisi 
myöskään turvannut riittävästi vastapuolen oikeuksia.24 Lainvalmistelun 
jatkuessa skenaario toteutuikin Helsingin käräjäoikeuden ja hovioikeuden 
hylätessä yksittäisen turvaamistoimihakemuksen.25
Noin vuosi viimeisten kuulemisten jälkeen huhtikuussa 2005 sivistys-
valiokunnassa esiteltiin ilmeisesti opetusministeriössä (vastuuministeriö), 
oikeusministeriössä ja liikenne- ja viestintäministeriössä virkatyönä ja 
sidosryhmiä kuulematta laaditut säännökset.26 Ne hyväksyttiin lakivalio-
kunnassa ja sivistysvaliokunnassa lähes sellaisenaan ilman sidosryhmien 
kuulemisia.27 Lainsäädäntövaihe huomioiden säännösten kirjoittaminen 
tyhjästä oli merkittävä asiallinen laajennus, lähes 400 sanaa. Tunnistamis-
tietojen luovuttamisesta oikeudenhaltijoiden on korvattava kaikki kulut, 
mutta estämisen kuluista operaattori vastaa pääsääntöisesti itse.28
Sittemmin on valmisteltu muitakin ehdotuksia operaattoreiden täytän-
töönpanoroolin kasvattamiseksi. Vuonna 2009 valmistuneessa virkamies-
työryhmän selvityksessä esitettiin, että oikeudenhaltijat voisivat lähettää 
internet-operaattoreiden kautta liittymänhaltijoille huomautuskirjeitä, 
mikäli oikeudenhaltijat valvontaoperaatioissaan huomaisivat liittymää 
käytettävän tekijänoikeuden loukkaukseen.29 Lausuntokierroksen jälkeen 
tämä johti hallituksen esitykseen, joka kuitenkin raukesi eduskuntakauden 
vaihtuessa.30 Hanketta kritisoitiin monella tavoin,31 mutta tässä valtakamp-
Muissa lausunnoissa tätä ei käsitelty. Eri toimijatahoja esitellään laajasti jäljempänä luvussa 
4.
24 LaVL 5/2005 vp, oikeusministeriön lausunto 4.5.2004; Viestintäviraston lausunto 
13.5.2004; Elisa Oyj:n lausunto 14.5.2004 ja TeliaSonera Finland Oyj:n lausunto 28.5.2004. 
25 LaVL 5/2005 vp s. 8; Siiki 2009 s. 176; Helsingin käräjäoikeus 21.12.2004 (04/22468).
26 SiVM 6/2005 vp, Ficom ry:n lausunto 2.5.2005.
27 SiVM 6/2005 vp, TTVK:n lausunto 1.4.2005 s. 7, koontitaulukko: asiantuntijalausun-
noissa tehtyjä muutosehdotuksia (versio 2, 8.5.2005) s. 98–106, opetusministeriö: pykälien 
muotoiluehdotukset 31.5.2005 s. 21. Ficom ry:n ilmeisesti oma-aloitteisesti lähettämässä, 
2.5.2005 päivätyssä lausunnossa esitettyjä huomioita ei juurikaan noteerattu. Tietosuoja-
valtuutettu katsoi pyydetyssä, 24.5.2005 päivätyssä lausunnossaan säännösten edellyttävän 
jatkovalmistelua tai jopa poistamista esityksestä. Opetusministeriö esitti, että säännökset 
tulisi muotoilla tältä osin lakivaliokunnan ehdottamalla tavalla.
28 LaVL 5/2005 vp s. 9–10.
29 OPM 2009:21. Oikeusministeriön edustaja katsoi lausumassaan ehdotuksen ennenai-
kaiseksi.
30 HE 235/2010 vp.
31 Ks. esim. Norrgård, JFT 2010.
Oikeustiede_2014.indb   211 1.7.2014   13:46:31
212
Pekka Savola
pailun kannalta keskeisintä oli erimielisyys kustannusten korvaamisesta. 
Hallituksen esityksen mukaan oikeudenhaltijoiden olisi pitänyt korvata 
kulut kokonaan, arviolta 60–250 euroa huomautuskirjeeltä. Oikeuden-
haltijat totesivat myöhemmin, etteivät ne tulisi näin korkeilla hinnoilla 
kirjeitä lähettämään.32 Heidän mielestä operaattorin tulisi vastata ainakin 
osittain kustannuksista, mitä on väläytetty myös uudessa vuoden 2013 
taustaselvityksessä.33
Vastaavasti oikeudenhaltijoiden vuonna 2004 tekemä esitys laajemmasta 
estomenettelystä konkretisoitui, kun tekijänoikeustoimikunnan vuoden 
2012 mietintö päätyi samansuuntaiseen malliin. Kritiikkiä aiheutti muun 
muassa kulukysymyksen jättäminen jatkovalmisteluun.34 Huomattavasti 
jatkokehitelty, mutta vastaavasti kritisoitu HE-luonnos lähetettiin lausun-
noille 13.12.2013. Siinä esitettiin uutena keinona myös hidastamismääräys. 
Esitystä käsitellään laajemmin jäljempänä.35
3 LAINVALMISTELU TEORIAN VALOSSA
3.1 Lainvalmistelu ja eri tahojen intressit
Perinteisesti lakien säätäminen on hahmotettu järkeen ja tutkimustietoon 
perustuvaksi rationaaliseksi päätöksenteoksi (rationaalisen valinnan teoria). 
Toisen teorian mukaan lainvalmisteluun vaikuttavat eri ryhmien intressit, 
valta-asetelmat ja institutionaaliset tekijät (yksityisten intressien tai julkisen 
valinnan teoriat).36 Kohtaamastaan kritiikistä huolimatta rationaalinen malli 
on hallinnut hahmotustapaa lainvalmistelun tutkimuksen ja valtionhallinnon 
säädöspolitiikan piirissä.37 Näitä teorioita on kehitelty eteenpäin institutio-
naalis-realistisessa lainlaadintakäsityksessä, jossa korostetaan lainlaadinnan 
instrumentalismia, polkuriippuvuutta, tiedon ja asiantuntemuksen merki-
32 OKM 2013:13 s. 63, 68, 110. Vastaavasti esimerkiksi Uudessa-Seelannissa kustannusten 
vuoksi elokuvatuottajat eivät ole lähettäneet ainuttakaan ilmoitusta ja musiikkituottajien 
ilmoitukset ovat jääneet vähäisiksi (Giblin 2014 s. 160, 162).
33 OKM 2013:13 s. 68, 110.
34 OKM 2012:2 s. 65; OKM lausuntotiivistelmä 22.5.2012 s. 1, 5–15. Vastaavalla tavalla 
myöhemmässä esityksessä kuluvastuun jakautuminen jätettiin tuomioistuimen harkittavaksi 
– ilman arviointikriteerejä (OKM 2013:13 s. 81).
35 OKM 2013:13; Hankerekisteri OKM056:00/2013. HE-luonnoksen lausunnoista ks. luku 
4.2.3.
36 Pakarinen 2012 s. 49, 74, 84–85. Vastaavasti Rantala 2011 s. 13–19.
37 Pakarinen 2011 s. 6; Tala ym. 2011 s. 11–12.
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tystä, epävarmuutta ja erimielisyyksien ratkaisemista.38 Normatiivisessa 
sääntelyteoriassa tarkastellaan parhaan ohjauskeinon löytämistä tietyn 
yhteiskuntapoliittisen tavoitteen saavuttamiseksi, kun taas positiivisessa 
sääntelyteoriassa tutkitaan niitä tekijöitä, jotka tosiasiallisesti vaikuttavat 
lainsäätäjän valintoihin. Yleisen edun asemasta eturyhmien, poliitikoiden 
ja virkamiesten intressit voivat olennaisesti vaikuttaa lainsäädännön sisäl-
töön.39 Erilaisia ja keskenään ristiriitaisiakin malleja on siis useita.
Ranskalainen Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) tarkasteli muiden tutkimus-
kohteidensa ohella ”byrokratian kenttää” eli valtion ja sen toimielinten 
toimintaa.40 Viranomaista ei tulisi nähdä neutraalina, yleisen edun tunte-
vana ja sitä tavoittelevana tahona tai rationaalisena työkaluna yleisen edun 
toteuttamisessa.41 Valtion monopoli fyysiseen ja symboliseen väkivaltaan 
johtaa väistämättä kamppailuun monopolin herruudesta ja siihen liittyvistä 
eduista.42 Alistetut hyväksyvät tiedostamatta (ns. doksa) valtiossa valtaa 
pitävien ja valtakoneiston hyväksikäytön avulla toteutetun symbolisen 
väkivallan.43 Yleisen edun vartijoilta edellytetään neutraaliutta ja yhteiskun-
nallisen perspektiivin säilyttämistä, mutta sosiologisessa tarkastelussa tämä 
ideaali on hurskastelua ja ristiriidassa todellisuuden kanssa.44 Bourdieun 
valtateoria vastaa näin ollen lainsäädäntöteorioista yksityisten intressien 
teoriaa ja positiivista sääntelyteoriaa.45
Lainsäädäntöteoriassa valtasuhteista johtuvaksi rakenteelliseksi lain-
valmisteluun osallistumisen esteeksi on hahmotettu se, että ”jokin ryhmä 
kykenee käyttämään lakiuudistuksessa omaa lainsäädäntövaltaansa muita 
ryhmiä voimakkaammin”.46 Oikeuspoliittiset kysymykset lakien neutra-
liteetista, syntymekanismista ja taustavoimista jäävät usein vähemmälle 
huomiolle.47 Havaitusti nämä ilmenevät hiukan eri tavalla muotoiltuina 
sekä lainsäädäntöteoriassa että Bourdieun analyysissä. Tämä ideaalisten 
käsitysten kyseenalaistaminen on myös tämän tutkimuksen lähtökohta. 
38 Tala ym. 2011 s. 12–13.
39 Pakarinen 2012 s. 49; Mähönen – Määttä 2002 s. 187, 189. Vastaavasti ks. Koulu 2004 
s. 1–5.
40 Bourdieu 1994.
41 Bourdieu 1994 s. 2. Vastaavasti säädettyjen lakien uskotaan usein olevan neutraaleja 
välineitä, joiden avulla valtiot voivat ohjata ja valvoa kansalaisten käyttäytymistä sekä 
yhteiskunnallista kehitystä (Houtsonen 2002 s. 156).
42 Bourdieu 1994 s. 16.
43 Bourdieu 1994 s. 15.
44 Bourdieu 1994 s. 17–18.
45 Rationaalisen valinnan teoria onkin nimenomaisesti todettu Bourdieun hahmotustavalle 
vastakkaiseksi (Bourdieu – Wacquant 1995 s. 153–154).
46 Pakarinen 2011 s. 74.
47 Houtsonen 2002 s. 157–158.
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Tarkastelu kohdistuu sekä intressiryhmiin että siihen, onko lainvalmistelijan 
toiminnassa havaittavissa piirteitä, jotka olisivat omiaan vahvistamaan tai 
neutraloimaan eturyhmien vaikutusmahdollisuuksia.
Etujärjestöjen intressinä on laaja valmistelu, väljät toimeksiannot, 
itsenäiset työryhmät ja lainvalmistelijan rooli mekaanisena lakitekstien 
kirjoittajana.48 Sen sijaan jos lainvalmistelu olisi rationaalista toimintaa, 
eturyhmien tehtävänä olisi lähinnä lainvalmistelijan roolia korostava 
lainvalmistelun tietopohjan laajentaminen.49 Eturyhmät voivat vaikuttaa 
tarjoamalla lainsäätäjälle vaihtohyödykkeenä tietoa.50 Epätasapainoa 
syntyy, kun eri osapuolilla ei ole yhtäläisiä resursseja tiedon tuottamiseen, 
sillä tietoja ei ole luonnollisesti valittu ja esitetty puolueettomasti.51 Tämä 
korostaa eri intressiryhmien keskenään erilaisia vaikutusmahdollisuuksia. 
Yksinkertaistaen heikkoon tai ylityöllistettyyn lainvalmistelijaan vaikute-
taan tekemällä itse lakiehdotukset, vahvaan ”voittamalla” muut osallistujat 
tuottamalla omaa kantaa tukevia tietoja ja tutkimustuloksia.
OECD:n arvioinnin mukaan Suomessa yleinen lainvalmistelun kuule-
mistapa suosii vain järjestäytyneitä ryhmiä, ja se syrjäyttää liian helposti 
vähemmän vaikutusvaltaiset sidosryhmät ja erityisesti ne kansalaiset, joiden 
etua mikään sidosryhmä ei aja.52 Sidosryhmien mahdollisuus osallistua 
näennäisesti lainvalmisteluun ja esittää lausuntoja onkin eri asia kuin tosi-
asiallinen vaikuttaminen. Kyse on oikeastaan siitä, miten lainvalmistelijat 
suhtautuvat sidosryhmien kantoihin ja eri- ja samanmielisyyden hallin-
nointiin ja miten yleistä etua tai lainvalmistelijan neutraliteettia voidaan 
arvioida.53 Ratkaisuja perustellaan usein esimerkiksi enemmistön tai valta-
osan tukemalla kannalla, mutta tämä voi johtaa strategiseen keinotteluun. 
Tällöin keskeiseksi kriteeriksi tulisi edustajatahojen määrä eikä esitettyjen 
argumenttien laatu tai edustamattomien tahojen intressit.54 Ongelmallista 
on, jos lainvalmistelija tekee ratkaisunsa lausuntojen määrän perusteella 
tai vetäytyy lausuntojen määrään viittaavan fasadiperustelun taakse.
48 Tala ym. 2011 s. 7. Vastaavasti oikeudenhaltijat olivat vahvoja taustavaikuttajia direk-
tiiveissä ja ACTA-sopimuksessa, ks. Farrand 2014 s. 118, 128–129, 183 viitteineen
49 Pakarinen 2012 s. 85–86; Pakarinen 2011 s. 7, 43.
50 Bouwen – McCown 2007 s. 425; Bouwen 2002.
51 Tiedon epäneutraaliudesta ja strategisista hyödyntämiskeinoista ks. Tala ym. 2011 s. 12. 
Vastaavasti epätasapainosta ja asiantuntijuudesta ks. Farrand 2014 s. 17 ja alaviite 126.
52 OECD 2010 s. 71–72; Ahtonen – Keinänen 2012 s. 5.
53 Rantala 2011 s. 100–117, 194 ss; Pakarinen 2011 s. 24, 41. Erimielisyyksien hallin-
noinnista ks. esim. Tala ym. 2011 s. 12–13; Ahtonen – Keinänen 2012 s. 11.
54 Rantala 2011 s. 159–160, 193. Vastaavasti keskenään ristiriitaisten sidosryhmien mie-
lipiteiden keskinäisen painoarvon määrittämisestä, ks. Ahtonen – Keinänen 2012 s. 2.
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3.2 Lainsäädäntökenttä Bourdieun valtateoriassa
Bourdieu keskittyi oikeuden kenttää analysoidessaan lainsoveltajien ja oi-
keustieteilijöiden välisiin kamppailuihin esitellen muun muassa käytännön 
ja teoreettisen lähestymistavan vastakkainasetteluita.55 Oikeuden kentällä 
käydään jatkuvaa valtakamppailua lain oikeasta tulkinnasta.56 Kentällä 
tarkoitetaan jonkin merkityksellisen asian (pääoman) ympärille rakentuvaa 
sosiaalisten suhteiden tilaa. Pääoma on sosiaaliseen peliin osallistumisen 
edellytys ja tavoittelun kohde. Kentällä käytävää peliä ohjaavat pelaajien 
sisäistämät säännönmukaisuudet eli tieto siitä, miten peliä pelataan, mutta 
toisaalta kentällä kamppaillaan myös sääntöjen sisällöstä ja kentän rajoista. 
Kamppailu kohdistuu myös siihen, millainen pääoma on kentällä hallit-
sevassa asemassa. Kyse on ennen kaikkea kulttuurillisten ja sosiaalisten 
voimien tarkastelusta. Oikeuden kentän juridinen pääoma onkin tiedollista 
ja taidollista, kulttuurista pääomaa.57 Kaikki kentät ovat alisteisia taloutta 
ja politiikkaa edustavalle vallan kentälle.58
Kentän peliin osallistuminen edellyttää osallistumishalua (intressi), 
pääoman hallintaa ja pelin tajua. Oikeuden kentän kamppailuihin voivat 
tosiasiassa osallistua vain juridista pääomaa omaavat, oikeustieteellisen 
koulutuksen saaneet henkilöt. Henkilöiden tapa ja näkökulma todellisuuden 
hahmottamiseen ilmenee ns. habituksessa, joka muodostuu opintojen ja 
ammatin harjoittamisen aikana. Oikeuden kentällä habitukseen on sisäis-
tetty muun muassa oikeudellisten ajattelun traditioiden ja ilmaisutapojen 
tuntemus, tietoisuus mahdollisista toimintatavoista ja ymmärrys oikeu-
dellisesta argumentaatiosta. Se myös osaltaan yhdistää ryhmää, ylläpitää 
identiteettiä ja tekee eron ryhmän ulkopuolisiin.59 Tällä tavoin niin ikään 
pyritään sulkemaan kentältä ulos muut toimijat.60
Lainvalmistelua ja lain säätämistä ei voida nähdäkseni tarkastella oi-
keuden kentän avulla, koska kyse ei ole oikeussääntöjen tulkinnasta vaan 
niiden luomisesta. Myös kentän osallistujat ovat osin eri tahoja: oikeuden 
kentällä tuomioistuimilla on keskeinen asema eikä poliitikoilla ole sinne 
asiaa. Lainvalmistelussa tuomioistuimilla on vähäisempi, yleensä pidätty-
väinen asiantuntijarooli. Poliitikoilla voi olla huomattava vaikutus lakeihin 
55 Ylhäinen 2010 s. 169–170; Bourdieu 1987 s. 821–824.
56 Ylhäinen 2010 s. 167; Bourdieu 1987 s. 817–818.
57 Ylhäinen 2010 s. 159–160; Bourdieu – Wacquant 1995 s. 125–128, 148–149.
58 Ylhäinen 2010 s. 161–162; Bourdieu 1987 s. 823–824.
59 Ylhäinen 2010 s. 162–163, 171–172; Bourdieu 1987 s. 818–819; Terdiman 1987 s. 
811–812.
60 Ylhäinen 2010 s. 167–168; Bourdieu 1987 s. 828–829, 832.
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ja he myös viime kädessä tekevät kaikki päätökset.61 Päätösten perusteet 
voivat olla myös poliittisia, eikä oikeus ohjaa lakien säätämistä samalla 
tavoin kuin se ohjaa lainoppia ja lainkäyttöä.
Edellä mainituista syistä on mielestäni syytä erottaa tämä ns. lainsää-
däntökenttä oikeuden kentästä. Myös virkamiesten toimintaa analysoivan 
byrokratian kentän näkökulma on liian suppea, koska tässä päähuomio koh-
distuu intressiryhmiin. Lainsäädäntökentän pääomaksi voidaan hahmottaa 
vaikutusvalta: se on tavoittelun kohde, mutta myös edellytys (tosiasialli-
selle) osallistumiselle. Jos tarkastellaan poliittisen ohjauksen ”alapuolis-
ta” tasoa, kentillä on myös samankaltaisia piirteitä.62 Lainvalmistelijat, 
lausuntojen laatijat ja työryhmiin osallistuvat ovat miltei poikkeuksetta 
oikeustieteellisen koulutuksen saaneita henkilöitä. Keskeisimmistä lainsää-
däntökentän toimijoista vain poliitikot ja heidän avustajansa eivät yleensä 
kuulu juristiprofessioon.63 Valmistelussa käytetään oikeudellista kieltä, 
käsitteitä, ilmaisutapoja ja mekanismeja. Tämä takaa juristeille etulyön-
tiaseman muihin osallistujiin nähden. Vastaavasti esitetään oikeudellista 
argumentaatiota vetoamalla esimerkiksi perusoikeuksiin, kansallisiin tai 
eurooppalaisiin säädöksiin, tuomioistuinratkaisuihin ja hallitusohjelmakir-
jauksiin. Tekijänoikeuslaki on myös hyvin monimutkainen ja valmisteluun 
osallistuu lähes yksinomaan lakimiehiä. Edellä Bourdieun kuvaamalla 
tavalla tällä käytännössä tehdään ero ulkopuolisiin ja suljetaan pois muut 
kuin tekijänoikeuteen vihkiytyneet juristit. Professioiden samankaltaisuus 
oikeuden tulkintakentällä ja valmistelussa lisää niin ikään kenttien keski-
näistä riippuvuutta.
Lainsäädäntökenttä lienee parhaiten kuvattavissa oikeuden kenttään 
vahvasti kytköksissä olevana politiikan osakenttänä.64 Lainvalmistelijoiden 
toimintaa voidaan mallintaa osin myös byrokratian kentän avulla. Oikeu-
den kentän tavoin – tai poliittisista vaikutteista johtuen jopa vahvemmin 
– lainsäädäntökenttä monilta osin vastaa (homologia) politiikan ja yleisen 
vallan kenttää.65
61 Vastaavasti ks. Tuori 2000 s. 150.
62 Vastaavasti ks. Tuori 2000 s. 149–151. Tuori tarkastelee erityisesti sitä, mikä erottaa 
poliittisen argumentaation oikeudellisesta.
63 Esimerkiksi oikeusministeriön lainvalmisteluosaston 40:stä lainvalmisteluun osallistu-
vasta henkilöstä 38 oli juristeja (Raili Paananen/OM 1.10.2013). Niin ikään viimeisimmän 
tekijänoikeustoimikunnan kokoonpanossa (21 henkilöä) vain kolmella ei ollut oikeustie-
teellistä tutkintoa. Vastaavasti OKM:n seitsemästä tekijänoikeuden alan henkilöstä, pois 
lukien sihteerit, vain projektitutkijalla oli muu kuin oikeustieteellinen koulutus. (Lakimies-
matrikkeli 2014.)
64 Tätä kuvastaa myös yleinen politiikan oikeudellistumiskehitys.
65 Ylhäinen 2010 s. 166; Bourdieu 1987 s. 850–851.
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4 OPERAATTOREIDEN VÄLINEELLISTÄMISEN 
 ANALYYSI
4.1 Toimielimet ja niiden rooli
4.1.1 Tekijänoikeuden valmistelu- tai tulkintaelimet
Lainsäädäntöön voi vaikuttaa ennen varsinaisen valmistelun aloittamista 
(esivalmistelu), hallituksen esityksen laatimisvaiheessa (perusvalmistelu, 
lausuntomenettely ja jatkovalmistelu) tai eduskuntavaiheessa. Yleisesti 
ottaen etujärjestöt ovat kokeneet eduskuntakuulemiset vaikuttamisen 
kannalta ajankohdaltaan liian myöhäisiksi, ja painopiste on aiemmassa 
edunvalvonnassa. Aika ennen työryhmän perustamista on katsottu kaikkein 
tärkeimmäksi valmisteluvaiheeksi. Sama pätee myös pysyviin komiteoihin, 
toimikuntiin ja neuvottelukuntiin. Järjestäytyneet ja institutionalisoituneet 
ryhmät, kuten oikeudenhaltijajärjestöt, hallitsevat ja ovat vahvassa ase-
massa tällaisessa epämuodollisessa ja useimmiten dokumentoimattomassa 
vuorovaikutuksessa.66
Yleisesti ottaen ainoastaan vastaavan ministeriön ja riippumattomien 
asiantuntijoiden kuulemisella on tilastollista merkitystä eduskunnan va-
liokunnan kannanmuodostukseen. Muilla ministeriöillä tai eturyhmillä ei 
keskimäärin ole vaikutusta.67 Tämä korostaa tarvetta vaikuttaa vastuumi-
nisteriön edustajiin. Tekijänoikeusasiat käsitellään sivistysvaliokunnassa, 
jossa oikeudenhaltijat ovat kuultavina tahoina vahvasti tai jopa lähes 
yksinomaan edustettuina.68 Valiokunnassa voidaan lähinnä tehdä pieniä 
muutoksia ja myöhemmin oikeuslähteenä hyödynnettäviä kirjauksia. 
Tilanteen muuttuminen tai valmistelussa avoimeksi jääneet kysymykset 
tosin korostavat valiokunnan roolia, kuten ilmeni vuoden 2004–2005 val-
mistelussa.69 Valiokuntavaiheen toissijaisen merkityksen ja tähän liittyvän 
aineiston vähyyden vuoksi artikkelissa on rajauduttu eduskuntakäsittelyä 
edeltäviin vaiheisiin.
Taulukoissa 1 ja 2 on esitetty eri tahojen osallistumista tekijänoikeuden 
valmistelu- tai tulkintaelimiin sekä niiden antamia lausuntoja nyt käsillä 
olevista aiheista. Taulukoissa on yhdistetty suuri määrä erilaisia tietoja. 
Tässä esitetään taulukon rakenne lyhyesti, ja sisältöön paneudutaan myö-
66 Pakarinen 2012 s. 75–76; Pakarinen 2011 s. 40; Tala ym. 2011 s. 2, 4, 7.
67 Ahtonen – Keinänen 2012 s. 21. Epäselvää on, onko näin myös tekijänoikeuden alalla.
68 Yleisesti ks. esim. Peltomäki 2013b.
69 Pakarinen 2011 s. 53–54. Oikeuslähteenä käyttämisestä ks. Ahtonen – Keinänen 2012 
s. 12.
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hemmissä alaluvuissa.70 Eräitä yleisiä havaintoja esitetään kuitenkin heti 
taulukoiden esittelyn jälkeen.
Tahot on jaettu ”ryhmiin” eli eräänlaiseen taustakontekstiin.71 Ryhmä-
jaon tarkoituksena on helpottaa hahmottamaan eri toimijaleirien sisäisiä 
ja ulkoisia samankaltaisuuksia ja eroja. Ryhmät voisi tietyiltä osin hah-
motella toisinkin.72 Lihavoinnilla on korostettu tahoja, jotka ovat muita 
aktiivisempia tai vaikutusvaltaisempia.
Seuraavassa kolmessa sarakkeessa on lueteltu tahon edustajien lukumää-
rä kussakin elimessä. ”Nvk” viittaa 40-henkiseen tekijänoikeusasioiden 
neuvottelukuntaan, ”Tmk” 21-henkiseen tekijänoikeustoimikuntaan ja 
”TN” 16-henkiseen tekijänoikeusneuvostoon varajäsenineen.73 Vastaavasti 
”SiVM” viittaa eduskunnan sivistysvaliokunnassa täytäntöönpanokeinoja 
käsiteltäessä kuultujen asiantuntijoiden lukumäärään.74 Taulukoihin on 
sisällytetty kaikki kolmessa ensimmäisessä elimessä edustetut tahot.75 
Terminologian yksinkertaistamiseksi jäljempänä ”työryhmä” kattaa myös 
komiteat eli tekijänoikeusasioiden neuvottelukunnan ja tekijänoikeustoi-
mikunnan.
Seuraavissa sarakkeissa on tarkasteltu tahojen suhtautumista lainsäädän-
töhankkeisiin. ”+” tarkoittaa myönteistä, ”–” kielteistä ja ”X” neutraalia 
suhtautumista. Lukutapa on subjektiivinen ja voimakkaasti yksinkertaistava, 
jopa polarisoiva; suluissa oleviin kantoihin sisältyy tavallista enemmän 
tulkintaa tai ehdollisuutta. Kantoja viimeisimpään estoesitykseen on havain-
nollistettu yksityiskohtaisemmin luvussa 4.2.3. Ehdotusta on lausunnoissa 
harvoin vastustettu täydellisesti. Kielteiseksi suhtautumiseksi on luokiteltu 
sellainen kritiikki, jossa hanketta pidetään tarpeettomana, jatkovalmistelun 
70 Taulukoiden on tarkoitus esittää tietoa tiivistetyssä ja systematisoidussa muodossa, ei 
niinkään toimia yhteenvetona tekstiesitykselle. Näin ollen olen katsonut parhaaksi esittää 
taulukon ensimmäisessä loogisessa asiayhteydessä. Tässä vaiheessa lukijan oletetaan 
tutustuvan taulukkoon vain pääpiirteittäin ja muodostavan yleiskäsityksen tahoista ja 
ryhmittymistä. Yksityiskohtia mm. valmisteluelimistä ja lausuntokannoista oletetaan 
tarkasteltavan vasta myöhemmin, kun tekstissä niitä käsitellään.
71 Taho on kirjattu tiettävästi tosiasiallisen edustuksen mukaan (tästä ks. alaviite 144).
72 ”Hyödyntäjällä” tarkoitetaan sekä käyttäjä- että oikeudenhaltijaroolin omaavaa tahoa, 
esimerkkinä mediatalo (Oesch 2009 s. 7 vrt. toisenlainen hahmottelu tekijänoikeustoimi-
kunnasta mts. 14). Tarvetta erotella näitä oikeudenhaltijoista ei ehkä tässä tutkimuksessa 
olisi. Oikeudenhaltijaksi luokittelu on tehty laajentavasti mukaan lukien muun ohella 
asianajotoimistot, jotka tyypillisesti edustavat oikeudenhaltijoita.
73 Hankerekisteri OKM044:00/2012 (Tekijänoikeusneuvosto), OPM012:00/2010 (Tekijän-
oikeustoimikunta 2010–2011), OKM037:00/2014 (Tekijänoikeusasioiden neuvottelukunta).
74 SiVM 6/2005 vp sisältäen liiteaineistot. Myös lakivaliokunnan aineisto on käyty läpi 
(LaVL 5/2005 vp).
75 Pois on jätetty sivistysvaliokunnan kuulemia tämän tarkastelun ulkopuolisiin asioihin 
osallistuneita tai yksittäisiä tahoja (yhteensä 23 kpl).
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tarvetta korostetaan tai esitystä vastustetaan tai keskeisiin ehdotuksiin 
kohdistetaan huomattavaa kritiikkiä. Myönteiseksi on luokiteltu myös 
laajennuksia esittävä lausunto. Neutraalia (X) on käytetty vain poikkeuk-
sellisesti, lähinnä kun taho ei ole halunnut lausua mitään. 
Taulukko 1. Toimijat eri elimissä ja lausunnonantajina.
Sarake ”kirje” viittaa vuonna 2009 valmistuneeseen ns. huomautuskirje-
menettelyä koskevaan esiselvitykseen ja siitä annettuihin lausuntoihin. 
Kannat on arvioitu lausuntotiivistelmän perusteella.76 ”Kirje/HE” viittaa 
samaa menettelyä koskevaan hallituksen esitysluonnokseen. Kannat on 
arvioitu pääosin hallituksen esityksen valmisteluvaiheita koskevan luvun 
perusteella, mutta myös esitysluonnoksesta annettujen lausuntojen perus-
teella.77 ”Estot” viittaa tekijänoikeustoimikunnan vuonna 2012 valmistu-
neen mietinnön estomenettelyn laajentamista koskevaan osaan. Kantoja 
76 OPM 2009:21; OPM lausuntotiivistelmä 27.11.2009; Hankerekisteri OPM016:00/2009.
77 HE 235/2010 vp; Hankerekisteri OKM001:00/2010.
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on arvioitu lausuntotiivistelmän ja lausuntojen perusteella.78 ”Estot/HE” 
viittaa 13.12.2013 lausuntokierrokselle lähetettyyn em. mietinnöstä jatko-
kehiteltyyn HE-luonnokseen ja sen taustaselvitykseen. Kantoja on arvioitu 
lausuntojen perusteella ja niitä eritellään tarkemmin luvussa 4.2.3.79 Taulu-
koista on jätetty pois lausuntotiivistelmässä mainitsemattomia, yksittäisiä 
tai irrelevantteja tahoja (17 kpl).
Taulukko 2. Hyödyntäjät ja oikeudenhaltijat elimissä ja lausunnonantajina.
 
78 OKM 2012:2; Hankerekisteri OPM012:00/2010; OKM lausuntotiivistelmä 22.5.2012, 
s 1, 5–15.
79 Hankerekisteri OKM056:00/2013; OKM 2013:13.
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Tässä vaiheessa voidaan esittää eräitä huomioita taulukoiden tietosisällöstä. 
Jäljempänä tullaan tarkastelemaan lähemmin eri tahojen edustusta ja sen 
jakautumista eri valmisteluelimissä. Niin ikään eri tahojen suhtautumista 
esillä olleisiin lainsäädäntöhankkeisiin tarkastellaan lähemmin. Taulukois-
ta voidaan havaita oikeudenhaltijoiden vahva edustus kaikissa elimissä. 
Edustus on joissain tapauksissa jopa vahvempi kuin muilla ryhmillä 
yhteensä. Keskeisiä, lähes kaikissa elimissä edustettuja tahoja on myös 
runsaasti. Vastaavasti oikeudenhaltijat ovat olleet aktiivisia eri hankkeista 
lausuessaan ja kannat ovat olleet pitkälti samansuuntaisia. Muut tahot ovat 
lausuneet hajanaisemmin. Seuraavaksi siirryn tarkastelemaan lähemmin 
mainittuja toimielimiä.
Tekijänoikeustoimikunnassa arvioidaan muun muassa tekijänoikeuslain-
säädännön uudistamistarpeita ja Suomen kantaa kansainvälisiin asioihin. 
Toimikunta nimettiin yleensä kahdeksi vuodeksi kerrallaan ja sillä oli 
yleisluontoisia, 15 vuoden ajan lähes sellaisenaan säilyneitä tehtäviä. 
Vuodesta 2012 lukien toimikuntaa ei ole asetettu. Viimeisin toimikunta 
(2010–2011) laati sittemmin jatkojalostetun mietinnön mm. estomenetel-
mien laajentamisesta. Mietintöön sisältyi operaattoreiden edustajan vahva 
eriävä mielipide. Toimikunnassa oli puheenjohtajan ja neljän ministeriön 
edustajan lisäksi 16 varsinaista jäsentä. Oikeudenhaltijoilla oli kahdeksan 
edustajaa ja hyödyntäjillä neljä. Operaattoreilla oli yksi edustaja ja ylei-
sellä elinkeinoelämällä kaksi. Kokoonpano oli hyvin vahvasti kallellaan 
oikeudenhaltijoiden suuntaan, ja mietintöä väritti vastakkainasettelu eikä 
yhteisymmärrystä löydetty. Lainvalmistelussa tärkeää olisi löytää hyväk-
syttävissä oleva ratkaisu. Tässä ei tällä erää onnistuttu. Lausuntojen kirjo 
myös viittaa siihen, että työ jäi kesken eikä toimikunta pystynyt löytämään 
täysin tasapainoista ratkaisua.80
Tekijänoikeusasioiden neuvottelukunta on 40 hengen laajapohjainen elin, 
jonka tarkoituksena on keskustella tekijänoikeusasioista. Neuvottelukunta 
asetettiin ensimmäisen kerran vuosiksi 2012–2013 ja tehtäväkuvauksen 
perusteella se on korvannut tekijänoikeustoimikunnan. Edustetut tahot olivat 
identtisiä sittemmin vuosille 2014–2015 asetetussa neuvottelukunnassa.81 
Asetuspäätöksessä nyt nimenomaisesti todetaan, että ”neuvottelukunta 
voi päättää, että tiettyjä kysymyksiä käsitellään valmistelevasti neuvotte-
lukunnan jäsenistä ja muista asiantuntijoista koostuvassa pienryhmässä”, 
80 Jos muuta ei ole todettu, jäljempänä lukujen 4.1–4.2 analyysissä on käytetty edellä 
mainittujen taulukoiden lähdeaineistoja.
81 Neuvottelukunta asetettiin olennaisesti samanlaisena, koska ”jäsenistöltä on tullut 
siitä positiivista palautetta” (Anna Vuopala/OKM, 19.2.2014). Jäljempänä kuvatusti olen-
naisempaa olisivat kuitenkin aliedustettujen ja edustamattomien tahojen, eivät jäsenten 
näkemykset.
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”neuvottelukunnan työn tueksi voidaan teettää selvityksiä” ja että ”neu-
vottelukunta voi lisäksi tehdä ministeriölle esityksiä selvityksistä, tutki-
muksista ja kehittämishankkeista”. Pienryhmien hyödyntäminen olisikin 
välttämätöntä, sillä kokoonpanon laajuudesta, neuvottelukunnan asialistoista 
ja aineistoista voi päätellä, että se on ainakin toistaiseksi toiminut lähinnä 
opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriön (OKM) tiedotuskanavana.82 Toimikuntaa 
vastaavalla tavalla oikeudenhaltijoilla on 16 edustajaa, hyödyntäjillä viisi, 
operaattoreilla yksi ja elinkeinoelämällä kolme. Käyttäjillä on toimikuntaan 
verrattuna hiukan laajempi, vaikkakin intresseiltään hajanainen edustus.
OKM järjestää lisäksi vuosittain avoimen tekijänoikeusfoorumin laajem-
paa tekijänoikeuspoliittista keskustelua ja yhteydenpitoa varten. Käsiteltäviä 
asioita ovat hallitusohjelmaan kirjatut lainmuutosesitykset ja muut minis-
teriössä vireillä olleet asiat.83 Neuvottelukunnan tavoin foorumissa on kyse 
lähinnä tiedottamisesta ja yleisen tason vuoropuhelusta, jolla ei ole muuta 
tai kovin merkittävää konkreettista vaikutusta lakivalmistelun sisältöön.
Tekijänoikeusneuvosto (TekL 55 §) avustaa OKM:ää tekijänoikeutta 
koskevien asioiden käsittelyssä ja antaa lausuntoja tekijänoikeuslain sovel-
tamisesta. Se tarjoaa tuomioistuimiin nähden vaihtoehtoisen tavan ratkoa 
tekijänoikeudellisia kiistoja. Se on sisällytetty tarkasteluun kokonaiskuvan 
saamiseksi ja koska se vahvistaa valmisteluelimiin liittyviä havaintoja. 
Tekijänoikeusasetuksen (574/1995) 19 §:n mukaan neuvostossa tulee olla 
edustettuna keskeiset tekijänoikeuslaissa säädettyjen oikeuksien haltijat sekä 
suojakohteiden käyttäjät. Neuvostoon kuuluu kolmen asiantuntijan lisäksi 
13 eturyhmien edustajaa sekä varajäsenet. Intressiryhmistä noin kolme 
neljännestä (19/26) edustaa oikeudenhaltijoita tai media-alaa, teollisuutta 
neljä, museoita/arkistoja kaksi, operaattoreita yksi ja kuluttajia ei kukaan. 
Tasapainoisempi kokoonpano olisi legitimiteetin kannalta välttämätön, 
varsinkin kun lausunnoilla on tosiasiallista oikeuslähdeopillista merkitystä.84
Oikeudenhaltijatahojen lukumäärä ja vahva edustus eri työryhmissä joh-
taa helposti niiden etuja myötäilevään lainsäädäntöön. Lainvalmistelijalta 
edellytettäisiin rohkeita ratkaisuja, jottei hän joutuisi eturyhmien määräl-
lisen tai ”tiedollisen” johdattelun uhriksi. Tilanne on hankala. Luvussa 
3.1 kuvatusti valmisteluelinten epätasapainoisuus johtaa ongelmallisiin 
tuloksiin. Toisaalta lainvalmistelija tarvitsisi tukea objektiivisen tiedon 
kerryttämisessä. Mikäli tämä ei ole mahdollista, tasapainoisessa asetelmassa 
esitetyt subjektiiviset näkemyksetkin voisivat vielä johtaa kohtalaiseen 
lopputulokseen. Tästä esitetään esimerkkejä jäljempänä.
82 OKM 2014.
83 OKM 2013.
84 Tätä epätasapainoa on kritisoinut voimakkaasti mm. Mylly (2013).
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Yleisesti ottaen lainvalmistelun ongelmaksi on havaittu työryhmien 
tarkoitushakuiset tai yksipuoliset kokoonpanot ja epäinformatiiviset kuu-
lemistilaisuudet.85 Kritiikki soveltuu myös pysyvämpiin komiteoihin kuten 
tekijänoikeustoimikuntaan ja tekijänoikeusasioiden neuvottelukuntaan. 
Yksipuolisuus ja liiallinen laajapohjaisuus on ainakin ilmeistä, eikä tällainen 
laajakaan kokoonpano takaa valmistelun legitimiteettiä. Epäselvää tosin on, 
missä määrin tämä johtuu siitä, ettei ole pystytty tunnistamaan tarpeeksi 
toisia intressejä edustavia, dialogiin halukkaita ja kykeneviä tahoja. Tätä 
ongelmaa käsitellään laajemmin jäljempänä luvussa 4.3.1..
4.1.2 Siirtyminen valmisteluun virkatyönä
Tekijänoikeustoimikunta kasvoi ensin 21-henkiseksi ja vuodesta 2012 lukien 
sen korvasi 40-henkinen neuvottelukunta. Vuoden 2007 loppuun saakka 
kokoonpano oli suppeampi. Viimeisimmässä oli neljä henkilöä opetusmi-
nisteriöstä, kolme muista ministeriöistä (liikenne- ja viestintäministeriö 
(LVM), työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (TEM) ja oikeusministeriö (OM)) ja 
kaksi tekijänoikeuteen perehtynyttä oikeustieteen tutkijaa.86 Tällainen 
kokoonpano olisi voinut vielä olla valmisteluelimenä toimintakykyinen. 
On ilmeistä, ettei myöskään tekijänoikeusasioiden neuvottelukunnalla tai 
tekijänoikeusfoorumilla ole tehtävistä tai kokoonpanon laajuudesta ja pai-
nottumisesta johtuen konkreettista lisäarvoa lainvalmistelussa. Tällaisilla 
valmisteluelimillä tavoiteltu lainvalmistelun legitimiteetti jää näennäiseksi. 
Kompromissinmuodostuksen menettelyehtojen tulisi olla sellaisia, jotka 
suovat kaikille merkityksellisille intresseille mahdollisuuden ottaa osaa 
neuvotteluihin, ja samalla varmistetaan intressien välinen valtatasapaino.87 
Tasapainoinen, päätöksentekoon tähtäävä asioiden käsittely ei ole mahdol-
lista, ja toisaalta oikeudenhaltijoiden näkemykset saataisiin selville ilman 
kyseisiä elimiäkin.
Tekijänoikeuselinten laajeneminen ja yksisuuntaistuminen on merkki 
tosiasiallisen valmistelun ja päätöksenteon siirtymisestä entistä enemmän 
lainvalmistelijoille ja kulisseihin. Toisaalta neuvottelukunnan asetta-
mispäätökseen lisätty pienryhmätyöskentelyn ja selvitysten teettämisen 
mahdollisuus viittaa tarkoitukseen hyödyntää varsinaisessa valmistelussa 
pienempiä ad hoc -ryhmiä.88 Foorumeiden ja valmistelutahojen moninai-
85 Pakarinen 2012 s. 75; Pakarinen 2011 s. 35.
86 Hankerekisteri OPM122:00/2005.
87 Ks. Tuori 2000 s. 114, jossa vedetään yhteen Jürgen Habermasin tutkimuksia.
88 Tästä huolimatta ongelmana on neuvottelukunnan painottuminen. Pienryhmiä voidaan 
lisäksi käyttää vain, jos neuvottelukunta niin päättää.
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suus mahdollistaa nimellisen kuulemisen ja puheenvuorojen käytön, mutta 
tosiasiallinen kuuleminen ja vaikutusmahdollisuudet jäävät arvoitukseksi. 
Laajapohjaisuutta olennaisempaa olisi työryhmien työskentelyn laatu.89 
Yleisesti ottaen noin puolet hallituksen esityksistä laaditaan pelkästään vir-
katyönä, joka soveltuu parhaiten pienten ja teknisluontoisten lakiuudistusten 
valmisteluun. Muita on ensin työstetty työryhmässä tai toimikunnassa.90 
Nyt tarkasteltavat muutosehdotukset olivat verraten merkittäviä. Niin ikään 
luonnoksista ja selvityksistä pyydetään lausuntoja sadoiltakin tahoilta, 
mutta lausuntojen arviointi ja yhteensovittaminen jää usein epäselväksi 
tai sattumanvaraiseksi.91
Virkamiesvalmistelussa tapahtuvaan lausuntojen arviointiin ja yhteen-
sovittamiseen liittyviä haasteita voidaan tarkastella esimerkin valossa. 
13.12.2013 laaditussa hallituksen esitysluonnoksessa (HE-luonnos) aiempia 
valmisteluvaiheita kuvattiin seuraavasti. HE-luonnoksen mukaan suurin 
osa lausunnonantajista katsoi, että piratisminvastaisia oikeuskeinoja on 
tarvetta lisätä varsinkin silloin, kun loukkaajat ovat tuntemattomia tai 
sijaitsevat ulkomailla. Niin ikään ”asian jatkovalmistelua kannatettiin 
laajasti ja vain muutama lausunnonantaja katsoi, ettei toimenpiteitä voisi 
hyväksyä missään muodossa”.92 Lausuntoja ja taulukon 1 ”Estot”-saraketta 
tarkasteltaessa ilmenee, ettei tämä aivan pidä paikkaansa. Asian jatko-
valmistelua esitetyltä pohjalta vastustettiin nimenomaisesti laajemmin. 
Kritiikki esitettyjä operaattoreihin kohdistettavia ja niiden kustannuk-
sella toteutettavia keinoja vastaan oli myös laajaa. HE-luonnos antaakin 
myönteisemmän kuvan lainvalmistelun aiemmista vaiheista kuin aiempi 
lausuntotiivistelmä.93
Suuri osa lausunnonantajista toki kannatti estoja: olivathan oikeudenhal-
tijat yhtenäisesti kannattaneet niitä. Tämä korostui seuraavassa vaiheessa, 
jossa kaksinkertainen määrä oikeudenhaltijoita antoi lausunnon. Tällöin 
lausuminen oli laajempaa myös verrattuna aiempaan HE-luonnokseen 
(”Kirje/HE”). Niin ikään useat lausunnonantajat kannattivat jatkovalmiste-
lua. Tämä lienee kuitenkin useimmiten tulkittava kritiikiksi ja eufemismiksi 
sille, että esitystä on olennaisella tavalla muutettava. Eräisiin kysymyksiin 
HE-luonnoksessa olikin muotoiltu ratkaisuja, mutta keskeiset ongelmat 
muun muassa kuluvastuusta jäivät edelleen ratkaisematta.
89 Ahtonen – Keinänen 2012 s. 8; Pakarinen 2011 s. 74.
90 Pakarinen 2011 s. 14, 31–32.
91 Vrt. tuntemattomien tai tavoittamattomissa olevien tekijöiden teoksia (orpoteoksia), 
suoja-ajan pidennystä ym. koskevassa lainmuutoksessa lausuntoja saatiin 74 taholta, ja 
niitä käsiteltiin lähes lakonisesti vajaassa puolessa sivussa (HE 73/2013 vp s. 16).
92 OKM HE-luonnos 13.12.2013 s. 18–19. Samansuuntaisesti OKM 2013:13 s. 35.
93 Ibid. vrt. OKM lausuntotiivistelmä 22.5.2012.
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Puolentoista vuoden hiljaiselon jälkeen poliittisen ohjauksen vuoksi asia 
oli saatava kiireellisesti eduskunnan käsiteltäväksi.94 Tarve viedä hanke 
eteenpäin myös ilmeisesti vaikutti siihen, että aiempia kriittisiä vaiheita oli 
tarpeen	silotella	konfliktien	avoimen	käsittelyn	asemasta.	Tämä	vaikuttaa	
kyseenalaiselta tavalta ohittaa ilmeinen erimielisyys. Tällaisen lähesty-
mistavan riskinä on, että hankkeen etenemistä perusteltaisiin määrällisin 
perustein eli lausuntojen valtaosan (ts. oikeudenhaltijoiden) kannoilla.95
Aiempi esimerkki virkatyönä kiireessä jopa ilman nimellistä kuulemista 
tehdystä valmistelusta oli luvussa 2 esitelty TekL 60 a–d §:n valmistelu 
valiokuntavaiheessa vuosina 2004–2005. Asiassa olisi ollut mahdollista ottaa 
aikalisä. Ilmeisesti eduskunnan valiokunnassa ja aika ajoin myös OKM:ssä 
vallitsee uskomus, joka täytyy hyväksyä, eli bourdieulaisittain ortodoksia: 
tekijänoikeutta on suojattava yhä vahvemmin keinoin.96 Toisaalta direktiivin 
implementointiin ja hallitusohjelman toteuttamiseen liittyy myös poliittisia 
paineita, vaikka ne eivät sisällöllisiä ratkaisuja sanelisikaan.
Valmistelutavan muutoksiin liittyy kuvattuja riskejä, jotka ovat ilmeisesti 
esimerkkien valossa osin realisoituneetkin. Lainvalmistelijan rooliin tulisi 
kiinnittää lainsäädäntöteorian ja Bourdieun byrokratian kentän valossa 
huomiota. Varsinkin erimielisyyden hallinnoinnin sudenkuopat, kuten ratkai-
sujen perusteleminen määrällisillä argumenteilla, tulisi välttää. Valmistelu 
olisi muussa tapauksessa omiaan antamaan vaikutelman valmistelijoiden 
asennoitumisesta hyvin tekijänoikeusmyönteiseen ideologiaan.97
4.2 Toimijat ja positiot
4.2.1 Viranomaiset ja asiantuntijat
Tekijänoikeusasioista vastaa ja niitä valmistelee opetus- ja kulttuuriminis-
teriö. Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö vastaa teollisoikeudellisista asioista ja 
vuonna 2007 käytiin keskustelua tekijänoikeusasioiden vastuuministeriöstä. 
Tämän seurauksena TEM osallistuu aikaisempaa vahvemmin valmis-
94 Hallitusohjelmakirjaus ja kulttuuriministerin toimeksianto 7.10.2013, ks. OKM 2013:13 
s. 132, 138. Aiemmin toimikunnan mietinnöstä (OKM 2012:2) annettujen lausuntojen 
jälkeen painopiste oli yli vuoden ajan yleisemmän tason tekijänoikeuspolitiikassa, eikä 
näkyvää konkreettista valmistelua tapahtunut.
95 Tällaisen erimielisyyden hallintatavan kritiikistä ks. luku 3.1.
96 Bourdieu 1987 s. 839, 851; Terdiman 1987 s. 812. Ks. esim. HE 235/2010 vp s. 3–4; 
OKM 2012:2 s. 36–37; SiVM 11/2010 vp s. 8.
97 Ks. esim. immateriaalioikeudellisten kansainvälisten sopimusten neuvottelussa ilmene-
västä virkamiesten ideologiasta ja vaikeudesta vastustaa oikeudenhaltijoiden vaatimuksia, 
Mylly 2009 s. 260; Sell 2003 s. 7.
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teluun.98 Ministeriöiden roolit heijastuvat suhtautumisessa ehdotuksiin. 
Karkeasti ottaen TEM on kannattanut markkinaehtoisia ratkaisuja eli 
oikeudenhaltijoiden liiketoimintamallien uudistamista. Liikenne- ja vies-
tintäministeriö vastaa muun muassa viestintämarkkinoiden ja viestinnän 
tietosuojan sääntelystä, ja kuuntelee herkemmällä korvalla operaattoreita. 
Oikeusministeriö toimii hankkeissa lainsäädäntökonsulttina ja teknisenä 
apuna ja kritisoi puutteellista selvittämistä.99
Aiemmin täytäntöönpanokeinoja on käsitelty käytännössä yksinomaan 
Helsingin käräjäoikeudessa. Lakiehdotuksista lausuessaan käräjäoikeus on 
suhtautunut menettelyihin yleensä suotuisasti. Se on kiinnittänyt huomiota 
erityisesti soveltamistilanteiden selkeyttämiseen ottamatta kantaa perustavan-
laatuisiin tai oikeuspoliittisiin kysymyksiin. Syyskuussa 2013 uusien riita- ja 
hakemusasioiden käsittely siirtyi markkinaoikeuteen. 13.12.2013 päivätystä 
HE-luonnoksesta annetussa lausunnossa markkinaoikeus kritisoi puutteellista 
selvittämistä ja esitti huomattavan määrän yksityiskohtaisia huomioita.100
Tunnistamistietojen luovuttamisella ja huomautuskirjemenettelyllä 
on vahva kytkös yksityisyyden suojaan, ja tietosuojavaltuutettu on usein 
lausunut esityksistä kriittisesti. Viestintävirasto kantaa LVM:n ohella 
huolta internetin teknisestä toimivuudesta ja operaattoreiden sääntelystä 
ja on usein kritisoinut ehdotuksia. Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirastolla (KKV) 
on laajempaa edustusta elimissä. Lausunnot ovat keskittyneet kulutta-
jansuojakysymyksiin.101 Oikeustieteen piiristä on vain haja-edustusta 
valmisteluelimissä ja lausuntoja on annettu niukalti IPR University Cen-
teriä lukuun ottamatta; edustus painottuu tekijänoikeusneuvostoon eli 
soveltamistilanteisiin.
Herää kysymys, mistä oikeustieteen asiantuntijoiden hyödyntämisen 
vähyys johtuu. Muilla aloilla tieteellisillä asiantuntijoilla on keskeinen 
rooli erityisesti eduskunnan valiokunnissa. Tekijänoikeuden alalla josta-
kin syystä näin ei ole, vaikka tekijänoikeus on korostetun monimutkainen 
ala. Asiantuntijoiden rooli olikin merkittävämpi aiemman, suppeamman 
tekijänoikeustoimikunnan aikaan, ja nyt edustus on merkittävää ainoastaan 
tekijänoikeusneuvostossa. Mahdollisia syitä on useita. Oikeudenala on 
ehkä liian pieni kannatellakseen kovin laajaa asiantuntijajoukkoa. Suuri 
osa muuten pätevistä asiantuntijoista on hakeutunut muihin kuin tieteel-
lisiin tehtäviin ja toimii esimerkiksi lainvalmistelussa, tuomioistuimessa, 
98 Oesch 2009 s. 13. Esimerkkinä ministeriöiden välisestä valtapiirikamppailusta ks. Koulu 
2004 s. 21–22.
99 Ks. esim. OKM lausuntotiivistelmä 22.5.2012 s. 10, 12, 14; OPM 2009:21 s. 29–30.
100 Jos muuta ei ole todettu, luvun 4.2 analyysissä on käytetty luvun 4.1 taulukoiden läh-
deaineistoja.
101 Kuluttajaviranomaisten roolista yleisesti ks. Oesch 2009 s. 20.
Oikeustiede_2014.indb   226 1.7.2014   13:46:34
227
valtakamppailu lainvalmistelussa: internet-operaattorit tekijänoikeuden …
oikeudenhaltijajärjestöissä tai asianajosektorilla. On myös mahdollista, 
että asiantuntijoiden näkemykset poikkeavat paljon toisistaan ja näin 
ollen esimerkiksi lausuntopyyntöön vastatessa yliopiston tai tiedekunnan 
näkemyksen muodostaminen olisi haastavaa. Lisäksi yliopiston lausunnon 
tyypillisesti antaa hallinto, ei tiedekunta tai tutkijat. Niin ikään edes tie-
dekuntatasolla ei välttämättä ole myöskään halua ottaa keskitetysti kantaa 
oikeuspoliittisiin kysymyksiin. Lopuksi tiedontarpeen on ehkä koettu 
kohdistuvan enemmän esimerkiksi liiketoimintaan kuin säännöksiin tai 
tieteelliseen tutkimukseen. Havaittavissa on, että oikeudenhaltijoita pidetään 
alan asiantuntijoina. Riskinä on, että lainvalmistelija tai sivistysvaliokunta 
eristäytyisi kuvitellen omaavansa parhaan tietämyksen asioista.102
4.2.2 Eturyhmät
Vain operaattoreiden eturyhmällä Ficom ry:llä on edustusta kaikissa elimissä. 
Operaattorit suhtautuvat lausunnoissaan hankkeisiin lähes aina kriittisesti. 
Suomen Yrittäjät ja Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto (EK) ovat keskeisimmät 
yleistä elinkeinoelämää edustavat tahot.103 EK ja Keskuskauppakamari 
ovat olleet lausunnoissaan kohtalaisen kriittisiä, mutta niiden edustamien 
tahojen erilaisten kantojen vuoksi eivät aivan yhtä kärkkäitä kuin edellä 
mainitut. STTK ja Teknologiateollisuus ilmeisesti kuuluvat Ficom ry:n 
muodostamaan elinkeinoelämän rintamaan.
EFFI ry suhtautuu tekijänoikeusasioihin kriittisesti, ja se on ollut 
taustavoimana myös Järkeä tekijänoikeuteen -kansalaisaloitteessa. Sen 
lausunnot ovat usein myös provokatiivisia, mitä voidaan pitää poikkeava-
na. Lainsäädäntökentän omaksuttuja pelisääntöjä ajoittain rikkoen se on 
ajautunut osittain kentän ulkopuolelle. Piraattipuolue on ollut vastaavalla 
tavalla kriittinen, mutta senkin painoarvo on jäänyt vähäiseksi. Erinäisille 
kirjastoille ja arkistoille on eri elimissä varattu edustusta, mutta niillä ei ole 
intressiä nyt tarkasteltaviin asioihin. Tietoyhteiskunnan kehittämiskeskus 
102 Tähän viittaa esimerkiksi se, että orpoteoksia, suoja-ajan pidennystä ym. koskevassa 
käsittelyssä sivistysvaliokunnassa kuultiin tai lausunnon antoi OKM:n valmistelijan lisäksi 
14 oikeudenhaltijoiden tai media-alan edustajaa, EK ja Kansalliskirjasto (SiVM 6/2013 
vp). Vastaavasti Sell 2003 s. 99: ”To a certain extent IP law is reminiscent of the Catholic 
Church when the Bible was in Latin. IP lawyers are privileged purveyors of expertise as 
was the Latin-trained clergy. IP law is highly technical and complex, obscure even to most 
general attorneys.” Vastaavasti oikeudenhaltijoiden asiantuntijuudesta ja sen suomista 
vaikutusmahdollisuuksista ks. Farrand 2014 s. 2–3, 17, 129.
103 Yleisellä elinkeinoelämällä ei välttämättä ole kovin suurta intressiä tässä tarkastelta-
viin kysymyksiin, mutta keskeisempiä eturyhmiäkään ei ole ilmeisesti kyetty löytämään. 
Elinkeinoelämällä ja työmarkkinajärjestöillä on ilmeisesti tästä syystä kaiken kaikkiaan 
vahva edustus lainvalmistelussa, ks. Peltomäki 2013a.
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(TIEKE) on ollut aiempaa merkittävämpi toimija käyttäjien edustamises-
sa.104 Kuluttajaliitto on Kilpailu- ja kuluttajaviraston tavoin pidättäytynyt 
laajemmalta kritiikiltä.
Oikeudenhaltijatahoja on lukematon määrä, koska kaikilla taiteenaloilla 
ja tuotantoportailla on yksi tai useampia eturyhmiä. Ne ovat myös saaneet 
vahvan edustuksen eri toimielimissä. Perinteisesti Yleisradio on esittänyt 
enemmän kritiikkiä kuin kaupalliset toimijat, mutta asetelma näyttää 
muuttuneen. Myös ”teollisuus”-ryhmään luokiteltu Kaupan liitto on sel-
västi oikeudenhaltijoille myönteinen. Se edustanee lähinnä tahoja, jotka 
myyvät oikeudenhaltijoiden tuotoksia. Toisaalta Markkinointiviestinnän 
Toimistojen Liitto ja Suomen Journalistiliitto ovat varauksellisempia kuin 
oikeudenhaltijat keskimäärin.
4.2.3 Lähitarkastelussa viimeisin estoesitys
Tarkastelen vielä tarkemmin 13.12.2013 päivätystä hallitusesitysluonnok-
sesta annettuja lausuntoja eri tahojen tarkempien kantojen selvittämiseksi. 
Taulukoissa 3 ja 4 esitetään pelkistetysti lausunnoista ilmeneviä kantoja.105 
Taulukoissa yhteisinä sarakkeina ovat kolme ensimmäistä: hidastamissään-
nöksen epätarkoituksenmukaisuus, loukkaajaan kohdistettavasta kanteesta 
erilliset itsenäiset estot ja vaatimus estojen helposta kohdistamisesta kaik-
kiin operaattoreihin. Muuten näkökulmat jakautuivat niin merkittävästi, 
että olennaiset kohdat on esitelty kummassakin erikseen. Taulukossa 3 
toisen lausunnon tukeminen on mainittu erikseen, koska epäsuoran tuen 
huomiointi johtaisi + / – -merkkejä täynnä olevaan taulukkoon.106
Oikeudenhaltijat ja Yleisradio olivat tukiviittaukset mukaan lukien 
käytännössä yksimielisiä lukuun ottamatta Suomen journalistiliittoa (22 
kpl).107 Lausuntoja oli koordinoitu: 15 (noin 2/3) lausunnossa oli suora, 
tukea osoittava viittaus Tekijänoikeuden tiedotus- ja valvontakeskus ry:n 
(TTVK) lausuntoon ja lisäksi mahdollisesti muihin lausuntoihin.108 Vaikka 
nimenomaisesti mainituissa asioissa oli painotuseroja, sisällöllisen yhte-
näisyyden perusteella yhteistyö oli kaiken kaikkiaan ilmeistä.
104 Tämä lienee seurausta painotuksesta, joka syntyi vuosina 2003–2011 kansanedustajana 
toimineen Jyrki Kasvin siirtymisestä TIEKEn tutkimus- ja kehittämisjohtajaksi.
105 ”Tyhjät” Sanoma ja Suomen Journalistiliitto eivät lausuneet taulukkoon valituista 
aiheista.
106 Tähdellä merkitty tuki tarkoittaa, että tuki- tai viittauslausuma on rajoitettu johonkin 
osa-alueeseen.
107 Suomen Journalistiliitto katsoi, että sananvapauden ydinalueella estomääräyksen ei 
tulisi olla mahdollinen ja sananvapausarviointia olisi muutenkin lisättävä.
108 LYHTY 5 kpl, Musiikkituottajat, Teosto, Kuvasto ja Suomen taiteilijaseura kukin 1 kpl.
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Yksittäisiä poikkeuksia lukuun ottamatta jokainen lausui suoraan tai 
viittauksen kautta seuraavaa. Hidastamismääräys on oikeuspoliittisesti ky-
seenalainen ja estomääräykseen nähden toissijaisena käytännössä tarpeeton. 
Välittäjiä vastaan tulee voida antaa itsenäisiä ja loukkaajaan kohdistetuista 
toimenpiteistä riippumattomia estomääräyksiä. Lainvoimaiset estomääräyk-
set tulee voida laajentaa muitakin operaattoreita koskeviksi. Estämisen ja 
mahdollisen hidastamisen tulee olla tehokasta, ja keinoilla tulee voida estää 
tai hidastaa mikä tahansa loukkaava sivusto. Huomautuskirjemenettely 
tulee lisätä hallituksen esitykseen ja sen tulisi sisältää myös seurannan 
ja/tai eskalointikeinot.  Vain Gramex ja TTVK nimenomaisesti esittivät 
tunnistamistietojen luovuttamiseen liittyvän säilyttämisajan pidentämistä, 
mutta viittauksen kautta pidentämisesitys sisältyi laajasti muihinkin lausun-
toihin. Vastaavia sanamuotoja hidastamismääräyksen kyseenalaisuudesta 
käyttivät myös Sanoma, MTV Media ja Viestinnän Keskusliitto. Kaksi 
ensimmäistä korostivat myös operaattoreiden vastuun lisäämistä. Kaksi 
viimeksi mainittua tukivat myös kirjemenettelyä.
Selvää on, että oikeudenhaltijat olivat käsitelleet kantaa lausunto-
pyyntöön yhdessä ja yhteisistä linjoista saavutettiin yhteisymmärrys. 
Taulukko 3. Oikeudenhaltijoiden ja hyödyntäjien kantoja esitysluonnokseen.
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Keskeisten toimijoiden tuottama materiaali tukee ja helpottaa oikeuden-
haltijoiden lausuntojen laatimista. On myös ilmeistä, että oikeudenhaltijat 
ovat edellä luvussa 4.1.2 kuvatusti tehneet ”ryhtiliikkeen” ja panostaneet 
lausuntojen määrään. Tällä on saatettu haluta vaikuttaa edellä mainitulla 
tavoin määrällisesti lainvalmisteluun. TTVK:n ohella taustavoimana on 
syytä mainita yhteistyöprojekti ”Luovan alan tekijät ja yrittäjät” (LYH-
TY), jossa on mukana 15 oikeudenhaltijajärjestöä sekä välillisesti niiden 
jäsenjärjestöjä.109 
LYHTY-projektissa toimii erilaisia työryhmiä, joista tässä merkittävimpiä 
ovat lausuntoja valmisteleva lausuntotyöryhmä ja hallitusohjelmaan vai-
kuttava hallitusohjelmatyöryhmä.110 Tämäkin havainnollistaa yhteistyötä ja 
toisaalta sitä, että tällaisissa asioissa lukemattomien järjestöjen kuuleminen 
tai edustus valmisteluelimissä on oikeastaan tarpeetonta. Samat kannat 
käyvät joka tapauksessa ilmi koordinoidusta vastauksesta.
Taulukko 4. Muiden alojen kantoja esitysluonnokseen.
Muiden tahojen lausunnot jakautuivat enemmän. Kukaan ei pitänyt hidasta-
mismääräystä tehokkaana tai tarkoituksenmukaisena keinona.111  Itsenäisiä 
kieltomääräyksiä vastustivat kaikki operaattorit ja lisäselvityksiä edellyttäen 
109 LYHTY 2014.
110 Gramex vuosikertomus 2011, Liite 1: LYHTY toimintakertomus 2011 s. 19–20.
111 Helsingin käräjäoikeus kuitenkin kategorisesti kannatti esitystä suppeassa lausunnossaan, 
vaikka näki toteutuksen haasteellisena.
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TEM ja Keskuskauppakamari. Yksittäisen estomääräyksen laajentamista 
muita operaattoreita koskevaksi nimenomaisesti vastustivat Viestintävirasto 
ja markkinaoikeus.112 Kilpailunäkökulmasta yhtäläisyyttä kannattivat Elisa 
ja EK. Elisa, Finnet-liitto, TIEKE, STTK ja Keskuskauppakamari katsoivat, 
että toimet tulisi kohdistaa varsinaisiin loukkaajiin ongelman lähteellä. 
LVM, TEM, KKV, TIEKE, EK, Teknologiateollisuus, STTK ja Elisa kat-
soivat, että ongelmaan pitäisi puuttua ensisijaisesti tai yksinomaan laillisia 
sisältöjä kehittämällä. Kaikki operaattorit, Keskuskauppakamari, TIEKE, 
TEM, OM ja markkinaoikeus kritisoivat varsin suoraan operaattoreiden 
kustannusvastuuta. Epäsuoraa kritiikkiä on havaittavissa myös LVM:n, 
tietosuojavaltuutetun ja ulkoasiainministeriön lausunnoista. Muun muassa 
OM ja markkinaoikeus kritisoivat voimakkaasti puutteellista valmistelua. 
Myös tietosuojavaltuutettu toi esiin puutteita ja kehityskohteita. Vastaavasti 
IPR University Center esitti lähtökohdaksi myös aiemmassa mietinnössä 
esillä ollutta mallia. Viestintävirasto katsoi, että keinojen tehokkuus olisi 
valitettavan heikko.
Myös operaattoreiden vastauksista käy ilmi jonkin asteinen koordinointi. 
Eri käyttäjätahoista on havaittavissa hienoista ryhmittymistä samaan rin-
tamaan työmarkkinajärjestöjen kanssa. Lausuntojen perusteella tämä on 
kuitenkin huomattavasti pienimuotoisempaa ja vähemmän ilmeistä kuin 
oikeudenhaltijatahojen välinen yhteistyö. Selvää on, että osallistuvien 
tahojen määrä on huomattavasti suurempi kuin esitettyjen näkemysten 
määrä. Tässä mielessä lausunnot ja työryhmät eivät tietyn pisteen jälkeen 
enää laajenna lainvalmistelijan tietopohjaa.
Voidaan todeta, että mikään taho ei kannattanut hidastamismääräystä 
ensisijaisesti tai oikeastaan lainkaan. Sen sijaan oikeudenhaltijat ja hyö-
dyntäjät esittivät ”yhtenäisillä nuoteilla” HE-luonnosta huomattavasti 
laajentavia ehdotuksia, joihin ei luonnollisesti voitu esittää vastalauseita, 
koska kyseiset ehdotukset eivät olleet lausuntopyynnön kohteena. Operaat-
torit sinänsä kannattivat nykyisten säännösten selkeyttämistä, mutta vain 
omista lähtökohdistaan ja heille edullisempaan suuntaan. Muut pääosin 
vastustivat, kritisoivat tai kyseenalaistivat selvityksiä hiukan poikkeavin 
painotuksin, joista vahvimmat yhteiset tekijät näyttivät olevan kustannus-
jako ja voimavarojen väärä kohdentaminen. Luonnollisesti viranomaistahot 
olivat lausunnoissaan keskimäärin pidättyväisempiä eräitä poikkeuksellisen 
kriittisiä lausuntoja lukuun ottamatta.
112 Esimerkkimalli oli, että Viestintävirasto voisi määrätä eston kaikkia operaattoreita 
koskevaksi (OKM 2013:13 s. 79–80, 124). Vähäinen lausuntojen määrä selittyy sillä, että 
malli oli jo pääosin hylätty HE-luonnosta laadittaessa.
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4.3 Valta-asemat ja urat
4.3.1 Positioiden suhteet ja valtarakenteet
Toimijoiden välinen suhde voidaan hahmottaa oikeudenhaltijoiden ja erityi-
sesti suurten tekijänoikeusjärjestöjen kamppailuksi internet-operaattoreita ja 
käyttäjiä vastaan; tässä kamppailussa taiteilijat ovat sivuosassa.113 Oikeu-
denhaltijat ovat jatkuvasti pyrkineet sisällöllisiin laajennuksiin. Intressiä 
liiketoimintamallien kehittämiselle ei ole kuin pakon edessä.114 Tämä ei ole 
kuitenkaan uutta, sillä kaikki teknologiset muutokset on lähes poikkeuksetta 
nähty uhkina, jotka täytyy estää.115 Tekijänoikeusjärjestöt ovatkin painotta-
neet lainsäädännön vahvistamista ja/tai vahvistamisen välttämättömyyttä 
liiketoimintamallien uudistumiselle. Muutoksia vastustavat pitävät liiketoi-
minnan ja tarjonnan uudistamista ensisijaisena tai ainoana reagointitapana 
digitalisoitumisen haasteisiin.116 Reagoinnin vaiheiksi on esitetty 1. paniikki 
ja ylireagointi täytäntöönpanokeinoja tehostamalla, 2. täytäntöönpanokeino-
jen rationalisointi ja 3. liiketoimintamallien vastentahtoinen kehittyminen.117 
Suomessa ollaan nähdäkseni siirtymässä toiseen vaiheeseen.
Oikeuspoliittisesti kysymys on siitä, onko täytäntöönpanokeinojen 
tehostaminen asianmukainen reagointitapa vanhentuvien liiketoiminta-
mallien ylläpitämiseen. Rakenteellinen vastakkainasettelu on ilmeinen. 
OKM on luovinut näiden vastakkaisten näkemysten välimaastossa ollen 
kuitenkin useimmiten lähempänä oikeudenhaltijoita. Positioitumiseen ovat 
mahdollisesti vaikuttaneet myös kansainvälisten sopimusten ja direktiivien 
asettamat reunaehdot. Kuitenkin on todettava, ettei EU-oikeuskäytännön 
valossa ole ilmeistä, että Suomella olisi velvollisuus laajentaa keinoja 
esitetyllä tavalla.
113 Levin 2012 s. 156. Yleisemmin ks. Mylly 2013.
114 Tuottajien ei ole kannattanut alentaa laillisten verkkopalveluiden hintoja piratismin 
vähentämisen toivossa vaan siirtää kustannukset hintoihin (OKM 2013:13 s. 25). Vastaa-
vasti ”oikeudenhaltijoiden mielestä on ollut väärin edellyttää markkinoiden kehitystä, ellei 
samalla tarjota riittäviä ja tehokkaita keinoja valvoa oikeuksia tietoverkossa” (mts. 53). 
Vrt. 39 % kuluttajista lopettaisi laittoman käytön, jos lailliset palvelut olisivat halvempia 
ja 32 %, jos lailliset palvelut olisivat kattavampia (mts. 27). Samoin liiketoimintamallien 
muutostarpeesta ja keinojen tehostamisen vaikutuksettomuudesta ks. Hargreaves 2011 s. 
78–79; Patry 2011 s. 256 ss.
115 Levin 2012 s. 136–137; Patry 2011 s. 141 ss; Yu 2011 s. 887–890; Litman 2001 s. 106–108. 
Aiempia muutospaineita ja voimakasta vastustusta ovat aiheuttaneet muun muassa radio, 
televisio, elokuvateatterit, VHS-nauhat, internet, ym. (ibid.) Kuvaavasti Yu (2011 s. 890) 
on todennut: ”Given the continuous evolution of our economy, the [copyright] industry has 
yet to convince us why its business model deserves to be singled out for protection while 
other equally important industries had to adapt to technological change.”
116 OKM 2013:13 s. 53; Levin 2012 s. 147–148, 150, 156–157.
117 Lim – Longdin 2011 s. 698.
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Oikeudenhaltijat ja erityisesti tekijänoikeusteollisuus ja tekijänoikeus-
järjestöt ovat hyvin vahvoja toimijoita.118 Niiden toiminta perustuu kan-
sainväliseen yhteistyöhön.119 Kollektiivisesti lupia hallinnoivien järjestöjen 
(Teosto, Kopiosto, Sanasto, Tuotos, Kuvasto ja Gramex) asema on vakiin-
tunut ja niillä on monopoliasema tekijöiden ja lähioikeuksien haltijoiden 
edustajina ja rahavirtojen käsittelijöinä.120 Tämä lisää niiden vaikutusvaltaa 
sekä taloudellista ja oikeudellista pääomaa. Pääomaa voidaan käyttää vai-
kuttamiseen oikeuden, politiikan ja lainsäädännön kentillä, omaa positiota 
pönkittävien tutkimusten teettämiseen, kansainväliseen yhteistyöhön ja 
oikeudellisten asiantuntijoiden käyttämiseen. Tämä luo myös kulttuurista 
pääomaa: laajojen verkostojen vuoksi tekijänoikeusjärjestöt ovat tietoisia 
kehitystrendeistä ja ovat osallisia oikeusprosesseissa.121 Muilla tahoilla, 
lainsäätäjä mukaan luettuna, ei ole resursseja vastaaviin selvityksiin. Pää-
omaan liittyvä tiedollinen ja taloudellinen ylivoima sulkee pois maallikot ja 
tekijänoikeuden perinteiseen tulkintatapaan vihkiytymättömät toimijat.122
Mahdollisia tasapainottamisyrityksiä hankaloittaa se, että on vaikea 
tunnistaa	tarpeeksi	monia	riittävän	korkean	profiilin	omaavia	ja	dialogiin	
halukkaita ja kykeneviä muita tahoja. Yksi mahdollinen reagointitapa 
olisi rajoittaa merkittävästi yhtenäisten kantojen vuoksi tarpeettoman 
laajaa oikeudenhaltijoiden edustusta.123 Bourdieun mukaan kentän peliin 
osallistuminen edellyttää intressiä, pääomaa ja pelin tajua; osallistuminen 
edellyttää myös kentälle sopimattomista lähestymistavoista luopumista.124 
Vaikka oikeudenhaltijat saattaisivatkin haluta käydä asiallista dialogia vas-
tapuolen kanssa, tämä ei ole helppoa, koska selkeitä ja yhteisiä pelisääntöjä 
noudattavia tahoja ei juuri ole. Tähän vaikuttaa osaltaan oikeudenalan 
pienuus, monimutkaisuus ja oikeudenhaltijatahon vakiintunut asema.125
118 Mylly 2013; Savola 2013b s. 51, 63, 65–66; Levin 2012 s. 147–150, 155–156; Oesch 
2009 s. 16–17.
119 Näin erityisesti esimerkiksi Musiikkituottajat IFPI (OKM 2013:13 s. 37). Yksityiset 
intressit olivat myös hyvin vahvasti kansainvälisen TRIPS-sopimuksen taustalla (Sell 2003 
s. 7, 99).
120 Ks. Oesch 2009 s. 16–17.
121 Vastaavasti esimerkiksi TRIPS-sopimuksen valmistelussa menestymisen syyksi on katsottu 
oikeudenhaltijoiden taloudellisten resurssien lisäksi useiden eri kanavien hyödyntäminen, 
IPR-asioiden vahva osaaminen ja tiedollinen ylivoima, jolla monimutkaiset asiat voitiin 
muokata poliittiseen diskurssiin sopiviksi (Sell 2003 s. 8; Haunss – Kohlmorgen 2009 s. 
107–109).
122 Ylhäinen 2010 s. 159–162; Bourdieu – Wacquant 1995 s. 36–39, 125–129; Bourdieu 
1987 s. 808– 809, 823–825.
123 Tämä voisi olla yksi tapa tasapainottaa eri intressien välisiä neuvotteluja, ks. alaviite 
87.
124 Vrt. esim. EFFI ry:n toiminta luvussa 4.2.2.
125 Molemminpuolisista ongelmista dialogissa ks. Yu 2011 s. 884: ”Although both sides 
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Harvoilla muilla kuin oikeudenhaltijoilla on mahdollisuutta ylläpitää 
tekijänoikeudellista erityisasiantuntemusta. Avoin kamppailu tällaista 
”Goljatia” vastaan vaatisi monipuolisia ja laajoja resursseja, pitkäjäntei-
syyttä ja rohkeutta. Niin ikään kansainväliset velvoitteet ovat niin laajoja, 
että kansallisessa lainsäädännössä ja vaikuttamisessa vapausasteita on 
monilta osin niukasti. Kansallisella tasolla toimivien vastapuolten (esim. 
EFFI) turhautuminen voi olla heijastumaa myös tästä johtuvasta voimat-
tomuudesta. Siinä mielessä on ymmärrettävää, että jotkin tahot haluavat 
toimia ainakin osittain popularisoinnin tai sissisodan hengessä eivätkä 
lainsäädäntökentällä. Vastaavasti oikeustieteilijöiden käymä keskustelu 
on Suomessa kohtalaisen vähäistä ja lainvalmistelu näyttää etääntyneen 
siitä: vaikka huomionarvoista keskustelua käytäisiinkin, se ei juuri heijastu 
lainvalmisteluun. Toisaalta myös oikeudenhaltijoiden vaikuttamistoiminnan 
kulmakivenä hyödynnetään omia tutkimuksia ja lähtökohtia, jotka eivät 
useinkaan kestäisi tieteellistä tarkastelua.126 On niin ikään ymmärrettävää, 
jos muilla ja erityisesti oikeustieteilijöillä ei ole kiinnostusta osallistua 
tällaiseen politikointiin tai mediapeliin.
4.3.2 Oikeudenhaltijoiden yhtenäisyys ja vallan kierre
Tekijöiden, tekijänoikeusteollisuuden ja etujärjestöjen näkemykset ja 
edut voivat olla ristiriidassa keskenään, ja yleisesti ottaen sisäinen valta-
kamppailu on väistämätöntä.127 Tässä artikkelissa tarkasteltavissa asioissa 
suhtautuminen on kuitenkin ollut poikkeuksellisen yhtenäistä, toisin kuin 
eräillä muilla tekijänoikeuden sektoreilla. Näissä asioissa operaattorit 
ovat myös vastavoimana oikeudenhaltijoille. Tavanomaisesti poliittisesti 
yhtenäinen tekijänoikeusteollisuus on kerännyt voittoja hajanaisen yleisön 
kustannuksella.128
Valtaapitävillä on taipumus varmistaa, että ne pysyvät vallassa jatkossakin. 
Eturyhmien valtapositio voikin johtaa ns. sääntelyloukkuun, jossa jonkin 
yksittäisen ryhmän etuja suosivalla sääntelyllä on taipumus jatkossakin 
have advanced a wide variety of arguments to support their positions, each side has yet 
to convince the other; oftentimes they talk past, rather than to, each other. The resulting 
debate is highly polarized and emotion-laden” (kursiivi lisätty, lähdeviittaukset poistettu).
126 Ks. esim. alaviite 133. Vastaavasti intressit puetaan legalistis-teknisten argumenttien taakse, 
joista ”tunnetusti paras on vetoaminen ’oikeussuojaan’” (Koulu 2004 s. 7). Kyseenalaisesti 
laadittujen tilasto- ym. tietojen välittämisestä lainvalmistelijalle ks. Farrand 2014 s. 115, 119. 
Politisoiminen ja popularisointi näyttää olleen tehokas keino vastustaa muutoksia (ks. alaviite 
129), kun akateeminen kritiikki jää usein merkityksettömäksi (Farrand 2014 s. 162, 175).
127 Mylly 2013; Pakarinen 2012 s. 85.
128 Kellomäki 2010 s. 67–68. Vastaavasti vastapuolten hajanaisuudesta enforcement-direk-
tiiviä säädettäessä ks. Farrand 2014 s. 127; Haunss – Kohlmorgen 2010 s. 257.
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suosia kyseistä ryhmää. Intressiryhmän menestystä lainvalmistelukamp-
pailuissa on todettu parantavan muun muassa ryhmän yhtenäisyys, kilpai-
lijoiden puute, hyvät taloudelliset resurssit, ryhmän jäsenten kuuluminen 
keski- ja yläluokkaan, oman alan uudistuksen ajaminen, osittaisuudistuksen 
ajaminen, vähäinen medianäkyvyys, vallitsevan oikeustilan puolustaminen 
ja yhteiskunnallisilla uhilla pelotteleminen.129
Tällä tekijänoikeuden osa-alueella useimmat edellä mainitut kriteerit 
täyttyvät: oikeudenhaltijat ovat äärimmäisen yhtenäinen ryhmä, mutta 
toisaalta operaattorit toimivat osittaisena, vaikkakin merkittävästi hei-
kompana vastavoimana.130 Järjestöillä on hyvät taloudelliset resurssit vai-
kuttamiseen, ja osittaisuudistukset kohdistuvat omaan fokusoituun alaan. 
Toiminnan perusteet ovat vallitsevan oikeustilan mukaisia, ja laajennuksia 
esitettäessä vedotaan siihen, kuinka aiemmat keinot eivät ole olleet riittäviä 
loukkausten torjumisessa. Useimpien uudistusten näkyvyys valtamedioissa 
on ollut viime aikoja lukuun ottamatta vähäinen.131 Kantoja perustellaan 
usein oikeudenloukkausten aiheuttamilla merkittävillä yhteiskunnallisilla 
taloudellisilla tappioilla ja esimerkiksi taiteilijoiden toimeentulon vaaran-
tumisella132, vaikka tosiasiassa loukkausten taloudellinen merkitys on alle 
0,1 % BKT:sta.133 Tekijänoikeusalan tappiot eivät kuvasta yhteiskunnallista 
vaikutusta kokonaisuudessaan.134 Lisäksi taloudelliset vaikutukset vähenevät 
olennaisesti vain jos laiton toiminta loppuu kokonaan, eikä esimerkiksi 
vertaisverkkokäyttö vain siirry toiselle sivustolle.135  Toivotut vaikutukset 
eivät olekaan toteutuneet.136 Toteutumista esitetyillä uusilla tai tehostetuilla 
keinoilla ei voi myöskään pitää realistisena.
129 Pakarinen 2012 s. 49–50 viitteineen. Vastaavasti tekijänoikeudessa hankkeet ovat 
menneet läpi kun ne tehty kaikessa hiljaisuudessa (ks. Culpepper 2011); vastarinta muu-
toksia kohtaan on ollut tehokkainta silloin, kun asia on saatu popularisoitua valtamediaa 
kiinnostavalla tavalla (Farrand 2014 s. 9, 17, 198).
130 On olemassa myös kansainvälisesti vahvoja välittäjätahoja, kuten Google.
131 Viime aikojen uutisoinnista ks. esim. Koistinen 2013a; Koistinen 2013b; Peltomäki 
2013b; Sorjanen 2014.
132 Esimerkiksi luovan työn tekijöiden ja yrittäjien projektin teettämän selvityksen mu-
kaan luvattomien tiedostojen levittämisen on arvioitu aiheuttaneen vuonna 2009 noin 350 
miljoonan euron menetykset sekä yhteiskunnallisia vahinkoja (OKM 2012:2 s. 36–37). 
Ongelman vakavuutta on korostettu myös muuten (ibid. ja SiVM 10/2010 vp s. 8).
133 Hargreaves 2011 s. 73–74. Edellisen alaviitteen tutkimusten luvut ovat metodologisesti 
kyseenalaisia ja tulokset epäluotettavia (ibid.). Tekijänoikeusalojen osuus BKT:sta (eri 
arvioissa noin 2–4 %) on vähemmän relevantti mittari. Vastaavasti ks. esim. Yu 2011 s. 
918–923. Yleisesti ks. esim. Collier 2014.
134 Patry 2011 s. 67–70; Kellomäki 2010 s. 67–68.
135 OKM 2013:13 s. 26, 135. Siirtyminen toisille sivustoille ja estojen kiertäminen on 
havaittu merkittäviksi tekijöiksi tehottomuuteen, ks. Poort ym. 2014 s. 396.
136 OKM 2013:13 s. 121.
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4.3.3 Henkilöiden sitoutuminen tekijänoikeusideologiaan
Sivistysvaliokunta on todennut, että ”tekijänoikeuslainsäädäntöön pereh-
tyneiden asiantuntijoiden on heidän kertomansa mukaan osin vaikea saada 
selkoa lain sisällöstä”.137 Tekijänoikeuden monimutkaisuuden vuoksi sitä 
on myös toisen alan juristien vaikea hallita. Työryhmiin osallistuvilla onkin 
usein työhistoriaa tai muuta taustaa tekijänoikeuden alalta.138 Tällaisen ”vih-
kiytymisen” tosiasiallinen edellyttäminen aiheuttaa sisäänpäin lämpiämistä 
ja ”hajuaistin turtumista”.139 Se voi myös johtaa siihen, että tekijänoikeuden 
suojaamisen vahvistamista pidetään itsestäänselvyytenä (doksana).  
Niin tekijänoikeudessa kuin IPR-asioissa yleensäkin työpaikkoja on 
lähinnä oikeudenhaltijoilla ja niitä palvelevissa asianajotoimistoissa.140 
Tekijänoikeuden ala on varsin kapea. Voidaan arvioida, että noin 1 % 
lakimiehistä on erikoistunut tekijänoikeuteen.141
Oikeustieteessä tekijänoikeuteen kohdistuvia kriittisimpiä puheenvuo-
roja kuullaan pääosin toisen oikeudenalan piiristä ja yleisemmin alasta 
taloudellisesti tai muuten riippumattomilta tahoilta.142 Vihkiytymättömät 
henkilöt ja lausunnot voidaan pyrkiä bourdieulaisittain rajaamaan kentän 
ulkopuolelle esimerkiksi ”ymmärtämättömyytenä”.143
137 Sivistysvaliokunnan kirje opetusministeriölle 18.2.2003 (Välimäki, LM 2004 s. 255). 
Vastaavasti kansainvälisesti ks. alaviite 102. Samansuuntaisesti ja vielä pidemmälle mennen 
esimerkiksi Herkko Hietanen: ”Poikkeuksiin tehdyt poikkeukset ja loputtomat pykälien ja 
kansainvälisten sopimusten ristiinviittaukset pitävät huolen siitä, että Suomessa on alle viisi 
ihmistä, jotka hallitsevat monimutkaisen tekijänoikeuslainsäädännön kokonaisuudessaan.” 
(Sorjanen 2014.). Vastaavasti ks. Farrand 2014 s. 2–3.
138 Ks. luku 3.2 ja erityisesti alaviite 63.
139 Mylly 2013.
140 Oikeudenhaltijoita lähellä olevilta tekijänoikeuslakimiehiltä eli alan ”ylipapistolta” (ks. 
alaviite 102) ei voi juuri odottaa kriittisiä kannanottoja.
141  Ääriesimerkistä  ”alle viisi ihmistä” ks. alaviite 137. Helsingin yliopiston oikeustie-
teellisen tiedekunnassa suoritettiin vuonna 2013 259 OTM-tutkintoa (Tiedekuntaneuvoston 
pöytäkirja 28.1.2014 s. 4). E-thesis-palvelusta löytyy vuodelle 2013 kirjattuja sähköisiä 
tiivistelmiä tai kokotekstejä 229 kpl. Vastaavasti kirjaston tietokantojen päivitys oli vielä 
tätä kirjoittaessa kesken ja sieltä tutkielmia löytyi 209 kpl. Näistä tekijänoikeuteen liittyviä 
eri haku- ja asiasanoilla etsittäessä oli viisi. Vuodelta 2012 tutkielmia löytyi vastaavasti 
kaksi ja vuodelta 2011 kaksi. Varsinkin vain paperimuodossa olevia tutkielmia on varmasti 
jäänyt huomaamatta. Vastaavasti oikeustieteen tohtorin tutkinnon suoritusoikeuksia oli 
7.3.2014 myönnetty yhteensä 428 henkilölle. Näistä 67:n pääaine on kauppaoikeus ja 
neljän pääteema on tekijänoikeus. Muissa pääaineissa on myös muutama tekijänoikeuteen 
kiinteästi liittyvä tutkimus. Havainnot lienevät kansallisesti edustavia. Luultavaa on, että 
myöhemmissä uravaiheissa tapahtuu huomattavasti enemmän siirtymistä toisille aloille ja 
yleisempiin juridisiin tehtäviin kuin kynnyksen ylittävää sisääntuloa. Näistä saadaan arvio 
korkeintaan 1–2 %:n erikoistumisesta.
142 Esim. Mylly 2013; Mylly ym. (toim.) 2007 erit. Lavapuron artikkeli; Mylly, LM 2004; 
Välimäki, LM 2004; Koillinen – Lavapuro 2002.
143 Mylly 2013 vrt. siinä viitattu Oeschin Järkeä tekijänoikeuslakiin -aloitteeseen kohdistama 
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Henkilökiertoa tapahtuu erityisesti OKM:n, oikeudenhaltijoiden ja niitä 
tukevien asianajotoimistojen välillä.144 Tutkijoiden työllistymismahdol-
lisuudet muualla rajoittuvat yksittäisiin paikkoihin ja vaihtoehdoksi jää 
siirtyminen toisiin tai yleisempiin juridiikan alan tehtäviin. Näillä seikoilla 
näyttää olevan vaikutusta alan toimijoiden tekijänoikeusideologian ja habi-
tuksen muotoutumiseen. Pienen alan sisältä käsin ei ole myöskään viisasta 
vähentää tekijänoikeuskentän painoarvoa ja vaikuttavuutta äänekkäillä 
puheenvuoroilla. Kansallisesti alalla vallitseekin sisäinen pidättyväisyys 
ja kritiikin kohdentamattomuus.145
4.3.4 Kamppailun päämäärät
Mistä kamppaillaan tai bourdieulaisittain mihin lainsäädäntökentällä saa-
vutettua pääomaa (vaikutusvaltaa) hyödynnetään? Kansainvälisesti oikeu-
denhaltijat ovat nähneet estomääräykset periaatteellisesti tärkeänä asiana, 
vaikka verkkoon päätyneessä sisäisessä esityksessä niiden myönnettiinkin 
olevan tehottomia loukkausten torjunnassa.146 Vastaavasti varoituskirjeme-
nettelyiden tehokkuus on kansainvälisissä tutkimuksissa jäänyt epäselväksi 
tai jopa osoittamatta.147 Kun estojen tehokkuus on kyseenalainen148, ja niitä 
halutaan toteuttaa satojen tuhansien eurojen kustannuksista huolimatta,149 
oikeudenhaltijoiden päämääränä on ilmeisesti edistää vahvaa tekijänoikeus-
ideologiaa tiukentamalla lainsäädäntöä, lisäämällä keinoja ja tuottamalla 
puheenvuoro.
144 Esimerkiksi OKM:n johtaja Jukka Liedes toimi ennen virkamiesuraa vuosina 1970–1980 
muun ohella Gramexissa ja sen hallituksen puheenjohtajana. Lisäksi hän on toiminut kym-
meniä vuosia muun muassa (oikeudenhaltijoiden kansoittaman) Suomen tekijänoikeudellisen 
yhdistyksen hallituksen puheenjohtajana, kansainvälisen ALAI-tekijäryhmän Suomesta 
raportoivana toimenpanevan komitean jäsenenä ja lukuisissa muissa vastaavissa tehtävissä. 
Asianajaja Pekka Tarkela toimi ennen asianajotoimisto Boreniukselle siirtymistään viiden 
vuoden ajan opetusministeriössä. Viestinnän keskusliiton Satu Kangas toimi 16 vuotta Teos-
ton ja sitä ennen neljä vuotta opetusministeriön palveluksessa. Asianajotoimisto Procopé 
& Hornborgin Lauri Rechardt toimii myös Musiikkituottajien toiminnanjohtajana. Hänen 
koko työhistoriansa koostuu toimimisesta tekijänoikeusjärjestöissä (Musiikkituottajat ja 
Gramex) tai niiden lukuun. Teoston Martti Kivistö on toiminut koko uransa tekijänoikeus-
järjestöissä, muun muassa Kopiostossa ja TTVK:ssa. (Lakimiesmatrikkeli 2014.)
145 Kansainvälisesti oikeustieteessä kritiikkiä ja vaikuttamista esiintyy huomattavasti 
enemmän, jopa valtaosin. Ks. esim. European Copyright Society 2013 vrt. ALAI report 
and opinion 2013. Keskustelu näistä on jatkunut oikeuskirjallisuudessa. Aiemmasta oikeus-
tieteellisestä direktiiveihin kohdistetusta kritiikistä ks. esim. Farrand 2014 s. 41–42, 46, 
162 viitteineen.
146 TorrentFreak 2012.
147 OKM 2013:13 s. 133–134; Giblin 2014 s. 183 ss.
148 Poort ym. 2014; Savola, OTJP 2013 s. 195–196.
149 Savola 2013b s. 63.
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uusia oikeudellisia tulkintoja.150 Tämä myös pönkittää niiden vaikutusvaltaa. 
Mikäli keinot hyväksytään, voidaan kehittää uusia, tehokkaampia keinoja 
tai uusia kohteita. Jos vaatimukset hylätään, tätä voidaan käyttää argu-
menttina oikeussuojan heikkoudelle ja tarpeelle korjata lainsäädäntöä.151
Käyttäjiin tunnistamistietojen luovuttamisen kautta kohdistettujen 
toimien tavoitteena ei ole korvausten saaminen. Tarkoituksena on käydä 
julkisuus- ja mielikuvasotaa: nostamalla pelotetta kiinnijäämisestä pyri-
tään saamaan ihmiset ajattelemaan, ettei piratismi kannata.152 Reagointia 
on perusteltu siten, ettei piratismia voi katsoa läpi sormien, sillä se kävisi 
liian kalliiksi. Etujärjestön toiminta-ajatus onkin ”jotain meidän täytyy 
tehdä”.153 Toisaalta on kysyttävä, onko tämä ”jotain” yhteiskunnan kannalta 
tehokasta, tarpeellista ja oikeutettua.154 Tämä pätee myös näillä motiiveilla 
esitettyihin lainsäädäntöehdotuksiin. Ehdotusten poliittinen uskottavuus ja 
tarve edellyttänevät myös aktiivisuutta täytäntöönpanokeinojen käytössä. 
On kuitenkin syytä tarkastella kriittisesti sitä, kuinka pitkälle meneviä ja 
millä perusteilla esitettyjä täytäntöönpanokeinoja hyväksytään.
Operaattoreihin kohdistuvilla keinoilla pyritään vastuuttamaan ope-
raattorit piratismin estotoimiin. Oikeudenhaltijoille olisi hyödyllistä 
lisätä nimenomaan operaattoreiden kustannuksella toteutettavia keinoja, 
koska tämän jälkeen ”kaltevaa pintaa” pitkin niitä voidaan myöhemmin 
syventää ja lisätä; kutakin yksittäistä pientä muutosta voi olla vaikea vas-
tustaa.155 Kustannuskysymyksellä on näin ollen myös suuri periaatteellinen 
merkitys kummallekin osapuolelle. Kansainvälisesti hakukoneyhtiöt ja 
tallennusalustat ovat joutuneet ottamaan käyttöön yhä moninaisempia 
keinoja, mutta toistaiseksi internet-yhteydentarjoajat ovat perustellusti 
välttyneet niiltä.156
150 Savola 2013b s. 65.
151 Ks. esim. Savola 2013b s. 51 ja esitetyt laajennukset luvussa 4.2.3.
152 OKM 2013:13 s. 14–15, 42–43; Koistinen 2013b.
153 Koistinen 2013a. Vastaavasti aiemmin The Pirate Bay -palveluun liittyen Beaumont 
2009: ”Given that such legal action does not appear to be producing the desired effect 
of stemming the tide of copyrighted material, it begs the question as to why the industry 
continues	to	fight	these	battles	in	court.	Mark	Mulligan	[Analyst	with	Forrester	Research]	
believes that the answer is quite simply because it has to be seen to be doing something. [... 
Writing	in	his	blog]:	ʼ If	the	music	industry	isn’t	seeing	to	be	taking	action	then	it	effectively	
turns	on	a	green	light	to	the	illegal	sectorʼ.”
154 Mm. symbolisen tekijänoikeusvalvonnan legitimiteetistä suhteellisuusarvioinnissa ks. 
Savola 2014.
155 Yksittäisillä sinänsä perusteltavilla laajennuksilla voidaan päätyä lopulta kokonaisuutena 
hyväksymättömään lopputulokseen (Schellekens 2011). Vastaavasti riskistä laajentumiseen 
muille kuin immateriaalioikeuden aloille ks. Pihlajarinne 2012 s. 150.
156 Ks. esim. OKM 2013:13 s. 47–48. Yhteydentarjoajien vastuu- ja toimintavapaus 
(SähköKL 13 §) on esimerkiksi tallennusvälittäjiä laajempi (15–16, 20 §).
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Vastaavasti operaattorit vastustavat teknisesti ongelmallisia tai kohdis-
tamisen osalta epämääräisiä keinoja ja erityisesti kustannuksia. Kyse on 
siitä, missä määrin operaattorin tulisi edistää oikeudenhaltijan liiketoimin-
nallisia intressejä.157 Tämä johtaisi keinotteluun, koska oikeudenhaltijoiden 
intressissä olisi yhä vain laajentaa keinoja. Toisaalta tulisi varmistaa, että 
operaattorille korvattavat kustannukset ovat todellisia, kohtuullisia ja 
perustuvat oikeudenhaltijoiden tarpeisiin.
Täyden kuluvastuun malli edistäisi sopimista vastakkainasettelun ase-
mesta. Oikeudenhaltijat voisivat itse kontrolloida keinojen käyttöä ja koh-
dentamista eikä niiden myöskään kannattaisi ehdottaa uusia keinoja, elleivät 
ne olisi valmiita niitä kustantamaan.158 Kuluvastuu varmistaa, että keinoja 
esitetään ja käytetään järkevästi.159 Lisäksi myös tehokkaammat keinot ovat 
mahdollisia, jos intressi on riittävä. Intressi punnitsisi oikeudenhaltijan 
uskoa keinojen tehokkuuteen ja vaikutukseen suhteessa niistä aiheutuviin 
kustannuksiin. Kyse onkin pohjimmiltaan siitä, kenen tulisi kantaa riski 
keinojen tehottomuudesta. Koska oikeudenhaltijat saavat väitetyt hyödyt 
keinoista, olisi perusteltua katsoa, että niiden tulee myös kantaa tähän liittyvä 
riski.160 Kovin kestävää ei olisi se, että riskit ja kustannukset ulkoistetaan 
internet-operaattoreille, mutta mahdolliset hyödyt kerätään itselle.
5 LOPUKSI
Kaaviossa 1 on hahmoteltu edellisen luvun analyysin perusteella kentän 
toimijoita ja niiden suhteellisia valta-asemia. Vaaka-akselilla on kuvattu 
suhtautumista tekijänoikeuteen ja pystyakselilla vaikutusvaltaa kamppai-
lussa. Tällä tekijänoikeuden sektorilla yhtenäisiä oikeudenhaltijoilla on 
vastavoimia – vaikkakin hajanaisia – tavallista enemmän. Varsinkin vai-
kutusvalta on vaikeasti mitattavissa. Arviot ovat näin ollen subjektiivisia 
ja korkeintaan suuntaa antavia.
157 Vastaavasti ks. LaVL 5/2005 vp s. 9. Sinänsä yhteisiäkin intressejä on, sillä monilla 
operaattoreilla on esimerkiksi lisäpalveluita, jotka kärsivät piratismista.
158 Kirjemenettely on esimerkki tehottomuudesta valmistelussa. Voimavaroja tuhlataan, 
jos perustavista kysymyksistä (kustannusten määrä, kohdentuminen ja maksuhalukkuus) 
ei – mielellään jo esivalmistelussa – ole päästy yhteisymmärrykseen. Ks. myös alaviite 
32. Vrt. Isossa-Britanniassa on useamman vuoden kestäneen valmistelun jälkeen päädytty 
malliin, jossa oikeudenhaltijat maksavat operaattoreille 75 % kirjemenettelyn perustamis-
kustannuksista ja korvausta järjestelmän operoimisesta (TorrentFreak 2014).
159 Täysi kuluvastuu tunnistamistietojen luovuttamisesta on nimenomaisesti tarkoitettu 
suuntaamaan toimia tarkoituksenmukaisiin tapauksiin (LaVL 5/2005 vp s. 9).
160 Ks. Pihlajarinne 2012 s. 147; Savola, OTJP 2013 s. 199.
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Kaavio 1. Kentän toimijoiden positiot ja valtasuhteet.
Laajapohjaiset ja oikeudenhaltijoista muodostuneet valmisteluelimet näyt-
tävät tulleen tiensä päähän ja lainvalmistelu siirtyneen enemmän virkatyönä 
tehtäväksi. Tämä ei ole täysin toivottava kehityspiirre, sillä lainvalmistelun 
laatu kärsii. Parempi olisi käyttää laajemmin neutraaleja asiantuntijoita ja 
tasapainottaa edustusta valmisteluelimissä. Niissä asioissa, joissa oikeu-
denhaltijat ovat yksimielisiä, 1–2 yhteistä edustajaa riittäisi tehokkaan 
työryhmän toimintaan. Jää nähtäväksi, onko viranomaisvalmistelussa kyse 
vain väliaikaisesta ilmiöstä vai laajemmasta muutoksesta – tai enteileekö se 
suppeampien asiantuntijapainotteisten valmisteluelinten paluuta. Niin ikään 
tieteellisten asiantuntijoiden kuulemisen vähäisyys on merkille pantavaa. 
Myös erimielisyyden hallinnointiin olisi toivottavaa saada läpinäkyvyyttä 
ja määrälliset lausuntojen arviointikriteerit tulisi eksplisiittisesti hylätä. 
Lainvalmistelijan rooli etenkin virkatyönä tehtävässä valmistelussa onkin 
hyvin merkittävä ja siihen tulisi kiinnittää huomiota.
Lainvalmistelijoiden kriittisyys eturyhmiltä tulevia paineita vastaan 
olisi vahvan poliittisen ohjauksen ohella ainoa tapa muidenkin intressien 
laajaan huomioimiseen ja tasapainoiseen sääntelyyn. Tämä olisi tiettyyn 
pisteeseen asti tavoiteltavaa myös kansantaloudellisesta näkökulmasta.161 
Poliittinen ohjaus voi kuitenkin vaihtaa suuntaa nopeasti. Jyrki Kataisen 
hallitusohjelman mukaan lainsäädäntöä on kehitettävä ja sen täytäntöönpa-
noa tehostettava. Tämä johti loppuvuonna 2013 puolentoista vuoden hiljai-
161 Kellomäki 2010 s. 65 ss. Farrand siteeraa tekijänoikeuden tutkijoiden yhä enenevässä 
määrin	kriittistä	konsensusta	(2014	s.	50):	”In	todayʼs	copyright	culture,	more	than	ever,	
legislators are no longer the primary arbiters of public policy. Instead, they are hostages 
of strong lobby groups whose interests usually prevail over those of the general public.” 
(Zemer 2006 s. 140.).
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selon jälkeen kiireiseen valmisteluun.162 Toisaalta hallitusohjelma sinänsä 
toteutuisi varsin pienelläkin muutoksella. Hallituksen esityksen antaminen 
laajasta muutospaketista163 oli epärealistisesti aikataulutettu toukokuulle 
2014.164 Tätä kirjoittaessa kesäkuussa 2014 tämä ei ollut vielä toteutunut, 
ja epäselvää on, ehditäänkö esitystä käsitellä tällä eduskuntakaudella.
Havainnot eturyhmien välisistä kamppailuista sekä lainvalmistelijan 
roolista voidaan selittää niin lainsäädäntökenttään sovelletun Bourdieun 
valtateorian kuin kriittisen lainsäädäntöteorian avulla. Viitekehykset tarjo-
sivat toisiaan tukevaa teoreettista kiinnikettä havainnoille. Lainsäädäntö-
teoria toi esille muun muassa epärationaalisuuden ja tässä pohjimmiltaan 
konkretisoituneen erimielisyyden hallinnoinnin ongelman. Pääoma ja 
kentän osallistujien rajaaminen selittivät tekijänoikeuden eksklusiivisuutta. 
Bourdieun viitekehys ohjasi tutkimusta kamppailun päämääriin sekä toimi-
jatahojen ja henkilöiden tarkkaan selvittämiseen. Kritiikin henkilöitymisen 
välttämiseksi tässä ei ole kuitenkaan arvuuteltu esimerkiksi henkilöiden 
asennoitumista, kytköksiä ja ministeriön valmistelutoimia. Tässä mielessä 
teoriasta ei otettu kaikkea irti. Tämä antaisi myös mahdollisuuksia jatko-
tutkimuksille.
162 Hallitusohjelmakirjaus ja kulttuuriministerin toimeksianto 7.10.2013, ks. OKM 2013:13 
s. 132, 138. Aiemmin toimikunnan mietinnöstä (OKM 2012:2) annetut lausunnot eivät 
johtaneet konkreettisiin toimenpiteisiin.
163 Lakiehdotus sisältäisi myös sellaisia muutoksia, joita ei ole tässä käsitelty.
164 Valtioneuvoston kanslia 2014 s. 21. Erikoista on, ettei perustuslakivaliokunnan arviota 
katsota tarvittavan.
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LEGISLATIVE POWER STRUGGLE TO EXPAND 
COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT THROUGH INTERNET 
SERVICE PROVIDERS
This article examines the legislative power struggle where copyright hold-
ers pursue adoption and expansion of copyright enforcement mechanisms 
through Internet connectivity providers. The participants, their positions 
and power are examined from the legal policy and sociology perspective 
based on Bourdieu’s power and critical legislative theories. Lobbying is 
prevalent	 in	 lawmaking	 in	 so-called	 ‘legislative	field’.	We	 see	 that	 the	
countless numbers of various copyright stakeholders and representatives 
have	a	rather	strong	position	within	the	field.	Internet	service	providers,	
industry and users lack coherence and resources to compete with them in 
equal terms. The goal of right holders appears to be to introduce new means 
of enforcement and make the existing ones more extensive at the expense 
of	internet	service	providers.	Others	criticize	inter	alia	the	distribution	of	
expenses, law drafting, and ineffectiveness of the means. They suggest 
that instead the solution should be to address the problem at its source or 
by	modernizing	the	business	models.	It	appears	that	at	least	for	the	mo-
ment	preparatory	bodies	previously	filled	with	the	representatives	of	right	
holders are not being used, resorting to the drafting by civil servants. This 
also	implies	significant	risks	to	the	quality	of	legislation.	Right	holders’	
information power over other participants through supplying data to sup-
port their own agenda also tends to result in imbalanced results. In any 
case, this situation requires attention and critical appraisal from supposedly 
neutral	parties,	particularly	law	drafting	officials.
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1. Johdanto
Tunnistamistiedolla tarkoitetaan tietoverkosta peräisin olevaa, viestinnän välit-
tämisessä käytettyä käyttäjään tai tilaajaan yhdistettävissä olevaa tietoa, esimer-
kiksi IP-osoitetta.1 Tunnistamistiedot ovat luottamuksellisia eikä niitä saa käsi-
tellä ilman lain säännöstä ja silloinkin vain välttämättömässä laajuudessa. Myös-
kään teleyritys ei saa kerätä, luovuttaa tai käsitellä tietoja muuten kuin laissa 
säädetyin tarkoin rajatuin perustein.2 Ne ovat luottamuksellisen viestinnän pe-
rusoikeussuojan piirissä, mutta vaikka tunnistamistietojen suojan on katsottukin 
jäävän ydinalueen ulkopuolelle, niiden salaisuuteen puuttuvien rajoitusten on 
täytettävä perusoikeuksien rajoittamisen yleiset edellytykset.3 Yksityiselämään 
1 Valmistelussa olevassa tietoyhteiskuntakaaressa »tunnistamistieto» ehdotetaan korvatta-
vaksi samansisältöisellä, mutta havainnollisemmalla »välitystiedon» käsitteellä. Tällä pyritään 
välttämään sekaannus erilaisiin tunnistautumispalveluihin ja korostamaan, että kyse on vies-
tinnän välittämisen yhteydessä kerätystä tiedosta, eikä esimerkiksi viestinnän osapuolten ke-
räämästä tiedosta (Hallituksen esitys tietoyhteiskuntakaareksi, lausuntoluonnos 4.4.2013 s. 86). 
Viestien välittämisen yhteydessä käsiteltävä IP-osoite, joka on puhelinnumeroa vastaava tieto-
verkon laitteen yksilöivä numerosarja, on miltei poikkeuksetta tunnistamistieto, ks. HE 
125/2003 vp sähköisen viestinnän tietosuojalaiksi ja eräiksi siihen liittyviksi laeiksi s. 46; 
Tietosuojaryhmän lausunto 4/2007 henkilötietojen käsitteestä (WP 136) s. 16–17; Jussi Päivä-
rinne: IP-osoitteen juridinen luonne ja käyttäjän yhteystietojen selvittäminen tekijänoikeuslain 
60 a §:n perusteella. Defensor Legis 2013 s. 196–215, s. 197–202; Joachim Enkvist – Magnus 
Westerlund: Personuppgiftsskydd – med särskild betoning på profilering. JFT 2/2013 s. 85–113, 
s. 91–94; Antti Innanen – Jarkko Saarimäki: Internetoikeus, 2. uud. p., Edita. 2012 s. 76–79, 
92–94.
2 Luottamuksellisuudesta säädetään sähköisen viestinnän tietosuojalain (516/2004, jäljem-
pänä SVTsL) 4–5 §:ssä ja käsittelyperusteista erityisesti 8–14 a §:ssä. Luonnolliseen henkilöön 
yhdistettävissä oleva IP-osoite voi olla tunnistamistiedon ohella tai asemesta myös henkilötie-
to, mutta tällä ei ole tässä juuri merkitystä (Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 202). SVTsL:n sääntely on 
ehdotettu yhdistettäväksi ja osin uudistettavaksi tietoyhteiskuntakaareen, mutta kovin merkit-
täviä muutoksia tämän tarkastelun osalta ei ole kuitenkaan odotettavissa.
3 PeVL 29/2008 vp s. 2; PeVL 23/2006 vp s. 3; PeVL 9/2004 vp s. 4; Innanen – Saarimäki 
2012 s. 26–29. IP-osoitteen merkitystä vain tunnistamistietona eikä merkityksellisenä osana 
luottamuksellista viestintää voidaan myös jäljempänä kuvatusti kritisoida. Aiemmin ydinalueen 
koskemattomuutta käytettiin lähinnä käänteisesti, legitimaatioperusteena reuna-alueen suurem-
malle liikkumavaralle. Tuoreempaa perustuslakivaliokunnan lausuntokäytäntöä voidaan pitää 
tässä mielessä positiivisena merkkinä, mutta toisaalta linja ei ole ehkä vielä vakiintunut, vaik-
ka siihen on muun muassa uuden pakkokeinolain televalvonnan laajennuksissa viitattukin 
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ja luottamuksellisen viestinnän suojaan liittyvät perusoikeudet ovatkin luoneet 
julkiselle vallalle suojaamisvelvoitteen myös yksityisten välisessä ho ri-
sontaalisuhteessa.4 
Kirjoituksessa on tarkoitus systematisoida ja arvioida perusoikeusnäkökul-
masta tunnistamistietojen luovuttamismääräyksiä keskittyen erityisesti tekijän-
oikeuslain (404/1961, jäljempänä TekL) luovuttamismääräykseen ja poliisilain 
(872/2011, jäljempänä PolL) tiedonsaantioikeuteen näitä vastaaviin pakkokei-
noihin vertaillen.5 Tarkoituksena on tuoda esiin tekijänoikeudellisen luovutta-
mismääräyksen soveltamiskäytännön ongelmakohtia, poliisilain tiedonsaantioi-
keuden epäsuhtaisuutta verrattuna telepakkokeinosääntelyyn ja telepakkokeino-
jen käyttöedellytysten laajentumista. Tarkastelen vain Internet-yhteydentarjoa-
jien (jäljempänä Internet-operaattori tai operaattori) yhteydentarjoamiseen liit-
tyvää IP-osoitteiden käsittelyä.6 Rajaan tarkastelun ulkoisista vaatimuksista 
johtuviin luovuttamisvelvoitteisiin, enkä käsittele tietojen omaehtoista käsitte-
lyä tai kansainvälisiä luovutuksia. En myöskään tarkastele lähemmin sinänsä 
ongelmallista ja oikeusturvaan liittyvää kysymystä siitä, kuka IP-osoitetta on 
tosiasiassa käyttänyt.7
Yksityiselämän suojaa tietoverkossa on erilaisten intressien vuoksi pyritty 
kovertamaan, ja niin ikään tunnistamistietojen sensitiivisyys on korostunut, hyö-
dyntämisintressin merkitys kasvanut ja käsittely helpottunut.8 Internet-konteks-
(PeVL 66/2010 vp s. 7). Ydinalueargumentaatiosta laajemmin ks. esim. Veli-Pekka Hautamäki: 
Perusoikeuden ydinalue argumenttina. Lakimies 2011 s. 82–98, erit. s. 96–98.
4 PeVL 9/2004 vp s. 2; HE 309/1993 vp perustuslakien perusoikeussäännösten muuttami-
sesta s. 53. Ks. laajemmin Innanen – Saarimäki 2012 s. 13–18, 333. Esimerkkeinä yleisem-
mästä velvoitteen laiminlyönnistä ks. EIT 2.12.2002, K.U. v Suomi (2872/02), 46–50 kohta ja 
EIT 17.7.2008, I v Suomi (20511/03), 33–38, 44, 48–49 kohta.
5 TekL 60 a §:ää käsitelleestä ansioituneesta esityksestä ks. Päivärinne DL 2013 erit. 
s. 204–214. Poliisin tehtävistä keskityn vain rikosten selvittämiseen. Pidän tarkastelussa läh-
tökohtana 1.1.2014 voimaan tulevaa poliisi- ja pakkokeinolainsäädäntöä, mutta vertailen tätä 
myös olennaisissa kohdin aiempiin säännöksiin (VanhaPolL, 493/1995 ja VanhaPKL, 
450/1987).
6 Internet-operaattoreita koskevista näkökulmista laajemmin ks. Pekka Savola: Internet-
operaattori ja perusoikeudet. Teoksessa Tapani Lohi (toim.): Oikeustiede–Jurisprudentia 
XLVI:2013. Suomalaisen Lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja s. 127–221.
7 Lähtökohta on, ettei Internet-liittymän haltijalla ole legaalista vastuuta liittymää käyttäen 
muiden tekemistä teoista, eikä hänellä ole myöskään erityistä huolenpitovelvollisuutta liitty-
mästä. Liittymäsopimukseen mahdollisesti sisältyviin ehtoihin tai niiden pätevyyteen en mene 
tässä. Vastuun kohdentuminen pelkistyykin useimmiten kysymykseen näytöstä ja sen arvioin-
nista. Oikeuskäytännössä eräässä tapauksessa langattoman lähiverkon haltijan ei katsottu olleen 
vastuussa loukkauksesta; toisessa tapauksessa näyttöenemmyysperiaatteeseen nojautuen hovi-
oikeus katsoi, että liittymän haltija oli tehnyt teon (Ylivieska-Raahen käräjäoikeus 14.5.2012 
(L 11/3769) vrt. Itä-Suomen hovioikeus 4.10.2012 (S 12/306) (ei lv.)). Ks. myös Päivärinne 
DL 2013 s. 201–202; Pekka Savola: Internet-operaattoreihin kohdistetut tekijänoikeudelliset 
estomääräykset erityisesti vertaisverkkopalvelun osalta. Tekniikan lisensiaattityö. Aalto-yli-
opisto. 2013 s. 49, 177–178; Richard Clayton: Online traceability: who did that? Technical 
expert report on collecting robust evidence of copyright infringement through peer-to-peer fi-
lesharing. Consumer Focus (26.7.2012) s. 16–17, 26–35.
8 Laajemmin ks. Päivikki Karhula (toim.): Paratiisi vai panoptikon? Näkökulmia ubiikki-
yhteiskuntaan. Eduskunnan kirjasto. 2008 s. 48–61, 141–161, 162–190. Kansainvälisesti ks. 
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tissa tunnistamistiedoilla on huomattavasti suurempi merkitys kuin käsin syöte-
tyillä henkilötiedoilla, koska tunnistamistiedoilla voidaan luoda kytkös tietover-
kon tapahtumien ja henkilöiden välille. Myös perusoikeuksien ja turvallisuuden 
tasapaino on järkkynyt yksityisyyden ja tietosuojan alalla, kun tietojen vaihtoa, 
seurantaa ja toimivaltuuksia on lisätty, mutta perusoikeuksia suojaavat säännök-
set ovat jääneet hajanaisiksi.9 
Tunnistamistietojen merkitys viestin sisällön luottamuksellisuuden kannal-
ta olikin aiemmin »puhelinaikaan» vähäinen eikä perustuslakivaliokunta 
1990-luvun loppupuolella katsonut tunnistamistietojen paljastumisen loukkaa-
van viestinnän luottamuksellisuuden suojaa.10 Verkkoaikakaudella esimerkiksi 
käytetyt palvelut ja vieraillut sivustot paljastavat enemmän kuin tieto puhelun 
osapuolista. Tunnistamistietojen hyödyntäminen onkin hyvin laajaa, ja tietoja 
käytetään muun muassa rikosten ennaltaehkäisyyn ja selvittämiseen, mainonnan 
kohdistamiseen, tekniseen kehittämiseen ja yrityssalaisuuksien luvattoman pal-
jastamisen selvittämiseen.11 Operaattorilla voi olla myös oma taloudellinen int-
ressi käyttäjien yksityisyyden loukkauksiin.12
Elävöitän aiheen käsittelyä vertaamalla sitä ns. Chisugate-tapauksessa esil-
le nousseisiin kysymyksiin, jotka havainnollistavat eri osapuolten näkökulmia 
tunnistamistietojen säilyttämiseen, luovuttamiseen ja rikosselvittämisintres-
siin.13 Tapauksessa vasta ilmestynyttä musiikkialbumia jaettiin vertaisverkossa, 
ja oikeudenhaltijoiden edustaja piti kirjaa jakajista 13.–14.10.2011 saaden sel-
ville 67 jakajan IP-osoitteet.14 18.11.2011 vireille pannun hakemuksen johdosta 
käräjäoikeus katsoi 5.1.2012 annetussa päätöksessä yksittäisenkin uutuusäänit-
teen jakamisen olleen toimintaa, jossa jokaisesta yksittäisestä teleliittymästä 
saatettiin yleisön saataviin tekijän oikeuksien suojan kannalta merkittävässä 
määrin suojattua aineistoa, ja määräsi luovuttamaan IP-osoitetta vastaavien te-
leliittymien haltijoiden tiedot. Oikeudenhaltijoiden valvontajärjestö kirjelmöi 
esimerkiksi Keith M. Richards: The Dangers of Surveillance. Harvard Law Review 2013 
s. 1934–1965; Michael A. Froomkin: The Death of Privacy? Stanford Law Review. Vol 52. 
Issue 5. 2000 s. 1461–1544.
9 Tuomas Ojanen: Perus- ja ihmisoikeudet terrorismin vastatoimissa Euroopan unionissa. 
Lakimies 2007 s. 1053–1074, s. 1072–1073; Riitta Ollila: Turvallisuus ja urkinta. Lakimies 
2005 s. 781–791, s. 783, erit. alaviite 10.
10 PeVL 7/1997 vp s. 1–2; Innanen – Saarimäki 2012 s. 27–28. 
11 Innanen – Saarimäki 2012 s. 28–29, 32; Jan van Dijk: The Network Society. 3rd Edition. 
SAGE Publications. 2012 s. 120–127. IP-osoitteena käytetyn tunnistamistiedon merkitys vies-
tinnän salaisuudelle onkin huomattavasti suurempi kuin perinteisesti perusoikeuksia arvioi-
taessa on tiedostettu.
12 Laajemmin ks. Paul Ohm: The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance. University of 
Illinois Law Review. Vol 2009. Issue 5 s. 1417–1496, erit. s. 1422–1437.
13 Vaikka kyse onkin käräjäoikeustasoisesta ratkaisusta ja poliisin toiminnasta, tämä osaltaan 
myös demonstroi tilanteen ongelmallisuutta: kysymyksiin ei ole eikä luultavasti tulla myöskään 
saamaan ylempien oikeusasteiden kannanottoja. Laajasti viimeaikaisia ratkaisuja tarkastellen 
ks. Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 204–213.
14 Tavallisesti jokainen lataaja on myös vähintään latauksen ajan aineiston jakaja.
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liittymän haltijoille, kehottaen oikeudellisten toimenpiteiden uhalla sopimaan 
hyvityksestä ja kulujen korvaamisesta. Kun eräs liittymän haltija ei suostunut 
vaatimukseen, asiasta tehtiin rikosilmoitus ja myöhemmin poliisi suoritti koti-
etsinnän ja takavarikoi liittymän haltijan 10-vuotiaan lapsen käytössä olleen 
tietokoneen. Sittemmin asia sovittiin ja esitutkinta lopetettiin.15
2. Tunnistamistietojen tallentaminen ja erityissäilyttäminen
Internet-operaattorilla ei ole velvollisuutta tallentaa tunnistamistietoja.16 Tyypil-
lisesti tietoja on kuitenkin kerättävä omaan käyttöön esimerkiksi palvelun to-
teuttamista, laskutusta tai teknisten vikojen selvittämistä varten.17
Operaattorin omaan tarkoitukseen tallentamia tiettyjä tietoja on säilytettävä 
12 kuukautta viranomaisten mahdollista tulevaa erityistä käyttöä varten (SVTsL 
14 a §, ns. data retention).18 Tämän säilytysvelvollisuuden ulkopuolisia tietoja 
voidaan poistaa niin halutessa.19 Säilytysvelvollisuuden alaisia tietoja voidaan 
käyttää vain PKL 10:6.2:ssa säädettyjen, televalvontaan oikeuttavien rikosten 
selvittämisessä. Vanhassa pakkokeinolaissa kyse oli rikoksista, joista säädetty 
ankarin rangaistus oli eräin laajennuksin vähintään neljä vuotta vankeutta.20 
Edellytystä on voimaan tulevassa pakkokeinolaissa lievennetty huomattavasti 
15 Eduskunnan apulaisoikeusasiamies 10.12.2012 (Dnro 4565/4/12) s. 1–4; HelKO 5.1.2012 
(11/47251) s. 3–5; EFFI: Apulaisoikeusasiamiehen päätös Chisugatesta – lakimuutos tarvitaan 
(12.12.2012). 
16 Ks. Innanen – Saarimäki 2012 s. 28–29. Sananvapauden käyttämisestä joukkoviestinnäs-
sä annetun lain (460/2003, jäljempänä SananvapL) säätämisen yhteydessä esitettiin viestien 
tunnistamistietojen tallentamisvelvollisuutta, mutta perustuslakivaliokunta katsoi, että tallen-
nus tulisi toteuttaa SVTsL:n yhteydessä yhteisin perustein ja poisti säännöksen (ehdotettu 7 §). 
SVTsL:ia säädettäessä ei kuitenkaan onnistuttu löytämään yksityiselämän suojan kannalta tar-
koituksenmukaista ratkaisua, poliisin tiedonsaantioikeuksien katsottiin olevan riittäviä eikä 
tallentamisvelvollisuudesta säädetty siinäkään. (PeVM 14/2002 vp s. 6; HE 125/2003 vp s. 18, 
36.)
17 SVTsL 10.4 §:ssä säädetään, että teleyrityksen on säilytettävä laskun määräytymiseen 
liittyviä tietoja vähintään kolme kuukautta laskun eräpäivästä tai tunnistamistietojen tallenta-
misesta. Vallalla on käsitys, että operaattorin tulisi säilyttää IP-osoitetietoja vähintään kolmen 
kuukauden ajan (ks. esimerkiksi HE 235/2010 vp laeiksi tekijänoikeuslain 60 a §:n ja sähköisen 
viestinnän tietosuojalain muuttamisesta (rauennut) s. 14). Tämä käsitys on nähdäkseni kuiten-
kin virheellinen, koska useimmissa tapauksissa laskutuksen tai laskun määräytymisen kannal-
ta operaattorille riittää muu tieto asiakkuudesta, eikä tätä tarkoitusta varten asiakkaan kunakin 
ajanhetkenä käyttämien IP-osoitteiden kirjaaminen tai säilyttäminen ole tarpeen.
18 Laajemmin ks. Innanen – Saarimäki 2012 s. 28–29, 212–218; Sanna Helopuro ym.: Säh-
köisen viestinnän tietosuoja. 2. uud. p. Talentum. 2009 s. 148–159. Viranomainen vastaa säi-
lyttämiskustannuksista (SVTsL 14 b §).
19 Rikoksen selvittämisen ajaksi voidaan antaa erityinen määräaikainen määräys tietojen 
säilyttämisen jatkamisesta (SVTsL 14b.2 §, pakkokeinolaki (806/2011), jäljempänä PKL, 
8:24.2). Nyt käsiteltävässä siviiliprosessissa ei tällaisia turvaamistoimenpiteitä ole, ja sellaista 
ehdotettiin lisättäväksi TekL 60 a §:ään, mutta esitys raukesi (HE 235/2010 vp).
20 TekL 60 a § ei ole oikeuttanut erityissäilytettyjen tietojen käyttöön aiemminkaan (HE 
235/2010 vp s. 13–14).
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siten, että teleosoitetta tai -päätelaitetta käyttäen tehdyissä rikoksissa edellyte-
tään enää vähintään kahden vuoden rangaistusmaksimia.21 
Operaattori voi toteuttaa erityissäilyttämisen määrittelemällä tarkan tai kes-
kimääräisen käsittelyajan omaa tarvetta varten tai siirtämällä tunnistamistiedot 
sen omaan erilliseen säilytysjärjestelmään.22 Tämä selkeyttäisi sitä, onko kysei-
nen tunnistamistieto luovutettavissa yleisesti ottaen vai vain PKL 10:6.2:ssa 
säädetyin edellytyksin.
Chisugate-tapauksessa jakaminen tapahtui 13.–14.10.2011, asia tuli vireille 
18.11.2011 ja käräjäoikeus antoi päätöksen 5.1.2012. Tyytymättömyyttä ei il-
moitettu, ja päätös tuli lainvoimaiseksi 13.1.2012. Ensimmäisenä mahdollisena 
täytäntöönpanohetkenä oli siis kulunut jo kolme kuukautta tapahtumasta. Mikä-
li operaattori ei olisi enää tarvinnut tunnistamistietoja omaan käyttöönsä, tiedot 
olisivat jo voineet siirtyä erityissäilytyksen piiriin, eikä niitä olisi voinut luovut-
taa.23 Yksityisoikeudellinen hakemusasia ei myöskään täytä SVTsL 14 a §:ssä 
säädettyä edellytystä, jonka mukaan erityissäilytyksessä olevia tietoja voidaan 
käyttää vain rikoksen tutkimiseksi, selvittämiseksi ja syyteharkintaan saattami-
seksi.24 Tuomioistuinten tulisikin kiinnittää aiempaa enemmän huomiota mää-
räyksen sanamuotoon, etteivät ne määräisi lainvastaisesti tietoja luovutettavak-
si.25
21 PeVL 66/2010 vp s. 6–7; LaVM 44/2010 vp s. 24. Kun sääntelyä ei ole sidottu rikostyyp-
peihin, sen piiriin tulee myös muun muassa (tietoverkossa tehty) tekijänoikeusrikos, jonka 
rangaistusmaksimi on kaksi vuotta vankeutta. Aiemmin televalvontaan oikeuttivat ilman edel-
lytyksiä automaattiseen tietojärjestelmään kohdistuneet hyökkäystyyppiset rikokset, eikä sään-
nös »enää vastannut tämän päivän rikostutkinnallisia tarpeita» ja siten sitä haluttiin moderni-
soida ja sen soveltamisalaa laajentaa (HE 222/2010 vp esitutkinta- ja pakkokeinolainsäädännön 
uudistamiseksi s. 124, 321), mutta perustuslakivaliokunnan lausunnon johdosta soveltamis-
edellytyksiä oli täsmennettävä. Muutos sääntelytavassa johti siihen, että tietojärjestelmiin koh-
distuneet rangaistusmaksimin alittavat rikokset eivät enää täyttäisi edellytystä, ja tältä osin 
sääntelyä on ehdotettu laajennettaviksi teleosoitetta tai -päätelaitetta käyttäen tehtyihin auto-
maattiseen tietojenkäsittelyjärjestelmään kohdistuneisiin eräisiin lievempiin rikoksiin (HE 
14/2013 vp laeiksi esitutkintalain ja pakkokeinolain muuttamisesta sekä eräiksi niihin liitty-
viksi laeiksi s. 18–21, 52–53).
22 Viestintäviraston määräys 53A/2011M tunnistamistietojen tallentamisvelvollisuudesta, 
7 §.
23 HE 235/2010 vp s. 13. Edellä todetusti operaattorin ei välttämättä tarvitse säilyttää tieto-
ja edes kolmea kuukautta. On epäilty, että jos kokonaisprosessin kesto lähenisi kolmea kuu-
kautta, operaattori ei ehkä enää säilyttäisi tietoja. Tiettävästi luovuttamismääräysten täytän-
töönpano ei ole kuitenkaan toistaiseksi estynyt tietojen poistamisen johdosta. (HE 235/2010 
vp s. 13; Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 206 alaviite 70.)
24 Näin myös HE 158/2007 vp laiksi sähköisen viestinnän tietosuojalain muuttamisesta s. 18, 
jossa viitataan vain poliisin oikeuteen saada säilytettyjä tietoja. Niin ikään taustalla olevan data 
retention -direktiivin (2006/24/EY) 17 perustelukappaleen ja 4 artiklan mukaan erityissäilytet-
tyjä tietoja saa luovuttaa yksinomaan kansallisesti säädetyille toimivaltaisille viranomaisille. 
Asianomistajan yksityisoikeudellinen rikosselvittämisintressi ei tätä edellytystä täytä. 
25 Päätöslauselmissa on vain yksikantaan määrätty luovuttamaan tiedot, ks. myös HE 
235/2010 vp s. 13–14. Tuomioistuimen tulisi joko muotoilla määräykseen erityissäilytyksestä 
riippuva soveltamisedellytys tai selvittää operaattorilta, onko tietoja ylipäätänsä (enää) olemas-
sa ja ovatko ne vielä omassa käytössä vai erityissäilytyksessä ja huomioida tämä ratkaisua 
antaessaan.
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3. Tunnistamistietojen luovuttaminen yksityisille
3.1. Säännökset ja perusoikeusarvioinnin lähtökohdat
SananvapL 17 §:n mukaan tuomioistuin voi määrätä lähettimen, palvelimen tai 
muun sellaisen laitteen ylläpitäjän luovuttamaan verkkoviestin lähettämisessä 
tarpeelliset tunnistamistiedot vaatimuksen esittäjälle, jos on todennäköisiä syitä 
epäillä viestin olevan sisällöltään sellainen, että sen toimittaminen yleisön saa-
taville on säädetty rangaistavaksi. Soveltamiskriteerit on määritetty varsin tark-
karajaisesti. Vaatija vastaa ylläpitäjälle luovuttamisesta aiheutuneista kohtuulli-
sista välittömistä kustannuksista.26
TekL 60 a §:n mukaan tekijällä tai hänen edustajallaan on oikeus tuomiois-
tuimen määräyksellä saada lähettimen, palvelimen tai muun sellaisen laitteen 
ylläpitäjältä taikka muulta välittäjänä toimivalta palvelun tarjoajalta yhteystie-
dot sellaisesta teleliittymästä, josta tekijän oikeuksien suojan kannalta merkit-
tävässä määrin saatetaan yleisön saataviin tekijänoikeudella suojattua aineistoa 
ilman tekijän suostumusta. Lakivaliokunnan mukaan kyse on luovutusedellytyk-
siä rajoittavasta säännöksestä ja tuomioistuimen tehtävänä on valvoa, että mer-
kittävyyskynnys ylittyy. Niin ikään korvausvelvollisuudella on haluttu ohjata 
selvittämistä tekijänoikeuden suojan toteuttamisen kannalta merkityksellisiin 
tapauksiin.27 Kontrollimekanismin toimivuus voidaan tosin kyseenalaistaa, sillä 
tiettävästi yhtä viimeaikaista ratkaisua lukuun ottamatta kaikki hakemukset on 
hyväksytty.28 Tekijän tai hänen edustajansa on korvattava luovuttamismääräyk-
sen täytäntöönpanosta aiheutuneet kulut sekä mahdollinen vahinko. Myös Inter-
net-operaattorin mahdolliset oikeudenkäyntikulut kuulunevat täytäntöönpano-
kuluina korvattaviksi.29
26 Laajemmin ks. HE 54/2002 vp laiksi sananvapauden käyttämisestä joukkoviestinnässä ja 
eräiksi siihen liittyviksi laeiksi s. 75–78; Innanen – Saarimäki 2012 s. 331–334.
27 LaVL 5/2005 vp s. 8–9; Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 208–209. Laajemmin ks. Päivärinne DL 
2013 s. 204–214; Marika Siiki: Tietoyhteiskunnan tekijänoikeusdirektiivin 8 artiklan menette-
lysääntöjen täytäntöönpano Suomessa. Defensor Legis 2009 s. 172–185, s. 177–178; Kristiina 
Harenko ym.: Tekijänoikeus. Kommentaari ja käsikirja. WSOYpro. 2006 s. 539–545.
28 Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 204–205. Hylkäävä päätös annettiin vastikään, ks. HelKO 
28.11.2012 (H 12/57279). Tätä edeltävistä lähteistä niin ikään ilmenee, että kaikki hakemukset 
oli hyväksytty, ks. HE 235/2010 vp s. 14; HelKO 11.6.2012 (H 11/51554) s. 14; Petteri Järvi-
nen: Näin piraatti kärähtää. Tietokone 8/2009 s. 42; Siiki 2009 s. 177 alaviite 51. Vrt. telepak-
kokeinoasioissa vuosittain noin 3500 lupahakemuksesta hylätään (vain) noin 10, ks. Johanna 
Niemi – Virve-Maria de Godzinsky: Oikeusturva telepakkokeinoasioissa. Lakimies 2009 
s. 555–574 s. 567–570. Niin ikään monet päätösten perustelut olivat hyvin kaavamaisia, ja ti-
lanne on tutkimuksen (aineisto oli vuodelta 2005) jälkeen huomattavasti kohentunut (Juha 
Haapamäki: Poliisin salaisen tiedonhankinnan valvonnasta. Teoksessa Eduskunnan oikeusasia-
mies 90. 2009 s. 191–201, s. 195–196). Vastaavasti telepakkokeinoista ja myös vangitsemis-
asioita koskevista oikeudenkäynneistä ks. Matti Kuuliala: Tuomioistuimen roolit ja rutiinit. 
Lakimies 2006 s. 727–749, s. 734–738.
29 Harenko ym. 2006 s. 544–545. Tähän viittaa myös se, että hakemuksissa on oikeuden-
käyntikulut-otsikon alla todettu hakijoiden vastaavan täytäntöönpanosta aiheutuvista kuluista, 
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Yksityisille luovuttamisessa tyypillistä on, että tietoja voi käyttää hyväksi 
vain määriteltyyn käyttötarkoitukseen, eikä yleinen hyväksikäyttö ole mahdol-
lista. Sekä SananvapL 17 §:ää että TekL 60 a §:ää sovelletaan useita kymmeniä 
kertoja vuodessa.30 Keskityn kuitenkin tässä vain viimeksi mainittuun.
Tekijänoikeuslain säännöksen taustalla olevat direktiivit eivät velvoita jä-
senvaltioita säätämään oikeudesta saada tunnistamistietoja siviiliprosessissa. Jos 
tästä on kuitenkin säädetty, se on toteutettava niin, että perusoikeuksien välillä 
vallitsee asianmukainen tasapaino.31 Useissa EU-maissa yksityisten välisestä 
luovutusvelvollisuudesta on säännöksiä.32 
Yksityisten välillä perusoikeusarvioinnin lähtökohdaksi tulee ottaa horison-
taalinen yksilöiden välinen suhde: oikeudenhaltijan omaisuudensuoja vastaan 
väitetyn loukkaajan yksityiselämän suoja ja sananvapaus.33 Omaisuudensuojal-
le voitaisiin pyrkiä hakemaan tukea myös vertikaalirelaatiosta, sillä onhan teki-
jänoikeusrikos kriminalisoitu, ja julkisen vallan tulisi yleisen järjestyksen ni-
missä torjua rikollisuutta ja toisaalta myös edistää omaisuudensuojan toteutu-
mista.34 Kuitenkin perusoikeudet ensisijaisesti rajoittavat rikosoikeudellisten 
keinojen käyttöä, ja ne voivat vain toissijaisesti perustella kriminalisointeja, jos 
muut keinot eivät ole osoittautuneet riittäviksi.35 Aiemmin kriminalisointi näh-
ks. esimerkiksi HelKO 28.11.2012 (H 12/57279), hakemus s. 9. Laskutetut kulut ovat ilmei-
sesti tyypillisesti suuruusluokaltaan 60–250 euroa (HE 235/2010 vp s. 20).
30 TekL 60 a §:n soveltamista kuvaa se, että vuonna 2008 tehtiin 55 hakemusta ja vuonna 
2009 82 hakemusta (HE 235/2010 vp s. 14). Helsingin käräjäoikeuteen tehtiin hakemuksia 
vuonna 2011 95 kpl, vuonna 2012 87 kpl ja vuonna 2013 kesäkuun alkupuolelle mennessä 
21 kpl (Helsingin käräjäjäoikeus, sähköposti 13.6.2013). SananvapL 17 §:n mukaisia asioita 
tuli Helsingin käräjäoikeuteen vuonna 2012 noin 40–50 kappaletta (Helsingin käräjäoikeus, 
osastonjohtaja Sirkka Jäntti, sähköpostit 3.6.2013). Viimeksi mainitut hakemukset ilmeisesti 
miltei poikkeuksetta liittyvät esitutkintaan (ks. esimerkiksi HelHO 12.9.2012 (R 12/1519)).
31 EUT 19.4.2012, Bonnier Audio (C-461/10), 52–60 kohta; EYT 19.2.2009, LSG v Tele2 
(C-557/07), 28–29 kohta; EYT 29.1.2008, Promusicae v Telefonica Espana (C-275/06), 62–70 
kohta.
32 Irini A.Stamatoudi: Data Protection, Secrecy of Communications and Copyright: Conflicts 
and Convergences – The Example of Promusicae v. Telefonica. Teoksessa Irini A. Stamatoudi 
(ed.): Copyright enforcement and the Internet. Kluwer Law International s. 199–231, s. 223–
230.
33 Tekijänoikeuden perusoikeussuoja ei ole ehdoton ja sitä voidaan tarkastella monipuolises-
ti ja kriittisesti. Kokoavasti ks. esimerkiksi Taina Pihlajarinne: Internetvälittäjä ja tekijänoi-
keu den loukkaus. Lakimiesliiton Kustannus. 2012 s. 31–46; Heikki Kemppinen: Uusi tekijän-
oikeus? Näkemyksiä tekijänoikeuden suhteesta perus- ja ihmisoikeuksiin. Pro gradu -tutkielma. 
Valtiosääntöoikeus. Oikeustieteellinen tiedekunta. Helsingin yliopisto. 2011 erit. s. 54–62.
34 Perusoikeuksista voidaan johtaa velvoite säätää kriminalisointeja, jotka ovat välttämättö-
miä perusoikeuden turvaamiseksi ulkopuolisilta loukkauksilta (PeVL 23/1997 vp s. 2–3). Jul-
kiselle vallalle voidaan niin ikään hahmottaa velvoite riittävän turvaamistason tarkkailijana 
(Pekka Länsineva: Perusoikeudet ja varallisuussuhteet. Suomalaisen Lakimiesyhdistyksen jul-
kaisuja. A-sarja N:o 235. 2002 s. 134–135, 140).
35 Veli-Pekka Viljanen: Perusoikeuksien rajoittaminen. Teoksessa Pekka Hallberg ym.: Pe-
rusoikeudet. 2. uud. p. WSOYpro. 2011 s.139–170, s. 160; Veli-Pekka Viljanen: Perusoikeuk-
sien rajoitusedellytykset. WSLT. 2001 s. 340–345.
Tunnistamistietojen luovuttamismääräykset ja telepakkokeinot 893
tiinkin ennen muuta perusoikeuksia toteuttavaksi kuin niitä rajoittavaksi toimek-
si, mutta lähtökohta on sittemmin muuttunut.36
Näin ollen suhtaudun torjuvasti vertikaali-intressin käyttämiseen rajoitta-
mista puoltavana seikkana, etenkin kun kyse on asianomistajarikoksesta ja kun 
julkisella vallalla on myös yksityiselämän suojan turvaamisvelvollisuus. Koska 
kriminalisointi on toteutettu oikeudenhaltijan intressin vuoksi, olisi kehäpäätel-
mä käyttää rikollisuuden torjumista sinänsä oikeudenhaltijan perusoikeuden 
turvaamista puoltavana argumenttina. Tekijänoikeussuoja ei liene turvallisuu-
teen verrannollinen yhteiskunnan kannalta tärkeä kollektiivinen intressi.37 Näen-
näisestä osittaisesta vertikaaliasetelmasta huolimatta punninta tulisi suorittaa 
yksinomaan horisontaalisuhteessa.
3.2. Yksiasianosaisprosessin ongelmia ja vertailu telepakkokeinoihin
TekL 60 a §:n keskeisin arviointikriteeri on merkittävyyskynnys, eli se, onko 
teleliittymästä saatettu yleisön saataville tekijän oikeuksien suojan kannalta 
merkittävässä määrin tekijänoikeuden suojaamaa aineistoa. Tämä kriteeri jäi 
lainsäädännössä kokonaan tuomioistuimen arvioitavaksi.38 Ongelma korostuu, 
koska kyse on hakemusasiasta, jossa on vain yksi asianosainen, hakija oikeu-
denhaltijan edustajana.39 Internet-operaattori on asiaan osallinen (kuultava), eikä 
hakijalla ole vastapuolta, jolla olisi intressiä riitauttaa hakijan vaatimuksia tai 
hakea muutosta kyseenalaisiin päätöksiin.40 Koska liittymän haltijaa ei vielä 
tiedetä, häntä ei voida kuulla, ja tältä osin asiassa on runsaasti yhtymäkohtia 
salaisten telepakkokeinojen käyttöedellytysten tuomioistuinkäsittelyyn.
Hakemusasiassa tuomioistuin arvioi esitetyn vaatimuksen hyväksymisen 
edellytyksiä.41 Tässä roolissa väitetyn loukkaajan »puolustajana» toimii tuomio-
istuin itse vastaavalla tavoin kuin salaisissa telepakkokeinoasioissa.42 Pakkokei-
36 Sakari Melander: Kriminalisointiteoria – rangaistavaksi säätämisen oikeudelliset rajoituk-
set. Suomalaisen Lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja. A-sarja N:o 288. 2008 s. 158–159. Laajem-
min kriminalisoinnista, viimesijaisuudesta ja perusoikeuksista ks. mts. 94–97, 157–160, 344–
346, 395–402.
37 Esimerkiksi televalvontaan oikeuttavilta rikoksilta edellytetään, että ne ovat törkeystasol-
taan yhteiskunnan tai yksilön turvallisuutta vaarantavia, joista esimerkkeinä mainitaan törkeät 
väkivalta- ja valtiopetosrikokset tai huumausainerikokset (PeVL 67/2010 vp s. 4 ja lähemmin 
jäljempänä alaviite 67).
38 Säännös lisättiin vasta eduskunnan lakivaliokunnassa, eikä myöskään esitöistä ole juuri 
apua tulkinnassa.
39 Yksiasianosaisuudesta laajemmin ks. esimerkiksi Matti Kuuliala: Edunvalvontaan esitetyn 
kuuleminen alioikeudessa. Suomalaisen Lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja. A-sarja N:o 303. 
2011 s. 98–113.
40 Internet-operaattori voisi toki myös katsoa periaatteellisesti tärkeäksi vastustaa ja tarvit-
taessa hakea muutosta kyseenalaisiin päätöksiin, mutta tällainen aktivismi voisi aiheuttaa kus-
tannuksia henkilötyönä ja oikeudenkäyntikuluina, ja operaattorin olisi harkittava, onko tämä 
liiketoiminnallisesti perusteltua.
41 Tuula Linna: Hakemuslainkäyttö. Juridica-kirjasarja. Talentum. 2009 s. 24. 
42 Vastaavasti ks. Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 212 erit. alaviite 111.
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nojen yhteydessä korkein oikeus on edellyttänyt, että tuomioistuimen tehtävänä 
on valvoa epäillyn ja sivullisten etuja silloin, kun ne eivät itse sitä voi tehdä.43 
Tällainen tilanne ei ole aiemmin tullut hakemuslainkäytössä nimenomaisesti 
esiin, koska kaikki intressantit ovat asiaan osallisia ja heille varataan kuulemis-
tilaisuus, ja näin mahdollisuus osallistua asian käsittelyyn turvataan.44 Hakemus-
lainkäytön periaatteiden soveltuminen tällaisissa tapauksissa onkin hiukan ky-
seenalaista, ja samankaltaisuuksien vuoksi analoginen tulkinta pakkokeino-
asioista voisi olla tarpeen. Esimerkiksi telepakkokeinoja koskevat asiat on käsi-
teltävä istunnossa, jotta tuomarilla olisi edellytykset selvittää pakkokeinon 
lainmukaisia edellytyksiä, mutta vastaavaa edellytystä tunnistamistietojen luo-
vuttamisen osalta ei ole.45 Eräissä tapauksissa telepakkokeinoasioissa eräänlai-
seksi puolustajaksi määrätään erityinen julkinen asiamies, jonka roolia tulisi 
kuitenkin tehostaa ja käytön alaa laajentaa.46
Laillisuusvalvojien suorittama »valvonnan valvonta» on oikeudenkäyntiin 
nähden pakostakin yleisluontoista.47 Pakkokeinolakia säädettäessä eduskunta 
edellytti hallitukselta selvitystä siitä, tulisiko nykyisten valvontajärjestelmien 
lisäksi perustaa erityinen asiantuntijoista koostuva toimielin, joka valvoisi esi-
tutkintaviranomaisten toimintaa.48
Yksipuolinen prosessi, jossa ratkaisut eivät päädy ylempien oikeusasteiden 
arvioitavaksi eikä oikeuskäytäntö yhdenmukaistu tai joudu kriittisen arvioinnin 
kohteeksi, vaikuttaa kyseenalaiselta väitetyn loukkaajan oikeusturvan ja oikeus-
käytännön kehittymisen näkökulmasta. De lege ferenda luovuttamisessa tulisi 
vahvemmin soveltaa salaisiin pakkokeinoihin liittyviä periaatteita tai harkita, 
43 KKO 2009:54, 9 kohta; KKO 2007:7, 4–6 kohta. Laajemmin »ex-parte» -prosessin oikeus-
turvasta vastaavassa asiayhteydessä ks. Tuomas Metsäranta: Yksilön oikeusturva pakkokei-
nolain mukaisten telekuuntelun ja teknisen kuuntelun käytössä. Pro gradu -tutkielma. Valtio-
sääntöoikeus. Oikeustieteellinen tiedekunta. Turun yliopisto. 2009 s. 40–49.
44 Linna 2009 s. 20–21. Asiaan osallisen kuulemisvelvollisuuden tarkoitus voidaan hahmot-
taa asian selvittämiseen tai oikeusturvatarkoitukseen, jolla viitataan aineellisen lainsäädännön 
suojaamaan intressiin asiassa (Kuuliala 2011 s. 103–104). Nyt käsillä olevassa lainsäädännös-
sä ei ole tästä säännöksiä. Yleisesti ottaen kuulemisen merkitystä on korostettu etenkin silloin, 
kun hakemuksella pyritään puuttumaan yksilön perusoikeuksiin (mts. 113).
45 Tunnistamistietojen luovuttamisen hakemusasialuonne poikkeaa telepakkokeinojen van-
gitsemisjärjestyksessä käsiteltävistä erillisasioista, joten prosessuaaliset lähtökohdat asioiden 
käsittelylle ovat erilaisia (Linna 2009 s. 88–89, 94). Nyt käsillä olevat hakemusasiat käsitellään 
pääsääntöisesti kansliassa, vaikka asia olisikin riitainen, mutta ne käsitellään istunnossa tuo-
mioistuimen niin harkitessa tai jos joku asiaan osallinen sitä vaatii (mts. 151–156).
46 PeVL 67/2010 vp s. 10; Klaus Helminen ym.: Esitutkinta ja pakkokeinot. Uudistettu laitos. 
Talentum. 2012 s. 718–719, 1076–1077 (Helminen ym. 2012a); Metsäranta 2009 s. 45–48; 
Kuuliala LM 2006, s. 736.
47 Haapamäki 2009 s. 195–196, 199–200; Jukka Lindstedt: Turvallisuus, kontrollipolitiikka 
ja laillisuusvalvonta. Lakimies 2007 s. 1006–1037, s. 1029–1031. Ensisijainen kontrollimeka-
nismi pakkokeinojen osalta tulisi olla poliisin sisäinen valvonta ja esimiestyö (Haapamäki 2009 
s. 197–199). 
48 PeVL 67/2010 vp s. 3; LaVM 44/2010 vp lausumat. Selvitystyö on ollut tarkoitus aloittaa 
ennen uuden pakkokeinolain voimaantuloa, mutta se on lykkääntynyt kiireellisempien pakko-
keinolain muutosten vuoksi (Hallituksen vuosikertomus 2012. Osa 4/4: Toimenpiteet eduskun-
nan lausumien ja kannanottojen johdosta. Hallituksen julkaisusarja 4/2013 s. 31–32).
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olisivatko tavoitteet toteutettavissa pakkokeinosääntelyn avulla kysymysten eri-
tyispiirteiden vuoksi huonosti soveltuvan hakemuslainkäytön asemesta. Niin 
ikään valvontaelimen, julkisen asiamiehen tai muun puolustajan käyttö voisi olla 
tarkoituksenmukaista.
3.3. Merkittävyyskynnyksestä erityisesti Chisugate-tapauksessa
TekL 60 a §:n mukaiset hakemukset ovat perinteisesti kohdistuneet yli tuhannen 
musiikkikappaleen jakamiseen, mutta tuoreemmissa ratkaisuissa, kun käytössä 
on ollut toinen vertaisverkkotekniikka, kysymystä on jouduttu arvioimaan uu-
sista lähtökohdista.49 Uudemmassa oikeuskäytännössä on huomioitu ainakin 
teoksen uutuusaste ja sen tuottamiseen ja markkinointiin käytetyt varat sekä se, 
kuinka laajasti teos on ollut saatavilla.50 Keskeisempää kuitenkin olisi se, kuin-
ka kauan kyseisestä liittymästä on jaettu teosta, mikä monissa tapauksissa kor-
reloi myös jakamisesta aiheutuneisiin taloudellisiin tappioihin eli siihen, kuinka 
paljon teosta on kopioitu tai kuinka monella on ollut mahdollisuus ladata teos.51 
Tällaista selvitystä tai argumentaatiota ei kuitenkaan ole tiettävästi esitetty.52
Chisugate-tapauksessa hakemuksessa vedottiin levyjulkaisun merkittävyy-
teen, ensimmäisen kuukauden aikaisten tulojen osuuteen kokonaismyyntitulos-
ta ja julkaisuun suositussa The Pirate Bay -palvelussa.53 Täydennyslausumassa 
49 Aiemmin laajemmassa käytössä olleessa DirectConnect-tekniikassa oikeudenhaltijan on 
ollut mahdollista helposti selvittää jonkun käyttäjän jaossa olevien tiedostojen määrä (Päivä-
rinne DL 2013 s. 210; Siiki DL 2009 s. 177). Nykyisin yleisemmässä BitTorrent-tekniikassa 
oikeudenhaltijan on hankalaa selvittää kaikkia käyttäjän jakamia teoksia, mutta teoskohtaises-
ti on mahdollista selvittää sen jakajat, ja tästä johtuen valvonta onkin kohdistunut yksittäisiin 
uutuuslevyihin. BitTorrent-tekniikkaa koskevissa luovuttamismääräyksissä jaettujen tiedosto-
jen määrä onkin ollut varsin vähäinen, 9–15 kappaletta, eli ilmeisesti kyse on ollut ainoastaan 
yhdestä musiikkialbumista. (Päivärinne DL 2013, s. 210–211.)
50 Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 211–212.
51 On ilmeistä, että jakaminen muutamien kymmenien minuuttien tai tuntien ajan (esimer-
kiksi silloin, kun käyttäjä itsekin lataa teosta) on merkitykseltään mitätöntä verrattuna siihen, 
että teos on aktiivisessa jaossa esimerkiksi kuukauden ajan. Toisaalta yksittäisen albumin pit-
käkestoinen jakaminen on niin ikään laajemmassa tarkastelussa vähämerkityksellistä huomat-
tavia teosmääriä käsittävään laajamittaiseen jakamiseen verrattuna, vaikkakin yksittäisen jaka-
jan ja oikeudenhaltijan välisessä relaatiossa muiden oikeudenhaltijoiden teoksiin kohdistuneel-
la jakamisella ei liene merkitystä. Ainoassa hylätyssä tapauksessa käräjäoikeus katsoi, ettei 
lataaminen (oikeastaan jakaminen) 86 kertaa voi yksinään tai yhdessä uutuusjulkaisun jakami-
senkaan kanssa täyttää merkittävässä määrin -kriteeriä, ks. HelKO 28.11.2012 (H 12/57279) 
s. 7–8 ja hakemus s. 6; Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 213.
52 Monitorointimahdollisuuksista laajemmin ks. esimerkiksi Tom Chothia ym.: The Unbear-
able Lightness of Monitoring: Direct Monitoring in BitTorrent. Teoksessa Security and Pri vacy 
in Communication Networks. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social 
Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering. Volume 106. 2013 s. 185–202 ja siinä mai-
nitut lähteet; Scott Wolchok – J. Alex Halderman: Crawling BitTorrent DHTs for Fun and 
Profit. Teoksessa Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT). 
2010. Jo nyt valvontakampanjat saattavat kestää päiviä tai viikkoja (HelKO 28.11.2012 (H 
12/57279), hakemus s. 6), mutta kunkin jakajan osalta tuloksia raportoidaan vain yksittäisen 
havainnon tai koelatauksen ajankohdan perusteella. 
53 HelKO 5.1.2012 (11/47251), hakemus s. 7–8.
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todettiin, että merkittävissä määrin -kriteeri täyttyisi jo sillä perusteella, mikä 
taloudellinen merkitys hakemuksessa yksilöidyllä albumilla oli hakijoille ja että 
aineiston kappalemäärä yksinään ei olisi edellytyksenä kriteerin täyttymiselle.54 
Jos tarkasteltaisiin 67 jakajan yhteisvaikutusta, kokonaisuutena kriteeri saattai-
si mahdollisesti täyttyä.55 Kuitenkin kyse on perusoikeusarvioinnista, jossa vas-
takkain on kukin yksittäinen jakaja ja oikeudenhaltija, ja lisäksi TekL 60 a §:n 
esitöiden ja miltei vastaavasti säännöksen sanamuodon mukaan merkittävyyttä 
tulee arvioida liittymäkohtaisesti (korostus lisätty):
»Sen mukaan tietoja voitaisiin luovuttaa vain sellaisen liittymän osalta, jos-
ta tekijän oikeuksien suojan kannalta merkittävässä määrin saatetaan ylei-
sön saataviin tekijänoikeutta loukkaavaa aineistoa.»56 
Tässä tapauksessa käräjäoikeus täydennyspyyntöä muotoillessaan ilmeises-
ti tunnisti ko. »yksilöidystä teleliittymästä» -kriteerin, vaikka lopulta hyväksyi-
kin vaatimuksen sen kummemmin perustelematta.57 Merkittävyyttä tekijän oi-
keuksien suojan kannalta argumentointiin edellä kuvatulla tavalla, mutta toises-
sa vaakakupissa olisi syytä pitää muun muassa kunkin yksittäisen jakajan mer-
kitys tekijän oikeuksien suojan kannalta, tekijän taloudellinen asema ja julkai-
sun kaupallisen menekin väheneminen tai perusteltu arvio siitä.58 
Teoksen lyhytaikainen jakaminen ei ole, varsinkaan nimenomaan yksittäi-
sen jakajan ja oikeudenhaltijan välisessä relaatiossa, kovin merkittävää tekijän 
oikeuksien suojan kannalta, mutta hyvin pitkäaikainen jakaminen voi sitä olla.59 
Yksilötarkastelussa ei ole myöskään merkitystä sillä, kuinka paljon jakajia ky-
54 HelKO 5.1.2012 (11/47251), täydennyslausuma 8.12.2011 s. 3–4. Yleisesti ottaen oikeu-
denhaltijat ovat pyrkineet perustelemaan kriteerin täyttymistä muun muassa 1) vastikään jul-
kaistulla teoksella, joka on vuoden tärkeimpiä julkaisuja, 2) teoksen tuottamiseen ja markki-
nointiin käytetyillä investoinneilla, 3) uusien teosten ensimmäisen kuukauden aikana tapahtu-
van myynnin merkityksellä kokonaismyynnin kannalta, 4) jakamisella suositussa tiedostonja-
kopalvelussa eli kohdeyleisön laajuudella ja 5) sillä, että merkittävissä määrin -kriteeri täyttyi-
si jo oikeudenhaltijan subjektiivisen taloudellisen merkityksen vuoksi (Päivärinne DL 2013 
s. 211).
55 Vrt. kuitenkin alaviitteessä 51 mainittu kielteinen päätös, jossa katsottiin, ettei 86 jakajaa 
täyttänyt edellytyksiä.
56 LaVL 5/2005 vp s. 9.
57 HelKO 5.1.2012 (11/47251), täydennyslausuma 8.12.2011 s. 3. Yleisesti ottaen kriteerin 
täyttymistä on perusteltu ratkaisuissa heikosti tai ei lainkaan, vaikka asianmukaisiin peruste-
luihin olisi oikeudellisen tulkinnanvaraisuuden ja yksityisyyden suojan vuoksi erityinen syy 
(Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 213–214).
58 Menestyneelle ja kymmeniä tai satoja tuhansia teoskappaleita myyneelle tekijälle merkit-
tävyyskynnys lienee syytä pitää korkeammalla kuin silloin, jos kyse on pienemmästä julkai-
susta, jolloin suhteessa vähäisempikin jakaminen voi vaikuttaa tekijän oikeuksien suojan kan-
nalta erityisen haitallisesti.
59 Tapauksessa ei tarkasteltu jakamisen ajallista kestoa, ja näin ollen on mahdotonta myös-
kään eritellä, kenen jakajien toimet olivat merkittäviä tekijän oikeuksien suojan kannalta. Oi-
keudellinen yhdenvertaisuus edellyttää, että samanlaiset tapaukset ratkaistaan samalla tavalla, 
kun taas erilaiset tapaukset eri tavalla. Tässä tapauksessa loukattiin viimeksi mainittua yksilöl-
listävän oikeudenmukaisuuden vaatimusta, kun kaikkia jakajia käsiteltiin niiden loukkauksen 
merkittävyyttä erittelemättä samalla tavalla.
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seistä aineistoa jakavassa ryhmässä on.60 Niin ikään teoksia kyseisestä jakaja-
ryhmästä ladanneiden käyttäjien määrällä ei tulisi olla yksilötarkastelussa rat-
kaisevaa merkitystä.61 Taloudellisista näkökohdista huomionarvoista on se, 
kuinka suuri prosentuaalinen tai absoluuttinen tappio laittomasta jakamisesta 
voisi arvion mukaan aiheutua.62 Tässä tapauksessa muutama päivä hakemuksen 
vireille panemisen jälkeen albumi oli reilun kuukauden kuluessa ilmestymises-
tä »myynyt tuplaplatinaa» (40 000 kpl).63 Kun otetaan huomioon artistin aiempi 
menestys ja ennätyksellinen myynti jo hakemusta vireille pantaessa, ensimmäi-
sen vuorokauden aikana 67 jakajaa voidaan pitää määrältään jopa yllättävän 
vähäisenä, sillä jos jokainen lataaja toimii useimmiten myös jakajana, lataajia-
kaan ei ilmeisesti ollut kovin paljon enemmän. Niin ikään kunkin yksittäisen 
jakajan ja oikeudenhaltijan välisessä perusoikeusarvioinnissa kunkin jakajan 
jakamisen ajallista kestoa tai muuta merkittävyyttä ei eritelty ja sen merkitys 
olisi ilmeisesti joka tapauksessa ollut vähäinen. 
Näin ollen jakajien toiminnalla tuskin oli kovin merkittävää vaikutusta lop-
putulokseen.64 Tapauksessa ei ollut viitteitä eri intressejä punnitsevasta koko-
60 Itse asiassa mitä enemmän jakajaryhmässä (»swarm») on jakajia, sitä vähäisempi on yk-
sittäisen jakajan ja teleliittymän merkitys. Tästä näkökulmasta hyvin pienissä jakajaryhmissä 
yksittäisen jakajan merkitys on suurempi. Kokonaisloukkauksen tarkastelu edellyttäisi tulkin-
taa sanamuodon vastaisesti ja muutenkin kyseenalaisesti tapauksen KKO 2010:47 14–22 koh-
dan ja KKO 2010:48 9–14 kohdan rikosoikeudellista osallisuusoppikonstruktiota vastaavasti 
hyödyntävällä tavalla. Korkeimman oikeuden tapauksissa kyse oli kuitenkin tiedostonjakopal-
velun ylläpitäjien ja palveluun kuvaustiedostojen lisänneen käyttäjän vastuusta, ja oikeusohje 
ei sellaisenaan soveltune varsinkaan hetkelliseen aineiston jakamiseen tai soveltaminen vähin-
tään edellyttäisi perusteellista tarkastelua.
61 Oikeudenloukkaus on toki sinänsä merkittävämpi, mitä enemmän jaettua teosta kokonai-
suudessaan jakajaryhmästä ladataan. Merkittävyyskynnyksen on katsottu täyttyneen, jos jaka-
jaryhmästä ladattiin teosta yli tuhat kertaa kuukaudessa silloin, kun kyseinen jakaja oli aktii-
vinen tai viimeistään seuraavien kuukausien aikana (HelKO 10.6.2013 (H 13/20791) s. 10–11). 
Tämä ei kuitenkaan vielä osoita, että kyseisestä teleliittymästä olisi jaettu aineistoa merkittä-
vässä määrin. Kriteerin täyttyminen edellyttäisi edellä mainittua rikosoikeudelliseen osalli-
suusoppiin perustuvaa konstruktiota, johon hakijat tapauksessa analogisesti vetosivatkin, mut-
ta jota ei käsitelty ratkaisun perusteluissa (mts. 6).
62 Koska on mahdotonta tietää, kuinka paljon teoksia myytäisiin ilman laitonta jakamista, 
tämän vaikutusta on tyydyttävä arvioimaan (vastaavasti ks. Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 212, erit. 
alaviite 108). Ainoassa hylätyssä hakemuksessa käräjäoikeus katsoi, etteivät hakijat olleet esit-
täneet selvitystä jakamisen vaikutuksesta levyn myynnille, vaikka sitä olisi ollut esitettävissä, 
ks. HelKO 28.11.2012 (H 12/57279) s. 7; Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 213.
63 HelKO 5.1.2012 (11/47251), täydennyslausuma 8.12.2011. Lokakuisesta julkaisuajankoh-
dasta huolimatta kyse oli toiseksi eniten myydystä kotimaisesta albumista vuonna 2011 (63 429 
kappaletta), ks. IFPI: Myydyimmät kotimaiset albumit vuonna 2011. Artistin edellinen albumi 
oli myynyt samana vuonna tuplaplatinaa kokonaismyynnin ollessa tähän mennessä reilut 
50 000 kpl.
64 Oikeastaan vaikutus on saattanut olla jopa positiivinen, koska eräiden osin kiisteltyjen 
tutkimusten mukaan jakaminen lisää levymyyntiä ja vertaisverkkoa käyttävät joka tapauksessa 
kuluttavat musiikin ostamiseen keskimääräistä enemmän varoja, ks. esimerkiksi Luis Aguiar 
– Bertin Martens: Digital Music Consumption on the Internet: Evidence from Clickstream 
Data. European Commission Joint Research Center Technical Reports. Institute for  Prospective 
Technological Studies. Digital Economy Working Paper 2013/04; Robert G. Hammond: Profit 
Leak? Pre-Release File Sharing and the Music Industry. SSRN working papers series (last 
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naisarvioinnista.65 Myös perusoikeusnäkökulmasta punninta omaisuudensuojan, 
yksityiselämän suojan ja sananvapauden välillä olisi johtanut toiseen lopputu-
lokseen.
4. Tunnistamistietojen luovuttaminen viranomaisille
4.1. Kontrollipolitiikan tiukentamisesta yleisen edun nimissä
Perusoikeuksien rajoittamista voidaan tarkastella yksityisten välisten horison-
taalisuhteiden ohella myös yhteiskunnallisista intresseistä käsin. Näistä tärkein 
lienee rikollisuuden torjunta laajasti ymmärrettynä, ja useimmat horisontaaliset 
perusoikeusloukkaukset ovatkin tavalla tai toisella kriminalisoituja. 2000-luvun 
alussa huomio keskittyi erityisesti varsin vakaviin ja erityisluonteisiin rikoksiin 
kuten terrorismiin, mutta myös esimerkiksi huumausainerikosten tai järjestäy-
tyneen rikollisuuden torjunnan on toisinaan katsottu vaativan järeitä keinoja.66 
Yksilön tai yhteiskunnan turvallisuutta vaarantaviksi katsotaan muun muassa 
törkeät väkivalta- ja valtiopetosrikokset sekä jopa perusmuotoiset huumausai-
nerikokset.67 Erilaisten uhkien jälkeen usein esitetään uusia tiedonhankinta-, 
säilytys- tai luovutuskeinoja, ja kontrollipolitiikka on tiukentunut muun muassa 
pakkokeino- ja poliisilakien muutoksissa: pakkokeinojen määrä on kasvanut, 
soveltamisala on laajentunut ja teknisen kehityksen myötä ne ovat myös saaneet 
uuden sisällön.68
2000-luvun alussa käytiin vilkasta keskustelua henkilökohtaisen turvalli-
suuden ja muiden perusoikeuksien rajoittamisesta arvioitaessa asiaa rajoituspe-
rusteen hyväksyttävyyden näkökulmasta.69 Perustuslakivaliokunta korosti, että 
yhteiskunnallinen intressi soveltuu rajoitusperusteeksi vain ääritapauksessa ja 
revised 3.4.2013); Joe Karagani – Lennart Renkema: Copy Culture in the US & Germany. The 
American Assembly. Columbia University. 2013; TorrentFreak.com: Sony Music Boss: Cen-
sored YouTube Videos Cost Us Millions (24.2.2012).
65 Vain yhdessä tapauksessa on pyritty vakavasti otettavaan kokonaisarviointiin ja epäillyn 
ja operaattorille aiheutuvien haittojen huomiointiin, ks. Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 212–213; Hel-
KO 28.11.2012 (H 12/57279) s. 7.
66 Laajemmin kontrollin lisääntymisestä ks. Lindstedt LM 2007 s. 1008–1018. Tällainen 
kriminaalipolitiikka ja sen toimivuus on kuitenkin kyseenalaistettavissa (Tapio Lappi-Seppälä: 
Kriminaalipolitiikka – rikosoikeuspolitiikka. Lakimies 1998 s. 1285–1308, s. 1303–1306). 
Uudeksi haasteeksi on viime aikoina mainittu myös kyberturvallisuus.
67 PeVL 67/2010 vp s. 4; HE 309/1993 vp s. 54.
68 PeVL 11/2005 vp passim; Lindstedt LM 2007 s. 1018–1027; Ojanen LM 2007; Ollila LM 
2005 s. 786–787, 790–791. Esimerkiksi uudessa pakkokeinolaissa televalvonnan edellytyksiä 
lievennettiin siten, että teleosoitetta tai -päätelaitetta käyttäen tehdystä rikoksesta edellytetään 
aiemman neljän vuoden asemesta vain vähintään kahden vuoden rangaistusmaksimia ja vas-
taavissa olosuhteissa suostumusperusteisen televalvonnan edellytykset poistuivat kokonaan.
69 Laajemmin ks. Viljanen 2001 s. 159–184. Tästä tiivistetysti ks. Länsineva 2002 s. 137–
140.
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että muidenkin yleisten rajoitusedellytysten tulee samalla täyttyä.70 Vaikka int-
ressi katsottaisiinkin sinänsä joissain rajoissa hyväksyttäväksi, sen täytyisi lä-
päistä myös muut osatestit ja erityisesti suhteellisuustesti. Perusoikeuksien tur-
vaamisvelvoite ei voi myöskään toimia rajoitusten yleisenä legitimaatioperus-
teena eikä jonkin perusoikeuden kuten henkilökohtaisen turvallisuuden pääteh-
tävänä voi olla muiden perusoikeuksien rajoitusten legitimoiminen. Oikeus 
henkilökohtaiseen turvallisuuteen (yksilöllisenä oikeutena) tulisikin pitää mah-
dollisimman pitkälle erillään yleisen järjestyksen ja turvallisuuden (kollektiivi-
nen hyvä) käsitteistä.71
Turvallisuutta edistäviä toimenpiteitä voidaan oikeuttaa ainakin ehdotto-
mien perusoikeuksien turvaamisella, mutta oletettujen ja etäisten uhkakuvien 
mukaan toimiminen on torjuttava, sillä tällöin tarkkailusta voi aiheutua laajem-
pia ongelmia kuin uhkakuvista.72 Toisaalta positivistisesta näkökulmasta edus-
kuntalailla tapahtuva kontrollipolitiikan lisääminen turvallisuuden nimissä voi-
daan nähdä sinänsä legitiiminä.73 Perustuslakivaliokunta ei uutta pakkokeinola-
kia ja poliisilakia säädettäessä hyväksynyt televalvonnan laajentamista kaikkiin 
teleosoitteita tai päätelaitteita käyttäen tehtäviin rikoksiin, koska kaikilta osin 
kyse ei enää ollut yksilön ja yhteiskunnan turvallisuutta vaarantavista, aiempaa 
törkeysastetta vastaavista rikoksista. Kannanottoa voidaan tosin pitää siinä mie-
lessä ponnettomana: sen yleisluontoisuus johti siihen, että tältä osin edellytetty 
rangaistusmaksimi aleni vähintään kahdeksi vuodeksi vankeutta. Tämä tosi-
asiassa toi valvonnan piiriin huomattavan määrän sellaisiakin rikoksia, jotka 
eivät kriteereiltään vastanneet aiemman pakkokeinolain sääntelyä tai perustus-
lakivaliokunnan esittämää törkeysedellytystä.74
4.2. Luovuttaminen rikosten selvittämiseksi ja muihin tarkoituksiin
Asianomistajan ohella pidättämiseen oikeutettu virkamies tai syyttäjä voi vaatia 
tuomioistuimelta SananvapL 17 §:n mukaista tiedon luovuttamista. Säännöstä 
70 PeVL 5/1999 vp s. 2. Laajemmin ks. Viljanen 2001 s. 175–178.
71 Viljanen 2001 s. 178–181, 184.
72 Ollila LM 2005 s. 788–791.
73 Lindstedt LM 2007 s. 1031–1035.
74 PeVL 67/2010 vp s. 3–5; PeVL 66/2010 vp s. 6; LaVM 44/2010 vp s. 24. Rajan valintaa 
perusteltiin vaikeudella poimia kattavasti niitä rikoksia, jotka olisivat tässä yhteydessä merki-
tyksellisiä ja toisaalta neljää vuotta lievempi seuraava merkittävä rangaistusmaksimi on kaksi 
vuotta vankeutta. Rikoslaissa tekoja, joista voidaan tuomita alle vuosi vankeutta on 69, enintään 
vuosi 68, kaksi vuotta 119, kolme vuotta 12, neljä vuotta 58 ja 5–10 vuotta tai elinkausi 61. 
Toisaalta esimerkiksi perinteisissä väkivalta- tai anastusrikoksissa on kyse siitä, voidaanko 
telepakkokeinoja kohdistaa tekoon suoraan liittymättömään viestintään, kun taas tietoverkkoa 
käyttäen tehdyissä rikoksissa kytkentä viestintään on teon edellytys. Tästä näkökulmasta jos-
sain määrin alempi kynnys saattaa olla perusteltu, sillä muutoin tietoverkossa tehtyjen rikosten 
tutkinta voisi hankaloitua huomattavasti tai estyä kokonaan. Kuitenkin lopputulos ja tapa, jol-
la säännökseen päädyttiin, vaikuttaa kyseenalaiselta.
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voidaan soveltaa silloin, kun tiedetään yleisön saataville saattamisesta rangais-
tava viesti, muttei sen lähettäjää tai tunnistamistietoja. 
Poliisi voi saada Internet-palveluntarjoajilta tunnistamistietoja, jos tietoja 
yksittäistapauksessa tarvitaan poliisille kuuluvan tehtävän suorittamiseksi (PolL 
4:3.2).75 Tässä tapauksessa kyse on tietyllä ajanhetkellä tiettyä IP-osoitetta käyt-
täneen liittymän haltijan selvittämisestä. Säännöstä voidaan soveltaa minkä ta-
hansa poliisille kuuluvan tehtävän suorittamiseen, eikä tuomioistuimen määrä-
ystä tai minkäänlaista merkittävyyskynnyksen ylittymistä edellytetä, joten se 
soveltuu muun ohella TekL 60 a §:n vaihtoehdoksi tai jos kyseisen säännöksen 
merkittävässä määrin -kriteeri ei täyty.76 Hallituksen esityksessä viitataan aiem-
paan käytäntöön ja todetaan, että kyse on tavanomaisesta poliisitoimintaan liit-
tyvästä toimenpiteestä, eikä pyyntö edellytä päällystöön kuuluvan poliisimiehen 
pyyntöä. Perustuslakivaliokunta ei käsitellyt asiaa.77 
Viestien tunnistamistietojen selvittäminen (televalvonta), viestien sisällön 
selvittäminen (telekuuntelu) ja muut tiedonhankintakeinot (esimerkiksi tele-
osoitteen yksilöintitietojen hankkiminen teknisellä laitteella) edellyttävät yleen-
sä määriteltyä kynnystä, ja niistä säädetään poliisilaissa ja pakkokeinolaissa.78 
Uuden pakkokeinolain mukaan telekuunteluedellytyksin operaattorilta voidaan 
saada tietoja myös takavarikkona (PKL 10:4.1).79 Telepakkokeinojen käyttöä 
rajoitetaan muun muassa viranomaisten toimintaa ohjaavilla periaatteilla, ylei-
sellä edellytyksellä tuloksellisuusodotuksesta, kuuntelukielloilla ja kiellolla 
hyödyntää ylimääräistä tietoa (PKL 1:2–4, 10:2.1, 10:52, 10:55–57).80 Tärkeä 
erityissäännös on niin ikään laitteen haltijan suostumuksella tapahtuva televal-
75 Tämä vastaa vanhan poliisilain säännöstä (VanhaPolL 36.2 §).
76 HE 235/2010 vp s. 6; HE 266/2004 vp laiksi poliisilain muuttamisesta ja eräiksi siihen 
liittyviksi laeiksi s. 34–35; Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 215; Helopuro ym. 2009 s. 290–294; Ha-
renko ym. 2006 s. 542; Viestintäviraston kannanotto tekijänoikeuslain 60 a §:n mukaiseen 
tietojen saantioikeuteen (29.11.2006), Dnro 1623/04/2006; Rauno Korhonen: Poliisin valvon-
takeinot ja kansalaisten yksityisyyden suoja. Edilex libri. Edita. 2005 s. 84–85. Vielä oman 
kysymyksensä muodostaa se, että esitutkinnassa asianomistaja saa joka tapauksessa tietoonsa 
epäillyn henkilöllisyyden (sikäli kuin poliisi sen selvittää), vaikka rikosasiana asia ei etenisi-
kään. En voi kuitenkaan tarkastella tätä enemmälti.
77 PeVL 67/2010 vp; HE 224/2010 vp poliisilaiksi ja eräiksi siihen liittyviksi laeiksi s. 88; 
Klaus Helminen ym.: Poliisilaki. Talentum. 2012 s. 435 (Helminen ym. 2012b).
78 Uusista laeista ks. esimerkiksi Helminen ym. 2012a s. 1031–1058; Matti Tolvanen – Rei-
ma Kukkonen: Esitutkinta- ja pakkokeino-oikeuden perusteet. Juridica-kirjasarja. Talentum. 
2011 s. 333–347. Aiemmista käytännön havainnoista ks. Niemi – de Godzinsky LM 2009. 
Edellä kuvatusti televalvonnan edellytyksenä on, että eräin laajennuksin rangaistusmaksimi on 
vähintään neljä tai teleosoitetta käyttäen tehtyjen rikosten osalta kaksi vuotta vankeutta. Te-
lekuuntelu on mahdollista vain ns. ylitörkeissä rikoksissa sekä muun muassa liike- tai ammat-
titoimintaan liittyvissä törkeissä rikoksissa.
79 Laajemmin ks. Helminen ym. 2012a s. 1038–1044. Vrt. vanhan pakkokeinolain mukaan 
välittäjän luona tehtävä tunnistamistietoihin kohdistuva takavarikko oli määritelmällisesti te-
lekuuntelua (Siiki DL 2009 s. 182–183). Kun tämä pakkokeino ei ole televalvontaedellytyksin 
käytettävissä, sillä ei ole juuri merkitystä tässä tarkastelussa.
80 Helminen ym. 2012a s. 1128–1130, 1133–1140. Perustuslakivaliokunta myös totesi, että 
päätäntävaltaa on siirretty ja olisi aiheellista siirtää enemmänkin muulle kuin esitutkintaviran-
omaiselle. Eduskunta hyväksyi asiasta lausuman, jonka mukaan hallituksen tulee selvittää ja 
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vonta (PKL 10:7), jota on perinteisesti voitu käyttää muun muassa eräiden häi-
rintärikosten tai anastetun puhelimen viestinnän selvittämiseksi. Tämä on uu-
dessa pakkokeinolaissa laajentunut siten, että säännöksen 4 kohdan mukaan sitä 
voidaan soveltaa myös minkä tahansa telepäätelaitetta tai -osoitetta käyttäen 
tehdyn rikoksen selvittämiseen.81
Muista pakkokeinoista voidaan mainita teleosoitteen yksilöintitietojen 
hankkiminen teknistä laitetta käyttäen (PKL 10:25), mikä vastaa poliisin tiedon-
saantioikeutta. Käyttö edellyttää vähintään vuoden rangaistusmaksimia ja siitä 
päättää pidättämiseen oikeutettu poliisimies.82 Niin ikään telekuunteluun ver-
rannollisella teknisellä laitetarkkailulla voidaan suorittaa esimerkiksi näp-
päimistökuuntelua tai asentaa haittaohjelmia tietokoneisiin (PKL 10:23), mutta 
viestien tai tunnistamistietojen selvittäminen edellyttää kuitenkin muita keinoja, 
esimerkiksi teknistä kuuntelua.83 
Erityisesti tietoverkkoa käyttäen tehtyä tekijänoikeusrikosta epäiltäessä on 
huomionarvoista, että aiemman pakkokeinolain voimassa ollessa erityissäilytet-
tyjä tietoja ei olisi voitu hyödyntää rikoksen selvittämisessä, koska televalvon-
nan edellytykset eivät olisi täyttyneet. Sen sijaan voimaan tulevassa pakkokei-
nolaissa televalvonnan edellytykset voisivat sinänsä täyttyä.84
Viestintävirastolla ja tietosuojavaltuutetulla on rajattu tiedonsaantioikeus 
tunnistamistietoihin ja viesteihin erinäisissä tietojärjestelmärikoksiin liittyvissä 
valvonta- ja selvitystehtävissä (SVTsL 33.3 §). Perusoikeusnäkökulmasta on 
huomionarvoista, että menettely ei sisällä minkäänlaisia oikeusturvakeinoja. 
Perustuslakivaliokunta vain totesi, että asia ei ole Suomen perustuslain 
(731/1999) 10 §:n näkökulmasta ongelmallinen ilmeisesti rinnastaen säännök-
sen hätäilmoituksiin (SVTsL 35.1 §) liittyviin hyväksyttäviin erityisiin luovu-
harkita, tulisiko salaisia tiedonhankintakeinoja koskeva ratkaisutoimivalta osoittaa tuomiois-
tuinten toimivaltaan. Selvitystyö on käynnistymässä, ks. alaviite 48.
81 Aiemmin asiasta säädettiin suppeammin SVTsL 36.3 §:ssä ja VanhaPKL 5a:3.2:ssa. Käy-
tännössä uudella säännöksellä poliisi voisi muun muassa aina selvittää viestinnän osapuolen 
suostumuksella toisen osapuolen (tai ainakin IP-osoitetta vastaavan liittymän haltijan) henki-
löllisyyden. Säännöstä ei arvioitu perustuslakivaliokunnassa. Ks. HE 222/2010 vp s. 124–125, 
137, 321–322; Helminen ym. 2012a s. 1052–1053.
82 HE 222/2010 vp s. 336; Helminen ym. 2012b s. 435. Säännöstä perusteltiin tarpeella 
saada selville rekisteröimättömistä liittymistä (esimerkiksi prepaid-liittymät) yksilöintitiedot 
televalvonta- tai kuuntelua koskevan hakemuksen tekemiseksi (HE 266/2004 vp s. 34–35).
83 Laajemmin ks. HE 222/2010 vp s. 328–337; Helminen ym. 2012a s. 1069–1088.
84 Mikäli tekijänoikeusrikoksen vahinkoedellytys ei täyttyisi, kyse voisi olla tekijänoikeus-
rikkomuksesta. Käsittelen tätä luvussa 4.4. Esitutkintaa koskeva tulkintaharkinta on tehtävä 
sillä hetkellä tiedossa olevien seikkojen perusteella ja törkeysarviota saatetaan joutua myöhem-
min tarkistamaan (Helminen ym. 2012a s. 687). Lienee kuitenkin yleistä, että esitutkinnassa 
rikos mieluusti kirjataan törkeämmäksi kuin mihin ratkaisuun tuomioistuin lopulta saattaisi 
päätyä, jotta tutkinnan apuna voitaisiin hyödyntää laajinta mahdollista pakkokeinoarsenaalia. 
Vaikka myöhemmin todettaisiinkin, ettei pakkokeinon myöntämiselle ollut edellytyksiä, sitä 
käyttäen saatu tieto on lähtökohtaisesti silti hyödynnettävissä (KKO 2007:58, 8–9 kohta; Hel-
minen ym. 2012a s. 1134).
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tuksiin.85 Näkökulma selittynee sillä, että valvontaviranomaisten tehtävänä ei 
ole selvittää rikollisia, vaan varmistaa infrastruktuurin toimivuus; saadut tiedot 
ovat salassa pidettäviä, eikä niitä saa luovuttaa kuin rajoitetuin edellytyksin 
(SVTsL 34.1 §).86 
4.3. Erityistarkastelussa poliisin tiedonsaantioikeus
Poliisin oikeus saada tunnistamistietoja (PolL 4:3.2, VanhaPolL 36.2 §) johtaa 
useimmiten tosiasiallisesti samaan lopputulokseen kuin SananvapL 17 §:n mu-
kainen tiedon luovuttaminen, teleosoitteen yksilöintitietojen hankkiminen tek-
nistä laitetta käyttäen tai televalvonta.87 Internet-kontekstissa PolL 4:3.2:n so-
veltamisessa on nimittäin useimmiten kyse siitä, että viestinnän osapuoli tai 
muuten viestin ja IP-osoitteen tietoonsa saanut taho vaatii poliisilta toimenpi-
teitä lähettäjän henkilöllisyyden selvittämiseksi ja vastuuseen saattamiseksi. 
Viestinnän osapuoli tai kolmas tämän suostumuksella saa käsitellä viestejä ha-
luamallaan tavalla (SVTsL 8.2 §), mutta tämän ei nähdäkseni tulisi tehdä tyh-
jäksi toisen osapuolen lähtökohtaista oikeutta luottamukselliseen viestintään.88 
Toiseksi tämä asettaisi eri asemaan henkilöt, joista yksi ei osaa selvittää saa-
maansa viestiin liittyvää IP-osoitetta (jolloin olisi käytettävä esim. televalvon-
taa) ja toinen, joka osaa (jolloin tiedonsaantioikeus riittäisi tarpeellisten tietojen 
saamiseksi). Vastaavasti olisi outoa, jos kolmannen käsiinsä saamaa ja poliisille 
toimittamaa IP-osoitteen sisältävää viestiä voitaisiin käsitellä olennaisesti eri 
tavoin kuin viestiä, joka ei sisällä IP-osoitetta. Niin ikään sekä televalvonnassa 
että tiedonsaantioikeudessa on kyse jo tapahtuneen liikenteen osapuolten selvit-
tämisestä.89 Tiedonsaantioikeuden soveltamisella voi kuitenkin olla huomattavaa 
85 PeVL 9/2004 vp s. 6–7; HE 125/2003 vp s. 85–88; Ollila LM 2005 s. 784–786.
86 Tunnistamistietoja, muttei viestejä, saa luovuttaa mm. ulkomaisille tietoturvaloukkauksia 
selvittäville tahoille sekä teleyrityksille ja yhteisötilaajille, joita on käytetty hyväksi tietotur-
valoukkauksessa tai joihin voi todennäköisesti kohdistua tietoturvaloukkaus (SVTsL 34a.2–
3 §). Osa luovutetuista tiedoista voisi siten päätyä esitutkintaan. Viestintäviraston käytäntönä 
on ollut, ettei tietoja luovuteta poliisille (Ollila LM 2005 s. 786 erit. alaviite 16). Laajemmin 
ks. Helopuro ym. 2009 s. 275–279.
87 Tiedonsaantioikeus on rinnastettu telepakkokeinoon, jossa teleosoitteen yksilöintitiedot 
hankitaan teknistä laitetta käyttäen (Helminen ym. 2012b s. 435). Teoksessa PolL 4:3.2:n mu-
kaisen tiedonhankinnan todetaan tapahtuvan avoimesti, kun taas yksilöintitietojen hankkiminen 
teknisellä välineellä salaiseksi pakkokeinoksi. Tämä erottelutapa on ongelmallinen, koska pää-
asiallinen oikeusturvan tarve kohdistuu määräyksen tosiasialliseen kohteeseen, eli siihen kenen 
tietoja selvitetään eikä määräyksen vastaanottajaan, ja molemmat keinot ovat näin ollen koh-
teen näkökulmasta yhtä kaikki salaisia pakkokeinoja.
88 Huomattavaa kuitenkin on, että edellä esitetysti uudessa pakkokeinolaissa suostumuspe-
rusteinen televalvonta ulotetaan koskemaan myös näitä tekoja, kunhan tiedon pyytäjänä on 
telepäätelaitteen tai -osoitteen haltija. PolL 4:3.2:n tiedonsaantioikeutta voidaan kuitenkin hyö-
dyntää myös silloin, kun poliisille vaatimuksen esittää sivullinen.
89 Poliisilain vastaavia telepakkokeinoja voidaan käyttää myös rikoksen estämiseksi ja pal-
jastamiseksi, jolloin kyse on tulevaisuuteen suuntautuneesta valvonnasta (Helminen ym. 2012a 
s. 1025–1028). Tällainen ei ole tiedonsaantioikeuden nojalla mahdollista.
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merkitystä viestinnän luottamuksellisuuden kannalta: esimerkiksi kerättyihin 
lokitietoihin sovellettaessa se voisi johtaa vaikkapa tuhansien eri osapuolten 
tietojen selvittämiseen.
Tiedonsaantioikeutta voitaisiin puolustaa lähinnä kolmella argumentilla. 
Ensimmäinen on vaivattoman tiedonsaannin tärkeys rikosten selvittämiselle. 
Tämä yleiseen etuun viittaava kategorinen justifiointiperuste on syytä torjua 
erityisen törkeitä tilanteita lukuun ottamatta. Toisen argumentin mukaan vies-
tinnän osapuolten identiteettiä ei tarvitse suojata ulkopuolisilta. Tämä ajattelu-
tapa on perusteeton ja rakentuu historialliselle ja nykyisin virheelliselle ajatuk-
selle tunnistamistietojen lähtökohtaisesta julkisuudesta luottamuksellisuuden 
asemesta, ja tästä näyttää olevan kyse esitöiden puhelinluettelo- ja osoitetieto-
viittauksissa. Kolmanneksi viestinnän osapuolen suostumuksella tai pyynnöstä 
kyseisen henkilön kanssa viestineiden identiteetit voidaan viranomaisten avulla 
esteettä selvittää. Vaikka argumentti saakin tukea SVTsL 8.2 §:stä, on syytä 
havaita, ettei edes suostumusperusteinen televalvonta ole vapaasti käytettävis-
sä.90 Pidänkin tätä laajemmassa perusoikeustarkastelussa kategorisena sääntönä 
yleisesti ottaen kestämättömänä.
Vanhaa poliisilakia säädettäessä silloinen säännös (35.2 §) koski vain tele-
toimintalain salassapidon piiriin kuulumattomia tietoja. Säännöksen tarkoituk-
sena oli ilmeisesti lähinnä asianomistajien ja omaisten tavoittaminen, sillä saa-
tujen tietojen todettiin olevan verrattavissa julkisiin osoite- ja henkilötietoihin.91 
Säännöstä laajennettaessa lähes nykymuotoon todettiin, että soveltamiskäytän-
nössä oli jo saatu tiedot kiinteistä IP-osoitteista, mutta ne haluttiin saada myös 
dynaamisista IP-osoitteista.92 Perustuslakivaliokunta totesi säännöksen vastaa-
van perustuslakivaliokunnan käytännössä asetettuja vaatimuksia viitaten tele-
markkinalain muuttamisesta aiemmin lausumaansa.93 Tässä kohdin arviointi 
kuitenkin toteutettiin huolimattomasti, sillä viitatussa tapauksessa tietojen luo-
vutus sallittiin vain hätätapauksissa ja muun ohella liittymän haltijan suostu-
muksella, ja muutoin tunnistamistietojen saamiseen tuli soveltaa pakkokeinola-
kia.94 Kun VanhaPolL 36.2 §:ään lisättiin mahdollisuus hankkia telepäätelaitteen 
tai -osoitteen yksilöintitietoja teknisellä laitteella, perustuslakivaliokunta ei kiin-
nittänyt asiaan erityistä huomiota, ilmeisesti assosioiden tapaukset lähinnä sa-
90 Helminen ym. 2012a s. 1052–1053. Tosin uudessa pakkokeinolaissa suostumusperusteisen 
televalvonnan käyttöala on laajentunut huomattavasti. Vanhan SVTsL 36.3 §:n mukaisissa ta-
pauksissa keinosta päättää pidättämiseen oikeutettu virkamies, mutta muissa tapauksissa pää-
tösvalta on kaikesta huolimatta tuomioistuimella (PKL 10:9).
91 HE 57/1994 vp poliisilaiksi ja eräiksi siihen liittyviksi laeiksi s. 71.
92 HE 125/2003 vp s. 13–14, 103–104.
93 PeVL 9/2004 vp s. 6–7.
94 PeVL 47/1996 vp s. 3–4; HE 163/1996 vp telemarkkinalaiksi ja laiksi telehallinnosta 
annetun lain muuttamisesta s. 8–9, 32–33.
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laisten osoite- tai puhelintietojen saantiin.95 Asiaa ei käsitelty myöskään uuden 
poliisilain säätämisen yhteydessä. 
Tunnistamistietojen tiedonsaantioikeuteen liittyviä ongelmia ei ole ilmei-
sesti yleisemmin tiedostettu. Tuoreissa poliisilakia sekä esitutkintaa ja pakko-
keinoja käsittelevissä teoksissa säännöstä on lähinnä yleislauseita toistaen asial-
lisesti käsitelty muutamassa kappaleessa tai lauseessa.96 Tämä väljä säännös on 
pakkokeinojen sääntelyn kontekstissa kyseenalainen ja perusoikeuksien kannal-
ta ongelmallinen. Sen merkitys on monimutkaisten vaiheiden, viittauskäytännön 
ja huolimattomuuden summana jäänyt perustuslakivaliokunnalta huomaamatta, 
ja säännös tulisi ottaa tarkasteltavaksi. Asiallisesti monin tavoin telekuuntelua 
vastaavan sääntelyn soveltamisalaa tulisi rajata tai se tulisi siirtää osaksi pakko-
keinosääntelyä.97
4.4. Merkittävyyskynnys ja suhteellisuus poliisin toiminnassa
Tunnistamistietojen luovuttamista ja telepakkokeinojen käyttöä voidaan vertail-
la myös poliisin muihin pakkokeinoihin, erityisesti kotietsintään ja takavarik-
koon. Chisugate-tapauksessa poliisi piti kotietsintää ja takavarikkoa perusteltui-
na, koska tuomioistuin oli jo luovuttamispäätöksessään katsonut huomattavuus-
kriteerin täyttyneen, ja koska takavarikon edellytyksenä ei ole rikoksen vaka-
vuus. Apulaisoikeusasiamies ei nähnyt toimia suhteellisuusperiaatteen 
vastaisena tai muutenkaan lainvastaisena.98 
Tuomioistuin ei kuitenkaan tunnistamistietojen luovutusta käsitellessään 
arvioi merkittävyyskynnyksen ylittymistä rikosoikeudelliselta kannalta. Merkit-
tävyyskynnyksen ylittymisellä ei voisikaan olla rikosprosessissa ratkaisevaa 
merkitystä, koska epäiltyä ei oltu kuultu eikä hän ollut saanut vastata kyseiseen 
väitteeseen, joten asian käsittely ei täyttäisi oikeudenmukaisen oikeudenkäynnin 
vaatimuksia. Toiseksi kotietsinnän edellyttämä tekijänoikeusrikos määritellään 
TekL 60 a §:n edellytyksistä poikkeavalla tavalla siten, että teon on oltava 
omiaan aiheuttamaan huomattavaa haittaa tai vahinkoa loukatun oikeuden hal-
tijalle, ja onkin kyseenalaista täyttäisikö yksittäisen henkilön yksittäisen albu-
min yksittäinen jakaminen tämän tunnusmerkistön, vaikka TekL 60 a §:n nojal-
la yleisön saataville saattamista katsottaisiin tapahtuneen tekijän oikeuksien 
suojan kannalta merkittävässä määrin. Kolmanneksi vaikka edellä mainitut kri-
95 PeVL 11/2005 vp s. 9.
96 Helminen ym. 2012a s. 584, 1085; Helminen ym. 2012b s. 435; Tolvanen – Kukkonen 2011 
s. 161.
97 Säännös on ollut erityisen huomattava varsinkin vanhan pakkokeinolain kontekstissa, jol-
loin tavanomaisen ja suostumusperusteisen televalvonnan edellytykset tietoverkkoa hyödyn-
täen tehdyssä rikoksessa olivat ratkaisevasti korkeammat kuin voimaan tulevassa laissa. Uuden 
pakkokeinolain aikana merkitys tullee jonkin verran vähenemään ja se painottunee poliisin 
»ohituskaistaan», jolloin tietopyynnöissä ei edellytetä tuomioistuimen myötävaikutusta.
98 Eoam 10.12.2012 (Dnro 4565/4/12) s. 4.
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teerit täyttyisivätkin, toiminta voisi silti olla kotietsinnän tai takavarikon osalta 
kyseenalainen. 
Kotietsinnästä päättää pidättämiseen oikeutettu virkamies ja sen laillisuus 
voidaan jälkeenpäin saattaa tuomioistuimen tutkittavaksi (PKL 8:18). Perustus-
lakivaliokunta on katsonut jälkikäteisen tuomioistuinkontrollin täyttävän EIT:n 
ratkaisukäytännön vaatimukset.99 Takavarikointi on mahdollista esitutkintavi-
ranomaisen päätöksellä, jos esine tai data voi olla todisteena rikosasiassa (PKL 
7:1), mutta takavarikon on oltava järkevässä suhteessa sen aiheuttamiin haittoi-
hin sekä loukattaviin etuihin tai arvoihin nähden.100 Poliisilain ja pakkokeinolain 
yleisiä toiminnan periaatteita ovat perus- ja ihmisoikeuksien kunnioittaminen, 
suhteellisuusperiaate ja vähimmän haitan periaate.101 Nämä kaventavat poliisin 
toiminnan avointa mandaattia: periaatteessa yleisten periaatteiden tulisi johtaa 
lievimmän keinon valintaan. 
Periaatteet eivät yksinään turvaa perusoikeuksien toteutumista. Periaatteet 
voisivatkin jäädä julistuksenomaisiksi ja jää nähtäväksi, tuleeko niiden käytän-
nön merkitys kasvamaan. Mielestäni nyt puheena olleessa tapauksessa olisi ollut 
perusteita todeta, että ensinnäkään ei ollut syytä epäillä tekijänoikeusrikoksen 
tunnusmerkistön täyttyneen ja toiseksi edellytyksiä kotietsinnälle tai takavari-
kolle ei ainakaan ensisijaisesti ollut käsillä.
5. Johtopäätökset
Tunnistamistiedoilla on verkottuneessa tietoyhteiskunnassa hyvin keskeinen 
merkitys niin käyttäjien yksityiselämän suojan, sananvapauden kuin näiden vas-
taintressienkin näkökulmasta. Viime kädessä keskeisin tunnistamistietojen »por-
tinvartija» on Internet-yhteydentarjoaja, koska vain sillä olevien tietojen avulla 
on yleisessä tapauksessa mahdollista yhdistää IP-osoite liittymän haltijaan. Tar-
kastelin tunnistamistietojen luovuttamismääräyksiä erityisesti vertaillen niitä 
poliisin tiedonsaantioikeuteen ja telepakkokeinoihin.
Esittelen pelkistetyn ja vertailevan yhteenvedon eri säännöksistä taulukossa 
1. Kohde-sarakkeesta ilmenee, mihin luovutus voi kohdistua: koko viestiin, vain 
tunnistamistietoihin vai muuhun tietoon. Päättäjä-sarakkeesta ilmenee, kuka 
toimenpiteestä voi päättää: erikseen säädetyissä kiiretapauksessa päätöksen voi 
tehdä pääsääntöisesti yhden asteen alempi taho. Edellytys-sarakkeella pyritään 
99 PeVL 66/2010 vp s. 6. Laajemmin ks. Helminen ym. 2012a s. 995–997; Tolvanen – Kuk-
konen 2011 s. 309–314.
100 HE 222/2010 vp s. 273. Käytännössä esimerkiksi tietokonetta ei pitäisi takavarikoida, jos 
jäljentämällä tiedot tietokoneen kiintolevyltä voidaan turvata riittävä todistusaineisto (Tolvanen 
– Kukkonen 2011 s. 283–284).
101 HE 222/2010 vp s. 46–47, 72, 147, 193–194. VanhaPolL 2.2 §:stä käy ilmi muun muassa 
suhteellisuusperiaate. 
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pelkistäen kuvaamaan vaadittu peruste luovutukselle. Oikeusturva-sarakkeella 
viitataan luovutuksen kohteena olevan henkilön tehokkaisiin oikeusturvakeinoi-
hin, joita ei käytännössä välttämättä ole. Fokus-sarakkeeseen on tähdillä mer-
kitty tästä näkökulmasta mielestäni ongelmallisimpia keinoja, joihin tulisi kiin-
nittää lähemmin huomiota. Kysymysmerkki tarkoittaa, että ainakin periaatteel-
liset ongelmat ovat todennäköisiä.102 
Taulukko 1: vertailua luovutus- ja pakkokeinosäännöksistä
Säännös Kohde Päättäjä Edellytys Oikeusturva Fokus










SVTsL 33.3 § Viesti ViVi/TSV Valvonta Ei ole ?
SVTsL 35.1 § TT Hätäkeskus Hätätilanne Ei ole 
PolL 4:3.2 TT Poliisi Poliisin tehtävä Ei ole **
Suost. televalv. TT TI/Pid.oik/kiire As.om. pyyntö Jälkikäteinen *
Televalvonta TT  TI/kiire 4v (2v) rang.
max 
Jälkikäteinen *
Telekuuntelu Viesti TI/kiire Ylitörkeät 
rikokset
Jälkikäteinen 
Yksilöintitiedot TT Pid.oik 1v rang.max Jälkikäteinen ?
Laitetarkkailu Muu  Pid.oik/kiire 4v rang.max Jälkikäteinen ?
Takavarikko Muu Pid.oik Todiste ym. Jälkikäteinen *
SananvapL 17 § ja TekL 60 a § rakentuvat samansuuntaisille periaatteille, 
mutta keskityin vain viimeksi mainittuun. Molemmissa on kyse hakemusasiasta, 
johon liittyviä yksiasianosaisprosessin haasteita ja verrannollisuutta telepakko-
keinojen vastaavaan sääntelyyn ei ole huomioitu. Tekijänoikeudellisessa luovut-
tamismääräyksessä keskeisin kysymys on merkittävyyskynnyksen tulkitsemi-
nen. Aiemmin käytetyssä vertaisverkkotekniikassa huomattava jakaminen pys-
tyttiin osoittamaan helposti ja oikeuskäytäntö oli vakiintunut, mutta nykyisin 
yhä enenevässä määrin käytössä olevassa BitTorrent-tekniikassa TekL 60 a §:n 
soveltaminen edellyttäisi oikeudenhaltijoilta laajempaa tarkkailua ja selvityksiä. 
Voidaankin sanoa, että tekniikkaan liittyvät näyttönäkökohdat painottavat sään-
nöksen soveltamistilanteita entistä enemmän tosiasialliseen jakamiseen tai tar-
102 Lyhenteiden selityksiä, siltä osin kuin merkitys ei ole ilmeinen: TT = tunnistamistieto; TI 
= tuomioistuin; ViVi = Viestintävirasto; TSV = tietosuojavaltuutettu; Pid.oik. = pidättämiseen 
oikeutettu virkamies; »4v rang.max» = teko, josta voi seurata vähintään 4 vuotta vankeutta.
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jolla pitämiseen. Näin ollen väitteet merkittävyydestä jäävät entistä helpommin 
todentamattomiksi, ja tätä voi pitää myös terveenä merkkinä tekijänoikeuslain 
tulkinnasta.
Myös PolL 4:3.2:n mukainen poliisin tunnistamistietojen tiedonsaantioi keus 
on kyseenalainen. Tiedot voi saada kuka tahansa poliisimies ilman ulkopuolista 
arviointia minkä tahansa poliisin tehtävän hoitamiseksi. Menettelyyn ei liity 
edes telepakkokeinojen kaltaisia jälkikäteisiä oikeusturvakeinoja, ja säännöksen 
tosiasiallinen merkitys on jäänyt perustuslakivaliokunnalta huomaamatta. Tie-
donsaantioikeutta voidaan tosiasiallisesti verrata tietyiltä osin suostumusperus-
teiseen tai tavanomaiseen televalvontaan tai teleosoitteen yksilöintitietojen 
hankkimiseen teknistä laitetta käyttäen, vaikkakin säännöksen merkitys lienee 
vähenemässä, kun uudessa pakkokeinolaissa tietoverkkoihin liittyvien pakko-
keinojen käytön edellytykset vähentyvät huomattavasti. Varsinkin nykyisin sään-
nöksen tarpeellisuus tässä kontekstissa on kyseenalainen, ja voisi harkita, tuli-
siko sen soveltamisalaa rajoittaa tai siirtää se osaksi telepakkokeinosääntelyä.
Periaatteellisesti merkittävänä voidaan pitää tietosuojavaltuutetun ja Vies-
tintäviraston tiedonsaantioikeutta, jonka nojalla sekä tunnistamistiedot että vies-
tit sisältöineen on luovutettava kyseisille valvontaviranomaisille eräiden tieto-
järjestelmärikosten selvittämiseksi (SVTsL 33.3 §). Vaikka tietoja ei luovuteta-
kaan edelleen poliisille, tarkempi säännöksen arviointi, hyväksikäyttökiellot tai 
nimenomaiset luovutusrajoitukset ja oikeusturvakeinot voisivat olla perusteltu-
ja. Hiukan vastaavasta, mutta rajatummasta tapauksesta on kyse hätä- ja pelas-
tustoimeen liittyvissä tunnistamistietojen luovutuksissa (SVTsL 35.1 §). 
Tässä yhteydessä keskeisimpiä salaisia telepakkokeinoja käsiteltiin vertai-
levasta perspektiivistä. Televalvonnasta ja -kuuntelusta päättää pääsääntöisesti 
tuomioistuin, ja prosessi on varsin tarkasti säännelty ja toimenpiteistä on myös 
jälkikäteen mahdollisuus kannella tuomioistuimeen. Pakkokeinoja ei voi koh-
distaa kuin tietyn törkeysluokituksen täyttäviin rikoksiin, ja keinojen käyttöä ja 
tiedon hyödyntämistä on muutenkin rajoitettu. Erityisesti on hyvä huomata, että 
erityissäilytettyjä tunnistamistietoja voidaan käyttää vain vähintään televalvon-
nan edellytykset täyttävien rikosten selvittämisessä. Päätelaitteen haltijan suos-
tumuksella voidaan toteuttaa televalvontaa tilanteesta riippuen joko poliisin tai 
tuomioistuimen päätöksellä (PKL 10:7). Tätä voidaan pitää laajennuksena ja 
toisaalta rajoitteena käyttäjän omalle oikeudelle käsitellä viestinnän toisen osa-
puolen tietoja. Tältä osin on havaittavissa tiettyä päällekkäisyyttä PolL 4:3.2:n 
mukaiseen tunnistamistietojen selvittämiseen silloin, kun käyttäjä vaatii polii-
silta toimenpiteitä.103
103 Tekninen laitetarkkailu on esimerkki muunlaisesta salaisesta pakkokeinosta, jota ei kui-
tenkaan saa käyttää tunnistamistietojen tai viestien selvittämiseen. Takavarikon edellytykset 
ovat hyvin joustavat, lukuun ottamatta tilannetta, jossa sitä sovelletaan tietojen hankkimiseen 
telekuuntelun sijaan.
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Vanhaa ja uutta pakkokeinolakia vertailtaessa huomataan useita periaatteel-
lisesti hyvin merkittäviä ja osin muun muassa perustuslakivaliokunnassa huo-
maamatta jääneitä tai lausunnon antamisen jälkeen toteutettuja muutoksia. Te-
lepäätelaitetta tai -osoitetta käyttäen tehdyissä rikoksissa televalvonnan edelly-
tyksenä ollut kategorinen neljän vuoden rangaistusmaksimi on alennettu kahteen 
vuoteen, mikä on tuonut pakkokeinon piiriin yli 100 uutta perusterikosta, muun 
muassa tässä käsitellyn tietoverkossa tehdyn tekijänoikeusrikoksen. Tämän joh-
dosta tällaisessa rikosepäilyssä voidaan jatkossa ainakin joissakin olosuhteissa 
hyödyntää myös erityissäilytettyjä tunnistamistietoja, mikä ei aiemmin ollut 
mahdollista. Toisaalta erityissäilytettyjä tietoja ei saa edelleenkään luovuttaa 
siviiliprosessissa. Niin ikään suostumusperusteista televalvontaa on laajennettu 
siten, että sitä voidaan kohdistaa tuomioistuimen luvalla mihin tahansa viestin-
nän osapuoleen, kun aiemmin se soveltui lähinnä eräisiin häirintärikoksiin tai 
edellytti perusterikokselta vähintään kahden vuoden rangaistusmaksimia.
Voidaan myös pohtia, ovatko TekL 60 a §:n mukaiset tuomioistuinratkaisut 
perustuneet osin myös reaalisiin näkökohtiin, koska kategorisesti kielteiset rat-
kaisut voisivat ohjata tapauksia poliisin esitutkintaan ja sitä kautta mahdollisesti 
rikosasiana tuomioistuimeen. Toistaiseksi oikeudenhaltijat ovat voineet valita 
rikosoikeudellisten ja siviilioikeudellisten keinojen välillä, ja itse asiassa tekijän-
oikeudellisten riita- ja hakemusasioiden siirtyessä markkinaoikeuteen tämä laa-
jenee yleisen ja erityistuomioistuimen väliseen foorumivalintaan. Vastaavasti 
oikeuspoliittisesti kyse on siitä, millä tavoin tällaisia tekijänoikeudellisia ongel-
matilanteita halutaan selvitettävän, eli onko yksityisoikeudellinen selvittely 
muun ohella omine painostamiseen liittyvine ongelmineen asianmukaista vai pi-
täisikö tähän käyttää merkittäviä viranomaisten, erityisesti poliisin resursseja.104
Tiivistetysti voidaan todeta, että telepakkokeinosääntelyn ulkopuolisiin tun-
nistamistietojen luovuttamismääräyksiin sisältyy erityisen paljon ongelmia. 
Näiden perusoikeustarkastelu on jäänyt huomattavasti telepakkokeinoja ohuem-
maksi, jos sitä on tehty lainkaan. Ainakin eräiltä osin erillissääntely voidaan 
kyseenalaistaa ja varsinkin poliisin tiedonsaantioikeutta on syytä tarkastella 
kriittisesti. Myöskään telepakkokeinojen sisäisesti eri keinoja, niiden eroja ja 
samankaltaisuutta ei ole tarkasteltu riittävästi erityisesti tunnistamistietojen luo-
vuttamisen kontekstissa. Ongelma korostuu etenkin yksilöintitietojen hankki-
mista ja televalvontaa vertailtaessa; ensiksi mainitun soveltamiskynnys on huo-
mattavasti alhaisempi, vaikka sitä voikin käyttää kauaskantoisin seurauksin. 
Niin ikään hyvin laajassa pakkokeinojen uudistamisessa ilmeisesti perusoikeus-
arviointi tai oikeastaan ponsilausuma jäi puutteelliseksi, koska huomattavat laa-
jennukset eivät kaikilta osin vaikuta aiempaan käytäntöön ja perusoikeusar-
viointeihin nähden asianmukaisilta.
104 Samansuuntaisesti ks. Päivärinne DL 2013 s. 215; Tuomas Mylly: Tekijänoikeuksia ei pidä 
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This article explores UK website blocking injunctions,
the CJEU ruling in Svensson (C-466/12), and referrals
on linking in the context of website operator's direct,
secondary or joint liability for copyright infringement
due to user-generated content. Direct liability and UK
authorisation doctrine seem questionable, but joint
tortfeasance and similar criminal law constructs form a
more solid foundation for operators’ liability.
Introduction
Various forms of liability for copyright infringement may
apply to website operators for user-generated content.
This is explored in the context of injunctions ordering
internet service providers to block access to such sites.
The focus is on sites that make infringement particularly
easy by aggregating content or facilitating peer-to-peer
networking.1 The most prominent such website is The
Pirate Bay, which has been blocked in about a dozen EU
countries; some other sites have also been blocked,
particularly in the United Kingdom.2 In a few countries
proxy services providing access to such websites have
also been targeted.3
In some judgments, linking to copyrighted material
constituted direct infringement, but in others the opposite
was held.4 On February 13, 2014, the CJEU judgment in
Svensson provided one answer to some pertinent issues,
but the approach chosen also raised new ones. More
referrals are also pending.5 National courts have also
applied other grounds for liability such as aiding and
abetting, authorisation or joint tortfeasance.
This article seeks to answer the question: which forms
of liability apply to the operators of prima facie
questionable websites based on users’ acts, and are such
sites eligible for blocking? The focus is on the United
Kingdom owing to the number of blocking injunctions
issued. When examining the preliminary question of
liability for linking in general, EU case law is more
broadly covered.
On communication to the public andforms of linking
Some further introductory remarks are in order. In this
context, online copyright infringementmay occur through
violating the author’s exclusive right to communication
to the public or reproduction of a work. Here only the
former is studied.6 As required by art.3.1 of the Infosoc
Directive (2001/29)7:
“Member states shall provide authors with the
exclusive right to [1.] authorise or prohibit any
communication to the public of their works, by wire
or wireless means, including [2.] the making
available to the public of their works in such a way
that members of the public may access them from a
place and at a time individually chosen by them.”
* Pekka Savola (Lic.Sc(Tech), Master of Laws) is legal counsel at CSC-Scientific Computing Ltd and researcher at the University of Helsinki, Finland.1 See e.g. Edward Lee, “Warming Up to User-Generated Content” [2008] U. Illinois L. Rev. 1459; John Blevins, “Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New
Expansion of Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms” (2013) 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1821, 1827–1829. See generally e.g. Patrick van Eecke, “Online Service
Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach” (2011) 48 C.M.L. Rev. 1455; Dennis Lievens, “L’Oreal v. eBay —Welcomed in France, Resented in England”
(2012) 43(1) I.I.C. 68.2As of this writing, over 30 sites have been blocked in this manner. See e.g. TorrentFreak, “UK Piracy Blocklist Expands with YIFY, PrimeWire, Vodly and Others”
(November 22, 2013), http://torrentfreak.com/uk-piracy-blocklist-expands-with-yify-primewire-vodly-and-others-131122/ [Accessed February 25, 2014].3TorrentFreak, “Police Visit Pirate Bay Proxy Owner’s Home Demanding a Shutdown” (June 9, 2013), http://torrentfreak.com/police-visit-pirate-bay-proxy-owners-home
-demanding-a-shutdown-130609/; TorrentFreak, “Movie Studios Get UK ISPs to Block Torrent Site Proxies” (September 5, 2013), http://torrentfreak.com/movie-studios
-get-uk-isps-to-block-torrent-site-proxies-130905/ [Both accessed February 25, 2014]. See also fnn.110–111.4 See e.g. Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (FAPL v Sky) [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch), [2013] E.C.D.R. 14 at [37]–[44]; Paperboy
[2003] BGH I ZR 259/00, [2005] E.C.D.R. 7. More of these below.5 Svensson v Retriever Sverige AB (C-466/12), February 13, 2014. The most important referrals are C More Entertainment (C-279/130) and BestWater International
(C-348/13) . More of these below.6The argument that linking infringes the reproduction right is weaker, except possibly in the case of embedded links. See e.g. Paperboy [2003] BGH I ZR 259/00, [2005]
E.C.D.R. 7. The German Supreme Court held that a news notification/search engine (Paperboy) did not infringe newspapers’ rights by providing direct links to subpages
even if doing so bypassed advertisements on the front page.7Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (Infosoc Directive) [2001] OJ L167/10. See e.g. EMI
Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (EMI v Sky) [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), [2013] E.C.D.R 8 at [30]–[32]; SCF v Del Corso (C-135/10) [2012] E.C.D.R. 16; Katarzyna
Klafkowska-Waśniowska, “Public Communication Right: Towards Full Harmonisation?” [2013] E.I.P.R. 751, 756–757.
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The first part concerns communication to the public in
general, the latter part “making available” by offering
and providing access to works for on-demand
transmission.8The latter is broader in this context, because
it applies irrespective of transmission occurring.9
There are many ways to classify web linking.10 The
most relevant distinction is between “normal” hyperlinks,
where clicking the browser redirects to another page, and
embedding, i.e. inline links where the browser
transparently fetches material (e.g. image or another web
page) and displays it as part of the current page. Framing
links require user activity (clicking) but the page is
portrayed as if it was part of the original site. Such a
portrayal page essentially embeds the material on the
framing page and therefore for most purposes framing is
similar to embedding.
Linking as direct infringement
Direct infringement in UK blocking
injunctions
In EMI v Sky, access to three websites (KAT, H33T and
Fenopy) was blocked.11 The sites included user-uploaded
descriptions of copyrighted material (metadata, including
so-called “torrent” files) in indexed and searchable form,
but no infringing material as such. While users were
clearly committing infringement, for example by sharing
works in a peer-to-peer network, the question of whether
the operators of the said websites did too is of more
interest here. Three bases for infringement were claimed:
that sound recordings were communicated to the public
by the operators, the operators committed the tort of
authorising infringements, and that operators were jointly
liable as accessories for infringements.12 The last two will
be addressed in the next section. It was held that the
service provided by the website was not purely passive
and the operator had intervened in an active manner by
having a mechanism specifically designed to allow users
to provide the actual content. Arnold J., however,
explicitly noted that even if this interpretation of
communication to the public was wrong, the operators
might still be liable on the grounds of authorisation and
joint tortfeasance.13
The same judge reached the same conclusions also in
a slightly different context in FAPL v Sky.14 A website
called FirstRow provided links to various sports video
streams submitted and produced (from a broadcast) by
users.15 It is obvious that such user-generated streams
were infringing, but was the website operator also liable
for communication to the public for the posted links?16 It
was held that websites provided a mechanism specifically
designed to achieve the act of communication even if the
actual material was provided by others.17 The website was
considered analogous to torrent indexing sites,
aggregating, indexing and providing users a simple link
in order to access streams. A specific feature was also
that the stream was presented in a frame provided by
FirstRow, therefore making it seem as if the stream
originated from that site. FirstRowwas held directly liable
for communication to the public but the judge again
repeated the same “backup” grounds, authorisation and
joint tortfeasance.18
In a later blocking injunction case, Paramount v Sky,
Arnold J. reflected on his earlier reasoning on
communication to the public in the light of recent case
law and CJEU referrals. He acknowledged that it is
arguable whether inter alia provision of hyperlinks amount
to communication to the public. This did not affect the
outcome, however, and he emphasised that what the
operators of FirstRow were doing went beyond mere
provisioning of hyperlinks and, in any case, the operators
would be jointly liable for these activities.19
Recent Svensson judgment (C-466/12)
What is the basis for these interpretations? Let us examine
liability for linking in general. In Svensson, newspaper
journalists sued a media monitoring company for
providing links to their articles without paying
remuneration. CJEU held that hyperlinking was
communication to the public as “making available”.
However, given that the authors had already authorised
8The related rights of performers, phonogram and film producers, and broadcast organisations are covered similarly by art.3.2 and art.8 of Directive 2006/115 on rental
right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (codified version) [2006] OJ L376/28.9 For a detailed discussion, see Alexander Tsoutsanis, “Why Copyright and Linking Can Tango”, http://jiplp.blogspot.com/2014/02/why-copyright-and-linking-can-tango
.html [Accessed February 25, 2014] (pre-published version of February 3, 2014, to be published in J.I.P.L.P.). Also see Jane C. Ginsburg, “Hyperinking and ‘Making
Available’“ [2014] E.I.P.R. 147.10 e.g. based on linking technique: (1) surface linking (to the main page); (2) deep linking (directly to a subpage or resource); (3) framing (preserving original web page
address even when linking to foreign pages); and (4) inlining or embedded linking (making the web browser fetch the target page or resource and display it as part of the
current page). An alternative classification is based on (a) how source and target relate (intra-page, internal or external link); (b) link activation technique (embedded being
automatic, others manual); or (c) indication of origin of the material. See Alain Strowel and Nicolas Ide, “Liability with Regard to Hyperlinks” (2001) 24(4) Colum.-VLA
J.L. & Arts 403, 407–409.11EMI v Sky [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R 8. On problems with considering providing access to torrent files communication to the public, see Gaetano Dimita,
“Six Characters in Search of Infringement: Potential Liability for Creating, Downloading and Disseminating .Torrent Files” (2012) 7 J.I.P.L.P. 466, 469–471.12EMI v Sky [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R 8 at [43]. In an earlier case of blocking The Pirate Bay only the last two causes were pursued. See Dramatico
Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (Dramatico v Sky) [2012] EWHC 268, [2012] E.C.D.R. 14 at [44].13EMI v Sky [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R 8 at [44]–[46].14FAPL v Sky [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R. 14.15FAPL v Sky [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R. 14 at [14]–[16].16 See FAPL v Sky [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R. 14 at [28]–[37] including references.17FAPL v Sky [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch), [2013] E.C.D.R. 14 at [40]–[41] referring to Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd (Newzbin) [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch),
[2010] F.S.R. 21 at [125]; and EMI v Sky [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R 8 at [46].18FAPL v Sky [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R. 14 at [42]–[43], [50].19Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (Paramount v Sky) [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch) at [32]–[35]. In this case blocking was
extended to two additional sites, SolarMovie and TubePlus.
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publication in open internet and there were no access
restrictions, there was no new public and therefore no
infringement.20
The referral questions had been speculated and
advocated in a number of writings as well as court cases.
The European Copyright Society (ECS) opined that
setting a hyperlink does not amount to transmission of a
work and therefore communication to the public cannot
occur; a hyperlink would communicate to the public
something other than “a work”; and in any case
communication would not be directed to a new public. A
similar argument would apply to a framing link.21
Unfortunately, the ECS Opinion did not consider the
applicability of “making available”. Another group,
ALAI, published an opinion with almost diametrically
opposite views. Their suggestion was that only hyperlinks
merely referring to a source are not covered under the
author’s exclusive right. On the other hand, linking
directly to a “protected file” would be.22 The opinion
failed to see that webpages are also protected works and
technically files. Therefore the distinction provided was
unclear and insufficient, and the result would be absurd.23
Tsoutsanis provided a good analysis based on these two
diverging approaches, trying to avoid the pitfalls of the
broad making available right by emphasising flexibility
through inter alia “new public” test.24 This was for most
part the approach later adopted by CJEU.
The ruling raised a number of issues and questions.25
For example CJEU did not critically examine if
hyperlinking to a public webpage (as in Svensson) actually
constitutes making works directly accessible.26 The
underlying WIPO Copyright Treaty focused on ensuring
that “offering” and “providing access to a work” was
within the scope of making available. This meant that
mere placing a work on a website from which it could be
downloaded or streamed would be infringing irrespective
of whether transmission occurred. It has been argued that
this also applies to hyperlinking owing to, e.g., a
technology neutral interpretation.27 This can be contested.
In some or even most cases, linking is equivalent to
providing a reference,28 and in others it is at most indirect
making available of a work. There is no authority to
suggest that this should (or must) be in scope of “making
available” and there are strong reasons to prefer the
opposite.29
In previous CJEU judgments, the “new public” seemed
to have effectively lost most of its relevance. Any public
or means of transmission that the right holder did not
originally consider was considered “new” and as such
covered by the author’s exclusive right.30 This emerged
as a solution in Svensson. There was no new public,
because all users could access the authorised publication,
and were deemed to have already been taken into account
by the author.31
Another Swedish referral, C More Entertainment
(C-279/13) , should also be noted. In this case sports
events were streamed to customers behind a pay-wall. A
customer discovered the streaming webpage address
(URL) and published a link to it on his own webpage,
thus enabling free access to the public.32 In Svensson it
was implied that using linking to circumvent access
restrictions to an otherwise unavailable work would result
in a new public.33 This might imply finding infringement.
Framing and embedding links
In Svensson (C-466/12), February 13, 2014 the approach
was the same to framing.While embedded links were not
discussed (and in contrast, the ruling mentioned only
clickable links), the argumentation used with framing
would apply to embedding as well.34 Previously, the ECS
opinion suggested there is no reason to differentiate
hyperlinking and framing, but noted that linking might
give rise to liability on other grounds such as accessory
20 Svensson , February 13, 2014 at [20], [27]–[29], [31].21Paramount v Sky [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch) at [13]–[22]; European Copyright Society, “Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson” (February
15, 2013). Similarly in Jeremy de Beer andMira Burri, “Transatlantic Copyright Comparisons: Making Available via Hyperlinks in the European Union and Canada” [2014]
E.I.P.R. 95, 103–104.22L’Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI), “Report and Opinion on the Making Available and Communication to the Public in the Internet Environment
— Focus on Linking Techniques on the Internet” (September 16, 2013), also published in [2014] E.I.P.R. 149. Ginsburg, “Hyperinking and ‘Making Available’“ [2014]
E.I.P.R. 147 provided a supportive contextual comment. The opinion was referred to in Paramount v Sky [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch) at [29].23Ginsburg, “Hyperinking and ‘Making Available’“ [2014] E.I.P.R. 147 seemed satisfied with, inter alia, copyright exceptions and implied licence bringing balance to the
very broad right as suggested by the ALAI opinion. While the CJEU has made somewhat of a “judge-made exception” to the right with the new public requirement, at least
in EU statutory exceptions are insufficient (i.e. no “fair use” exception and e.g. quotation right is too narrow). Essentially the ALAI opinion advocated that the right holder
should have the exclusive economic right to control the contexts where a work is mentioned or referenced.24Tsoutsanis, “Why Copyright and Linking Can Tango”, http://jiplp.blogspot.com/2014/02/why-copyright-and-linking-can-tango.html [Accessed February 25, 2014].25See e.g. Pekka Savola, “Hyperlinks, making available and the ‘new public’ — or just a dead end?” (February 14, 2014), The 1709 Blog, http://the1709blog.blogspot.com
/2014/02/hyperlinks-making-available-and-new.html [Accessed February 25, 2014]26 cf. Svensson , February 13, 2014 at [18]–[20].27Tsoutsanis “Why Copyright and Linking Can Tango”, http://jiplp.blogspot.com/2014/02/why-copyright-and-linking-can-tango.html [Accessed February 25, 2014].28This was also (to some rather vague extent) supported by ALAI, “Report and Opinion on the Making Available and Communication to the Public in the Internet
Environment” (September 16, 2013).29With this line of argument a mere mention of a web page address or domain name (without providing a hyperlink tag to it) could also be “indirectly making available” a
web page, i.e. a work.30 See Benoît Keane, “Ill Communication — The Concept of a Communication to the Public under EU Copyright Law” [2013] Ent. L.R. 165, 168–169; Poorna Mysoor,
“Unpacking the Right of Communication to the Public: A Closer Look at International and EU Copyright Law” [2013] I.P.Q. 166, 177–178; Martin Senftleben, “Breathing
Space for Cloud-Based Business Models: Exploring the Matrix of Copyright Limitations, Safe Harbours and Injunctions” (2013) 4 J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87, para.19. cf. Tsoutsanis,
“Why Copyright and Linking Can Tango”, http://jiplp.blogspot.com/2014/02/why-copyright-and-linking-can-tango.html [Accessed February 25, 2014].31 Svensson , February 13, 2014 at [25]–[28].32Paramount v Sky [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch) at [23]–[24]; Mark Turner, “European National News” (2013) 29 C.L.S. Rev. 616.33 Svensson , February 13, 2014 at [31].34 Svensson , February 13, 2014 at [29]–[30].
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liability, unfair competition or authors’ moral rights but
the CJEU currently does not have competence as regards
that subject-matter.35On the other hand, Tsoutsanis argued
for differentiation and that the new public would not need
to be evaluated with embedding and framing because the
content is made available “under different technical
conditions”.36 It is not obvious that “conditions” are of
relevance. In ITV v TVCatchup “mere technical means”
not requiring permission (such as means to improve
reception) were distinguished from “specific technical
means” requiring permission (such as converting a
satellite TV signal to an internet broadcast).37 Linking
seems to be more of the first category but this distinction
might be considered in subsequent rulings.
Traditionally, the evaluation of embedding links has
not been as straightforward as with hyperlinks.
Technically the linker only instructs the user’s web
browser to fetch material from the linked third-party
website. In consequence, from a purely technical
perspective it is actually the user (or the web browser)
which makes a copy of the material even though it is the
linker that (practically) causes it to happen.38 Essentially
this doctrinal or technically purist view suggests that such
“infringement” is not a relevant act from a copyright
perspective and must be addressed with other means. In
contrast, a broad interpretation focuses on the practical
effects of acts of the linker. Indeed, embedding possibly
infringing the right of communication to the public or
reproduction rights has been rather generally accepted,
although exact criteria for infringement have been
unclear.39
Embedding will be considered in a referral from
German Supreme Court (BGH), BestWater International
(C-348/13) .40 In this case an embedding link was added
on a web page to a competitor’s video that someone had
uploaded in YouTube. BGH noted that hyperlinking
would not have required permission but it was unclear if
the embedding link would. BGH suggested that the
answer should be affirmative even if there would not be
a new public and the technical process as to how a video
would be viewed from the webpage is identical to viewing
it from YouTube. Essentially the suggestion boiled down
to a reasoning that the linker misappropriated the work
as his own by embedding it into a website and this might
be a yet unnamed right of exploitation.41 If the path paved
by Svensson is taken, the fact of embedding might be
irrelevant; however, infringement could be found based
on the lack of authorisation for the initial publication.42
Nonetheless, to consider BGH’s argument, it is not
obvious which economic right of copyright would be
violated (and how) by “misappropriation”. It might be
out of the scope of copyright law completely, possibly
covered by national laws such as unfair competition or
passing off. Or if it was deemed a violation of author’s
moral rights, it would be determined by national law.43
Senftleben also argues that embedding is acceptable as
long as it is made clear that the content stems from
another source.44
Authorisation for publication and theimplied licence
Svensson concerned a case where the referred work was
already publicly available on the internet. The arguments
could be read to imply that linking to non-public or
unlawful material would be infringing. The CJEU will
need to explicitly address this in subsequent rulings,
particularly in the pending BestWater International case.
The legality of linking should not be entirely based on
the authorisation of the original publication or in general
the lawfulness of the source. The linker cannot and even
need not know who the author is and ensure the legality
of the target.45 With regard to BestWater International,
the critical question would be the conditions on which
the linkers might have a defence against the originally
illegal uploading act.46 Strict liability in all
cases—especially when the linker does not intentionally
link to unlawful material—would seem disproportionate
and would undermine the functioning of the internet. In
contrast, the Czech Supreme Court recently held that
embedding illegal videos residing on third-party servers
on your own web page was communication to the public.
As with the previous UK cases, secondary liability would
have been preferable grounds for infringement.47
In the implied licence interpretation, the right holder
tacitly allows normal use of the work by putting it on the
internet.48 This is supported by Svensson, which seems to
make a blanket statement of the intent of authors who
35ECS, “Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson” (February 15, 2013), paras 7, 53–59; Senftleben, “Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business
Models” (2013) 4 J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87, paras 20, 23. On US case law rejecting direct infringement, see e.g. Blevins, “Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism” (2013) 34
Cardozo L. Rev. 1821, 1853–1855.36Tsoutsanis, “Why Copyright and Linking Can Tango”, http://jiplp.blogspot.com/2014/02/why-copyright-and-linking-can-tango.html [Accessed February 25, 2014].37 ITV v TVCatchup (C-607/11) [2013] E.C.D.R. 9 at [24]–[30].38 For more detail, see e.g. Pessi Honkasalo, “Links and Copyright Law” (2011) 27 C.L.S. Rev. 258, 261–262; Senftleben, “Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business
Models” (2013) 4 J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87, para.18.39 See Honkasalo, “Links and Copyright Law” (2011) 27 C.L.S. Rev. 258, 261–264 and references.40BestWater International [2013] BGH I ZR 46/12; Paramount v Sky [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch) at [25]–[28].41Benjamin Schuetze, “Germany: The Federal Court of Justice and ‘the reality’ about embedded content” (June 18, 2013), Kluwer Copyright Blog, http://kluwercopyrightblog
.com/2013/06/18/germany-the-federal-court-of-justice-and-the-reality-about-embedded-content/ [Accessed February 25, 2014].42 Svensson , February 13, 2014 at [27].43Recital 19 of Infosoc Directive. Also see Honkasalo, “Links and Copyright Law” (2011) 27 C.L.S. Rev. 258, 262 (especially n.31) and 264 (n.55).44 Senftleben, “Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models” (2013) 4 J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87, paras 20–23.45 See Savola, “Hyperlinks, making available and the ‘new public’ — or just a dead end?” (February 14, 2014), The 1709 Blog, http://the1709blog.blogspot.com/2014/02
/hyperlinks-making-available-and-new.html [Accessed February 25, 2014].46 See fn.41 and corresponding text.47 8 Tdo 137/2013; Martin Husovec, “Czech Supreme Court: Embedding is Communication to the Public” (November 5, 2013), Kluwer Copyright Blog, http:/
/kluwercopyrightblog.com/2013/11/05/czech-supreme-court-embedding-is-communication-to-the-public/ [Accessed February 25, 2014].48 See e.g. Taina Pihlajarinne, “Setting the Limits for the Implied License in Copyright and Linking Discourse — the European Perspective” (2012) 43(6) I.I.C. 700.
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make their works available on the public internet.49 This
construct is useful only if linking is considered infringing
in the first place because the implied licence cannot help
in the situation of unauthorised publication.
The construct might also lead to issues if one accepts
that the author would have the possibility of withdrawing
consent (i.e. the right to forbid linking) without
withdrawing the material (i.e. without restricting access),
for example by placing an explicit note on the website.
It seems obvious that such exclusive right does not exist
at least when it comes to hyperlinking, again barring
certain moral rights aspects. This is at least tentatively
supported by Svensson: withdrawing authorisation appears
to require removing the work or restricting access to it.50
Also, this construct cannot answer a problem of
embedding: using technical resources of a target website
without generating benefit similar to visiting it,
particularly when the author and website operator are two
different entities.51
Summary
There has been mixed case law on direct liability but
secondary liability has provided another basis for
infringement.52 Both in Svensson and earlier in Paperboy
the author had already made the content available to the
public and there were no access restrictions.53
Circumventing access restrictions has sometimes led to
holding infringement, and this is to be addressed in C
More Entertainment .54 It seems widely established that
at least a hyperlink to lawful and publicly available
content is non-infringing. With the support of Svensson
this applies to framing and tentatively might be extended
to embedding, with the moral rights requirement to
adequately note that the content originates from another
website.55
The same analysis should apply to material that the
linker can reasonably expect to be lawful, but there is no
authoritative case law yet on this. Preferably the same
approach should also apply to direct infringement related
to unlawful material, to be addressed through, e.g.,
secondary liability. However, previous case law seems
to have taken a different path and Svensson, in obiter
dicta, seemed to point towards that as well.56
Traditionally it has been argued that the concept of
communication must be construed broadly to mean any
kind of transmission of protected works.57 Making
available also expands the overarching concept of
communication to the public to include providing and
offering “access” to works.58 A broad interpretation was
provided in SGAE, where the hotel was held to
communicate to the public by installing television
equipment in the rooms, owing to “interven[ing], in full
understanding of its actions, to give access to the
protected works to its customers”. The interpretation was
later affirmed in another, Irish hotel case.59 However,
Recitals 23 and 24 of the Infosoc Directive also state that
the respective rights should not cover any other acts.60
Reading these together would suggest that acts which
preceded or are related to the transmission or making
available might—and in some cases, should—be out of
the scope even if those ultimately resulted in
communication to the public.61 Care is needed when
interpreting broadly the already overly broad concepts.
Fortunately, there are some signs that lately users have
been better taken into account in balancing of interests.62
49 Svensson , February 13, 2014 at [26]–[27].50 Svensson , February 25, 2014 at [31]. cf. the ALAI Report, which advocated a broader exclusive right: see fnn.22–23.51 In some countries it has been held that embedded linking is not normal use covered by the implied licence. See Pihlajarinne, “Setting the Limits for the Implied License
in Copyright and Linking Discourse” (2012) 43(6) I.I.C. 700, 705–06.52 See Allen N. Dixon, “Liability of Users and Third Parties for Copyright Infringements on the Internet: Overview of International Developments” in Alain Strowel (ed.),
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in Copyright Law (Edward Elgar, 2009), pp.22–23; Alain Strowel and Vicky Hanley, “Secondary Liability for Copyright
Infringement with Regard to Hyperlinks” in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing (2009), pp.84 et seq.; Honkasalo, “Links and Copyright Law” (2011) 27 C.L.S. Rev. 258, 260–261;
ECS, “Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson” (February 15, 2013), paras 7, 54–56; Blevins, “Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism” (2013)
34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1821, 1853–1855.53 Svensson , February 13, 2014 at [27]; Paperboy [2003] BGH I ZR 259/00, [2005] E.C.D.R. 7 at [42]; Senftleben, “Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models”
(2013) 4 J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87, para.21.54 Session-ID [2010] BGH I ZR 39/08; Tsoutsanis (n 9).55Honkasalo, “Links and Copyright Law” (2011) 27 C.L.S. Rev. 258, 264; Senftleben, “Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models” (2013) 4 J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87,
paras 20, 23. cf. Tsoutsanis, “Why Copyright and Linking Can Tango”, http://jiplp.blogspot.com/2014/02/why-copyright-and-linking-can-tango.html [Accessed February
25, 2014]. It is unclear whether Senftleben requires the original content to be lawful. It has typically also been suggested that a reasonable expectation of the source being
lawful is sufficient.56As can be seen from the recent UK cases, direct infringement for adding a hyperlink has been held essentially based on facts similar to concerted action or similar doctrines
to be examined next.57FAPL v QC Leisure (C-403/08 and C-429/08) [2011] E.C.R. I-9083; [2012] E.C.D.R. 8 at [186], [193] (concerning inter alia legality of foreign satellite decoder cards
and pub owner committing communication to the public by showing football matches on television).58Tsoutsanis, “Why Copyright and Linking Can Tango”, http://jiplp.blogspot.com/2014/02/why-copyright-and-linking-can-tango.html [Accessed February 25, 2014].59PPL v Ireland (C-162/10) [2012] E.C.D.R. 15, affirming SGAE v Rafael Hoteles SL (C-306/05) [2006] E.C.R. I-11519, [2007] E.C.D.R. 2 at [42].60 See also ECS, “Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson” (February 15, 2013), paras 9–1].61See fn.29 and corresponding text. The concrete communication act is already covered, and it is submitted that preceding or subsequent acts should cause at most secondary
liability.62 Senftleben, “Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models” (2013) 4 J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87, paras 37–43, referring to e.g. FAPL v QC Leisure [2011] E.C.R. I-9083,
[2012] E.C.D.R. 8 at [162]–[163]; and Painer v Standard (C-145/10) [2012] E.C.D.R. 6 at [132]–[133] (a case on photographs, inter alia focusing on striking a fair balance
when interpreting copyright exceptions). See also SCF v Del Corso (C-135/10) [2012] E.C.D.R. 16 at [88]–[89] (a dentist did not communicate sound recordings to the
public by playing the radio at his practice).
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Secondary liability and joint actions
Classification of liability
There are various ways of classifying non-direct
infringement.63 In the United States, third-party liability
is based on contributory, vicarious and inducement
doctrines.64 Secondary liability has not been subject of
harmonisation in the EU.65 In Commonwealth countries,
there are authorisation, joint tortfeasor liability, and
criminal law accomplice theories.66 In civil law countries,
third-party liability is based on knowing assistance, duty
of care and possibly injunctive relief. Similar constructs
such as joint actions may also be available.67 It is not
possible to discuss these in detail here.68 However, in
consequence, the applicability of judgments from a
different legal tradition is particularly limited.
In general, Dixon has characterised the elements of
third-party culpability as follows: (1) relation of the third
party with the user, that is, the potential or actual
influence on the user; (2) extent of the third party’s
involvement (for example sanctioning, countenancing or
causing; preparatory acts or providing means for
infringement); (3) knowledge of infringing activities; (4)
intention of the third party (even inferred based on
inactivity or indifference); (5) extent of infringement and
lawful activities, such as substantial (potential of actual)
non-infringing use; (6) financial or other benefit of the
third party (for example if the business model depends
on infringement); (7) ability to prevent or deter
infringement; (8) due care of the third party implying
responsible practices; and (9) cost-benefit analysis
(liability is a bad fit if preventing or deterring
infringement would be technically infeasible or
economically unreasonable). In the seven examined cases,
no one factor itself caused liability but substantial findings
from two or more criteria did.69
Liability exemptions and defences
Likewise the exemptions from third-party liability granted
to intermediaries also differ somewhat. The United States
includes safe harbour provisions that in some aspects go
further than their EU counterparts, and within the EU
interpretations also vary.70 In this context, of particular
note is art.14 of the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31),
by which hosting providers are not liable for information
stored by recipients of the service provided that (a) the
provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity
or information or circumstances fromwhich it is apparent,
and (b) the provider removes suchmaterial upon obtaining
such knowledge or awareness.71 If this defence is
inapplicable, national rules on material liability or lack
thereof apply.72 Further, art.15 precludes imposing a
general monitoring obligation on transmitted information
or to seek facts or circumstances of illegal activity.73
In L’Oréal v eBay, the online marketplace operator
was not liable for trade mark infringement by its users
on certain conditions. A standard of “diligent economic
operator” was established, requiring inter alia also the
processing of imprecise takedown requests and the
termination of repeat infringers. Specifically, required
duties of care must not be monitoring obligations, but
rather providing for example a sufficiently sophisticated
notification system for receiving complaints.74 These
exemption provisions could be important in cases where
the website operator only provides a platform for users
to create or link content. However, this “it was just a
platform” defence has almost invariably been rejected
when the site relates to illegal activity.75
In practice, courts have found ways to find platform
providers liable owing to awareness, participation or some
other basis. This has also led to undesirable uncertainty
as to what exactly could cause liability for platform
providers. This has a “chilling” effect on service providers
63 See e.g. Dixon, “Liability of Users and Third Parties for Copyright Infringements on the Internet” in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing (2009), pp.12 et seq.64 See e.g. Dixon, “Liability of Users and Third Parties for Copyright Infringements on the Internet” in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing (2009), pp.15–16; Alfred C. Yen, “Third
Party Copyright Liability after Grokster” (2006) 91 Minn. L.R. 184.65Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in L’Oréal v eBay (C-324/09) [2011] E.C.R. I-6011, [2011] E.T.M.R. 52 at [55]–[56]; Paul S. Davies, “Accessory Liability: Protecting
Intellectual Property Rights” [2011] I.P.Q. 390.66See e.g. Dixon, “Liability of Users and Third Parties for Copyright Infringements on the Internet” in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing (2009), pp.16–18; Christina Angelopoulos,
“Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright Infringement” [2013] I.P.Q. 253, 255–259. For a more elaborate discussion, see
Davies, “Accessory Liability” [2011] I.P.Q. 390; Saw Cheng Lim and Warren B. Chik, “Revisiting Authorisation Liability in Copyright Law” (2012) 24 Sac. L.J. 698.67See e.g. Dixon, “Liability of Users and Third Parties for Copyright Infringements on the Internet” in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing (2009), pp.18–19; Angelopoulos, “Beyond
the Safe Harbours” [2013] I.P.Q. 253, 266–270.68On issues with holding platform providers liable through facilitating users’ infringing acts, see e.g. Mark A. Lemley and R. Anthony Reese, “Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation” (2004) 56 Stan. L.R. 1345; Blevins, “Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism” (2013) 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1821, 1829;
Senftleben, “Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models” (2013) 4 J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87, paras 52, 59, 67, 73.69Dixon, “Liability of Users and Third Parties for Copyright Infringements on the Internet” in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing (2009), pp.38–40.70See e.g. Jane C. Ginsburg, “User-Generated Content Sites and Section 512 of the US Copyright Act” in Irini A. Stamatoudi (ed.), Copyright Enforcement and the Internet
(Kluwer Law International, 2010), p.183; Jeremy de Beer and Christopher D. Clemmer, “Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network
Intermediaries?” (2009) 49 Jurimetrics 375, 382–389; Mark A. Lemley, “Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbours” (2007) 6 J.T.H.T.L. 101. Directive 2000/31 on certain legal
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1 arts 12–15. On developing common secondary liability
in varying legal traditions, see Angelopoulos, “Beyond the Safe Harbours” [2013] I.P.Q. 253, 270–273.71As we have seen and will be discussed below, in all UK cases knowledge seemed apparent.72 See Van Eecke, “Online Service Providers and Liability” (2011) 48 C.M.L. Rev. 1455, 1463–1464.73 See generally e.g. Van Eecke, “Online Service Providers and Liability” (2011) 48 C.M.L. Rev. 1455, 1465–1478. On interpretations of monitoring obligations, see e.g.
Etienne Montero and Quentin van Enis, “Enabling Freedom of Expression in Light of Filtering Measures Imposed on Internet Intermediaries: Squaring the Circle?” (2011)
27 C.L.S. Rev. 21, 28–34; Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, “Online Monitoring, Filtering, Blocking …What is the Difference? Where to Draw the Line?” (2013) 29 C.L.S. Rev.
702, 704–710.74 L’Oréal v eBay [2011] E.C.R. I-6011, [[2011] E.T.M.R. 52 at 120]–[122], [140]–[141]; Senftleben, “Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models” (2013) 4
J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87, paras 49–50, 57–59; Montero and Van Enis, “Enabling Freedom of Expression in Light of Filtering Measures Imposed on Internet Intermediaries” (2011)
27 C.L.S. Rev. 21, 29.75 See e.g. Dixon, “Liability of Users and Third Parties for Copyright Infringements on the Internet” in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing (2009), pp.40–41. A disclaimer against
illegal activity was present in Newzbin terms and conditions, but it was deemed entirely cosmetic and neither intended to be acted upon: see Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608
(Ch), [2010] F.S.R. 21 at [41]–[42]. Disclaimers were also present in torrent indexing sites: see EMI v Sky [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R 8 at [60]–[62]. On
“window dressing”, also see Saw and Chik, “Revisiting Authorisation Liability in Copyright Law” (2012) 24 Sac. L.J. 698, para.81.
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and externalises copyright enforcement costs to platform
providers.76 Higher costs and uncertainty in turn raises
the standard in order to “play safe”, which leads to market
concentration and stifles innovation by placing barriers
to newcomers.77 When on paper the liability is extensive
and exemptions practically uncertain, differentiating
between bona fide services and liable services is difficult,
with the aforementioned consequences.78
Examples of non-direct liability for platforms
In the UK blocking injunction Dramatico v Sky, The
Pirate Bay operators were held to authorise infringement
and be jointly liable as accessories, and internet service
providers were ordered to block access to the site.79
Comparatively, in Sweden the operators of The Pirate
Bay website were found guilty of secondary liability for
copyright infringement under criminal law. The
defendants were found to have furthered the main offence
of users’ unlawful communication to the public by
providing a website with well-developed search functions,
storing facilities, providing a tracker service and having
actual knowledge of copyrighted material. The hosting
defence was rejected.80 Somewhat differently in the
Finreactor case, the Finnish Supreme Court considered
the file sharing activity as a whole instead of assessing
each participant’s acts and liability separately. Most
operators were considered joint infringers based on
criminal law doctrine of mutual understanding and
complicity which had until then been unfamiliar to
copyright law; the hosting defence was likewise rejected.81
In contrast, in the United Kingdom establishing criminal
accessory liability has not been so successful.82 Recently,
with regard to the similar yet private Lithuanian site
Linkomanija, in civil proceedings the operator was
ordered to pay the maximum statutory damages and shut
down the site for contributing to the infringement based
on knowing of and encouraging illegal activities. The
hosting defence was also deemed inapplicable.83
Authorisation
Authorising means granting or purported granting of the
right to do the act complained of; it does not extend to
mere enablement, assistance or even encouragement. The
nature of the relationship, the means used to infringe, the
inevitability of infringement, the degree of control and
steps to prevent infringement were each examined in turn.
The conclusion was that the operators went far beyond
merely enabling and assisting, and on any view, they
sanction, approve and countenance users’ infringements
and also purport to grant users the right to do the acts
complained of.84 These five criteria, developed by Kitchin
J. in Newzbin, were mostly based on circumstances
rejected or unsupported in case law.85
Therefore, it is questionable how authorising is
applicable at least in the narrow sense. In CBS Songs v
Amstrad it was specifically noted that mere facilitation
or giving the users the means to infringe would not
suffice, although with certain additional notes.86 Grant or
encouragement by someone who does not have authority
is insufficient.87 Given that users are responsible for their
own activities, it is submitted that a purported grant to
infringe should require significantly more and for clarity
something explicit rather thanmere provision of a website
well suited for infringement. This is especially the case
if the website includes an explicit disclaimer warning
against copyright infringement. However, such
disclaimers have had little impact on liability if it seems
that the warning was not to be honoured.88
Because in the United Kingdom copying for private
use is not permitted, the most important non-infringing
substantial use of an Amstrad device was likely to be
copying self-made recordings. Was karaoke really that
big in the United Kingdom in the 1980s? Particularly,
copying such recordings to enchanted friends and family?
Probably not. It is likely that the majority of activities
were in fact infringing. Therefore, a website such as The
Pirate Bay, which allows all kinds of material, even
though most of it ends up being infringing, is not
76Lemley and Reese, “Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation” (2004) 56 Stan. L.R. 1345; Blevins, “Uncertainty as Enforcement
Mechanism” (2013) 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1821, 1824, 1834–1855; Lital Helman, “Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability of Technology
Providers for Copyright Infringement” (2010) 19 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 111, 155–156; Angelopoulos, “Beyond the Safe Harbours” [2013] I.P.Q. 253, 253–254.77 Senftleben, “Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models” (2013) 4 J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87, paras 51–52.78Michael A. Carrier, “The Pirate Bay, Grokster, and Google” (2010) 15 J.I.P.R. 7, 14–15; Senftleben, “Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models” (2013) 4
J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 87, paras 67, 73.79Ruth Hoy, John Wilks and Nick Edbrooke, “Dramatico Entertainment v BSKYB: Pirate Bay Runs Aground in English Waters” [2012] Ent. L.R. 151, 152–53. Direct
infringement was not claimed in this case (see Dramatico Entertainment [2012] EWHC 268, [2012] E.C.D.R. 14).80 Jerker Edström and Henrik Nilsson, “The Pirate Bay Verdict — Predictable, and Yet …” [2009] E.I.P.R. 483, 483–486; Mikko Manner, Topi Siniketo and Ulrika Polland,
“The Pirate Bay Ruling—When The Fun and Games End” [2009] Ent. L.R. 197, 200–201; Carrier, “The Pirate Bay, Grokster, and Google” (2010) 15 J.I.P.R. 7, 9–12.81Pessi Honkasalo, “Criminal Proceedings Against the Administrators of a BitTorrent Tracker: Finreactor KKO 2010:47” [2010] E.I.P.R. 591;Manner, Siniketo and Polland,
“The Pirate Bay Ruling” [2009] Ent. L.R. 197, 202–203.82See Davies, “Accessory Liability” [2011] I.P.Q. 390 393–394. The psychological bar to convict may also be higher in countries where such matters are decided by a jury.
This may be one of the reasons for aversion to criminal proceedings in certain countries and inclination towards civil litigation.83 [2012] Vilnius District Court 2-742-262/2012. The decision has been appealed. See Rita Matulionyte and Mindaugas Lankauskas, “Bittorrent Loses Again: A Recent
Lithuanian BitTorrent Case and What It Means for the Construction of the E-commerce Directive” (2013) 4(3) J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 179, paras 5–8.84Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), [2010] F.S.R. 21 at [85]–[102]; Dramatico v Sky [2012] EWHC 268, [2012] E.C.D.R. 14 at [73]–[81]; EMI v Sky [2013] EWHC 379
(Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R 8 at [52]–[70];Min Yan, “The Law Surrounding the Facilitation of Online Copyright Infringement” [2012] E.I.P.R. 122. For a more nuanced discussion
of interpretations of authorisation liability, see Saw and Chik, “Revisiting Authorisation Liability in Copyright Law” (2012) 24 Sac. L.J. 698.85Angelopoulos, “Beyond the Safe Harbours” [2013] I.P.Q. 253, 256.86CBS Songs v Amstrad [1988] A.C. 1013 HL. The case was about the liability of producers of twin cassette recording devices, and comparison to an internet service may
be difficult.87CBS Songs v Amstrad [1988] A.C. 1013 at 1054; Davies, “Accessory Liability” [2011] I.P.Q. 390, 396; Saw and Chik, “Revisiting Authorisation Liability in Copyright
Law” (2012) 24 Sac. L.J. 698, paras 14–16.88 See fn.75. It should be a factor on this aspect of authorisation, however. It is also worth considering which kind of disclaimer could be considered serious enough, given
that the operator may not be able or required to enforce it. At some point this must be distinguished from negligence, which is unlikely to apply to an accessory owing to
the lack of any duty of care, see Davies, “Accessory Liability” [2011] I.P.Q. 390, 398.
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necessarily so far from the “substantial non-infringing
use” standard when compared with this aspect of CBS
Songs v Amstrad.89 This also shows how particularly in
the United States the original doctrine required only
potential substantial non-infringing use. Nowadays the
requirement for non-liability seems to have been raised
to actual use. This might in turn in many contexts be
uncontrollable by the operator with the reasonable effort
as required by the safe harbour provisions, for example
in a video publishing service.90
In Newzbin, the strongest signals of authorisation
seemed to be the advice on the user support message
board and the operators and volunteer editors creating
and classifying material to detailed subject-matter
categorieswhich showed knowledge of infringing content.
All or most (other) activities could also have been deemed
as “enabling, assisting and encouraging”, which is not
sufficient for authorisation—and neither is, according to
House of Lords, to “sanction, approve and countenance”.91
While in The Pirate Bay case the statements of operators
might be indicative,92 also in Newzbin the applicability
of the authorisation doctrine was suspect. Essentially the
defendant had built a technical system for easily obtaining
file collections from the Usenet newsfeed service, a
precursor to the World Wide Web.93 The developed
system could be beneficial for non-infringing purposes
provided that there existed a substantial amount of
non-infringing content in Usenet.
Interpretation has shifted more towards allowing
facilitation through the flexibility of recent judgments.94
Based on case law the precise difference between what
is in and out of scope seems unclear.95 As a consequence,
caution is advised when considering applying the
authorisation doctrine through interpretative expansion.
Angelopoulos states this evenmore strongly and suggests
joint tortfeasance as a more sensible approach:
“If both [operator and users] know that the intended
copying is illegal, it is misleading to talk about the
purported grant of a right; quite contrary, what the
sites in question encourage is precisely unauthorised
copying.”
And:
“What [High Court decisions] reveal is bewildered
lower courts struggling to identify a sound
jurisprudential basis on which to ground the liability
of third parties whose wrongfulness the judges
instinctively accept. The result is legal gymnastics
that fail to convince.”96
Joint tortfeasance
Joint tortfeasance is based on general theory of tort law
and in consequence has more generic applicability. Based
on earlier case law, Kitchin J. and later Arnold J.
concluded that mere (even knowing) assistance or
facilitation of the primary infringement is not enough.
The joint tortfeasor must be so involved as to make the
tort his own. This would be the case if he induced, incited,
or persuaded the primary infringer to engage in the act
or if there is a common design or concerted action or
agreement on a common action to secure the doing of the
act.97
Based on CBS Songs v Amstrad, this again raises
questions, given that it is the user who chooses to commit
infringing acts and there has been no evidence of explicit
incitement or persuasion. As Lord Templeman stated:
“The purchaser will not make unlawful copies
because he has been induced or incited or persuaded
to do so by Amstrad. The purchaser will make
unlawful copies for his own use because he chooses
to do so. Amstrad’s advertisements may persuade
the purchaser to buy an Amstrad machine but will
not influence the purchaser’s later decision to
infringe on copyright.”98
This is supported by an appeals case focused on the
inevitability of infringement which seems to set the case
apart from these injunctions where the choice of
infringement lay with the users.99
Therefore, it could be argued that providing a website
with an “open doors” policy does not procure the user to
potential subsequent acts of infringement. Procurement
seems to require giving the primary infringer an idea (s)he
would not otherwise have had and make the primary
infringement more desirable than it otherwise would have
89On the probability of infringement and requirement of culpability, i.e. a “mental element” on the part of the accessory, see Davies, “Accessory Liability” [2011] I.P.Q.
390, 394–395, 397–398.90Yen, “Third Party Copyright Liability after Grokster” (2006) 91 Minn. L.R. 184, 225–226, 232; Blevins, “Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism” (2013) 34 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1821, 1841–1842, 1849.91Angelopoulos, “Beyond the Safe Harbours” [2013] I.P.Q. 253, 256.92The site flaunted “piracy” and it was stated that no torrent descriptions would be removed (with certain exceptions) and requests would be published and ridiculed at the
site: see Dramatico v Sky [2012] EWHC 268, [2012] E.C.D.R. 14 at [13], [79]–[80]. Obviously users clearly knew that website operators were in no position to grant them
any right. See Saw and Chik, “Revisiting Authorisation Liability in Copyright Law” (2012) 24 Sac. L.J. 698, para.22.93 See Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), [2010] F.S.R. 21 at [23]–[31], [98]–[101].94Angelopoulos, “Beyond the Safe Harbours” [2013] I.P.Q. 253, 256.95 cf. the Australian case Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 187, referred to in Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), [2010] F.S.R. 21 at [91]–[93],
it was held that adding hyperlinks to music recordings on a website amounted to authorising infringement. However, in Australia there is a more explicit statutory provision
on what constitutes authorisation under copyright law, and the case is incomparable here.96Angelopoulos, “Beyond the Safe Harbours” [2013] I.P.Q. 253, 257. On lack of authority to grant any right, also see fn.92.97Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), [2010] F.S.R. 21 at [108]; Dramatico v Sky [2012] EWHC 268, [2012] E.C.D.R. 14 at [82]; EMI v Sky [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch); [2013]
E.C.D.R 8 at [71]–[74].98CBS Songs v Amstrad [1988] A.C. 1013 at 1058.99Football Dataco Ltd Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [2013] EWCA Civ 27 [96]-[97]; [2013] Bus. L.R. 837. Arnold J. noted that this approach cannot be translated wholesale
to the context of torrent site blocking, but in his view it provided support for conclusions reached; see EMI v Sky [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R 8 at [73]. Actually
it seemed to do the opposite.
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been.100 However, properly implementing takedown
procedures would still be required, and this was a failure
at least in case of The Pirate Bay. Respectively inNewzbin
knowledge of infringement, providing detailed categories
for the content on the site, advice on the message boards
and inducing editors to act in their roles seemed to be
strongest bases for participation in common design.101
Additional considerations for blockinginjunctions
A case for restraint in issuing orders
In addition to caution in applying substantive law, the
peculiar procedural situation in court may also warrant
consideration. The actual infringer is absent102 and internet
service providers have no incentive to appeal because it
would require resources and incur costs (e.g. legal fees).
Therefore, no decision will be reviewed by higher courts
thus eroding the value of case law as precedent.
It has also been argued that the UK accessory liability
doctrines could use development.103 Development and
acceptance would be maximised if done or approved in
higher courts. On the other hand, denying a request would
be likely to result in appeal, leading to review and even
CJEU referral if deemed necessary. From this perspective,
erring on the side of restraint would seem preferable than
on action.
Applicability to proxy sites
What about websites linking to infringing sites or websites
acting as proxies (e.g. www.pirateproxy.net to access
www.thepiratebay.se) to such sites? First, freedom of
expression implies that linking to a website’s main page
cannot amount to direct infringement, and the only
grounds that could even be considered would be joint
liability in some extreme cases. Secondly, specific proxy
sites numbering in the hundreds that provide access to
the blocked websites are a different question.104
In the implementation of Newzbin2, blocking the order
was extended to cover “any other IP address or URL
whose sole or predominant purpose is to enable or
facilitate access to the Newzbin2website”, to be identified
and verified by the right holders. Further, if inclusion of
an address or page is disputed the issue could be resolved
in court.105 In subsequent orders specific terms have not
been analysed by the court. However, it has been noted
that an IP address106 is not eligible for blocking if it is
shared with anyone else.107 This is a concrete risk given
that according to a study 10 years ago 87 per cent of
websites shared an IP address.108Owing to the running-out
of IP(v4) addresses109 the problem is likely to become
worse; ascertaining whether the address is shared may
also be difficult.
These provisions have apparently been the grounds for
including proxy sites in the blocking list. In contrast, it
is likely that the original intent was to cover the changes
of domain names and IP addresses by website operators,
not the acts of third parties. As long as over-blocking due
to shared IP addresses does not result, the evaluation of
infringement criteria seems similar. However, liability is
one step further from the main infringement, possibly
resulting in challenges in proving joint actions. Per the
Belgian SupremeCourt decision, the providers apparently
need to identify and block these on their own.110 On the
other hand, in the UK and Dutch courts these have been
addressed in proceedings against the website operator.111
Indeed, analysis of the liability of third parties and a
consideration of the limits of blocking given the potential
over-blocking results would be beneficial, especially in
the context of blocking injunctions.
Conclusions
Establishing website operators’ liability based on direct
infringement of communication to the public for
user-generated links seems to have been themost lucrative
option. This is understandable because this is harmonised
within the EU and requires little with regard to facts or
causality. However, such expansion is undesirable for
various reasons including subsequent use of the broadened
concept in less applicable contexts.
It is submitted that hyperlinking and embedding are
similar when it comes to direct infringement of economic
rights of communication to the public. There are
compelling systematic reasons to advocate that the
lawfulness of the source cannot be the sole factor for
100Davies, “Accessory Liability” [2011] I.P.Q. 390, 396. Davies argues (at 397) that criminal accessory liability leading inevitably to civil liability (as in Sweden) should
also be adopted in England, and also (at 401–402) on the preference of the US style of contributory liability.101 cf. Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch); [2010] F.S.R. 21 at [111].102 Serving summons was deemed unnecessary; see Dramatico v Sky [2012] EWHC 268; [2012] E.C.D.R. 14 at [9]–[15].103Saw and Chik, “Revisiting Authorisation Liability in Copyright Law” (2012) 24 Sac. L.J. 698, paras 86–91; Davies, “Accessory Liability: Protecting Intellectual Property
Rights” [2011] I.P.Q. 390, 397, 401, 403, 409.104 See e.g. http://TorrentProxies.com [Accessed February 25, 2014]; fnn.2–3.105 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc (No.2) [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch); [2012] Bus. L.R. 1525 at [10]–[12].106An IP address is used to identify and locate a computer in the network.107Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (No.2) [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch) [13], [2012] 3 C.M.L.R. 15 at [13]; FAPL v Sky [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch),
[2013] E.C.D.R. 14 at [56].108Benjamin Edelman, “Web Sites Sharing IP Addresses: Prevalence and Significance” (September 12, 2003), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/archived_content/people
/edelman/ip-sharing/ [Accessed February 25, 2014].109 Internet Society, “Frequently Asked Questions on IPv6 adoption and IPv4 exhaustion”, http://www.isoc.org/internet/issues/ipv6_faq.shtml [Accessed February 25, 2014].110TorrentFreak, “Court Orders ISPs to Police the Internet for Pirate Bay Proxies” (November 20, 2013)http://torrentfreak.com/court-orders-isps-to-police-the-internet-for
-pirate-bay-proxies-131120/ [Accessed February 25, 2014]. It is possible that this would be inappropriate, being too generic and not specific enough. See Opinion of A.G.
Kokott in UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH (C-314/12), November 26, 2013 at [86]–[90]. The case concerns which internet service providers
may be ordered to block access to a site and the required specificity of such orders.111TorrentFreak, “Court Shuts Down Wordpress Based Pirate Bay Proxy” (July 9, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/court-shuts-down-wordpress-based-pirate-bay-proxy
-120709/; TorrentFreak, “Pirate Party Shuts Down Pirate Bay Proxy After Legal Threats” (December 19, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/pirate-party-shuts-down-pirate-bay
-proxy-after-legal-threats-121219/ [Both accessed February 25, 2014].
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direct infringement. From a practical perspective,
however, it is understandable how hyperlinking to
unlawful material or embedding links could in some cases
be considered direct infringement.
A systematically preferable option is to examine
secondary and joint liability, even if applying these might
in some cases, such as with authorisation, be suspect. At
the very least arguments must be built with care. The
downside is that these doctrines have not been harmonised
and the role of CJEU in interpreting and approximating
copyright would be limited. It is submitted that if
harmonisation in these circumstances was deemed useful,
it should occur through legislation, not through judicial
interpretation of the concepts related to direct
infringement.
The practical inapplicability of the hosting defence and
the rise of the role of websites in policing content are
somewhat worrisome. This leads to legal uncertainty and
increases the costs of running a site. In addition, it seems
rather straightforward to issue a website blocking order.
Further, at least in the United Kingdom, after the initial
cases, it has been relatively straightforward to extend
blocking to new sites as soon as it seems apparent that
the site provides a platform suitable for substantial amount
of copyright.
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Abstract So-called ‘‘mere conduit’’ internet service providers (ISPs) have been
issued injunctions to block access to websites to try to mitigate online copyright
infringement. Such orders have an international and ubiquitous character, because
various parties reside and infringing acts typically occur in different states. This
raises questions as to which court has jurisdiction to try the case and to what extent,
and which laws apply. These issues are examined de lege lata from the perspective
of forum-shopping and choice of law, first in the context of proceedings against the
website operator and then against the ISP. We see that the flexibility afforded by EU
case law provides options for localizing infringing acts and damages and selecting
the jurisdiction and applicable law. A typical but complex scenario is a state
enforcing its laws and policies on a foreign website at the user end. The state of the
ISP’s domicile has global jurisdiction but local law may only be applied to com-
munications that go through the territory of that state. This portrays the distributive
effect of the Rome II Regulation which usually leads to the application of multiple
laws. Respectively, a foreign court would have local jurisdiction if the affected ISP
at least had a branch or an agency there. Jurisdiction may also be based on pre-
ventive or protective measures with arguable cross-border limitations. On the other
hand, Art. 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation on tort liability and Art. 6(2) on third
party proceedings seem inapplicable to these injunctions.
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Recently internet service providers (ISPs) have been issued injunctions to block
access to websites in order to mitigate copyright infringement in peer-to-peer
networks populated by users of the website. Most notably, website blocking has
been applied to The Pirate Bay in about ten EU states.1 In 2013, blocking expanded
in the UK to cover various other similar and proxy sites, and this trend is expected to
continue.2 The legal basis for an injunction against a so-called ‘‘mere conduit’’
intermediary ISP has been the national implementation of Art. 8(3) of the
Information Society Directive (2001/29/EC). This provides for injunctive relief that
does not require establishing an intermediary’s direct or secondary liability for
infringement.3
This kind of online copyright infringement has an international and often also
ubiquitous character. Typically the site is located in one state, the users are located
in various states, and the ISP operates in a number of states. The acts of
infringement can likewise be considered to occur in various states.4 The traditional
approach under private international law, largely based on the concept of liability, is
inadequate to resolve which forum and which law is applicable to issuing ISPs an
order to block access to a website, given that there is no wrongful conduct on the
part of the ISP.5 Further, international aspects provide the right holder with a large
number of options on how to seek a remedy and respectively also opportunities for
alleged infringers to avoid or optimize litigation.
While copyright law has to some degree been harmonized within the EU, many
aspects are still national and territorial.6 In the same vein, different national
1 See e.g. L. Feiler, ‘‘Website Blocking Injunctions under EU and U.S. Copyright Law – Slow Death of
the Global Internet or Emergence of the Rule of National Copyright Law?’’ (TTLF Working Paper No.
13, 2012); Husovec (2013); P. Savola, ‘‘Copyright Injunctions against Internet Connectivity Providers
Especially with Regard to Peer-to-peer Networking’’ (Aalto University Thesis [in Finnish], 2013). The
term ‘‘website’’ is used for simplicity to refer to all similar technical resources.
2 See e.g. TorrentFreak.com, ‘‘Movie Studios Get UK ISPs to Block Torrent Site Proxies’’ (5 September
2013) and references. There have also been other attempts to reduce online copyright infringement, such
as delisting or depreferring results in search engines. See e.g. TorrentFreak.com, ‘‘How Google Helps
Copyright Holders Fight Piracy’’ (11 September 2013).
3 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167 (22
June 2001). See M. Husovec, supra note 1, at 116–117, paras. 1–5; L. Feiler, supra note 1, at 17–22;
Fawcett and Torremans (2011, at 545–546, 575).
4 See e.g. J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 548–550.
5 For example, M. Husovec (supra note 1, at 125–126, paras. 46–48, 52) notes a paradigm shift from tort-
law-centric injunctions to in rem injunctions and vulnerability of third party injunctions to abuse. See also
C. Angelopoulos, ‘‘Beyond the safe harbours: harmonising substantive intermediary liability for
copyright infringement in Europe’’, 2013 I.P.Q. 253.
6 See e.g. Hugenholtz (2013, 277 et seq); Tritton et al. (2008, 1153 et seq); Football Dataco Ltd v.
Sportradar (C-173/11), 18 October 2012, para. 27. The grounds for this historical tradition have however
been disputed. See e.g. Ubertazzi (2012b); Neumann (2011).
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requirements and enforcement strategies for ISPs are acceptable, contrary to the
general principle of the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC).7 Indeed, this paper
focuses on issues of international jurisdiction (which courts can try the case and to
what extent) and the choice of law (which law should be applied in that court and to
what extent). For simplicity, all parties are assumed to be from the EU.8
There have been a number of studies on private international and intellectual
property law, also in the context of copyright and the online environment.9 However,
most have not focused on ‘‘mere conduit’’ intermediaries and the context of peer-to-
peer copyright infringement, or the focus has been on de lege ferenda.10 This paper
explores copyright injunctions ordering an internet connectivity provider to block
access to a website. The focus is on the current law and various forum-shopping and
choice-of-law opportunities and how these could be addressed in court.11
The three principal approaches to (try to) stop infringement are suing users or
website operators12 and obtaining an injunction ordering an intermediary service
provider to (try to) block access to the site, either at the user end or closer to the
source.13 These approaches have different costs, effectiveness, and international
character, and as such the choice is also strategic. From the right holders’
perspective, expanding the liability of intermediaries and suing facilitators is a
logical move in trying to change the economics of copyright law, even if it is not a
socially optimal response.14 Therefore, given that suing website operators may be
challenging,15 the growing interest in pursuing website blocking through interme-
diaries seems natural. Further discussion of these choices is, however, beyond the
scope of this article.
7 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L
178 (17 July 2000). In general, Art. 3 forbids making foreign service providers subject to stricter
requirements in local laws compared to those applicable in the state of their establishment, but this
specifically does not apply to copyright and related rights. See L. Feiler, supra note 1, at 51–52.
8 Denmark is partially excluded, and certain other non-EU states are also included per the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions. I will not go into details here. Otherwise national procedural and substantive law
applies, influenced by various international conventions and agreements, typically in a manner similar to
principles outlined here. See e.g. J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 665 et seq.
9 See e.g. Ubertazzi (2012a); De Miguel Asensio (2012); Maunsbach (2012); S. Neumann, supra note 6;
Dinwoodie et al. (2009).
10 For example, a number of academic principles governing jurisdiction and choice of law have been
suggested, e.g. so-called ‘‘ALI principles’’, ‘‘CLIP principles’’, the Japanese ‘‘Transparency Proposal’’
and ‘‘Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal’’. As a summary, see e.g. P. De Miguel Asensio, supra note 9;
B. Ubertazzi, supra note 9; International Law Association (ILA) Intellectual Property and Private
International Law Committee, Sofia Conference (2012), First Report. The goal of these proposals has
been, however, to reform legislation; they do not purport to be descriptive of the current law. See e.g. J.
Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 646, 652–653.
11 See generally J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 221–227 on forum-shopping.
12 Here ‘‘website operator’’ refers to a company or people responsible for the (content of a) website. This
typically excludes non-liable parties, for example the hosting provider.
13 Other options are also available, for example initiating criminal proceedings against infringers.
14 See Lemley and Reese (2003, at 1374 et seq); Schellekens (2011). See M. Husovec, supra note 1, at
124, paras. 44–45, for right holders pushing for a broad scope of injunctions against intermediaries.
15 See e.g. M. Husovec, supra note 1, at 121, para. 25.
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These principal approaches may also be connected. In order to obtain an
injunction against an ISP, in some states (e.g. Finland) the right holder is required to
sue the website operator in order to obtain a declaratory judgment of infringement,
prohibiting continued violation.16 If such a suit is dismissed, ruled inadmissible or
the plaintiff cancels the legal action or fails to appear in court, the plaintiff must
reimburse all damages and costs to the alleged infringer and the ISPs.17 Therefore,
choosing a forum without jurisdiction might lead to inadmissibility and have
dramatic consequences.
As an introduction and to flesh out the more generic perspective in a simpler
situation, proceedings against website operators are first discussed. This paper then
moves on to discuss the primary topic, issuing a multinational ISP an injunction that
affects other states. In both of these contexts, particular focus has been put on
various choices for acts or arguments that could optimize the outcome (‘‘shop-
ping’’). Finally, conclusions are presented.
2 Proceedings Against Website Operators
2.1 Jurisdiction
The general rule in the Brussels I Regulation18 is that the court where one of the
defendants is domiciled or has an establishment has jurisdiction per Arts. 2, 5(5),
and 6(1). This is extended in Art. 5(3) stating that, in case of a tort, delict or quasi-
delict, the courts where the harmful event occurred or may occur also have
jurisdiction.19 There is no specific provision that would apply to copyright, and for
special jurisdiction one must resort to tort law principles.20
16 This is supported by Art. 50(6) of the TRIPS Agreement, by which provisional measures may be
revoked unless proceedings leading to a decision on the merits of the case are initiated within a
reasonable period. It is possible that in other states a website blocking action is already considered to
constitute a decision on the merits. See infra notes 84 and 98 and accompanying text.
17 Finnish Copyright Act (404/1961, as modified by 821/2005 and 679/2006), Secs. 60b and 60c(4). This
is similar to Art. 50(7) of the TRIPS Agreement.
18 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12 (16 January 2001). The recast
regulation will apply from 2015. Article numbering has changed, but from the perspective of this paper,
the changes in content are not relevant. See Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ L 351 (20 December 2012).
19 Based on the CJEU judgment Folien Fischer AG, Fofitec AG v. Ritrama SpA (C-133/11), 25 October
2012, this also applies to negative declaratory actions seeking to establish that liability for damages does
not exist. Earlier some states adopted a different model, with exclusive jurisdiction under Art. 22(4) of the
Brussels I Regulation, which led to so-called ‘‘torpedo’’ issues aimed at lengthening proceedings. See B.
Ubertazzi, supra note 9, at 247–249. Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Niilo Ja¨a¨skinen on Fischer (C-133/
11), 19 April 2012, proposing a restrictive interpretation and answering that Art. 5(3) did not apply, but
this was not adopted in the judgment.
20 See S. Neumann, supra note 6, at 584–585.
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The CJEU interpreted liability under Art. 5(3) in its eDate judgment (C-509/
09 and C-161/10) in the context of personality right violations, such as libel, as
follows. The state where the publisher is established (where the action took
place) has jurisdiction for liability for all damages, and alternatively every state
where online content has been accessible (where effects appeared) has
jurisdiction to the extent of damages in that state.21 Because personality rights
are not subject to territoriality like intellectual property rights, applicability or
lack thereof to IPR infringement has been debated.22 Indeed, the CJEU later
stated in its Wintersteiger judgment (C-523/10) on a registered trade mark used
in online advertising that this principle does not apply to IPRs. It was also stated
that ‘‘in principle’’ protection is territorially limited and cannot ‘‘in general’’ be
relied on outside the territory of the granting state.23 A recent judgment on
copyright infringement, Pinckney (C-170/12), confirmed that the meaning of Art.
5(3) may vary according to the nature of the infringed right and that the Court
has distinguished between personality rights and IPR violations.24
In Wintersteiger it was established that the case could be tried in the state that
granted the trade mark (the place where damage occurred) or the state where the
company (advertiser) that had bought trademarked keywords was established (the
place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred).25 Pinckney confirmed strict
territoriality of registered trade marks, emphasizing further that the state that granted a
national mark was best placed to ascertain whether the right had been infringed. The
Advocate General suggested that an approach similar to Wintersteiger should be
followed with regard to copyright, but the CJEU went its own way.26 The CJEU held
that, by virtue of Directive 2001/29, copyright is automatically protected in all
21 Joined cases eDate Advertising GmbH v. X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez v.
MGN Limited (C-161/10), 25 October 2011 (Grand Chamber). See e.g. U. Maunsbach, supra note 9, at
55–57. The effect of the website in the state must still be significant enough at least to constitute the
centre of the victim’s interest. See e.g. J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 554–558; eDate (C-
509/09 and C-161/10), paras. 49–50.
22 See e.g. S. Neumann, supra note 6, at 596, especially note 56; B. Ubertazzi, supra note 9, at 231–232,
para. 28 including references, at 233, paras. 36–38, and at 245, para. 111; U. Maunsbach, supra note 9, at
56; N. Hitsevich, ‘‘Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation and Its Applicability in the Case of
Intellectual Property Rights Infringement on the Internet’’, 79 World Academy of Science, Engineering
and Technology Index 1811 (2013). In the Finnish Pirate Bay declaratory action (Helsinki District Court
case 11/48308, still pending), the applicants also argued for jurisdiction of the court based on the principle
of eDate.
23 Wintersteiger AG v. Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH (C-523/10), 19 April 2012, paras.
24–25; B. Ubertazzi, supra note 9, at 232, paras. 29–30.
24 Peter Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG (C-170/12), 3 October 2013, paras. 32, 35–37.
25 Wintersteiger (C-523/10), paras. 29, 38. Earlier it was widely argued that the infringing act and the
damage must occur in the same protecting state. See S. Neumann, supra note 6, at 593–594 (stating that
inter alia Art. 5(3) is considered to be limited to the infringement of IPRs committed in the protecting
country). Based on newer case law, this no longer appears to hold. Pinckney also points in this direction,
given that the infringing act (at least with a typical location of acts) apparently did not occur in the state
where the action was brought.
26 Opinion of Advocate General Niilo Ja¨a¨skinen on Pinckney (C-170/12), 12 June 2013, paras. 57–61,
68–69.
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Member States and that every state where an internet site was accessible has
jurisdiction.27
The Wintersteiger judgment did not contemplate what damages could be awarded
in which court.28 In Pinckney, it was held that the limited protection of a state also
applies to which damages may be considered or even that only local damages can be
awarded.29 Due to the facts of the case and vagueness of the judgment one should be
wary of making conclusions on this aspect of Pinckney.30 If the principle of eDate was
applied to Wintersteiger, the state where an online advertiser’s wrongful conduct
occurs would have jurisdiction for all damages, and the state where the infringed trade
mark is registered (where damage occurs) for local damages. This is also what the
Advocate General suggested in Pinckney in the context of infringement of the right to
communication to the public.31 This interpretation becomes suspect after Pinckney,
given that the judgment emphasizes that damages can only be considered insofar as
protection is offered, or alternatively limited to the state where the court is situated.
In practical terms, however, it would be more important to know where damage is
deemed to have been caused than the theoretical division between local and all
damages. For example, taking the facts of Pinckney, does an infringing communication
to the public by an online store in the UK cause (practically) all its damage in the
author’s domicile in France? Every state where the store is accessible? Or only in the
UK? If in the UK, would purchases from France still cause damage in France? Such
questions have significant practical relevance, but have not been specifically addressed
in EU case law.32 If practically all damages (from lost sales, profits, etc.) were always
considered to occur in the author’s domicile, this would in most cases render the
jurisdiction limitation and distinction of local and all damages meaningless.33
27 See Pinckney (C-170/12), paras. 39–44.
28 This did not make a difference in this particular case because (apparently) only two states were
involved. In Football Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar (C-173/11) this was also not considered.
29 Pinckney (C-170/12), paras. 45–47. The former interpretation is supported by para. 45; the latter by
paras. 46–47.
30 The CJEU did not consider the details of the protection granted by a state, which kind of infringement
had occurred, or where and by whom; possibly this was considered to belong to the substance of the
matter. Likewise, there was no consideration of what damage could have been caused in which states. On
the other hand, in his opinion the Advocate General discussed this in more detail and previous cases were
also more detailed in this respect. Consequently, it is not obvious how well the statements in the judgment
would apply to other cases.
31 Opinion of Advocate General Niilo Ja¨a¨skinen on Pinckney (C-170/12), para. 71. With Union-wide
IPRs, under the Community Trade Mark (and Design) Regulation, the domicile or establishment of the
defendant (if located in the EU) has principal jurisdiction; only local damages can be awarded by the
court on infringement. See B. Ubertazzi, supra note 9, at 232, para. 30.
32 Advocate General Niilo Ja¨a¨skinen discussed this issue in some detail in his opinion on Pinckney (C-
170/12), paras. 53 et seq. (especially in footnote 46), also referring to earlier case law. In para. 70 he
explicitly noted that, when the exclusive right of communication to the public is infringed, the damage is
linked to the location of the public rather than the centre of the author’s interests (as with personality
rights). Given that the AG’s opinion was not followed and the referred case law did not relate to IPRs, the
applicability of the argument is unclear.
33 In practice this would result in an inverse situation compared to the principal rule of jurisdiction at the
defendant’s domicile. Global jurisdiction was rejected but, as stated, the practical impact might still be the
same. See infra note 36.
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We have at least four potential interpretations on the award of damages.
Pinckney could be read so that damages can only be awarded to the extent of the
jurisdiction of the court or that only local damages can be awarded even if
jurisdiction were broader. The third interpretation is the solution described above
based on eDate, specifically with the focus on the act of infringement rather than
the protecting state.34 This was also the Advocate General’s interpretation of
infringement of communication to the public in Pinckney.35 As the fourth option,
the reverse could also be argued by focusing solely on the right and the state
that granted it, regardless of who infringed it and where. The argument would be
that the effectiveness of protection and sound administration of justice requires
the ability to make all claims in one court. That court would naturally be the one
with the closest connection to the granted IPR, rather than, for example, the
defendant’s domicile. This approach would actually have some similarity to
Pinckney except that the author’s domicile would explicitly have global
jurisdiction. Even though global jurisdiction was rejected in that case, a
practical backdoor remains open owing to the uncertainty of where the damages
occur. Accepting this model would have a similar impact as extending exclusive
jurisdiction per Sec. 22(4) to damage claims and non-registered rights, which
should be rejected.36 In this paper, I will follow the broad interpretation of
Pinckney, where the award of damages follows the extent of jurisdiction. This is
also in line with the proposal of the Advocate General and the first interpretation
of eDate, except that these interpretations would confer global jurisdiction on the
state where the event giving rise to damage occurred, that is, where the wrongful
conduct occurred.
In the Wintersteiger and Pinckney judgments, special jurisdiction was examined
solely from the perspective of Art. 5(3).37 Article 8(2) of the Information Society
Directive (2001/29/EC) requires Member States to ensure that right holders can
bring an action for damages for infringing activity that occurs in that state’s
territory. However, the situation where the act of copyright infringement occurs
outside the territory but damages are felt locally is unspecified. This could, however,
be considered an issue of substantive law, not a question of jurisdiction.38 Indeed,
any state recognizing copyright for a work has jurisdiction for damages in that state
34 Similarly in J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 561 (stating that the focus must be on the act
of the defendant).
35 Opinion of Advocate General Niilo Ja¨a¨skinen on Pinckney (C-170/12), para. 70, specifically referring
to Wintersteiger and the Advocate General’s opinion on Wintersteiger.
36 Article 22(4) does not apply to infringement cases. See J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at
19–20. The applicability of Art. 22(4) for copyright damages was reversed and rejected in the UK
Supreme Court’s ruling, Lucasfilm Ltd. & Ors v. Ainsworth & Anor, UKSC 29 (27 July 2011). See B.
Ubertazzi, supra note 9, at 243, paras. 93–94. Advocate General Niilo Ja¨a¨skinen in his opinion on
Pinckney (C-170/12), para. 69, also strongly advised against this because it would deprive Art. 2 of its
meaning and distort the intention of the legislature.
37 More generally, in certain matters relating to the validity of registered IPRs, the state that grants such a
right has exclusive jurisdiction per Art. 22(4), but this does not apply to copyright. See G. Tritton et al.,
supra note 6, at 1210–1211.
38 U. Maunsbach (supra note 9, at 57) has argued that it would not be unjust to force the right holder to
bring its claims before the court where the action took place or where the defendant is domiciled.
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by virtue of EU law and international conventions.39 Further, Football Dataco Ltd v.
Sportradar (C-173/11) appears to imply that escaping the applicability of national
law should not be possible by being located in a different state. This suggests that
the ‘‘home state’’ of the original database may have been a factor when deciding if
that state has jurisdiction.40 Pinckney went further and categorically granted
jurisdiction to every state granting copyright protection. On the other hand,
jurisdiction was limited to the damages caused in that state. These cases confirm that
at least in theory the ‘‘home state’’ does not have any special role when considering
jurisdiction, although it may have practical relevance to where damage is considered
to occur.
It has typically been assumed that the mere availability of a website to users in
another state is not a sufficient ground for jurisdiction. Rather, the court must
determine whether a particular website targets the public in a specific state. Targeting
has been evaluated based on factors such as having a commercial presence on the
market, contracts on content with parties in the target state or contents translated into a
target state’s language.41 Pinckney quashed that interpretation by stating that Art. 5(3)
cannot depend on criteria that belong to the examination of the substance and which do
not appear in the provision.42 This implies that the CJEU feels that targeting or the lack
39 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The Berne Convention precludes applying preferential ‘‘law
of origin’’ treatment to copyright. See Basedow (2010) at 14.
40 Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar (C-173/11), paras. 42–47. In this case the website was in Austria
and the establishment of the defendant was in Germany, but it was held that the UK court could consider
its jurisdiction for reasons of efficiency. See H. Smith & R. Montagnon, ‘‘Databases Hosted Outside the
United Kingdom Can Infringe Rights in UK Databases’’, 35 E.I.P.R. 111, at 112 (2013). However, there
was no discussion about infringement occurring at the location of the establishment of the company,
which would have followed the principal rule of the Brussels I Regulation. Cf. Opinion of Advocate
General Cruz Villalo´n on Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar (C-173/11), para. 60, who specifically
suggested that the court rule that infringement occurred in both states. The CJEU, however, underlined
the territorial nature of the database sui generis right and that the directive had not aimed at uniform law
at the EU level. Analogously, the court referred to the territorial nature of trade mark rights in
Wintersteiger (paras. 24–28). While similar arguments could be made with regard to copyright (see supra
note 26 and accompanying text), it is notable how the CJEU in Pinckney (C-170/12), para. 39, took an
entirely different course by emphasizing protection in all Member States.
41 Football Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar (C-173/11), paras. 37–43 with references; Opinion of Advocate
General Cruz Villalo´n on Wintersteiger (C-523/10), 16 February 2012, paras. 22–28. See also B.
Ubertazzi, supra note 9, at 231, para. 26 (particularly on the German interpretation that the mere ability to
download is not sufficient, but that the site must be ‘‘intentionally directed at’’ a specific country), and at
240, para. 78 (on factors to be assessed when considering whether a site is directed at the forum state); J.
Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 561 (on where infringement may be considered to occur); A.
Blythe, ‘‘Searching Questions: Issues Surrounding Trade Mark Use on the Internet’’, 35 E.I.P.R. 507, at
512–513 (2013) (on criteria to assess the targeting of a specific state). One must, however, be careful
when assessing these criteria, especially in the context of essentially unmanaged sites. Even if The Pirate
Bay (as of this writing) supports 35 languages, there is actually very little translated content and the
language matters little. Likewise, advertisements targeting a specific country are chosen automatically by
the advertisement provider, not the website.
42 Pinckney (C-170/12), paras. 41–42. This was distinguished from an appropriate targeting test under
Art. 15(1)(c) in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof (C-585/08 and C-144/09), 7 December 2010 (Grand
Chamber). Application by analogy had already been adopted in Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar (C-
173/11), para. 36, though the decision focused more on the details of where the act was considered to
have occurred. Which courts have jurisdiction for online copyright infringement, and particularly whether
a targeting test exists, has also been referred to the CJEU in a pending case, Pez Hejduk (C-441/13).
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thereof would possibly affect the evaluation of infringement but the examination of
jurisdiction should be straightforward. Also, in some cases, the act of infringement has
been considered to occur where the target audience is, rather than at the website
location or where the infringing content was uploaded.43 While this is connected to the
substance, it is also related to jurisdiction based on where the harmful event occurred.
This reasoning on localizing acts is questionable when it is grounded on the
effectiveness of protection under national law. It results in uncertainty especially from
the perspective of an alleged infringer, given that the principles on where acts can be
localized are open to debate and ultimately at the court’s discretion. This allows the
right holder shopping opportunities, because inadmissibility due to the lack of
jurisdiction seems rare, no matter where the issue is brought to court.44
The CJEU has focused perhaps unnecessarily on jurisdiction in contrast to the
choice of law. For example, Wintersteiger attempts to restrict jurisdiction by
excluding the search engine operator’s domicile and emphasizing the jurisdiction
of the state that granted the registered trade mark. In contrast, in Football
Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar, jurisdiction was unnecessarily expanded, because the
applicability of national law and preventing ‘‘escaping it’’ is already guaranteed
by the choice of law (lex loci protectionis, see below). These cases also
discussed the facts and substantive law, for example, where the infringement was
considered to have occurred. Pinckney was entirely different in many respects.
Jurisdiction on copyright became scattered, leading to a truly ‘‘mosaic’’
approach.45 It could even imply that no state would have jurisdiction per Art.
5(3) to consider damages caused in all states. Also, discussion of the substance
was very brief, which might have been intentional if the CJEU only wanted to
emphasize the criteria in Art. 5(3) and leave the rest to national courts. It might
also have been intentional not to take any stance on where the act or its effect
occurred, because the CJEU seemed to say that if it ‘‘may occur’’, meaning
multiple alternative locations, it is sufficient for jurisdiction. It remains to be
seen in which direction the case law will develop in the future. While the
CJEU’s interpretation of territoriality was already strong, it became even stronger
with Pinckney. An alternate direction moving towards fewer and a more
deterministic selection of jurisdictions with extraterritorial powers would also
have been possible. That would have led to a stronger internal market and pan-
European justice system.
The type of website and how actively it is operated varies. Some websites are
simplistic and include copyright content or direct links to such for users to download or
43 See references in supra note 41.
44 The ECJ case, Owusu v. Jackson (C-281/02), 1 March 2005 (Grand Chamber), paras. 37–46, seems to
suggest that declining jurisdiction based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens or by using case
management powers is severely restricted under the Brussels I Regulation. See J. Fawcett & P.
Torremans, supra note 3, at 204–206, 218–221.
45 On the other hand, Pinckney interpreted Wintersteiger so that the state where the registered IPR was
granted would be best placed to ascertain whether the right had been infringed, implying higher
concentration. The distinction was made for copyright because it was ‘‘automatically protected’’. The
same argument would also apply to other non-registered rights, such as database rights, even though
Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar earlier took a different view. It is unfortunate that this discrepancy was
not considered in Pinckney.
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stream.46 Others, such as The Pirate Bay, do not contain copyright works. Rather, such
sites only have descriptions and identification tags of content and links to third-party
rendezvous servers called ‘‘trackers’’, where the users sharing content corresponding
to a queried identification tag may be found. Depending on legislation, a website
operator’s acts could be deemed legal, as contributing to infringements by users
sharing content, or establishing liability based on knowingly participating in concerted
infringing activities.47 The evaluation of the latter kind of websites may be more
complicated, because the jurisdiction, choice of law and substance are somewhat
intertwined. If a particular law would not consider the website operator’s acts to be
infringing, the case might be rejected even if it were considered admissible.48 With
broadly distributed jurisdiction limited by territoriality per Pinckney, cases would be
considered admissible but could be more easily rejected, which might preclude re-trial
elsewhere (res judicata). On the other hand, the previous model of considering the
applicable law and substance in the jurisdiction phase, leading to inadmissibility,
would not incur such preclusion. This forces the plaintiff to plan more carefully how
and where exactly it is best to launch proceedings.
In order to understand how trade mark case law could apply to copyright, let us
consider both. Viewing or using trademarked products does not constitute
infringement and therefore trade mark infringement is always related to commercial
activities. On the other hand, sharing copyright works is infringement, and private
copying of copyright works may also be infringing, at least to some degree.
Consequently, there are arguably at least five fora for copyright infringement
proceedings: (1) the state where one of the website operators is domiciled, (2) the
state where the website is located, (3) the state where the users of the website share
copyright works, (4) the state where users download copyright works, and (5) any
other state that grants copyright for a work.
Traditionally, it has been argued that the location of the server is a more important
basis than the establishment of the defendant company.49 In Wintersteiger, the trade
mark was technically shown at the location of the search engine operator’s web
servers, but this was deemed objectively unforeseeable. ‘‘The place of establishment
of that server’’, likely referring to the technical location of web servers instead of
where the company was established, could not be the basis for jurisdiction due to its
46 At least in some cases, directly linking to copyright content may constitute infringement, but I cannot
go into this here. This issue will be contemplated, for example, in pending cases Svensson E.A. (C-466/
12) and C More Entertainment (C-279/13).
47 An example of the second category is the Pirate Bay case in Sweden (Svea Court of Appeals decision
on 26 November 2010, case B-4041-09; the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on 1 February 2012); a
third example is the Finnish Supreme Court case KKO 2010:47 (‘‘Finreactor’’). See Mylly (2012) at
214–215; Manner (2009). See generally C. Angelopoulos, supra note 5, on participation.
48 Limited jurisdiction forces courts to investigate the factual subject matter (to some degree) before
being able to decide questions of jurisdiction. See U. Maunsbach, supra note 9, at 47. On the other hand,
in Pinckney (C-170/12), para. 40, the CJEU noted that attributability of infringement and other factors are
matters of substance, not jurisdiction.
49 See J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 553. In the context of trade marks, a modified version
of Shevill (C-68/93), 7 March 1995, was proposed. Also, copyright infringement rarely relates to a
legitimate business as such, and the enforcement perspective (i.e. the location of the server) is more
relevant, especially if the location has been and is expected to remain stable.
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uncertain location.50 The irrelevance of the web server’s location was affirmed in
Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar.51 Pinckney, however, rejected additional criteria
that belong to the substantive examination. Until this has been considered in
subsequent cases, it is submitted that these grounds for refusal could still be valid. The
requirement for foreseeability and a restrictive interpretation of Art. 5(3) should prima
facie result in rejecting jurisdiction when the defendant obtains services from a non-
liable third party. Especially when infringement occurs in ‘‘cloud services’’, the
location is increasingly arbitrary and could also be changed in an instant.52 However, if
the website operator owns physical server infrastructure and is domiciled intentionally
in a country with a low degree of IPR protection, the location of the server could be a
possible basis for jurisdiction.53
Wrapping up, in the widest possible interpretation of Pinckney, any state where
damage may have been caused would have jurisdiction but only for that damage.
With a more restrictive interpretation and also taking into account where it would be
practicable to seek justice, the website operator’s domicile and the location where
users share copyright works seem generally acceptable fora. The technical location
of the website might also be acceptable under some circumstances. Because
infringement in the state where users download copyright works is not harmonized,
and in any case is not very interesting from the website operator’s perspective, it is
not discussed here.54 Also, as already noted, the state that grants copyright
protection for a work, but where no damages have been caused should be rejected.55
50 Wintersteiger (C-523/10), paras. 36–37; Football Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar (C-173/11), para. 45.
51 Football Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar (C-173/11), paras. 37–47. In this case, the website and the
establishment of the defendant were in Austria and Germany, respectively, and the company was sued in
the UK. It was claimed that the web server location constituted a ground for exclusive jurisdiction, but
this was rejected.
52 See B. Ubertazzi, supra note 9, at 242, para. 89 (that the server as a central point of infringement is no
longer identifiable in the era of cloud computing), and at 247, para. 123 (that the place of the server can be
manipulated too easily). J. Fawcett & P. Torremans (supra note 3, at 571) also argue that the location of
the server does not normally have much weight, but the weight increases if an action against a hosting
provider or other intermediary is made based on primary or secondary liability. Similarly, little weight
should be put on a third-party website location (e.g. Ebay) if the alleged infringer acts alone. See
generally van Eechoud (2003, 221 et seq) (on criteria for states that have an effective rather than a
theoretical connection to infringement).
53 A similar argument was presented in Football Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar (C-173/11), paras. 45–46: by
locating in a different EU Member or non-Member State, it should not be possible to escape the
applicability of national law. As noted above, relying on the choice-of-law provisions would also have
sufficed.
54 It is worth noting, however, that in Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar (C-173/11), paras. 39–42, it was
held that infringement may occur in the territory of the state where the target persons are located. In this
manner, the state where the users are targeted, even if they do not commit infringing acts, might be
relevant depending on where the website operator’s infringing act is considered to have occurred.
According to Pinckney, the location of acts and their effects could also be examined with the substance,
not necessarily when considering jurisdiction.
55 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Damage claims can be made in essentially any state that is a
party to the Berne Convention or TRIPS. See Metzger (2010) at 173 (that sharing a file in a peer-to-peer
network could infringe intellectual property rights in all WTO member states and third countries as well).
This interpretation should be restricted so that, if damages have not occurred in that state, such state
should not have jurisdiction for infringement. See e.g. Larsen (2011). Indeed, this suggestion is supported
by Pinckney.
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A separate question is the requirement of, for example, the Finnish Copyright Act
to apply for a declaratory action to prohibit operating the site.56 In a broad sense, such
a request could be considered based on a delict or quasi-delict: the order would give
rise to a legal obligation (to stop the site, i.e. copyright infringement). In the narrow
sense, a delict by definition needs to cause damage, and in this case prohibition could
be ordered even if damages were not claimed or could not be established.57 The
CJEU has held that Art. 5(3) covers all actions that ‘‘seek to establish the liability of a
defendant’’ which ‘‘are not related to a contract’’58 and also that Art. 5(3) does not
apply to allegedly wrongful conduct if the legal action does not seek compensation
for harm – for example a revocatory action paulienne. On the other hand, in Fischer
(C-133/11) it was held that Art. 5(3) would apply to an action seeking to establish
that liability for damages does not exist.59 This seems somewhat contradictory but,
given that liability could be affirmed even without establishing damages, the case law
seems to suggest that Art. 5(3) would be applicable. In any case, in practice this is
moot because the right holder could always claim damages. Also, given that Art. 5(3)
only requires that the issue ‘‘relates to’’ a tort, delict or quasi-delict, the type of action
is similar to a compensation claim, and it would seem natural that the jurisdiction for
a declaratory positive action on infringement should also follow Art. 5(3).60 For
example, similar rules on the defendant’s domicile and forum delicti also exist in the
Finnish Code of Judiciary Procedure (4/1734, modified by 135/2009).61 Also,
according to the principles of territorial jurisdiction, the court with limited
jurisdiction would only have jurisdiction to prohibit operating the site in that state.
2.2 Choice of Law
The law applicable to copyright infringement is the law of the state for which
protection is sought (lex loci protectionis), as set down in Art. 8 of the Rome II
56 The rationale of the provision is to establish that infringement occurred, provide a forum to investigate
liability for costs and damages, and satisfy the defendants’ fair-trial requirements, which are not yet
guaranteed in the blocking injunction proceedings. See supra note 81 and accompanying text for a critical
evaluation of ex-parte proceedings.
57 Similarly in Lundstedt (2001), at 136–137, arguing that the ‘‘event giving rise to the damage’’ is
infringement itself (by which damage may or may not be proven), and the damage occurs at the place of
infringement. See also J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 174 (that infringement cases do not
require that damage be shown). Later in Wintersteiger, the CJEU considered the damage rather to have
occurred where the right was registered (see supra note 25) and in a similar manner apparently also in
Football Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar.
58 Tacconi (C-334/00), 17 September 2002, paras. 21–23 including references.
59 Reichert and Kockler (C-261/90), 26 March 1992, paras. 17–20. See supra note 19 on Fischer. In CˇEZ
(C-343/04), 18 May 2006, paras. 15 and 18, it was also considered whether Art. 5(3) applies to
prohibiting a neighbour from causing a nuisance. This was, however, not specifically addressed by the
court.
60 Similarly, L. Lundstedt, supra note 57, at 137, who argues that jurisdiction should lie in a court in the
state where the alleged infringement occurred, regardless of any proof of damage. This is also what is
apparently referred to by B. Ubertazzi, supra note 9, at 248, note 153.
61 These rules would also be applied if the Brussels I Regulation were not applicable. As a minor detail,
Chapter 10, Sec. 7, restricts jurisdiction for cases relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict to damages; the
occurrence of harmful events is unspecified.
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Regulation. This cannot be changed even with the parties’ agreement, and escape
clauses of closer connection in Art. 4 also do not apply.62 Typically this refers to the
state where the work is being used or where the exploitation takes place, which
differs in some cases from the lex fori (where protection is sought) or where the tort
was committed.63 The same law also applies, for example, to determine liable
persons and liability for the acts of other persons per Arts. 15(a) and 15(g).
There have been multiple interpretations of what ‘‘for which country protection is
sought’’ means in the context of ubiquitous online copyright infringement. It is not
always clear how interpretations arising from the perspective of registered rights or
IPRs in general apply to copyright. The widely accepted understanding of the provision
is that the law of the state where the effects of an infringing act were felt is decisive. This
is often also cited without distinguishing acts and effects, but with a strict territorial
limitation to the protecting state, for example, by requiring that infringing acts and
damages need to occur in the same state. Consequently, multistate infringement must
be split into where its effects were felt and apply each state’s legislation to damages.64 It
is no wonder that this has been criticized as being inconvenient in cases of ubiquitous
online infringement, and proposals have been made to narrow down the choice of law.65
Unfortunately, formulations of this interpretation typically lack precision and detail in
order to properly evaluate its legal basis. It is accepted here as the primary
interpretation, but alternatives are examined in some depth.
An alternative is to relax absolute territoriality so that acts committed in multiple
states may be addressed under a single law of the state where the effects were felt,
that is, where damage occurred. A second alternative is localizing the act to a single
state and applying that state’s law to all effects without territorial limitation.66 Let
us start with the former. The Rome II Regulation and the concept of the ‘‘protecting
state’’ does not specifically exclude acts that occur abroad.67 Article 8 allows the
claimant to choose the state where protection is sought and, as a consequence, which
62 Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the
law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L 199 (31 July 2007). See U. Maunsbach,
supra note 9, at 59–60; P. De Miguel Asensio, supra note 9, at 352–353; J. Fawcett & P. Torremans,
supra note 3, at 804; S. Neumann, supra note 6, at 586–591; A. Metzger, supra note 55, at 157–161,
171–172; J. Basedow, supra note 39, at 27.
63 B. Hugenholtz, supra note 6, at 278; J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 676–678, 806–810; J.
Basedow, supra note 39, at 12–13. See also Frohlich (2009, at 885).
64 See P. De Miguel Asensio, supra note 9, at 353, para. 12; S. Neumann, supra note 6, at 592–593; U.
Maunsbach, supra note 9, at 54, 59; J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 818; A. Frohlich, supra
note 63, at 886; Dinwoodie (2009, at 730); M. van Eechoud, supra note 52, at 105 et seq., 222. In the
Pirate Bay case (Svea Court of Appeals decision on 26 November 2010, case B-4041-09), when the
Rome II Regulation was not yet in effect, Swedish law was applied to all damages, calculated on the total
number of downloads. This might no longer be appropriate. See U. Maunsbach, supra note 9, at 53–54; B.
Ubertazzi, supra note 9, at 249, para. 133. Similarly also in Schack (2009, at 133) (that if infringements
happen in several protecting countries at once, distributive application of multiple laws would be
unavoidable).
65 See references in supra note 10. I will not go into further detail here.
66 See e.g. A. Frohlich, supra note 63, at 886. Cf. Matulionyte (2011) at 60.
67 In the context of tort law, for example, Art. 4(1) explicitly selects the law where damage occurred (i.e.
where the effects were felt), rather than where the act was committed. Lex loci protectionis could however
be based on different choices.
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law is applied to the infringement. Also, Art. 8 does not include any provision that
would restrict territorial applicability of the chosen law if the law were to grant
protection in some extraterritorial scenarios. Rather, there is often no specific
provision on international applicability in a particular national act, but applicability
depends on the extent of jurisdiction of the court where the law is applied.
The main counter-argument would be that the limitation is built-in as an
unwritten principle. The traditionally widely understood territoriality principle is
usually only cited as a conclusion that both the infringing conduct and damage need
to occur in the same protecting state. For example, earlier it was submitted that ‘‘an
infringement of an intellectual property right arising from activities conducted
outside the country of protection is hardly conceivable’’.68 The ECJ judgment in
Lagarde`re Active Broadcast (C-192/04) might also be cited, which included a
statement that the Harmonization Directive does not detract from the internationally
recognized territoriality principle and territoriality of rights, and therefore domestic
law could only penalize conduct engaged in within national territory.69 Further,
delving into the wording of Art. 8(1), the concept of ‘‘protecting state’’ could be
interpreted to include a restriction on what the state is allowed to protect, for
example, based on arguments such as public international law.70 On the other hand,
if one accepts that the substance of the chosen law is decisive, limited by the
jurisdiction of the court, the conclusion is entirely different. In that case
acceptability of local damage for an infringing act abroad depends on national
copyright or tort law. For example, Finnish tort law does not have any territorial
limitations, and neither does copyright when it comes to infringement. Limitations
are set by jurisdiction, in this case through the Brussels I Regulation.71 For example,
a person living in Sweden could claim in a Finnish court the protection of Finnish
copyright law for an infringing act in Estonia for damages occurring in Finland.72
In the second alternative, localizing the infringing act, the details of infringement
and where it occurs need to be analyzed in more depth. The earlier interpretation
68 See e.g. A. Metzger, supra note 55, at 171–172. See also S. Neumann, supra note 6, at 589–594
including numerous references; J. Basedow, supra note 39, at 27. However, as noted above, in new case
law, for example Wintersteiger and Pinckney, the damage and the act might occur in different states. See
supra note 25.
69 Lagarde`re Active Broadcast (C-192/04), 14 July 2005, para. 46. The statement might be of obiter
dictum nature.
70 See S. Neumann, supra note 6, at 587 (on territoriality having an impact on the substantive law). On
the other hand, categorical limitations on what a state is allowed to protect do not exist, for example, in
tort or criminal law. Both allow national law to penalize extraterritorial conduct, although with some
restrictions. See M. van Eechoud, supra note 52, at 97. While the perspective was on exclusive
jurisdiction, the grounds of territoriality are disputed, e.g. in B. Ubertazzi, supra note 6, at 160 et seq.
71 Finnish Copyright Act (404/1961, as modified by 648/1974 and 446/1995) Secs. 63–65. The most
important territorial restrictions concern which works are protected, but as all works under the Berne
Convention are covered, this is not relevant when it comes to infringement. However, some uses of
related rights are territorially limited, for example, requiring that communication to the public must occur
in Finland.
72 The protection of Swedish authors in Finland and by Finnish law is provided by Art. 5(2) of the Berne
Convention and similar agreements. Protection for locally occurring damages by foreign acts is provided




that infringement due to activities outside the protecting state is hardly conceivable
has become suspect or, at the very least, requires creative interpretation of where the
infringement is considered to have occurred or where the damages are felt.73 In
Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar, it was held that the infringing act was
considered to have occurred in the territory of the targeted user audience.74 Let us
consider a very simple example. A website operator domiciled in Estonia uploads a
copyright work to a website located in Sweden, and the work becomes immediately
available. Users of the website in Finland and Germany download the said work.
The act of uploading infringes the reproduction right, most likely in the state where
the work was uploaded. As the work becomes immediately available, the act also
infringes the right of communication to the public. But where is that right infringed?
In the state where the website is located, the website operator’s domicile or all the
states where the website is accessible (or based on earlier case law, the targeted
states)? Lastly, users downloading the work may infringe the reproduction right in
their respective states. While some of the presented approaches to localizing the acts
might end up being rejected, we can see that there are multiple ways to slice the
cake. Obviously the right holder is in a key position to choose which way(s) to argue
and consequently which applicable law to invoke for the infringement. This allows
various shopping opportunities; on the other hand, this implies unpredictability for
the alleged infringer.
In order to obtain the most economically efficient response and application of a
single law, it would likely be beneficial for the right holder to focus on the right of
communication to the public. It could easily be argued that the right is infringed
both at the website location or the operator’s domicile and every state where the
website is available. By claiming infringement and damages at the former, only a
single law would be applied. If that law would not result in an optimal outcome, a
different argumentation could be used. It might even be possible to claim
infringement of the reproduction right in that state for each copy downloaded from
the server.75
In consequence, the earlier requirement that acts and damages need to occur in
the same state due to territoriality seems suspect in the context of ubiquitous internet
infringement. In the light of recent case law and the alternative interpretations
discussed above, it seems that 1) locating where the act of infringement occurred
may depend on the circumstances, 2) the infringement (act) and damages (effects)
can be considered to occur in different states, 3) either of these states or even a third
state may have jurisdiction or be chosen as the legal forum, although jurisdiction
may be limited, and 4) protection can also be sought in a number of different states,
including (in principle) every state that is a party to the Berne Convention or the
TRIPS Agreement.
73 See supra note 68 and corresponding text.
74 Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar (C-173/11), para. 39. This is a questionable example of localizing
acts of ubiquitous infringement.
75 The reproduction right might also be infringed at the website location or operator’s domicile by virtue
of the web server’s making a copy of the work as a necessary technical step in order to enable
downloading.
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For websites that directly infringe copyright, although the users do not, this
would imply applying the law of the state where the website is located or where it is
operated (i.e. the defendant’s domicile). In some cases, the technical location of the
website could also be argued to be most suitable, but with the rise of virtual services
this is, as a rule, becoming more and more unforeseeable and meaningless, as was
demonstrated in Wintersteiger.76 The state where the act was committed would have
local (per Pinckney) or global (per interpretation of eDate and Wintersteiger)
jurisdiction. The defendant’s domicile would always have global jurisdiction, and
the state where the damages occurred would have local jurisdiction. Depending on
the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation and the location of acts and damages,
one or multiple laws could be applied.
A low degree of IPR protection could be possible if the states where the website
is located and the defendant is domiciled are chosen carefully. However, locating
the acts elsewhere and jurisdiction anywhere where the site is accessible prevent
such optimization.77 Earlier case law has focused on the joint liability of users and
the foreign website as a prerequisite for bringing a foreign site under national law.
Football Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar arguably makes liability more straightforward to
prove by locating the infringing act in the state of the targeted user audience.78
Pinckney went even further and eliminated the targeting test from consideration of
jurisdiction. However, the judgment did not take a stance on the location of the
acts.79 This demonstrates flexibility but also highlights the need for due
consideration: right holders have shopping opportunities with flexible rules and
respectively defendants with rigid rules; both extremes are undesirable.
For websites that may or may not directly infringe copyright but users’ activities
do, at least to some degree (e.g. sharing content in a peer-to-peer network), the issue
is more nuanced.
In a court trying a case with global jurisdiction, the plaintiff might want to argue
that protection is sought at the location of the website or where it is operated (as
above), that the website operators would also be liable for damages caused by users,
and that only one law would need to be applied. This would be supported by the
argument that the website infringes copyright by making works available to the
public, that damages occur where the act is committed, and that users’ activities in
other states are irrelevant. However, it might be inconsistent to calculate the amount
of damages based on the number of downloads or some other measure that would
depend on the number of users if the users’ actions were not at issue or were
76 The same arguments presented in the context of jurisdiction also apply to the choice of law, although
the requirement for predictability is not so strict. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
77 This scenario of being domiciled in a country of lax protection was suggested in the context of suing
where the web server was located, e.g. by J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 553 (referring to
Ginsburg in its note 126). See also R. Xalabarder, ‘‘Copyright: Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the
Digital Age’’, 8 Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 79, at 84–88 (2002).
78 Football Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar (C-173/11), paras. 39–43. See Smith & Montagnon, supra note 40,
at 112; C. Angelopoulos, supra note 5, at 255–259 (on jurisprudence and the background to joint
tortfeasance doctrine in the UK).




considered to occur in some other state. This argument is also especially challenging
when the site does not have any directly infringing content, and the role of the
website operators is of (at most) contributory nature.80 Contributory IPR infringe-
ment could be based on general tort law principles governing contributory liability
(e.g. in the USA) or considered a form of IPR infringement (e.g. in the UK).81 While
in the former lex loci protectionis does not apply, at least in the latter context it has
become generally accepted that the governing law would be the law applying to the
main infringement.82 In this case the main infringement would be sharing or
downloading content by users in various other states, which would lead to the
application of multiple laws.
Alternatively, by another strategy, suing in a local court with only local
jurisdiction, the plaintiff would need to argue for damages caused locally by
infringing users (and/or by the website as such) and that the website operator is
liable for these damages. This approach would also be workable when the website is
operated from a state with a low degree of IPR protection. Establishing civil liability
might be easier than criminal liability and associated civil claims.83 Especially if
liability has already been established in some earlier proceedings, this is the easiest
path for national right holders, and it was also the approach chosen in the Finnish
case against The Pirate Bay operators.84 Lastly, it would also be possible to try the
case with global jurisdiction, but focus only on states with the most infringing
activity and thus keep the number of applicable laws manageable. All in all, it seems
that in most cases, or with the typical interpretation of the Rome II Regulation, the
result is a fragmentation of claims. The most notable exception is seeking
compensation for infringing the right of communication to the public at the website
location or the operator’s domicile.85
As previously mentioned, the law chosen also determines liability for other
persons’ acts. This expands shopping opportunities even further when alleging that
the website operators participate in or contribute to a distributed concerted
80 In Finland, however, in Supreme Court case KKO 2010:47, the operators of a site (‘‘Finreactor’’) were
held directly liable for users’ infringement. Liability was based on knowingly participating in concerted
actions. On the difficulty of proving the ISP’s role in concerted action, see J. Fawcett & P. Torremans,
supra note 3, at 545. However, the site was actively administered (including managing user accounts,
monitoring upload/download ratios, and maintaining content metadata) and had a private BitTorrent
tracker. As such it is not clear if the same argumentation could be reasonably applied to an essentially
unmanaged site as far as content is concerned, such as the current version of The Pirate Bay. See P.
Savola, supra note 1, at 160–170.
81 See J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at 920–921.
82 See P. De Miguel Asensio, supra note 9, at 352, para. 10.
83 For example, in the Swedish Pirate Bay case (Svea Court of Appeals decision on 26 November 2010,
case B-4041-09), the operators were held criminally liable and this was cited as a ground in subsequent
requests in Finland. The French Supreme Court considered having jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal
proceedings only if the infringing act took place in France, not if the harm was suffered in France. See B.
Ubertazzi, supra note 9, at 249, para. 133.
84 In the Finnish request for a declaratory judgment (Helsinki District Court, case 11/48306, still
pending), the right holders sought compensation for Finnish music producers’ works shared by Finnish
users. The alleged website operators lived abroad in various states or unknown locations.
85 See P. De Miguel Asensio, supra note 9, at 353, para. 12; J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at
818–819.
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infringement. Specifically, it would be strategic to sue under a law where the
persons who are liable and the liability for other persons’ activities is as broad as
possible (i.e. also for damages caused by the users of the website, not just website
itself). Similarly, the determination of compensation and damages may be crucial
due to variances in alternative applicable laws. For example, in Finland,
compensation and remuneration for infringement can be claimed under sui generis
Sec. 57(1) of the Copyright Act. These are usually calculated in a straightforward
manner and proof of actual damage caused and similar requirements are not needed.
However, only the violator can be ordered to pay compensation and remuneration.
Therefore, if only contributing acts are established, only damages, with a higher bar,
could be awarded. Similarly, some states allow the award of punitive damages,
which might also be an attractive choice for the plaintiff. Therefore, being able to
choose the law that is used to calculate damages or compensation might also be
beneficial for the right holder.
3 Website Blocking Injunctions Against ISPs
3.1 Scenarios, Differences and Tentative Analysis
In this paper, discussion of ISPs is restricted to internet connectivity providers, i.e.
passive so-called ‘‘mere conduit’’ intermediaries, which are not liable for users’
infringement per Art. 12 of the E-Commerce Directive.86 This does not preclude
Member States from having laws that allow a court or similar authority to give
orders to terminate or prevent infringement per Art. 12(3). There is not, however, a
general obligation to monitor communications or to actively seek facts or
circumstances indicating illegal activity per Art. 15. Based on the CJEU judgment
in Scarlet Extended (C-70/10), at least under certain conditions, systems that
monitor all communications are not appropriate. On the other hand, orders with
varying details to block a specific website are likely acceptable.87 The reason for
rejecting a website blocking request has typically been attributed to the lack of
implementation or interpretation of Art. 8(3) of the Information Society Directive.88
By comparison, in the USA such an injunction would require establishing
contributory infringement by the ISP which has never occurred.89
Website blocking by ISPs can at least be ordered for sites located in a different
Member or non-Member State.90 Indeed, blocking access can be implemented (1)
86 Other intermediaries, such as hosting providers or search engine operators have been assigned further
requirements for non-liability in the case law of EU, German and French courts. See e.g. C.
Angelopoulos, supra note 5.
87 Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM (C-70/10), 24 November 2011. See e.g. Kulk and Borgesius (2012); L.
Feiler, supra note 1, at 17–20. Specific orders will be contemplated in the pending case, UPC Telekabel
Wien (C-314/12). See M. Husovec, supra note 1, at 118, para. 8.
88 See L. Feiler, supra note 1, at 27–30.
89 See L. Feiler, supra note 1, at 46; Kopko (2003) at 116–117.




close to the source, for example, by issuing an injunction on the ISP that provides
connectivity to the hosting provider of the website, (2) in the middle if
communications go through a so-called ‘‘transit’’ ISP, or (3) at the ISP at the
user end. The first and third alternatives have been used multiple times in the case of
The Pirate Bay. The first has resulted in the site’s switching internet connectivity
providers, while the third seems to have been the primary, albeit somewhat
ineffective, means to block access to the site. This tendency to implement blocking
at the user end is natural in the sense that it is the easiest way to enforce national
policies and legislation at foreign sites.
The international element is the strongest in the latter two options, and this paper
focuses particularly on the third, for which a simplistic scenario is illustrated in
Fig. 1. The solid circle in the middle depicts an ISP established in Finland, which
operates and has customers in a number of states (Finland, Estonia and Sweden).
The website where access is being blocked is located in Sweden. The arrows show
the territory of the states used to transport communications through the ISP’s
backbone network.91
This scenario raises the following questions. If an injunction against the ISP is
requested in a court in Finland, does the court also have jurisdiction to block access
to the website by customers located in other states? More importantly, does the
court have jurisdiction to block customers’ communications that do not go through
the territory of the said state (Customer 3 and Customer 4), and if yes, which law












Fig. 1 International scenarios
of an ISP ordered to block
access to a website
91 For example, in the case of The Pirate Bay, the site was hosted for years until February 2013 in
Sweden. The Finnish ISPs that were the target of injunctions also had an international presence. For
example, an ISP named Elisa Plc. had a presence at interconnection points in Stockholm, Oslo,
Copenhagen, Frankfurt, London, Amsterdam, New York, and Tallinn, and also had customers in some of
these locations. See P. Savola, supra note 1, at 181–182. Likewise TeliaSonera Finland Plc. and DNA
Ltd. also had an international presence.
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Finland were initiated in some other state, would that state have jurisdiction and on
what conditions?
The introductory discussion of proceedings against a website operator can be
taken as a basis for analysis, keeping in mind that the situation of the ISP differs
significantly from that of the website operator. First of all, the ISP is not liable for
infringement, which could be argued to mean that Art. 5(3) of the Brussels I
Regulation as a special ground for jurisdiction is inapplicable. Would there be any
other jurisdiction in addition to the principal rule of Art. 2, and by extension Art.
5(5), and is jurisdiction limited in some of these cases? Further, what are the
implications of the territorial lex loci protectionis principle in Art. 8 of the Rome II
Regulation?
A tentative hypothesis suggests that from a traditional territorial perspective, a
Finnish court would only have jurisdiction to block access to Customer 1 and
Customer 2, and even if it did have jurisdiction to block access to Customer 3 and
Customer 4, the law of the state in question would need to be applied. The
hypothesis is also that the Finnish ISP could only be sued in a foreign state (e.g.
Estonia) if it was established in that state, i.e. had a sufficient branch office there.
The mere existence of physical equipment or cabling would not be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on a foreign court.
3.2 Jurisdiction
Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation confers principal jurisdiction on the state
where the defendant (the ISP) is established. Traditionally, jurisdiction has been
limited by territoriality, unless it has been extended by conventions and similar
international instruments. Arguably, the Brussels I Regulation could confer global
jurisdiction within the EU and its scope of applicability.92 The choice of law could,
however, limit or practically influence the extraterritorial impact.
Article 6(2) allows any third party proceedings in the court seised of the original
proceedings, unless such a change of forum would amount to abuse.93 The provision
seems to be targeted at issues where the original defendant seeks to secure either
performance of a warranty, guarantee or some other indemnity against the
consequences of the original claim.94 It could, however, be submitted that the
wording ‘‘or in any third party proceedings’’ allows any kind of claim. On the other
hand, the wording refers to a specific legal institution; the jurisdictional basis for
how and in what capacity a third party may be joined in proceedings must be
supplemented by legal criteria.95 Due to the lack of liability, there is no similar link
here: neither the right holder nor the website operator could make the same claim
92 While Pinckney did limit jurisdiction to the local protecting state, it is submitted that the judgment
only considered jurisdiction in the context of Art. 5(3) and provided no guidance to interpret Art. 2.
93 GIE v. Zurich (C-77/04), 26 May 2005, paras. 33–37.
94 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs on GIE v. Zu¨rich (C-77/04), 24 February 2005, paras. 32–33;
Jenard Report of 1968, OJ C 59, at 27–28 (5 March 1979). See also J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra
note 3, at 188–189.
95 See Schlosser Report, OJ C 59, at 112 (5 March 1979).
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against the ISP. Therefore, ‘‘third party proceedings’’ seem to have a special
meaning in the context of Art. 6(2), excluding this kind of action. A mere interest in
issuing an injunction against a non-liable ISP in the course of primary proceedings
could not be considered as such.
Article 31 allows the court to apply national provisional or protective measures
even if another state would have jurisdiction on the substance of the matter. Further,
an order might also have extraterritorial effect, but this has been rejected due to an
insufficient connecting link, for example, in patent infringement cases. It has been
submitted that for extraterritorial effect, the court of the substantive action should be
used rather than relying solely on jurisdiction.96 Therefore, at least local jurisdiction
is available, but extraterritorial jurisdiction or enforceability would be suspect,
requiring ascertaining the nature of these proceedings. The website operator could
be considered the defendant and the ISP a third party or, alternatively, the ISP the
defendant and the website operator not a party at all. The first option would likely
preclude the use of extraterritorial provisional or protective measures, because the
order would likely need to be given ex parte (the website operator being absent) and
therefore it would not be enforceable in another state.97 In the second option there is
no such restriction provided that the ISP has been heard. On the other hand, this
approach may require initiating proceedings against the website operator on the
merits of the case per Art. 50(6) of the TRIPS Agreement. In most cases, primary
proceedings are not required and have not been initiated or, in the case of Finland,
were initiated as required only after the interlocutory injunction had already been
issued.98 Traditionally, this provision would be applicable to the seizure of goods in
transport or an interim prohibitive injunction.99 In this context it could be similarly
applicable, but would likely require a link to subsequent or parallel primary
proceedings.
Article 5(5) provides that in a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch,
agency or other establishment, the court where the branch is established has special
jurisdiction. What would be the conditions for an ISP to be sued in a state where it
had a branch? Focusing on the operations of a branch, it would seem safe to assume
that the court would only have local rather than global jurisdiction. But are third-
party blocking injunctions ‘‘disputes’’ and what is a ‘‘branch, agency or other
establishment’’? Moreover, is a request to order the ISP to block access to a website
in such state an issue ‘‘arising out of the operations of a branch’’?
96 See G. Tritton et al., supra note 6, at 1184–1185, 1194–1196. J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3,
at 248–250, note different views on extraterritoriality between German and English lawyers and that the
law is not acte clair.
97 Even though the recast Brussels I Regulation abolishes the exequatur procedure, enforcing decisions
abroad will require providing that the judgment has been successfully served. This may be challenging,
because, for example in Finland, the case against website operators has been pending due to the inability
even to serve the summons successfully.
98 In the UK, only the first blocking injunction (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v. British
Telecommunications Plc, EWHC 1981 (28 July 2011) (Newzbin II) included primary proceedings or the
website operator as a party to the blocking order proceedings. See M. Husovec, supra note 1, at 122, para.
33 et seq., and in the context of website blocking, supra note 16.
99 For the latter, see Solvay SA v. Honeywell (C-616/10), 12 July 2012.
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The term ‘‘dispute’’ is likely intended to cover any kind of (non-criminal) issue
that can be adjudicated. In contrast, in some states, at least in Finland, there are also
so-called ‘‘petitionary matters’’ that are not disputes in a narrow sense. The
applicant for a matter files a request and the court considers it, often also asking
parties with an interest in the matter for comment. This model is also used in
copyright injunctions. The ISP is not even formally a defendant in the proceedings
but rather comparable to a third party that participates in the proceedings at the
invitation of the court and as required by substantive law. Nonetheless, making an
autonomous interpretation of the regulation, it is likely intended that this kind of
procedural peculiarity is covered as well. Furthermore, the concept of ‘‘branch,
agency or other establishment’’ requires that the place of business should have an
appearance of permanency, have management and be materially equipped to
negotiate business in the name of the parent company or as an extension of it.100
ISPs may operate in multiple states in numerous ways. First, the most typical
case for a smaller ISP is simply to have network infrastructure in place and no staff
or agency; the ISP might not even have customers in that state.101 Second, the ISP
might have a small branch office or a similar sales arrangement. Third, the ISP
might have a significant establishment in the state, with dozens or hundreds of
employees, typically also including some network engineering and operations staff;
networks in different states might also be separated and mostly autonomous. It is
clear that Art. 5(5) does not apply to the first scenario but would apply to the third
scenario. A more difficult question is whether it applies to the second scenario,
especially if the local branch would not even have the possibility of making any
changes to the network on its own to implement an injunction order. Based on the
earlier case law, a permanent and specific branch or agency would likely fulfill the
criteria. Further, this seems to be supported by the interpretation of ‘‘operations of a
branch’’. In Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG (33/78) this was interpreted to include
inter alia claims concerning undertakings concluded in the name of the parent
company to be performed in that state or similar non-contractual obligations.102
This was later extended in Lloyd’s v. Bernard (C-439/93) so that the undertakings
need not be performed in the state of the branch.103 A local branch entering into
contracts to provide internet connectivity to customers in that state could be
considered such an undertaking. Therefore, a non-contractual obligation due to a
court order to block a site could also probably be considered within the scope of Art.
5(5). On the other hand, if there is no such representation locally and contracts with
local customers are concluded directly from the main establishment in another state,
such a link would not exist merely by virtue of the existence of network
100 See e.g. Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG (33/78), 22 November 1978; SAR Schotte v. Parfums
Rothschild (218/86), 9 December 1987.
101 The purpose of having network infrastructure abroad might be to optimize traffic load and to save
transit costs by increasing the amount of traffic exchanged through settlement-free peer arrangements
with other ISPs.
102 Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG (33/78), para. 13.
103 Lloyd’s Register of Shipping v. Socie´te´ Campenon Bernard (C-439/93), 6 April 1995.
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infrastructure (e.g. an optical fibre cable or a router) and provision of internet
connectivity.104
Does Art. 5(3) apply to proceedings concerning injunctive relief against a non-
liable intermediary? It has been argued that this kind of injunction is not a tort and,
owing to the lack of liability or due care, it also cannot be a delict.105 The CJEU has
held that Art. 5(3) covers all actions that ‘‘seek to establish the liability of a
defendant’’ which ‘‘are not related to a contract’’. On the other hand, in Fischer this
was also considered to cover a negative declaratory action that liability for damages
did not exist.106 However, there was no wrongful conduct on the part of the ISP, and
these could be characterized as in rem injunctions, aimed at resolving the
disharmony between legally granted rights and the factual situation.107 Indeed, the
traditional liability-based approach is unsuited to this scenario. Earlier case law also
suggests that Art. 5(3) does not apply to an action that does not seek compensation
or a declaration of lack of liability for such. Specifically, it does not apply to a
revocatory action (action paulienne) that also targeted a non-obligated third party
who had not committed any wrongful act.108 Therefore, because injunction
proceedings do not attempt to establish the liability of the ISP, and in any case the
objective would not be compensation but to oblige the ISP, a third party, they would
seem to be outside the scope of Art. 5(3).
For the sake of argument, let us put aside the mentioned case law and consider
how a broad interpretation could be justified based on the textual form of Art. 5(3).
First, one could interpret ‘‘related to’’ in a very broad manner, so that it would be
sufficient that jurisdiction is ‘‘related to’’ events caused by the infringing activity of
someone else, i.e. the website operator or the ISP’s customers. Second, one could
interpret the concept of tort widely, possibly also arguing that liability exists in
principle, even if there are limitations or exceptions in some circumstances.109
If the German-language version of Art. 5(3) was used, it might be possible to
argue that a third-party injunction could be comparable to a tort, but even this would
104 Comparatively, for example, the Personal Data Directive does not apply to foreign data controllers
when equipment is used only for purposes of transit through the territory of the Community per Art.
4(1)(c). See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, OJ L 281 (23 November 1995).
105 The German version of Art. 5(3) also covers an action that is comparable to a tort (‘‘eine Handlung,
die einer unerlaubten Handlung gleichgestellt ist’’). On the other hand, the Finnish text only covers
damages for non-contractual issues (‘‘sopimuksenulkoinen vahingonkorvaus’’).
106 See Tacconi (C-334/00), 17 September 2002, paras. 21–23 including references. On Fischer (C-133/
11), see supra note 19.
107 See M. Husovec, supra note 1, at 113, para. 11. There is no provision in the Brussels I Regulation that
would grant jurisdiction in cases of in rem issues, except when related to object rights to immovable
property per Art. 22(1). While copyright may be classified as immovable property, for the purposes of the
Brussels I Regulation, it should not be treated as such. See J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note 3, at
33–34, 189; CˇEZ (C-343/04), para. 33 (likewise that the provision only applies to the existence and
content of rights such as ownership and no other kind of related rights or damages).
108 Reichert and Kockler (C-261/90), paras. 17–20, referred to in the Opinion of Advocate General Niilo
Ja¨a¨skinen on Fischer (C-133/11), para. 52.
109 Similarly, on indirect liability in the context of choice of law, see P. De Miguel Asensio, supra note 9,
at 353, para. 10.
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be somewhat far-fetched. It seems more appropriate to discuss the ‘‘related to’’
argument, because a tort does exist, even if the ISP was not responsible. Essentially
the situation would be similar to a broad interpretation of Art. 6(2), arguing that a
blocking injunction qualifies for ‘‘third party proceedings’’, or Art. 31 on provisional
measures, arguing that cross-border injunctions are acceptable. Indeed, the question
of jurisdiction with regard to the ISP could possibly be avoided if the proceedings
primarily targeted the website operator. Still, the CJEU has emphasized that
alternative grounds for jurisdiction must be based on a close link between the court
and the action and to facilitate the sound administration of justice.110 In a copyright
context, Art. 3(3) of the E-Commerce Directive does allow making foreign service
providers subject to laws other than those of the state of their establishment. Using
these arguments, the implication would be that an ISP could be sued in any state
where it is operating, with some definition of ‘‘operating’’. All in all, this line of
argumentation seems insufficient in the face of earlier case law. Also, such an
interpretation of Art. 5(3) might even be largely unnecessary given that ISPs have
branches in various states. There are also other bases of jurisdiction, for example,
suing the website operator per Art. 5(3) and requesting an interim injunction against
the ISP based on Art. 31.
In summary, the state where the ISP is domiciled has principal and also global
jurisdiction. Provisional or protective measures could also be ordered individually in
each state, but arguably they could only have extraterritorial effect or enforceability in
rare cases. Also, having a branch or some other establishment in another state confers
special jurisdiction to order injunctions affecting that state. On the other hand, earlier
case law seems to exclude applying Art. 5(3) to non-liable third parties such as ISPs.
Also, Art. 6(2) on third-party proceedings appears to be inapplicable in this context.
3.3 Choice of Law
As discussed above, Art. 8 of the Rome II Regulation specifies that the law for non-
contractual obligations arising from copyright infringement is lex loci protectionis.
This and territorial fragmentation implies substantial, even excessive, legal
uncertainty for ISPs operating in a number of states or worldwide due to the need
to take into account various laws on liability and requirements for preventive or
reactive measures. Subjecting the ISP to the laws of each country of protection has
been criticized as a source of unfair and unreasonable results, but this nonetheless
seems to be the current law.111
It seems to have been generally accepted that the law where the main
infringement occurs also applies to indirect or secondary liability, including
limitations or exemptions of liability per Art. 15. A cited example is the liability of a
hosting provider. Nonetheless, the measures the court may take to prevent or
terminate infringement, while provided by the applicable law, are limited by the
110 See e.g. Wintersteiger (C-523/10), paras. 18, 27, 31 referring to Recital 12 of the Brussels I
Regulation.
111 P. De Miguel Asensio, supra note 9, at 353, paras. 12–13. Academic proposals have indeed made de




procedural law of lex fori.112 This may give rise to shopping opportunities, for
example, in the field of interim injunctive relief.
It is questionable how well this concept applies in this context, because with
website blocking requests little consideration is usually given to what precisely is
the main infringement and it has certainly not been the subject of primary
proceedings. As discussed above, an infringing act could occur in a number of
justifiable ways. The easiest and the strongest case would be the peer-to-peer
network users of a website sharing copyright works: the main infringement would
then be local. However, it might be more challenging to argue why the website must
be blocked, and also how the claim for damages from the website operators would
be justified. A second option would be to claim that the website operator commits
primary infringement. However, establishing this might be challenging if the
website does not have any directly infringing content. Also, as the website would
typically be located and operated in another state, the issue of applicable law might
arise. If the principle of the law applicable to secondary liability was followed, this
might lead to the law of the state where the website operator is established,
assuming that the act was committed there. All in all, this heads into murky waters.
Recital 6 of the Rome II Regulation specifies that the same national law must be
applied irrespective of the country where the action was brought in order to improve
the predictability of litigation, certainty as to the applicable law, and the free
movement of judgments. It must be noted that the goal is not to harmonize the
applicable laws or make the same national law applicable extraterritorially, but to
make the choice of law more predictable and independent of the forum state. In the
context of territoriality and lex loci protectionis this may also imply multiple laws.
In consequence, the Rome II Regulation must not be seen as a ground to expand the
scope of national and typically territorial law. The only predictability that has
materialized has been of an unpredictable type; however, by now it should be clear
that you may be sued practically anywhere and under any law.
In addition to legal uncertainty, it has been questioned whether a transit scenario
constitutes the closest link to justify application of the law of the transit state.113 As
discussed above in the context of jurisdiction, the Wintersteiger judgment rejected
jurisdiction at the location of the search engine operator’s server due to
unforeseeability and uncertainty based on the recitals in the Brussels I Regula-
tion.114 Similar aspects have not been considered in the Rome II Regulation,
although the reference in Recital 26 to preserving the universally acknowledged
principle of lex loci protectionis could be read to include the case law on the
interpretation of earlier traditions.115 Indeed, Recitals 6 and 26 could arguably
justify adding some flexibility to the otherwise very rigid Art. 8.
112 See P. De Miguel Asensio, supra note 9, at 352–353, para. 10; J. Fawcett & P. Torremans, supra note
3, at 811–812, 920–921.
113 S. Neumann, supra note 6, at 599–600.
114 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. At least for now, this might still be valid even after
Pinckney.
115 This principle, its scope and to what extent it is really universally accepted has been doubted. See e.g.
S. Neumann, supra note 6, at 587 et seq.
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Let us consider the case of transit in the context of internet connectivity. Using
the presented argument, the mere presence of communications through at least some
kind of network equipment in the state would be insufficient to apply lex loci
protectionis. This could be supported at least when the request could not be
implemented in that state, or from a broader perspective, could not be implemented
so that it would only apply to that state. Obviously, a website could not be blocked,
for example, if a fibre-optic cable just passes through the territory of a state. With
some other kinds of network equipment, implementation would also be suspect. For
example, DNS blocking might be impossible, because typically it requires changes
to specific DNS resolver servers that are located close to the users. IP-address-based
blocking, on the other hand, might be possible if router equipment is present.116
Therefore it would seem reasonable to argue that it should be possible to implement
the ordered blocking in the state in question or, at the very least, be able to do so
reasonably outside the state in a manner that does not affect other states. The
requirement of considering each law separately is based on territoriality and the
potential differences in the substantive law and its interpretation. In conclusion, this
would also imply that even if a court had global jurisdiction, it would be
questionable to issue an injunction to block access to a website from foreign states
by applying the local law (rather than the respective foreign laws) when the
communications do not go through the state of the applied law.
Now we can consider the scenario in Fig. 1. In a Finnish court, Finnish copyright
law could not be applied to block access to a website in Sweden if it concerns
communications from Estonia that do not go through Finland. On the other hand, if
the website operations in Sweden constitute the primary infringement, Swedish
copyright law could be applied even in a Finnish court to block all access from
outside Sweden, provided that the order could be implemented in Swedish territory.
An Estonian court, on the other hand, might or might not have jurisdiction,
depending on whether the ISP has a sufficient branch there. Even if such were
present, jurisdiction would be limited to blocking access from Estonian customers or
communications that transit the territory of Estonia, with reservations on
implementability.
Some additional considerations must be noted on blocking access to websites in
the middle of the internet. Internet connectivity providers form a loose hierarchy,
and there are a number of operators that provide services on most continents and
also provide connectivity to ISPs in a lower ‘‘tier’’.117 Would it be possible to order
such a global ISP to block access to the website worldwide? Arguably, jurisdiction
would be limited to the EU and the states party to jurisdiction conventions, or in the
case of jurisdiction based on a branch or other establishment, only that particular
state. Following earlier argumentation, within these limits on jurisdiction, it would
seem that the court could issue such an order by applying the law of (1) simply the
state where the website is located, (2) state(s) through which the communications
116 For a description of technical measures, see e.g. M. Husovec, supra note 1, at 122, para. 30; P.
Savola, supra note 1, at 67 et seq.
117 For example, in 2002, US providers that were targeted were global backbone operators operating in
dozens of (or even a hundred) states. See D. Kopko, supra note 89.
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transit, with reservations regarding implementability, or (3) each state from which
access would be blocked.
4 Conclusions
Proceedings against website operators can be pursued in a number of different ways
due to the flexibility afforded by legislation and the case law of the CJEU. There are
a number of options for jurisdiction, defining where infringing acts and damages are
considered to occur, and the choice of law, even to the extent of whether one or
multiple laws would need to be applied. The right holder has a large choice of
‘‘shopping’’ opportunities in order to ‘‘stack the deck’’ in trying to ensure a
successful outcome. On the other hand, for the alleged infringer this implies serious
unforeseeability and unpredictability. He or she could be sued for allegedly
infringing activity anywhere under practically any law.
When it comes to ISPs ordered to block access to websites, the case where access
is blocked close to the source (i.e. the website) is straightforward in the international
context: local courts have jurisdiction for blocking access from every state applying
the local law. However, if the ISP does not have a sufficient branch or other
establishment in that state, the local court would not have jurisdiction on the matter
except on the grounds of preventive or protective measures. Further, in some cases
where only passive network infrastructure exists in the territory of the state and
implementing blocking would not be possible, it is submitted that lex loci
protectionis in that state could not be applied.
This paper has focused on blocking at the user end due to its practical importance
and the related international considerations. If the court with local jurisdiction
formulates the blocking order in such a manner that it only affects the local ISP’s
local customers or customers whose communications go through the territory of the
state, issuing the injunction is relatively straightforward. Nonetheless, issues with
regard to suing the website operator might still arise. More care is needed if the ISP
is domiciled in some other state; a branch would confer only local jurisdiction. Also,
it is submitted that the mere presence of network infrastructure is not a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction but, on the other hand, this kind of ISP is not likely to be very
interesting from the national perspective because the focus has typically been on the
largest ISPs. In the most difficult scenario, the court would also order the ISP to
block access to a foreign website by foreign users whose communications do not go
through the said state. It is submitted that in such a case the foreign law(s) would
need to be applied. Further, the most complex issues of jurisdiction and choice of
law would arise in the context of issuing global ‘‘transit ISPs’’ blocking orders due
to the distributive effect of the applicable law.
The provisions of current law are ill fit for ubiquitous internet infringement,
especially as complex as occurring in peer-to-peer networks and related websites. It
is no wonder that a number of academic principles have been suggested and widely
discussed to mitigate these issues. However, as this paper has focused on the de lege
lata perspective, they are beyond its scope. The juridical interpretative activism of
the CJEU has to some degree addressed certain shortcomings but, on the other hand,
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the flexibility and over-emphasis on territoriality has created new uncertainties and
shopping opportunities for right holders. The grounds for territoriality of IPRs and
copyright are also suspect, especially in the face of the practical impact of
international conventions and localization of acts and damages.
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is provided. The major observation is that the under-
lying goal of copyright enforcement has implications 
on how the scale tilts. In particular, ineffective en-
forcement mechanisms can be more easily accepted 
if the goal of symbolic, educational or politically mo-
tivated enforcement is considered legitimate. On the 
other hand, if the goal is to decrease the impact of in-
fringement, higher efficiency and economically quan-
tifiable results may be required.
Abstract:  Internet connectivity providers have 
been ordered to block access to websites facilitat-
ing copyright infringement in various EU countries. 
In this paper, the proportionality of these enforce-
ment measures is analysed. After addressing prelim-
inary questions, the recent CJEU ruling UPC Telekabel 
Wien (C-314/12) and then case law from all Member 
States are examined from the perspective of propor-
tionality. Finally, five criteria are submitted for pro-
portionality analysis, and a proportionality evaluation 
A. Introduction
1 There has been an increasing tendency to oblige 
various kinds of intermediaries to perform web 
filtering and aid in enforcement.1 This paper focuses 
on enforcement of specific right (copyright), target 
(Internet connectivity, i.e. access providers), means 
(court order to block access to a website) and 
perspective (proportionality of such order).2
2 Intermediaries are typically faultless third parties 
with respect to the dispute between right holders 
and infringers.3 Therefore, passive or neutral 
intermediaries are generally exempt from liability 
within varying constraints. To balance the lack of 
liability, a court may issue an injunction ordering – for 
example, to stop or prevent a specific infringement.4 
Indeed, intermediaries are an attractive tool to 
enforce local policies on foreign sites.5 However, 
broad liability for activities that intermediaries 
cannot and need not control or monitor would 
result in inter alia stifling of innovation, preventive 
censorship and increased operating costs.6
3 Proportionality evaluation is depicted as three or 
four steps. The initial and sometimes omitted step is 
the legitimacy of the pursued objective.7 The first two 
of the three main stages are suitability and necessity 
of the means in achieving the objective, i.e. that 
the goal can be achieved and there are no better 
means, respectively. Third, the actual balancing part 
is proportionality in the narrow sense (stricto sensu), 
i.e. whether the burden of the means is excessive in 
relation to the objective sought.8
4 In this context, proportionality analysis concerns 
fundamental rights conflicts in national measures 
implementing EU legislation. Because blocking 
measures are unlikely to affect the fundamental 
freedoms,9 the evaluation occurs between 
conflicting fundamental rights. Here EU and 
national fundamental rights coexist, but in conflict 
the supremacy of EU law prevails.10 CJEU case law 
provides minimum and maximum standards11 and 
guidelines that must be applied when national courts 
interpret EU law. Issues at stake are the effectiveness 
of protecting the right holders’ intellectual property 
in contrast to the costs and limits on the freedom to 
conduct a business on the ISP and the limitations of 
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freedom of information (expression) on the users.12 
ECtHR has not made very significant rulings in this 
aspect.13 The evaluation is augmented with more 
intense scrutiny.14
5 This paper is structured as follows. Section B first 
discusses the differences in liability exemptions 
between hosting and connectivity providers, and 
what constitutes a general monitoring obligation. 
Then various parties’ interests, EU IPR enforcement 
principles, and the effect of national legislation are 
briefly covered. After these preliminary questions, 
we move on to Section C, where the case law of 
CJEU and all Member States is covered from the 
proportionality perspective mixed with analysis 
and commentary. Using these as a basis, Section D 
formulates five criteria for assessing proportionality 
of website blocking. Finally, Section E provides 
proportionality analysis. Brief conclusions are 
presented last in Section F.
B. Preliminary Considerations
I. Legal Basis of Website 
Blocking Injunctions
6 Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive15 obliges 
Member States to provide a possibility for copyright 
injunctions against intermediaries:
Member States shall ensure that rightholders are 
in a position to apply for an injunction against 
intermediaries whose services are used by a third 
party to infringe a copyright or related right.
7 Per Recital 59, the conditions and modalities are to 
be determined in national legislation. Essentially 
identical provisions also exist for other intellectual 
property rights in fine of Article 9(1)(a) and 11 of the 
Enforcement Directive.16 Indeed, the E-Commerce 
Directive allows national law to provide specific 
injunctions against connectivity providers in Article 
12(3), but on the other hand prohibits general 
monitoring obligations in 15(1):
[12(3)]. This Article shall not affect the possibility 
for a court or administrative authority, in 
accordance with Member States’ legal systems, 
of requiring the service provider to terminate or 
prevent an infringement.
[15(1)]. Member States shall not impose a general 
obligation on providers, when providing the 
services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to 
monitor the information which they transmit or 
store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts 
or circumstances indicating illegal activity.
II. Different Providers and 
Liability Exemptions
8 While Internet service providers are not liable for 
information transmitted or stored, they may be 
subject to various obligations.17 As connectivity and 
hosting providers provide a different kind of service, 
the conditions and scope of potential obligations also 
differ.18 
9 The liability exemption of connectivity providers is 
based on neutrality, passivity and technical nature of 
automatic communication. According to the recital, 
this implies lack of knowledge and control over the 
transmitted information; deliberate collaboration 
in order to undertake illegal acts is also excluded.19 
10 On the other hand, the exemption of hosting 
providers is conditional on awareness or knowledge 
of illegal activities or facts or circumstances from 
which illegality is apparent. Upon obtaining 
awareness of illegal material, hosting providers 
also need to act expeditiously to remove or disable 
access to it. The exemption does not apply if the 
provider has authority or control over the user 
and the content.20 The awareness of facts relating 
to illegality appears to have been the grounds to 
exclude the operators of sites such as The Pirate Bay 
from the hosting defence; even if material on the site 
might not be infringing, its role in overall infringing 
activities has been apparent.21 
11 In the latest case on hosting providers, L‘Oréal v eBay, 
it was held that the operator must not have an active 
role allowing it to have knowledge of the data stored. 
To measure awareness (or “neutrality”22), a standard 
of diligent economic operator was established as to 
when illegality should have become apparent.23
12 This interpretation is inapplicable to connectivity 
providers, because their liability exemption is not 
tied to knowledge or awareness in the same manner 
as hosting providers.24 Further, their role is more 
passive, neutral and automatic, and transmitted 
data is transitory. They also have no obligation to 
act upon obtaining awareness of illegality25 unless 
explicitly required by national law as provided by 
Article 15(2) of the E-Commerce Directive.26
III. Restrictions on General 
Monitoring and Orders
13 The prohibition against imposing monitoring 




of providers. Likewise, a general obligation to seek 
facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity is 
forbidden. However, monitoring (in a fairly narrow 
meaning) “in a specific case” by orders of national 
authorities is possible.27 Court or administrative 
authority may also require termination of present 
or prevention of specific future infringement.28 
In particular, in UPC Telekabel Wien rather severe 
requirements regarding judicial review were 
imposed on generic orders targeting a website.29 In 
contrast, the Advocate General had more explicitly 
suggested that a specific kind of generic blocking 
order would not amount to a general monitoring 
obligation.30 
14 Only hosting providers may be subjected to “duties 
of care” in order to detect and prevent certain types 
of illegal activities.31 National legislation may also 
establish procedures governing the removal or 
disabling of access to information (i.e. notice-and-
takedown mechanisms).32 Examples of court orders 
to prevent future infringements in the context 
of hosting providers were suspending infringing 
users’ accounts or making user identification on the 
marketplace easier.33 In national courts, there have 
also been “stay-down” orders, obliging the hosting 
provider to ensure that a specific infringement is 
not repeated. Unless carefully constructed, these 
might be disproportionate or amount to a general 
monitoring obligation.34
15 All in all, the differences in the legal basis and the scope 
when comparing connectivity and hosting providers 
suggests that appropriateness of injunctions varies. 
Because for connectivity providers the conditions 
for liability exemption are broader, similar 
limitations could very well also apply to all types 
of injunctions. Depending on circumstances, it may 
be more proportionate and technically feasible  to 
order a hosting provider rather than a connectivity 
provider to implement a certain  kind of blocking. 
In contrast, issuing orders grounded on duties of 
care or knowledge assumed by a diligent economic 
operator at connectivity providers would not be 
appropriate. Also, accepting the premise of narrower 
injunctions, all the conditions in case law relating to 
hosting providers that restrict the orders (e.g. what 
constitutes a monitoring obligation and principles 
for weighing proportionality) would be prima facie 
valid. On the other hand, those conditions which 
expand the scope should be critically evaluated.
IV. Interests in Balancing
16 The following table summarizes private and public 
interests at stake; detailed elaboration is not possible 
here.
Private interests Public interests
IPR Holder IPR protection Sufficient protection, innovation, 
policy, culture
C o n n e c t i v i t y 
provider
Froodom to conduct a 
business (and protection of 
property)
Market economy, network 
neutrality
User Freedom of expression (and 
protection of personal data)
Democracy, freedom of expression 
in general, culture
Website operator Freedom of expression, right 
to fair trial (and business 
freedom)
Possibility to enforce national 
policies on foreign sites
17 Intellectual property rights are not absolute, 
and it is impossible to completely protect them 
through enforcement. Therefore, trying to find 
the least restrictive means (LRM) to eliminate IPR 
infringement is misguided. This specifically applies 
to copyright, given the extensive exclusive rights 
also governing non-commercial activities, whereas 
in contrast e.g. trademarks or patents can be used by 
private individuals more freely. This was emphasised 
in Scarlet Extended and affirmed in UPC Telekabel Wien 
very explicitly as follows:35
There is, however, nothing whatsoever in the 
wording of [Article 17(2) of Charter stating that 
“Intellectual property shall be protected”] or in the 
Court’s case-law to suggest that that [intellectual 
property] right is inviolable and must for that 
reason be absolutely protected.
18 A better question is to ask which degree of IPR 
enforcement is deemed appropriate when balanced 
with other issues at stake, in particular other 
fundamental rights.36 This reflects the underlying 
(and unresolved) policy issue on the level and 
constraints of enforcement an IPR holder is entitled 
to.
19 Rather than trying to find LRM in general, one 
must survey the means and their trade-offs (e.g. 
effectiveness, costs and other impacts). Based on 
this analysis, the appropriate balance between 
certain degrees of enforcement using a specific 
means and other rights can be considered. In UPC 
Telekabel Wien, issuing a generic order incurred 
requirements to the national procedure in order to 
ensure proportionality evaluation.37 This was noted 
more explicitly in the Advocate General’s Opinion 
that proportionality cannot be evaluated if the 
necessary measures could not be reviewed.38 
V. IPR Enforcement 
Principles in EU Law
20 The Infosoc Directive does not provide guidance on 
how to balance injunctions of Article 8(3).39 On the 
other hand, Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive 
applies to (all) measures, procedures and remedies 
necessary to ensure the enforcement of IPRs covered 
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by the Directive. These shall be “fair and equitable 
and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, 
or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted 
delays”, and also “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as 
to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade 
and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”40 
Strong Neutral Weak
effective fair proportinate
dissuasive equitable not complicated
no time-limits not abusable not costly
no delays no barriers to trade
21 It is challenging to realize all of these at the same 
time. In consequence, case-by-case balancing will be 
needed.41 In the preceding table these are classified 
as “strong” (pro-rights), “weak” (pro-users) 
and “neutral” principles. However, in different 
interpretative contexts – for example, against 
infringer versus a third party – the principles could 
have an entirely different meaning.42 Per Article 2(1), 
a Member State may provide stronger enforcement 
only “in accordance with Article 3”, i.e. the balance 
must not be upset.43
22 Norrgård noted in 2005 that a national judge could 
reasonably adopt both a weak or strong enforcement 
ideology based on the discretion granted by the 
directive.44 A balanced interpretation was suggested 
based on principles of Article 3, fundamental rights, 
context-sensitivity and the comparative method.45 
These have since then materialised in CJEU case law, 
and this paper also continues on that path. Similarly, 
Ohly has underlined the need of proportionality to 
balance effectiveness and dissuasiveness, referring 
in a similar fashion to taking due account of the 
specific characteristics of the case as noted in Recital 
17.46
23 Both directives have been geared towards 
infringers. Applying principles of effectiveness and 
dissuasiveness against a faultless intermediary is 
questionable.47 Indeed, in his Opinion in L’Oréal v 
eBay, Advocate General Jääskinen was not convinced 
that the identical scope of injunctions available 
against the intermediary and the infringer would 
be a reasonable interpretation of Article 11 of the 
Enforcement Directive.48 Similarly, the requirement 
for context-sensitivity would suggest caution 
with regard to third-party injunctions.49 Further, 
the notions attached to injunctions are different 
and comparisons difficult between infringers and 
intermediaries as well as between legal systems.50
VI. National Principles and 
Triggers for Evaluation
24 National law may specify the grounds for a 
proportionality evaluation or leave issuing the 
order at the court’s discretion. While this may 
give the national court leads on what to evaluate, 
it is important to note that EU law provides the 
minimum (and maximum) level of protection to 
various competing rights. This will perforce affect 
the court’s discretion and evaluation.51
25 As an example of national law,52 in Finnish Copyright 
Act (404/1961, as amended by 679/2006) Section 
60c(1):53
[...The] court [...] may order [...the] intermediary 
to discontinue [...] unless this can be regarded as 
unreasonable in view of the rights of the person 
making the material available to the public, the 
intermediary and the author.
26 On the other hand, many countries seem to have 
transposed Article 8(3) in a very minimal fashion, 
almost verbatim, or without substantial additional 
details or modalities.54
C. Proportionality in Case Law
I. Introduction
27 The latest blocking requests targeting connectivity 
providers at the user end in EU/EEA are illustrated 
in the following table. In other EU/EEA countries, 
blocking has not been requested. The table notes the 
highest court which has made the latest decision. The 
rulings are final except the Netherlands (pending 
appeal to Supreme Court). The type of proceedings 
(civil and/or criminal) has also been noted. 
28 “(X)” under “ruling” implies that the decision has 
been reversed in contrast to a lower court instance 
or earlier proceedings. This illustrates that while the 
general trend has been to order one or more ISPs 
to block access to a website, in some cases requests 
have also been rejected on various grounds. The 
most prominent reason for rejection (particularly 
in Ireland and Norway, and arguably in Germany) 
has been attributed to the lack of legal basis due to 




Country Site Provider Date Court Type Ruling
Spain Other
Vodafone 






The NL TPB Ziggo etc. 28.1.2014
Appeal (to 
Sct) Civil No block (x)





etc. 22.10.2013 Supreme Civil+Crim. Block (x)
Ireland TPB UPC etc. 12.6.2013
First 
instance Civil Block (x)
Finland TPB
TeliaSonera 
etc. 11.2.2013 Appeal Civil Block








Germany Other Unknown 22.12.2010 Appeal Civil No block
Denmark TPB Telenor etc. 27.5.2010 Supreme Civil Block
Norway TPB Telenor etc. 10.2.2010 Appeal Civil No block
Italy TPB All ISPs 23.12.2009 Supreme Criminal Block (x)
29 Next, a summary of all cases is provided, with 
particular focus on issues relating to proportionality. 
The goal is to review arguments used in CJEU and 
national decisions as a step of formulating the 
criteria for balancing.
II. The Court of Justice
30 As for blocking injunctions,56 in L’Oréal v eBay, it was 
held that courts of Member States must be able to 
order online marketplaces to take measures to stop 
current infringements as well as – if justified by the 
circumstances – prevent future ones. These must 
be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and must 
not create barriers to legitimate trade. The measures 
must also be fair and not excessively costly. A couple 
of examples were provided.57 This provides little 
guidance in the present context.
31 Scarlet Extended applied the aforementioned 
proportionality principles to whether a connectivity 
provider could be ordered to install a comprehensive 
filtering system.58 The system would have monitored 
all the data relating to all customers in order to 
prevent any future infringement of claimants’ 
intellectual property rights. CJEU held that it 
would have constituted a general monitoring 
obligation in violation of Article 15(1); nonetheless, 
proportionality was also considered.59 As introduced 
in Promusicae, protection of the IPR must be balanced 
against other fundamental rights. Specifically, 
the connectivity provider’s freedom to conduct a 
business would be inappropriately balanced against 
the interest to protect the IPR, because the order 
would require installing a complicated, costly and 
permanent system at the provider’s own expense. 
The cost and complicated nature of the system 
were also against Article 3(1) of the Enforcement 
Directive.60 The system would also be questionable 
from the perspective of users’ data protection and 
freedom of expression, as it would have applied 
to all the communications and would also have 
misidentified and blocked lawful communications.61 
This judgment is relevant, but given the intrusiveness 
of the contested filtering system, the constraints it 
provides for blocking orders are limited.62
32 UPC Telekabel Wien concerned a more restricted form 
of blocking, only one specified site. In summary, the 
CJEU in principle accepted generic orders (where 
adopted measures are chosen by the provider), 
but imposed judicial review requirements that 
might make issuing them unattractive for national 
courts. This restricted the applicability of generic 
orders and transformed generic orders into court-
approved specific orders.63 The Advocate General 
was more straightforward and suggested rejecting 
them instead of crafting requirements. In the end, 
the essential result was the same.64 More detailed 
analysis follows.
33 The CJEU held that national law must be transposed 
in a manner allowing a fair balance to be struck 
between competing interests. The law must also be 
interpreted in the manner that takes fundamental 
rights and proportionality into consideration.65 
The fundamental rights conflict was construed 
between Charter Articles 17(2) (IPR holders’ right 
to property), 16 (the provider’s freedom to conduct 
a business), and 11 (users’ freedom of information).66 
34 Business freedom was characterized as inter alia 
the right to freely use the economic, technical and 
financial resources available to the provider. An 
injunction was considered to constrain the free use 
of resources, as it obliges taking measures which 
may represent a significant cost, have considerable 
impact on the organization of activities, or require 
difficult and complex technical solutions. However, 
such an injunction was held not to infringe on the 
very substance of conducting business.67 With a 
generic order, the provider can choose measures 
that are best adapted to the resources, abilities 
and challenges facing it. The provider can also 
avoid being in breach of an order by proving at the 
execution stage that all reasonable measures have 
been taken. Specifically, no unreasonable sacrifices 
are required.68 However, legal certainty was held to 
require that the evaluation of reasonableness – i.e. 
which means can be expected – is done in court prior 
to issuing any sanctions due to the lack of sufficient 
compliance.69 Essentially, the CJEU transferred the 
evaluation of proportionality from the ordering 
phase to the execution phase, with a mandate 
to provide for court review. In consequence, the 
provider can obtain confirmation of compliance in 
court by first doing a minimal implementation. Very 
likely this will decrease the use of generic orders.70
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35 With generic orders and uncertainty, the A.G. had 
been concerned with providers opting for intrusive 
means, endangering users’ freedom of information 
or facing the risk of disobeying the order.71 The 
CJEU’s approach was to impose requirements on the 
adopted measures and require allowing court review 
for both providers and users. In particular, measures 
must comply with Internet users’ right to freedom 
of information: they must be strictly targeted to end 
infringement, and must not affect users lawfully 
accessing information.72 The A.G. provided an 
example of collateral damage by referring to the 
ECtHR ruling Yildirim v Turkey, where the whole 
Google Sites service was blocked when only one 
site hosted there should have been targeted. This 
violated the freedom of expression guaranteed by 
Article 10 ECHR in various ways.73 
36 The CJEU held that national courts must be able to 
verify that the measures are appropriate. This may 
not be possible if the provider chooses the measures 
and their use is not contested. In consequence, in 
this case users must be provided locus standi to assert 
their rights before the court.74 It is submitted that 
this also applies to national courts issuing specific 
orders, unless proportionality has also been reviewed 
from the users’ perspective.75
37 As previously noted, the IPR is not inviolable in 
that it must be absolutely protected. It is possible 
that a complete cessation of IPR infringement is not 
achieved, if for example some measures that would 
achieve the result would not be reasonable for the 
provider, or because means do not exist or the goal 
is not in practice achievable.76 The adopted measures 
should still be “sufficiently effective” or at least 
discourage users from accessing the site and make 
accessing the site difficult to achieve.77 Therefore, 
even if infringement is not completely prevented, 
the fair balance and proportionality in the light of 
Article 52(1) is achieved provided that freedom of 
information to lawful material is not unnecessarily 
prevented and that blocking prevents access or at 
least makes it difficult and seriously discouraged.78
38 The CJEU’s emphasis on effectiveness, a high degree 
of IPR protection, and the means which may place 
significant obligations on the provider could be 
read to imply that the balance should be shifted 
more towards IPR protection. This reading must be 
rejected. The CJEU appears to have taken no clear 
stance on the balance of protecting the IPR and 
business freedom.
39 The fourth question was whether it was proportional 
to order a provider to implement specific means even 
if these incurred significant costs and the blocking 
could be easily circumvented without technical 
knowledge. The CJEU’s final answer displays naiveté 
or evasion, because those issues were also in the 
background in the third question. The problem 
is apparent when considering the ineffectiveness 
of blocking in general, and that there may not be 
“sufficiently effective” and “seriously discouraging” 
means that would not also be complicated, costly 
and/or too intrusive. The CJEU provided no guidance 
on the provider’s required degree of involvement. 
The problem of unlawful material on a site which 
also includes lawful material was also not addressed. 
In consequence, essentially both balancing exercises 
(IPR holder vs provider and IPR holder vs user, 
respectively) were effectively deferred to national 
evaluation or a future referral. Therefore, the A.G.’s 
guidelines on the fourth question are valuable and 
will be used tentatively as a basis. 
40 When assessing suitability, the A.G. noted that 
protecting the rights of others was a valid grounds 
for limitation. It was questionable whether 
ineffectiveness of blocking could imply unsuitability, 
but he opined that this would not necessarily be the 
case. While users can circumvent blocking, it does 
not follow that every one of these users will do so. If 
the user learns about a website’s illegality, he might 
forgo accessing the site. Finally, even if many users 
could circumvent blocking, all of them cannot. Also, 
even if the same site is available through another 
domain name or IP address, it does not prima facie 
mean that blocking would be unsuitable. The users 
here could also forgo accessing the site, and they 
need to use a search engine to find the site. With 
repeated blocking, it is also more difficult to find 
the site with search engines. In consequence, the 
A.G. held that generally speaking even somewhat 
ineffective means are not unsuitable.79
41 When assessing necessity, appropriateness and 
proportionality stricto sensu, the A.G. noted that the 
least restrictive means should be adopted. It would 
be the responsibility of the national court to make 
the assessment based on guidelines and the non-
exhaustive list of considerations provided. First, the 
estimated efficacy of the order would be one factor 
to consider. However, the possibility to circumvent 
blocking would not in general exclude the means. 
Second, the complexity, costs and duration needs 
to be assessed. The A.G. expected that this may be 
a test case, and more blocking injunctions might 
be pending. If one of them were disproportionate 
under those three grounds, the court might need to 
consider whether proportionality would be ensured 
by making the right holder liable for costs wholly or 
in part. Third, the right holders should have some 
means against an infringing site, but notably the 
provider has no contractual relationship with the 
infringer. This implies that the right holder must 
primarily target the infringer or the infringer’s 
provider. Fourth, an injunction must not undermine 
the legitimate business of providing Internet 
connectivity. In general, the A.G. underlined freedom 




society as essential and access to the Internet as an 
essential right.80 
42 All of these seem applicable against the backdrop 
of the CJEU’s judgment, with a potential caveat 
with regard to the third criterion. The CJEU had 
rejected contractual relationship as a prerequisite 
for injunction.81 The A.G. had done likewise, 
but had opined that it is “obvious” that an 
intermediary without contractual link can “in no 
circumstances” be held unconditionally responsible 
for stopping infringements, laying out implications 
for proportionality of the third consideration.82 
Further, “in many cases such intermediaries are 
best placed” in Recital 59 (and respectively Recital 
23 in the Enforcement Directive) implies that in 
some cases intermediaries are not best placed. In 
that case, the infringer should be targeted. This also 
conveys an additional issue of which intermediary 
is best placed; typically there are three to five 
connectivity providers in the “chain” between the 
user and the source. As an example, the A.G. opined 
that an injunction would be appropriate against a 
website connected by a non-European provider, 
because the website and its operators often cannot 
be prosecuted.83 E contrario websites operated in the 
EU or connected by providers in the EU might be 
evaluated differently.
43 Orders may target the infringing website’s 
connectivity provider, a provider in the middle 
of the Internet, or a provider at the user end.84 A 
contractual relationship between the provider and 
the website operator exists only in the first case. 
In the second case, some providers may obtain 
indirect financial gain (through transit agreements 
between providers), but in the third case there is 
not even such indirect benefit.85 This study focuses 
on blocking at the user end, because actions against 
infringing customers are in many aspects more 
proportionate, and in any case different from those 
against a completely third party.
44 A few interim observations are in order before 
moving on to examine national case law. The rights 
to balance in enforcement have been confirmed. 
However, the evaluation has been rather thin 
except for the A.G. opinion on the fourth question 
(unaddressed by the CJEU) in UPC Telekabel Wien. In 
all likelihood, in the future courts will mainly issue 
specific orders. Also, neither the CJEU nor the A.G. 
addressed the required level of efficiency when 
constraining a provider’s rights.86 The CJEU’s position 
on the provider’s function to discourage users could 
possibly be seen as approving the suitability of 
educating the users of the site’s illegality. Finally, the 
A.G. made a number of points that the CJEU did not 
get a chance to address. He noted that proportionality 
would be affected by the right holder’s possibility of 
primarily targeting the infringer or the infringer’s 
connectivity provider. Second, effectiveness could 
be used as a factor both in suitability (with limited 
impact) and necessity. Third, the assumption seemed 
to be that the connectivity provider might bear the 
costs, but an alternative cost model could also be 
used particularly if the number of blocking requests 
grew.
III. Expanding Blocking in the UK
45 A Usenet newsgroup service Newzbin, whose content 
consisted primarily of infringing files, was ordered 
to stop copyright infringement with a restricted 
injunction.87 The site ceased operations, but 
essentially the same service reappeared overseas, 
and the claimants sought an order against the 
connectivity provider British Telecom to block access 
to the new Newzbin2 site. Judge Arnold examined 
the issues in depth and inter alia found the specific 
injunction order to be compatible with Articles 12 
and 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 10 
ECHR. Against the backdrop of the referral of L’Oréal 
v eBay and Scarlet Extended, he held that the court had 
jurisdiction to block the whole site.88 
46 Arnold also considered and rejected four reasons why 
the court should exercise its discretion to decline 
the request. First, the order targeting the whole site 
would also affect other right holders. This benefit 
would rather support issuing the order, and further, 
the incidence of non-infringing uses was considered 
de minimis.89 Second, it was immaterial that accepting 
the request might lead to more requests in the 
future.90 Third, ineffectiveness of blocking was not 
decisive. Specifically, users will need to acquire 
additional expertise to circumvent blocking. Even 
if they were able to do so, it was not clear that the 
users wished to expend the time and effort. Arnold 
also seemed to rely on advocacy research claiming 
that in Italy, the use of The Pirate Bay had been 
markedly reduced. All in all, he stated that the order 
would be justified even if it only prevented access 
to the site by a minority of users.91 Fourth, Arnold 
evaluated proportionality against EHCR in the light 
of L’Oréal v eBay. He held that it was necessary to 
protect the right holders’ property rights, and this 
clearly outweighed freedom of expression by the 
users and the connectivity provider, and even more 
clearly by the site operator. The order was narrow 
and targeted, it included safeguards against changes 
of circumstances and the cost of implementation 
would be modest and proportionate. He also rejected 
the requirement of notifying infringing files by URLs 
as being disproportionate and impracticable for the 
claimants when the site did not have a substantial 
proportion of non-infringing content.92
47 After the main judgment in Newzbin2, additional 
issues on details of the order were raised, some 
of which may be of relevance here. Arnold found 
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it proportional to apply the order to all services 
which use BT’s Cleanfeed, but in essence excluded 
access and wholesale business from blocking. Other 
IP addresses and URLs, whose sole or predominant 
purpose was to enable or facilitate access to the 
Newzbin2 website, could also be added later to 
the block list without judicial determination. The 
request to allow temporary shutdown of blocking 
(e.g. due to operational reasons) without court 
or claimant approval was rejected. The relatively 
modest implementation costs would be borne by 
the connectivity provider, at least in this case. The 
legal fees were divided based on the merits of the 
arguments.93 Later the blocking was also extended 
to other connectivity providers.94
48 Blocking of The Pirate Bay was soon to follow in 
Dramatico Entertainment, where it was held that the 
users and website operators infringed copyrights 
of the claimants in the UK. After Newzbin2, the 
connectivity providers have elected not to actively 
participate in court proceedings.95 In a subsequent 
ruling, the injunction was issued on the terms the 
claimants had agreed with connectivity providers. 
Again, Arnold considered the discretion to grant the 
order. He stated that the proportionality of orders 
must be considered, referring to the principles of the 
Enforcement Directive and L’Oréal v eBay. While the 
terms of the order may be proportionate between the 
right holders and connectivity providers, it was the 
duty of the court to ensure the proportionality from 
the perspective of those who are not before the court 
(in particular, the users). Given that the IP address 
of The Pirate Bay was not shared, blocking it was 
appropriate.96 Since this judgment, specific terms 
of orders have been agreed in advance between the 
claimants and providers, and those have not been 
described in the ruling or scrutinized by the court.97
49 In Emi v Sky, blocking was extended to cover three 
more sites (KAT, HEET and Fenopy). In this case, 
proportionality was more extensively discussed in 
the light of recent English judgments. Specifically, 
Arnold had established a balancing test of conflicting 
fundamental rights in the context of an order to 
disclose identities of subscribers, and it had been 
later endorsed by the UK Supreme Court.98 Also, 
he considered the referral questions posed in UPC 
Telekabel Wien. Arnold rather brusquely dismissed 
the third preliminary question on whether 
“prohibition of outcome” would be inappropriate, 
essentially stating that UK courts carefully consider 
such matters before any blocking order is made.99 
Arnold also seemed to dismiss the Austrian Supreme 
Court’s desire for European uniformity in assessing 
the proportionality of specific blocking measures 
by referring to the context-sensitivity of such 
evaluations.100 The cost of compliance was also not 
relevant in the UK context because no connectivity 
provider had resisted making the orders on the 
basis that compliance would be unduly burdensome 
or costly. He still held that blocking order may be 
justified (emphasis added) even if it only prevents 
access by a minority of users, and that the efficacy 
depends on the precise form of the order. For 
example, orders in Dramatico Entertainment were 
likely less easy to circumvent due to the ability of the 
right holders to revise the list of blocked resources. 
Finally, Arnold noted that evidence indicates that 
orders are reasonably effective, again pointing to the 
Italian study and the drop of The Pirate Bay in Alexa 
site popularity rankings.101 In conclusion, the orders 
were deemed necessary and appropriate to protect 
IPR, and these interests outweighed the freedom of 
expression rights by users, connectivity providers 
and website operators.102 Since then, blocking 
has extended to cover over 40 sites, but no new 
considerations of proportionality have come up.103
50 Access to FirstRow, a site consisting of user-
generated streams of sports events, was also 
blocked in a similar manner. The claimant, FAPL, 
contended that the order would be proportionate 
because 1) the providers do not oppose the order and 
implementation costs are modest and proportionate; 
2) the orders are necessary to protect copyrights 
infringed on a large scale and identifying and bringing 
proceedings against the operators of the website 
would be difficult, leaving no other effective remedy 
in this jurisdiction; 3) the orders are necessary or 
at least desirable to protect sporting objectives in 
general; 4) while also foreign content is available, 
the vast bulk of content infringes the rights of FAPL; 
and 5) the orders are narrow and targeted ones, and 
include safeguards against changes of circumstances. 
The orders will also likely be reasonably effective, 
even if not completely efficacious. Arnold did not 
object to these grounds.104 FAPL had submitted 
evidence that FirstRow’s IP address is not shared, 
but this later seemed to turn out to be incorrect, 
leading to substantial overblocking.105 Further, 
Arnold added an additional provision to the orders 
introduced earlier by Mann J, so that any website 
operator claiming to be affected by the order would 
have permission to apply to vary or discharge it.106
IV. Mixed Approach in 
Nordic Countries
51 The Supreme Court of Denmark has issued two 
relevant judgments on preliminary injunctive relief. 
The first judgment in 2006 concerned a file transfer 
(FTP) server and TDC as the connectivity provider 
for that subscriber. Because the injunction would 
have essentially required terminating the Internet 
connection, it was held that Article 8(3) of the Infosoc 
Directive requires consideration with balancing of 
interests.107 In a case concerning blocking users’ 
access to a website, it was submitted that injunctive 




balance of interest requirement, but this claim was 
denied with reference to obligations of Article 8(3).108 
In the second judgment, on blocking The Pirate Bay, 
in the Supreme Court it was mainly argued that the 
requested interim relief was too imprecise and the 
balance of interest did not favour injunction. This 
was rejected because the court felt the order was 
precise enough to be granted, and there would be 
no harm to the connectivity provider in a way which 
would make it disproportionate.109
52 In Sweden there have been no court cases on blocking 
at the user end. One reason may be the Swedish 
Copyright Act tying injunctive relief to contributing 
to infringement.110 However, a website’s connectivity 
provider has been ordered to implement blocking. 
In Black Internet, the Svea Court of Appeal upheld 
the order to cease providing connectivity to The 
Pirate Bay. The provider’s argument was that the 
site also had other connectivity providers, the 
access prevention would not be effective and the 
site had been reorganised so that the order would 
not be effective. These did not prevent injunctive 
relief, and the balance of interest also favoured 
granting it. Further, the freedom of expression or 
other fundamental rights would not be restricted 
in a manner that would violate the ECHR.111 
Similarly, in Portlane, a connectivity provider was 
ordered to prevent access to a peer-to-peer tracker 
service “tracker.openbittorrent.com”. The court 
noted that the relief was fair and equitable and not 
unnecessarily complicated or costly as required by 
the Enforcement Directive.112 Later, Portlane and 
other providers were persuaded to stop servicing 
The Pirate Bay.113
53 In Norway, the request to block access to The 
Pirate Bay was rejected because providers had no 
obligation to remove or block illegal content in the 
implementation of Article 12 of the E-Commerce 
Directive. Therefore, there was no legal basis 
for granting an injunction. In another EEA state, 
Iceland, an initial attempt at blocking failed due to 
the claimants’ procedural error.114 Since the cases 
in Norway the Copyright Act has been amended in 
this respect, and a blocking request is expected in 
the near future.115
54 In Danish and (former) Norwegian statutes, 
injunctive relief shall not be granted if it would cause 
harm or inconvenience to the defendant in a manner 
that would be obviously disproportionate to the 
plaintiff’s interest in the injunction. Balancing thus 
occurs between the parties. However, because the 
court has some discretion, in special circumstances 
third-party interests may also be considered, and this 
has indirectly happened in case law. In contrast, in 
Sweden the balance of interests has been developed in 
case law and legal theory. In the two described cases, 
third-party interest was not considered. As such, in 
all three countries extraordinary circumstances 
seem to be required before a court would take third 
parties into account when balancing interests.116 In 
Finland, the statute also provides for reasonableness 
balancing only between the IPR holder, intermediary 
and infringer.117 These are in stark contrast to the 
more recent CJEU case law.
55 In Finland, the three largest providers have been 
ordered to block access to The Pirate Bay with 
specific orders to avoid uncertainty for the providers. 
Also, specifying and updating the list of blocked 
IP addresses and domain names was deemed to 
require judicial review. It was acknowledged that all 
measures differed with regard to their effectiveness, 
precision, cost and implementation time. By citing 
earlier reports, it was held that none of the proposed 
technological measures was so ineffective as to 
preclude issuing the order. The efficacy of blocking 
could be measured only after implementation. Costs 
and harm of the injunction were not unreasonable.118 
The blocking order affected the providers’ whole 
network, and for example the connectivity provided 
to other providers or the government could not be 
excluded.119 It was considered proportionate that the 
providers needed to cover their own implementation 
expenses (ca. 10,000 euro) and legal fees (ca. 100,000 
euro) each.120 While the blocking must not endanger 
third parties’ communications, the minor amount 
of legal content on the website did not prohibit 
blocking. Targeting the infringers in Sweden was 
also not required by law.121
V. Divergence of Positions in Benelux
56 In The Netherlands, summary proceedings to block 
access to The Pirate Bay failed in July 2010. The judge 
argued that access could only be blocked from those 
who directly infringe copyrights rather than non-
infringing visitors of the site, and that the individual 
infringers should have been targeted first.122 
57 In new proceedings, Ziggo and XS4ALL were ordered 
to block access to the site, with the right holders 
having authority to update the list as needed. On 
subsidiarity the claimant had already sued The Pirate 
Bay operators and hosting providers, and proceedings 
against connectivity providers were appropriate; 
suing users was not needed. On proportionality, 
given the amount of illegal content on the site, the 
interests of the copyright holders outweighed those 
of ordinary Internet users. Also the necessity in a 
democratic society was briefly addressed. Claims 
as to effectiveness of blocking were made, which 
subsequently turned out to be unfounded.123 Other 
providers have also been ordered to block access, 
but this time the list of sites needed to be updated 
in court.124
58 The first order was overturned on appeal in January 
2014.125 Based on recent research by the University of 
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Amsterdam, the blocking was found to be ineffective, 
particularly if it targeted only one site, because most 
of the affected users would just use another website 
or circumvent blocking.126 Only the images of art 
works of music albums and video covers and such 
material were found to be infringing, and blocking 
access to these was not sufficiently important when 
contrasted to the operators’ freedom to conduct a 
business.127 It seemed that the court might have 
been more amenable if the claimants had requested 
blocking more sites at once instead of proceeding 
step-by-step.128 This would have arguably made 
blocking more effective.
59 In Belgium, interlocutory proceedings to block 
access to The Pirate Bay also failed in July 2010. 
Immediate blocking was deemed disproportionate, 
especially since the site had already existed for 
years.129 Blocking a fixed list of 11 domain names 
was established in September 2011 on appeal. The 
court held that subsidiarity is not required by Article 
8(3) of the Infosoc Directive, and the order was 
also proportionate.130 In a different set of cases, in 
criminal investigation against unidentified operators 
of The Pirate Bay, all connectivity providers were 
ordered to block access to the site in April 2012. 
This was appealed but upheld in February 2013. In 
October 2013, the Supreme Court upheld the decision 
that required providers to stop all current and 
future Pirate Bay domain names and monitor them. 
Strangely enough, it was not considered a general 
monitoring obligation.131
VI. Varied or Lack of Action 
in Other EU countries
60 In Ireland, a blocking injunction was rejected in 2010 
due to lacking implementation of Article 8(3) of the 
Infosoc Directive.132 The law was amended, and six 
providers were ordered to block access to The Pirate 
Bay in June 2013.133 A draft order had been agreed in 
advance between the parties, though concern with 
overblocking was voiced. The blocking list could 
be updated without judicial determination as in 
Newzbin2. Providers bore the cost of implementation 
and most of their legal expenses. The judge 
considered the draft order both proportionate and 
reasonable.134
61 In Italy the access to The Pirate Bay was blocked for 
a while in 2008–2009 as a criminal seizure, then the 
blocking was rejected and then again blocked, the 
latest order being from February 2010.135 There is no 
explicit provision to issue connectivity providers a 
blocking order in civil proceedings, and the easier 
criminal procedure has been used.136 There have also 
been subsequent orders to block other sites.137 At the 
end of 2013, the law changed so that the regulatory 
authority AGCOM could block sites, though the 
EU Commission had serious doubts about various 
aspects of the draft regulation.138
62 In Germany there is no explicit statutory provision on 
Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive. The alternative 
“Störerhaftung” (disturber) liability imposes a high 
bar on these injunctions. A prevailing opinion has 
been that the Infosec Directive has been adequately 
implemented, and Störerhaftung is an acceptable 
solution as to “the conditions and modalities”. 
Website blocking has also been considered with 
strong scepticism. Yet UPC Telekabel Wien may require 
reconsideration through expanding interpretation 
of Störerhaftung or legislation.139 
63 The lack of an explicit legal basis and evaluation 
against Störerhaftung has been adopted in a number 
of cases.140 For example, in the Hamburg Court of 
Appeals ruling, the legal basis for injunction was 
deemed insufficient. It was also stated that Article 
8(3) would not require providing for blocking 
injunctions.141 Last, in the Cologne District Court 
ruling, a request to order a connectivity provider to 
block access to certain URLs in the eDonkey peer-
to-peer networking service was likewise rejected. 
This was due to the lack of explicit legal basis, 
Störerhaftung liability not being met, and the lack of 
technical capabilities in preventing infringements. 
In consequence, the blocking would have been 
unreasonable and ineffective due to the small effort 
of circumventing such measures.142 On the other 
hand, a preliminary injunction has been issued to an 
operator providing connectivity to The Pirate Bay.143
64 There has been no blocking in Portugal, but a request 
to block The Pirate Bay is to be expected.144 In Spain, 
there have been mixed rulings on the legality of 
operating peer-to-peer indexing sites such as The 
Pirate Bay. A single case of website blocking has been 
overturned in appeal due to insufficient grounds.45 
In France, due to the efforts aimed at users through 
Hadopi, The Pirate Bay has not been blocked, but 
ISPs and search engines have been ordered to block 
a set of video streaming sites.146 In Greece, only two 
music sites have been blocked.147 There has been no 
news of any blocking activity in Eastern Europe.148
D. Criteria for Assessing 
Proportionality
I. Overview
65 Blocking cases essentially concern four parties, 
each with its own private interests: the IPR holder, 
provider, user and website operator.149 The operator’s 
interests have not usually been considered explicitly, 




interests in the background may also implicitly 
affect the weight court affords each private interest.
66 Proportionality has been considered in case law, 
though often in a summary fashion. Typically 
it is difficult to even find the criteria used in 
the evaluation. The criteria may also have been 
formulated at so high a level (as with most CJEU 
judgments) that applying them in concreto is 
challenging. However, there are also exceptions. 
The A.G. opinion on the fourth, unanswered question 
in UPC Telekabel Wien is useful, as well as UK cases 
Newzbin2 and FAPL v Sky. Also, several recurring 
themes can be noticed from other national case 
law. These concern in particular effectiveness (or 
lack thereof), impact of subsidiarity, effect on the 
third parties and implementation costs.151 Further, 
in the literature, comprehensive lists of criteria 
have been formulated at least by Lodder and van der 
Meulen,152 Husovec,153 Savola154 and Pihlajarinne.155 
These also have many recurring issues, but the 
interest for brevity precludes detailed discussion of 
each. Various requirements for adequate safeguards 
have also been suggested, but these are less relevant 
here.156
67 A generic balancing rule, which as such is not yet 
very helpful in concreto, could be formulated as 
follows. The more significant negative economic 
impact infringements cause to the IPR holder, 
the stronger enforcement mechanisms should 
be available, and in contrast the more significant 
negative impact of ordering such blocking needs to 
be on the other parties. Respectively, the more costs 
or constraints blocking causes to the provider, and 
the more it impacts freedom of information of the 
users, the more significant the losses must be to the 
IPR holder.
68 In consequence, in the crux are effectiveness and 
costs (or burden in general), respectively. If blocking 
is ineffective, it cannot mitigate the economic losses 
of IPR holders; such blocking would only have 
symbolic value. On the other hand, if blocking is 
cheap, non-intrusive and precise, it usually does 
not have a major immediate impact to providers 
and users. The more intrusive, expensive or vague 
blocking becomes, the stronger its justification and 
effectiveness needs to be in order to be proportionate.
69 In the following, concrete evaluation criteria are 
submitted. Interpretation of these criteria is based 
on the enforcement principles and fundamental 
rights.
II. Degree and Basis of Illegality
70 The legal basis of blocking, the illegality of the 
source, has implications on proportionality. If 
some other court has already established the 
illegality (as with The Pirate Bay),157 or the court 
issuing blocking does so when the operators have 
been served summons, more extensive blocking 
may be appropriate. Blocking is always dubious if 
the operators have not been represented and the 
illegality has not been subject to rigorous analysis.158 
Proxies that enable circumventing blocking provide 
a problematic example of this. 
71 Is the intent of blocking to prevent site operators 
from (facilitating) making available copyrighted 
material,159 blocking access from users as such, or to 
prevent users from copying and sharing the material? 
If illegality cannot be clearly attributed to the site 
(e.g. because it at most facilitates infringements by 
others), the legal basis of blocking the site may be 
in doubt. Because accessing the site is not as such 
infringing, the focus should be on preventing the 
main infringement, i.e. users downloading and 
sharing material. It might be sufficient to target 
blocking only to those users – i.e. consumers – who 
are expected to become infringers, rather than e.g. 
wholesale business, companies or the government.160
72 The scale of infringement also matters as to how 
invasive blocking mechanisms may be appropriate. 
For example, a site which has essentially no legal 
material at all could more easily be blocked as a 
whole, but this may not be appropriate for a site 
which has substantial legal uses or where the 
illegality is doubtful. Specifically, in some such 
cases URL blocking (for example) has been required 
instead of blocking the whole site.161 Also, if blocking 
is targeting a site hosted in the EU/EEA, it also seems 
relevant to assess whether the site is operating 
legally in the origin state.162
III. Effectiveness
73 The relevance of ineffectiveness has come up in 
almost every case as well as in the literature.163 
Users’ and operators’ ease to circumvent blocking, 
respectively, could be distinguished. The accuracy 
and completeness of measures may also be 
measured.164 The possibility of revising the blocking 
list already allows taking into account the website 
operator’s actions, although blocking proxies would 
still be challenging. Overblocking will be discussed 
below. Therefore, in practice the effectiveness – or 
more precisely, circumventability – of blocking from 
the user’s perspective is most relevant.
74 IPR holders have conducted or commissioned 
unverifiable advocacy research on the effectiveness 
of blocking. For example, Italian or Belgian studies, 
where effectiveness ranges between 73 and 80%, 
have been cited first when requesting blocking 
to support its effectiveness. Yet afterwards the 
ineffectiveness has been implicitly or explicitly 
argued to justify extending blocking. Alexa ratings 
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have also been cited, but those are unreliable as they 
do not apparently account for those that arrive at 
the site through non-conventional channels.165 In 
contrast, in a University of Amsterdam study, it 
was noted that blocking could in theory only affect 
the behaviour of those 27 to 28% of consumers 
who download or intend to download from illegal 
sources. Of these infringing consumers, the large 
majority (70-72%) was found to be non-responsive 
to blocking by finding other ways to access the 
same or a different site. There was essentially no 
lasting effect, and even the awareness effect wore 
off quickly. In consequence, blocking affected only 
4 to 6% of all users. Respectively, in another survey 
Dutch university students were asked if they were 
downloading less illegal material after the blockade 
of The Pirate Bay. 13 % of 302 respondents used 
only legitimate sources, the rest at least sometimes 
downloaded from illegal sources: 39 % used The 
Pirate Bay and 48 % used other sources. Of The 
Pirate Bay users, 66 % used various techniques to 
bypass blocking, 18 % did not even notice blocking, 
and 17 % no longer had access to the site. Only 22 % 
of its users told they now downloaded less from the 
site. Because some downloaded more, statististically 
blocking had no discernible impact on the amount 
of infringement. 166 Connectivity providers have also 
similarly observed no significant impact on traffic 
levels. This is also supported by an intuitive finding 
that those who are already aware of the site (say, 
“The Pirate Bay”) can just enter the name in a search 
engine and obtain the list of proxy services on the 
first page of results.167
75 It is obvious that blocking may affect some users, 
especially the ones who are not already familiar with 
the sites and arrive at the site by web references 
or by searching for specific content.168 Equally 
obvious is that blocking will not affect those regular 
users who know sites by name, and will continue 
using them or the alternatives through other, 
essentially equally easy means (e.g. proxies). This 
is exacerbated by the fact that infringing users are 
more knowledgeable and determined than users 
on average.169 In consequence, blocking seems to 
– at most – accomplish a slight deterrence against 
some non-recurring users, provide “education” to 
those users,170 and make it seem that IPR holders 
are doing something. It seems obvious that almost 
everyone downloading or sharing from clearly 
notable unauthorized sources is aware of its 
illegality. In consequence, education as a goal seems 
difficult to justify.171 Indeed, the reasoning that 
users do not bother or will forgo accessing the site 
when encountering a block seems to apply at most 
with non-recurring users.172 Therefore, the A.G.’s 
justification for ineffective blocking as deterrence 
is questionable. As will be discussed in the context of 
legitimacy below, it is not obvious that subordinating 
providers to such a task is proportionate, especially 
if it incurs expenses.
76 Blocking with inefficient mechanisms usually results 
from having to resort to a least bad solution. While 
a more effective mechanism would in principle be 
desirable, usually one does not exist or must be 
rejected on other grounds. Therefore, the main 
alternative would be to reject the request. As 
previously noted, it seems easier for courts to accept 
inefficiency if a more effective order could not be 
granted.173
77 Acceptance of inefficient mechanisms therefore 
depends on the associated costs, degree of efficiency, 
and whether using blocking for (somewhat 
ineffective) educational, symbolic or political 
purposes is considered legitimate. It is submitted 
that blocking must be at least reasonably effective by 
substantially reducing IPR holders’ economic losses. 
Otherwise, it would be reduced to a symbolic gesture, 
a useless attempt to educate users, or as a political 
power play in the field of legal policy.174
IV. Negative Burden
78 With blocking, the IPR holder shifts the burden of 
enforcement to third parties, i.e. providers.175 For 
providers, this implies implementation cost and 
expenses for legal services. In all the reviewed 
cases, the cost of implementation has been 
borne by providers, even if this is not required 
by EU legislation.176 Given that costs have been 
modest, at most 10,000 euro for a large provider, 
these are only important in principle.177 On the 
other hand, requiring the installation of a URL-
blocking mechanism (for example) would likely 
be disproportionate.178 Providers likely fear the 
expansion of mechanisms and costs. Arnold J and 
the A.G. anticipated this and noted that there may 
be reasons to cover some or all costs in the future.179
79 Given that blocking furthers the IPR holder’s 
private interest, and the IPR holder is also the sole 
beneficiary, it would not seem unreasonable for it to 
cover all costs.180 This would guide it to do a rigorous 
assessment of which blocking would be economically 
justified. This might also allow adopting more 
efficient yet costlier means.
80 However, to date, implementation costs have been 
dwarfed by 10 to 30 times larger legal expenses. It 
would be disproportionate to require the provider 
also to bear the claimants’ costs if an order is granted. 
This applies in particular to countries where the 
provider is not even legally allowed to implement 
blocking without court approval.181 Likewise, if 
the provider makes good arguments in court and 
the claimant’s request is restricted, the provider’s 
costs should also be compensated.182 An appropriate 
default might be that both parties bear their own 





81 Other burdens may also be relevant because the 
order will restrict how the provider is able to use its 
resources.183 The order may also require reducing the 
security and reliability of the network.184 Likewise, 
there may be limits (usually hundreds or thousands 
of entries) of blocked targets until the provider faces 
a serious performance penalty. In consequence, 
there may also be an issue of scalability if the number 
of blocking entries grows significantly.185
82 Usually blocking orders have been ordered without 
a time limit. This imposes restrictions on the 
provider because as a matter of business, services 
(e.g. BT’s Cleanfeed and equivalents) might need to 
be replaced or retired. Blocking orders should not 
restrict innovation and maintenance of services.186 
Also, even if the site disappears, blocking will stay 
in place until the order is discharged. In that case, 
the blocking might unduly affect the new user of 
(in particular) IP addresses. It would be appropriate 
for the order to have a fixed time limit of two to 
five years, but renewable as need be with a simple 
substantiated request.187 Alternatively, the IPR holder 
could have the obligation to apply for discharging 
or varying the order if circumstances change or 
face liability for potential damages.188 These would 
hopefully ensure that the list of blocked sites will 
contain only relevant and up-to-date entries.
83 The impact of this kind of burden must be accounted 
for, though admittedly the potential technical and 
innovation implications may be difficult to qualify.
V. Subsidiarity
84 The issue of addressing the infringement at its source 
has been a recurring theme in national case law as 
well as in the literature. While the CJEU confirmed 
that the connectivity provider at the user end may be 
issued a blocking order, it is not always necessarily 
best placed to end or prevent infringement.189 In 
contrast to subscriber identification requests that 
the CJEU referred to, the user end provider is not 
the only provider that could implement blocking. 
Further, the A.G. opined that as a consideration of 
proportionality, if possible, primarily the infringer or 
infringer’s provider should be targeted. This might 
be the case in particular if an upstream provider is 
located in the EU.190 It must also be observed that 
Article 8(2) of the Infosoc Directive does not require 
Member States to provide for injunction (against 
infringers), except when infringement occurs on its 
territory.191 While wider protection may be provided, 
this portrays the general principle that in some cases 
it is not unreasonable to require that the IPR holder 
pursues the case abroad.192
85 All of this seems to indicate that subsidiarity does 
have some role in evaluating proportionality. This 
is underlined especially if the measures would be 
burdensome, ineffective, the infringer is operating 
in EU, there has been no attempt to target him/
her or to disconnect the site and/or the illegality 
is suspect. On the other hand, if there is evidence 
that the website has repeatedly changed providers 
(as with The Pirate Bay) or the administrators are 
anonymous and difficult to identify,193 addressing 
the issue at the user end might be more easily 
proportionate.
VI. Avoiding Collateral Damage
86 The CJEU has emphasised the importance 
of freedom of information, and the A.G. also 
underlined its necessity for democracy and 
supporting the provider’s legitimate business.194 
Legal communications in particular must not be 
“unnecessarily” disturbed.195 This implies that a 
minor disturbance might be acceptable in some 
circumstances; one example might be a site that 
has a small fraction of legal content. However, it is 
difficult to conceive of a scenario where overblocking 
– i.e. blocking affecting unrelated sites – would be 
acceptable. This comes up (and has come up) in 
particular with IP address blocking. For example, 
Arnold J has noted in two UK blocking cases that 
IP address blocking would not be appropriate if the 
address was shared.196 
87 While overblocking has not yet caused significant 
problems with the top infringing sites, the ever-
expanding blocking implies that this would become 
a problem. Specifically, for example, proxy sites 
and less significant websites will most likely almost 
always use a shared IP address. Thus IP address-
based blocking would be excluded. On the other 
hand, more detailed forms of blocking (e.g. URL 
blocking) might be unavailable, and more generic 
ones such as DNS blocking might suffer from other 
problems. Given the crudeness of the website 
blocking as a tool, the result may be that blocking 
would be disproportionate.
88 Another difficult-to-qualify issue, as already touched 
on in the context of burdens, concerns the technical, 
architectural and security implications of blocking 
mechanisms, among others. All blocking mechanisms 
have their problems. DNS blocking undermines the 
security of the Internet by decreasing trust in domain 
name lookup services. IP blocking is simple, yet it 
has a risk of overblocking if not used with caution. 
There is also a danger of permanent blocking orders 
hindering innovation as some addresses cannot be 
recycled to new uses due to lingering blocking orders 
all over Europe. URL blocking may be expensive and 
it is incompatible with secure web connections. All of 
these might cause collateral damage through specific 
problems or as unreliability in general.197
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E. Proportionality Evaluation
I. Legitimacy of the Objective
89 The objective might be construed as IPR protection 
in such a manner that it does not disproportionately 
affect other rights. Prima facie this could be accepted 
as legitimate as is, but closer examination reveals 
doubts on the ultimate goal of blocking.
90 The general goal of blocking would seem to be 
protecting the private interests of IPR holders.198 The 
political motives of IPR holders include strengthening 
the position against other parties, obtaining ever 
more effective enforcement mechanisms, and being 
seen to be doing something. The latter is essential 
to legitimise the existence of central copyright 
organisations to the actual copyright holders, 
as well as to affect public opinion that “piracy” 
cannot be tolerated. On the other hand, the more 
concrete motive would be to decrease the amount 
of infringement to regain some “lost” sales.
91 The crucial question is which and to which degree 
these underlying motives of blocking can be 
accepted as legitimate. Specifically, are enforcement 
mechanisms (especially at intermediaries’ expense) 
available only for efficient enforcement that 
produces economically quantifiable results?199 Or is 
blocking also acceptable for educational, symbolic 
or politically motivated gestures?200 There is likely 
no single right answer to this because the symbolic 
value of copyright enforcement is also tied to the 
public interests, with varied valuations. However, 
at least using enforcement to enhance your own 
political agenda at others’ expense must be rejected. 
II. Suitability for the Purpose
92 The Advocate General suggested that, in general, 
specific blocking is not inappropriate for the purpose 
of furthering the aim of protecting the IPR holder’s 
rights. This was essentially based on a belief that 
many users would forgo accessing the site and would 
not bother to search for it because finding a way to 
access the material would become significantly more 
difficult. These also seemed to rest on an uneasy 
assumption that users would not be familiar with 
the illegality of the site, and blocking would have 
an educational purpose, affecting users’ behaviour. 
This displays naiveté or undue optimism. Almost 
everybody seems to know that downloading and 
especially sharing is illegal; clearly “illegal sites” are 
typically also identifiable as such. Most infringers 
are likely recurring users who are not affected either 
by blocking or such subtle forms of education. Also, 
as demonstrated, searching is also trivial, and the 
increase in deterrence is minimal. As such, the A.G. 
seemed to overestimate the suitability of blocking as 
a deterring and educational mechanism.201
93 The University of Amsterdam study202 and other 
public studies confirmed that the anticipated 
efficacy of deterring and also educating users is 
too optimistic. In the survey, 71% of infringing 
users reported that they did not intend to decrease 
or stop their infringing behaviour; after blocking, 
77% continued (similar and even more pessimistic 
figures were found in other Dutch studies). This 
was one of the grounds for the Appeals Court 
rejection of blocking in The Netherlands. It raised 
an issue, however: would an order be more easily 
proportionate if the IPR holder requested extensive 
blocking at once? The court rejected proceeding 
with a step-by-step approach, which perforce is 
more ineffective than blocking more sites at once. 
The court seemed to think “yes”, but it is not clear 
if this was a fair assessment given that The Pirate 
Bay was only a test case.203 On the other hand, a 
step-by-step approach demonstrates IPR holders’ 
rhetorical twists: first it is claimed that blocking is 
effective and as such the request should be granted, 
and later insufficient effectiveness is used to argue 
for extending blocking.204
94 What is deemed to be the legitimate goal of 
blocking affects the evaluation of effectiveness 
and subsidiarity in suitability analysis. If symbolic 
gestures, education or politics are accepted, even 
completely ineffective means could be deemed 
appropriate, assuming that the negative impact 
on providers and users is minimal. If the goal is to 
make a significant impact on sharing and reduce the 
economic loss of IPR holders, a much higher degree 
of effectiveness may be required. The scale also tilts 
towards higher requirements if the negative impact 
on others increases. For example, Arnold J seemed to 
accept blocking even if it only affected a minority of 
users.205 This might be suspect unless a broad notion 
of the goals of blocking is adopted.
III. Necessity: What Is the Least 
Restrictive Means?
95 Necessity concerns whether there are better means 
of achieving the objective. With the objective of 
preventing infringements, targeting the infringer 
(if possible) or infringer’s provider (especially if 
located in the EU, unless the operator has already 
switched providers multiple times) would be 
preferable to a patchwork of step-by-step blocking 
separately in all Member States. Blocking at the user 
end incurs much higher costs overall in the form 
of implementation costs and legal expenses than 
addressing the problem at its source.206 The necessity 
to try alternative means first, if at all possible, was 




Wien. This is more important in particular if the cost 
and burden for the provider or the impact on users’ 
freedom of expression is not minimal.
96 Again, if the objective of blocking is deemed to (also) 
be symbolic, educational or political, there may 
not be much better means. It is in the IPR holder’s 
interest to increase the duties and responsibilities 
of intermediaries irrespective of efficacy. Further, 
blocking appears to be the second- or third-best 
solution to educating the users, with graduated 
response probably being preferable; there seems to 
be a mixed reaction to the relatively expensive and, 
in PR terms, uncertain trend to sue the users.207 On 
the other hand, deploying ineffective mechanisms 
may also result in ridicule, especially from infringing 
website operators. It would be a much more powerful 
message from IPR holders to pursue infringers 
directly.
IV. Proportionality: Weighing the 
Burden against the Objective
97 Criteria and their impact have already been 
discussed. Here only a general observation is made. 
As has already come up repeatedly, the goal of 
blocking as perceived and accepted by a court doing 
a proportionality evaluation incurs implications 
on the level of accepted proportionality. This is in 
particular the case with ineffective measures that 
do not cause significant costs or burden to the 
provider or the users. With a stricter focus on the 
economically quantifiable results – that is, proof 
that blocking significantly reduces the losses by IPR 
holders – ineffective mechanisms might be more 
easily rejected. 
98 One point is worthy of noting, however. The 
effectiveness or lack thereof in a particular country 
or context can be measured only (and even then with 
difficulty) after blocking has been implemented. 
Erring on the side of restraint, however, might 
cause the issues to be addressed at higher courts or 
referred to the CJEU. This might also allow (or force) 
the IPR holder to conduct more rigorous studies of 
effectiveness in other countries.208
F. Conclusions
99 IPR holders, intermediaries, users and website 
operators each have very different interests, and 
satisfying all of them is obviously impossible. As CJEU 
case law provides only very high-level guidance, five 
interrelated criteria for assessing proportionality 
were formulated: degree and basis of illegality, 
effectiveness, negative burden, subsidiarity and 
avoiding collateral damage. 
100 As was already observed by Norrgård in 2005, the 
Enforcement Directive affords a national judge wide 
discretion in how strong an enforcement model is 
adopted. It is submitted that by using these criteria, 
it would be possible to untangle the Gordian Knot of 
proportionality evaluation and make more reasoned, 
nuanced and explicit decisions. Too little attention 
has also been given to the different interpretative 
contexts (infringer vs intermediary) of enforcement 
principles.
101 Blocking has not been requested in most EU 
countries. This is likely due to strategic choices of 
major national IPR holders and associations: e.g. 
unsatisfactory benefit compared to the expenses. 
On the other hand, with reasoned judgments the 
UK has been in the forefront of blocking. Different 
aspects of discretion and proportionality have also 
been considered in many UK rulings, even if on 
most issues there has not been detailed scrutiny. 
The appropriateness of blocking, even if impacting 
only the minority, hinted at particular regard for the 
symbolic value of copyright enforcement; this was 
also observable from Ireland. 
102 Case law from Scandinavian countries provides an 
example of how proportionality has traditionally 
been assessed mainly between the parties in 
proceedings – a model which is now insufficient. 
Finland is an example of a country that adopted 
a very strict interpretation on establishing and 
updating the blocking list through judicial review 
only. Norway and several other countries such as 
Germany also demonstrated the rejection of requests 
when Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive was not 
explicitly transposed. Belgium was atypical in the 
sense that both criminal and civil proceedings were 
used. Criminal proceedings resulted in probably the 
most extensive blocking and a related monitoring 
obligation in Europe, closely followed by criminal 
proceedings in Italy. 
103 In contrast, a Court of Appeals decision in 
the Netherlands was striking. It adopted an 
unconventional and restricted interpretation of 
the illegality of the site, and rejected blocking in a 
proportionality evaluation due to ineffectiveness as 
demonstrated by public research.209 It remains to 
be seen if this will be considered an anomaly and 
overturned in the Supreme Court or CJEU, or if this 
will be a sign of a new kind of critical movement in 
European case law.
104 As was seen, the key point in proportionality 
analysis is establishing which goals in blocking are 
accepted. Blocking may be portrayed as a technical 
measure aimed at reducing the economic losses 
from infringement by increasing sales. Legitimacy 
of this objective requires substantial impact and 
effectiveness. On the other hand, if it is accepted 
that IPR holders have a legitimate aim to try to use 
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connectivity providers (at their own expense) to 
perform vain attempts at educating users, or to make 
symbolic gestures or political moves to increase 
their own power, inefficient mechanisms might be 
considered more easily acceptable as well. While 
the national case law from various EU countries has 
suggested that the latter justification has also been 
implied to some degree, it is submitted that a critical 
assessment is needed before embarking on that path.
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